... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... switch callers.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

V4 updated to current linux-security#next
Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Modern application runtime environments like to use
naming schemes that are structured and generated without
human intervention. Even though the Smack limit of 23
characters for a label name is perfectly rational for
human use there have been complaints that the limit is
a problem in environments where names are composed from
a set or sources, including vendor, author, distribution
channel and application name. Names like

	softwarehouse-pgwodehouse-coolappstore-mellowmuskrats

are becoming harder to avoid. This patch introduces long
label support in Smack. Labels are now limited to 255
characters instead of the old 23.

The primary reason for limiting the labels to 23 characters
was so they could be directly contained in CIPSO category sets.
This is still done were possible, but for labels that are too
large a mapping is required. This is perfectly safe for communication
that stays "on the box" and doesn't require much coordination
between boxes beyond what would have been required to keep label
names consistent.

The bulk of this patch is in smackfs, adding and updating
administrative interfaces. Because existing APIs can't be
changed new ones that do much the same things as old ones
have been introduced.

The Smack specific CIPSO data representation has been removed
and replaced with the data format used by netlabel. The CIPSO
header is now computed when a label is imported rather than
on use. This results in improved IP performance. The smack
label is now allocated separately from the containing structure,
allowing for larger strings.

Four new /smack interfaces have been introduced as four
of the old interfaces strictly required labels be specified
in fixed length arrays.

The access interface is supplemented with the check interface:
	access  "Subject                 Object                  rwxat"
	access2 "Subject Object rwaxt"

The load interface is supplemented with the rules interface:
	load   "Subject                 Object                  rwxat"
	load2  "Subject Object rwaxt"

The load-self interface is supplemented with the self-rules interface:
	load-self   "Subject                 Object                  rwxat"
	load-self2  "Subject Object rwaxt"

The cipso interface is supplemented with the wire interface:
	cipso  "Subject                  lvl cnt  c1  c2 ..."
	cipso2 "Subject lvl cnt  c1  c2 ..."

The old interfaces are maintained for compatibility.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Dave Chinner wrote:
> Yes, because you have no idea what the calling context is except
> for the fact that is from somewhere inside filesystem code and the
> filesystem could be holding locks. Therefore, GFP_NOFS is really the
> only really safe way to allocate memory here.

I see. Thank you.

I'm not sure, but can call trace happen where somewhere inside network
filesystem or stackable filesystem code with locks held invokes operations that
involves GFP_KENREL memory allocation outside that filesystem?
----------
[PATCH] SMACK: Fix incorrect GFP_KERNEL usage.

new_inode_smack() which can be called from smack_inode_alloc_security() needs
to use GFP_NOFS like SELinux's inode_alloc_security() does, for
security_inode_alloc() is called from inode_init_always() and
inode_init_always() is called from xfs_inode_alloc() which is using GFP_NOFS.

smack_inode_init_security() needs to use GFP_NOFS like
selinux_inode_init_security() does, for initxattrs() callback function (e.g.
btrfs_initxattrs()) which is called from security_inode_init_security() is
using GFP_NOFS.

smack_audit_rule_match() needs to use GFP_ATOMIC, for
security_audit_rule_match() can be called from audit_filter_user_rules() and
audit_filter_user_rules() is called from audit_filter_user() with RCU read lock
held.
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>

The transmuting directory feature of Smack requires that
the transmuting attribute be explicitly set in all cases.
It seems the users of this facility would expect that the
transmuting attribute be inherited by subdirectories that
are created in a transmuting directory. This does not seem
to add any additional complexity to the understanding of
how the system works.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

A kernel with Smack enabled will fail if tmpfs has xattr support.

Move the initialization of predefined Smack label
list entries to the LSM initialization from the
smackfs setup. This became an issue when tmpfs
acquired xattr support, but was never correct.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

This fixes builds where CONFIG_AUDIT is not defined and
CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK=y.

This got introduced by the stack-usage reducation commit 48c62af6
("LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union").
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union.  To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack.  Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures.  I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path.  We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Trim security.h
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

On some build configurations PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID symbol was not
found when compiling smack_lsm.c. This patch fixes the issue by
explicitly doing #include <linux/personality.h>.
Signed-off-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.j.sakkinen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>

Protections for domain transition:

- BPRM unsafe flags
- Secureexec
- Clear unsafe personality bits.
- Clear parent death signal
Signed-off-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>

This patch is targeted for the smack-next tree.

This patch takes advantage of the recent changes for performance
and points the packet labels on UDS connect at the output label of
the far side. This makes getsockopt(...SO_PEERCRED...) function
properly. Without this change the getsockopt does not provide any
information.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

There are a number of comments in the Smack code that
are either malformed or include code. This patch cleans
them up.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Al Viro pointed out that the processing of fcntl done
by Smack appeared poorly designed. He was right. There
are three things that required change. Most obviously,
the list of commands that really imply writing is limited
to those involving file locking and signal handling.
The initialization if the file security blob was
incomplete, requiring use of a heretofore unused LSM hook.
Finally, the audit information coming from a helper
masked the identity of the LSM hook. This patch corrects
all three of these defects.

This is targeted for the smack-next tree pending comments.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

This patch is targeted for the smack-next tree.

Smack access checks suffer from two significant performance
issues. In cases where there are large numbers of rules the
search of the single list of rules is wasteful. Comparing the
string values of the smack labels is less efficient than a
numeric comparison would.

These changes take advantage of the Smack label list, which
maintains the mapping of Smack labels to secids and optional
CIPSO labels. Because the labels are kept perpetually, an
access check can be done strictly based on the address of the
label in the list without ever looking at the label itself.
Rather than keeping one global list of rules the rules with
a particular subject label can be based off of that label
list entry. The access check need never look at entries that
do not use the current subject label.

This requires that packets coming off the network with
CIPSO direct Smack labels that have never been seen before
be treated carefully. The only case where they could be
delivered is where the receiving socket has an IPIN star
label, so that case is explicitly addressed.

On a system with 39,800 rules (200 labels in all permutations)
a system with this patch runs an access speed test in 5% of
the time of the old version. That should be a best case
improvement. If all of the rules are associated with the
same subject label and all of the accesses are for processes
with that label (unlikely) the improvement is about 30%.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary.  My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary.  My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

pass that via mask instead.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

smack_file_lock has a struct path, so use that instead of only the
dentry.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from
one that contains a full path.  This allows us to make it harder to
misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces
of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or
inode.  Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code
complexity.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.

Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y
Signed-off-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.

Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y
Signed-off-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed.
Signed-off-by: NLucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>

The mmap policy enforcement checks the access of the
SMACK64MMAP subject against the current subject incorrectly.
The check as written works correctly only if the access
rules involved have the same access. This is the common
case, so initial testing did not find a problem.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

The mmap policy enforcement was not properly handling the
  interaction between the global and local rule lists.
  Instead of going through one and then the other, which
  missed the important case where a rule specified that
  there should be no access, combine the access limitