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  1. 23 2月, 2015 2 次提交
  3. 18 2月, 2015 6 次提交
  5. 17 2月, 2015 11 次提交
  7. 16 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • R
      PM / sleep: Make it possible to quiesce timers during suspend-to-idle · 124cf911
      由 Rafael J. Wysocki 提交于 
      The efficiency of suspend-to-idle depends on being able to keep CPUs
in the deepest available idle states for as much time as possible.
Ideally, they should only be brought out of idle by system wakeup
interrupts.

However, timer interrupts occurring periodically prevent that from
happening and it is not practical to chase all of the "misbehaving"
timers in a whack-a-mole fashion.  A much more effective approach is
to suspend the local ticks for all CPUs and the entire timekeeping
along the lines of what is done during full suspend, which also
helps to keep suspend-to-idle and full suspend reasonably similar.

The idea is to suspend the local tick on each CPU executing
cpuidle_enter_freeze() and to make the last of them suspend the
entire timekeeping.  That should prevent timer interrupts from
triggering until an IO interrupt wakes up one of the CPUs.  It
needs to be done with interrupts disabled on all of the CPUs,
though, because otherwise the suspended clocksource might be
accessed by an interrupt handler which might lead to fatal
consequences.

Unfortunately, the existing ->enter callbacks provided by cpuidle
drivers generally cannot be used for implementing that, because some
of them re-enable interrupts temporarily and some idle entry methods
cause interrupts to be re-enabled automatically on exit.  Also some
of these callbacks manipulate local clock event devices of the CPUs
which really shouldn't be done after suspending their ticks.

To overcome that difficulty, introduce a new cpuidle state callback,
->enter_freeze, that will be guaranteed (1) to keep interrupts
disabled all the time (and return with interrupts disabled) and (2)
not to touch the CPU timer devices.  Modify cpuidle_enter_freeze() to
look for the deepest available idle state with ->enter_freeze present
and to make the CPU execute that callback with suspended tick (and the
last of the online CPUs to execute it with suspended timekeeping).
Suggested-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      124cf911
  9. 15 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  11. 14 2月, 2015 19 次提交
    • A
      kasan: enable instrumentation of global variables · bebf56a1
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      This feature let us to detect accesses out of bounds of global variables.
This will work as for globals in kernel image, so for globals in modules.
Currently this won't work for symbols in user-specified sections (e.g.
__init, __read_mostly, ...)

The idea of this is simple.  Compiler increases each global variable by
redzone size and add constructors invoking __asan_register_globals()
function.  Information about global variable (address, size, size with
redzone ...) passed to __asan_register_globals() so we could poison
variable's redzone.

This patch also forces module_alloc() to return 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned
address making shadow memory handling (
kasan_module_alloc()/kasan_module_free() ) more simple.  Such alignment
guarantees that each shadow page backing modules address space correspond
to only one module_alloc() allocation.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      bebf56a1
    • A
      module: fix types of device tables aliases · 6301939d
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() macro used to create aliases to device tables.
Normally alias should have the same type as aliased symbol.

Device tables are arrays, so they have 'struct type##_device_id[x]'
types. Alias created by MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() will have non-array type -
	'struct type##_device_id'.

This inconsistency confuses compiler, it could make a wrong assumption
about variable's size which leads KASan to produce a false positive report
about out of bounds access.

For every global variable compiler calls __asan_register_globals() passing
information about global variable (address, size, size with redzone, name
...) __asan_register_globals() poison symbols redzone to detect possible
out of bounds accesses.

When symbol has an alias __asan_register_globals() will be called as for
symbol so for alias.  Compiler determines size of variable by size of
variable's type.  Alias and symbol have the same address, so if alias have
the wrong size part of memory that actually belongs to the symbol could be
poisoned as redzone of alias symbol.

By fixing type of alias symbol we will fix size of it, so
__asan_register_globals() will not poison valid memory.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      6301939d
    • A
      kernel: add support for .init_array.* constructors · 9ddf8252
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      KASan uses constructors for initializing redzones for global variables.
Globals instrumentation in GCC 4.9.2 produces constructors with priority
(.init_array.00099)

Currently kernel ignores such constructors.  Only constructors with
default priority supported (.init_array)

This patch adds support for constructors with priorities.  For kernel
image we put pointers to constructors between __ctors_start/__ctors_end
and do_ctors() will call them on start up.  For modules we merge
.init_array.* sections into resulting .init_array.  Module code properly
handles constructors in .init_array section.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      9ddf8252
    • A
      mm: vmalloc: pass additional vm_flags to __vmalloc_node_range() · cb9e3c29
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      For instrumenting global variables KASan will shadow memory backing memory
for modules.  So on module loading we will need to allocate memory for
shadow and map it at address in shadow that corresponds to the address
allocated in module_alloc().

__vmalloc_node_range() could be used for this purpose, except it puts a
guard hole after allocated area.  Guard hole in shadow memory should be a
problem because at some future point we might need to have a shadow memory
at address occupied by guard hole.  So we could fail to allocate shadow
for module_alloc().

Now we have VM_NO_GUARD flag disabling guard page, so we need to pass into
__vmalloc_node_range().  Add new parameter 'vm_flags' to
__vmalloc_node_range() function.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      cb9e3c29
    • A
      mm: vmalloc: add flag preventing guard hole allocation · 71394fe5
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      For instrumenting global variables KASan will shadow memory backing memory
for modules.  So on module loading we will need to allocate memory for
shadow and map it at address in shadow that corresponds to the address
allocated in module_alloc().

__vmalloc_node_range() could be used for this purpose, except it puts a
guard hole after allocated area.  Guard hole in shadow memory should be a
problem because at some future point we might need to have a shadow memory
at address occupied by guard hole.  So we could fail to allocate shadow
for module_alloc().

Add a new vm_struct flag 'VM_NO_GUARD' indicating that vm area doesn't
have a guard hole.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      71394fe5
    • A
      kasan: enable stack instrumentation · c420f167
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      Stack instrumentation allows to detect out of bounds memory accesses for
variables allocated on stack.  Compiler adds redzones around every
variable on stack and poisons redzones in function's prologue.

Such approach significantly increases stack usage, so all in-kernel stacks
size were doubled.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      c420f167
    • A
      mm: slub: add kernel address sanitizer support for slub allocator · 0316bec2
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated by
slub.  Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as
redzone.  Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by
caller number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object
(including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (inaccessible).

We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object.
There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire
size of really allocated area.  Such callers could validly access whole
allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible.

Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's
metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0316bec2
    • A
      mm: slub: share object_err function · 75c66def
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      Remove static and add function declarations to linux/slub_def.h so it
could be used by kernel address sanitizer.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      75c66def
    • A
      mm: slub: introduce virt_to_obj function · 912f5fbf
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      virt_to_obj takes kmem_cache address, address of slab page, address x
pointing somewhere inside slab object, and returns address of the
beginning of object.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: NChristoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      912f5fbf
    • A
      mm: page_alloc: add kasan hooks on alloc and free paths · b8c73fc2
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      Add kernel address sanitizer hooks to mark allocated page's addresses as
accessible in corresponding shadow region.  Mark freed pages as
inaccessible.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b8c73fc2
    • A
      kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure · 0b24becc
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector.  It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.

KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required.  v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.

This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer.  It's
not available for use yet.  The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].

Basic idea:

The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.

Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.

Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:

     unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
     {
                return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
     }

where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.

So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible.  Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).

To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.

These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory.  If access is not valid an error
printed.

Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:

	"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
	ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
	them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
	running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
	scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
	open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
	lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
	The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.

	We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
	(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
	start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
	Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
	We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
	people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.

	[...]

	As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
	performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
	shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
	programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
	kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
	running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
	have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
	finish all tuning).

	I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
	working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
	memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
	others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
	can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
	if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.

	Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
	instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
	parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
	relatively easy to port."

Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================

KMEMCHECK:

  - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can.  KASan uses
    compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
    kmemcheck.  The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
    uninitialized memory reads.

    Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
    x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:

$ netperf -l 30
		MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
		Recv   Send    Send
		Socket Socket  Message  Elapsed
		Size   Size    Size     Time     Throughput
		bytes  bytes   bytes    secs.    10^6bits/sec

no debug:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    41624.72

kasan inline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    12870.54

kasan outline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    10586.39

kmemcheck: 	87380  16384  16384    30.03      20.23

  - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs.  It always sets
    number of CPUs to 1.  KASan doesn't have such limitation.

DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
	- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
	  granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.

SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
	- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.

	- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
	  KASan able to detect both reads and writes.

	- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
	  bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
	  bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
	  place of first bad read/write.

[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies

Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0b24becc
    • A
      compiler: introduce __alias(symbol) shortcut · cb4188ac
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      To be consistent with other compiler attributes introduce __alias(symbol)
macro expanding into __attribute__((alias(#symbol)))
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      cb4188ac
    • T
      bitmap, cpumask, nodemask: remove dedicated formatting functions · 46385326
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      Now that all bitmap formatting usages have been converted to
'%*pb[l]', the separate formatting functions are unnecessary.  The
following functions are removed.

* bitmap_scn[list]printf()
* cpumask_scnprintf(), cpulist_scnprintf()
* [__]nodemask_scnprintf(), [__]nodelist_scnprintf()
* seq_bitmap[_list](), seq_cpumask[_list](), seq_nodemask[_list]()
* seq_buf_bitmask()
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      46385326
    • T
      cpumask, nodemask: implement cpumask/nodemask_pr_args() · f1bbc032
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      printf family of functions can now format bitmaps using '%*pb[l]' and
all cpumask and nodemask formatting will be converted to use it.  To
ease printing these masks with '%*pb[l]' which require two params -
the number of bits and the actual bitmap, this patch implement
cpumask_pr_args() and nodemask_pr_args() which can be used to provide
arguments for '%*pb[l]'
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      f1bbc032
    • T
      cpumask: always use nr_cpu_ids in formatting and parsing functions · 513e3d2d
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      bitmap implements two variants of scnprintf functions to format a bitmap
into a string and cpumask and nodemask wrap them to provide equivalent
interfaces.  The scnprintf family of functions require a string buffer as
an output target which complicates code paths which just want to print out
the mask through printk for informational or debug purposes as they have
to worry about how large the buffer should be and whether it's too large
to allocate on stack.

Neither cpumask or nodemask provides a guildeline on how large the target
buffer should be forcing users come up with their own solutions - some
allocate an arbitrarily sized buffer which is small enough to allocate on
stack but may be too short in corner cases, other come up with a custom
upper limit calculation considering the output format, some allocate the
buffer dynamically while one resorted to using lock to synchronize access
to a static buffer.

This is an artificial problem which is being solved repeatedly for no
benefit.  In a lot of cases, the output area already exists and can be
targeted directly making the intermediate buffer unnecessary.  This
patchset teaches printf family of functions how to format bitmaps and
replace the dedicated formatting functions with it.

Pointer formatting is extended to cover bitmap formatting.  It uses the
field width for the number of bits instead of precision.  The format used
is '%*pb[l]', with the optional trailing 'l' specifying list format
instead of hex masks.  For more details, please see 0002.

This patch (of 31):

Currently, the formatting and parsing functions in cpumask.h use
nr_cpumask_bits like other cpumask functions; however, nr_cpumask_bits
is either NR_CPUS or nr_cpu_ids depending on CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK.
This leads to inconsistent behaviors.

With CONFIG_NR_CPUS=512 and !CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK

  # cat /sys/devices/virtual/net/lo/queues/rx-0/rps_cpus
  00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000
  # cat /proc/self/status | grep Cpus_allowed:
  Cpus_allowed:   f

With CONFIG_NR_CPUS=1024 and CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK (fedora default)

  # cat /sys/devices/virtual/net/lo/queues/rx-0/rps_cpus
  0
  # cat /proc/self/status | grep Cpus_allowed:
  Cpus_allowed:   f

Note that /proc/self/status is always using nr_cpu_ids regardless of
config.  This is because seq cpumask formattings functions always use
nr_cpu_ids.

Given that the same output fields may switch between the two forms,
converging on nr_cpu_ids always isn't too likely to surprise userland.
This patch updates the formatting and parsing functions in cpumask.h
to always use nr_cpu_ids.  There's no point in dealing with CPUs which
aren't even possible on the machine.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      513e3d2d
    • T
      kernfs: remove KERNFS_STATIC_NAME · dfeb0750
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      When a new kernfs node is created, KERNFS_STATIC_NAME is used to avoid
making a separate copy of its name.  It's currently only used for sysfs
attributes whose filenames are required to stay accessible and unchanged.
There are rare exceptions where these names are allocated and formatted
dynamically but for the vast majority of cases they're consts in the
rodata section.

Now that kernfs is converted to use kstrdup_const() and kfree_const(),
there's little point in keeping KERNFS_STATIC_NAME around.  Remove it.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      dfeb0750
    • A
      mm/util: add kstrdup_const · a4bb1e43
      由 Andrzej Hajda 提交于 
      kstrdup() is often used to duplicate strings where neither source neither
destination will be ever modified.  In such case we can just reuse the
source instead of duplicating it.  The problem is that we must be sure
that the source is non-modifiable and its life-time is long enough.

I suspect the good candidates for such strings are strings located in
kernel .rodata section, they cannot be modifed because the section is
read-only and their life-time is equal to kernel life-time.

This small patchset proposes alternative version of kstrdup -
kstrdup_const, which returns source string if it is located in .rodata
otherwise it fallbacks to kstrdup.  To verify if the source is in
.rodata function checks if the address is between sentinels
__start_rodata, __end_rodata.  I guess it should work with all
architectures.

The main patch is accompanied by four patches constifying kstrdup for
cases where situtation described above happens frequently.

I have tested the patchset on mobile platform (exynos4210-trats) and it
saves 3272 string allocations.  Since minimal allocation is 32 or 64
bytes depending on Kconfig options the patchset saves respectively about
100KB or 200KB of memory.

Stats from tested platform show that the main offender is sysfs:

By caller:
  2260 __kernfs_new_node
    631 clk_register+0xc8/0x1b8
    318 clk_register+0x34/0x1b8
      51 kmem_cache_create
      12 alloc_vfsmnt

By string (with count >= 5):
    883 power
    876 subsystem
    135 parameters
    132 device
     61 iommu_group
    ...

This patch (of 5):

Add an alternative version of kstrdup which returns pointer to constant
char array.  The function checks if input string is in persistent and
read-only memory section, if yes it returns the input string, otherwise it
fallbacks to kstrdup.

kstrdup_const is accompanied by kfree_const performing conditional memory
deallocation of the string.
Signed-off-by: NAndrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Cc: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com>
Cc: Mike Turquette <mturquette@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      a4bb1e43
    • R
      lib: bitmap: change bitmap_shift_left to take unsigned parameters · dba94c25
      由 Rasmus Villemoes 提交于 
      gcc can generate slightly better code for stuff like "nbits %
BITS_PER_LONG" when it knows nbits is not negative.  Since negative size
bitmaps or shift amounts don't make sense, change these parameters of
bitmap_shift_right to unsigned.

If off >= lim (which requires shift >= nbits), k is initialized with a
large positive value, but since I've let k continue to be signed, the loop
will never run and dst will be zeroed as expected.  Inside the loop, k is
guaranteed to be non-negative, so the fact that it is promoted to unsigned
in the various expressions it appears in is harmless.

Also use "shift" and "nbits" consistently for the parameter names.
Signed-off-by: NRasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      dba94c25
    • R
      lib: bitmap: change bitmap_shift_right to take unsigned parameters · 2fbad299
      由 Rasmus Villemoes 提交于 
      I've previously changed the nbits parameter of most bitmap_* functions to
unsigned; now it is bitmap_shift_{left,right}'s turn.  This alone saves
some .text, but while at it I found that there were a few other things one
could do.  The end result of these seven patches is

  $ scripts/bloat-o-meter /tmp/bitmap.o.{old,new}
  add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 0/-328 (-328)
  function                                     old     new   delta
  __bitmap_shift_right                         384     226    -158
  __bitmap_shift_left                          306     136    -170

and less importantly also a smaller stack footprint

  $ stack-o-meter.pl master bitmap
  file                 function                       old  new  delta
  lib/bitmap.o         __bitmap_shift_right             24    8  -16
  lib/bitmap.o         __bitmap_shift_left              24    0  -24

For each pair of 0 <= shift <= nbits <= 256 I've tested the end result
with a few randomly filled src buffers (including garbage beyond nbits),
in each case verifying that the shift {left,right}-most bits of dst are
zero and the remaining nbits-shift bits correspond to src, so I'm fairly
confident I didn't screw up.  That hasn't stopped me from being wrong
before, though.

This patch (of 7):

gcc can generate slightly better code for stuff like "nbits %
BITS_PER_LONG" when it knows nbits is not negative.  Since negative size
bitmaps or shift amounts don't make sense, change these parameters of
bitmap_shift_right to unsigned.

The expressions involving "lim - 1" are still ok, since if lim is 0 the
loop is never executed.

Also use "shift" and "nbits" consistently for the parameter names.
Signed-off-by: NRasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      2fbad299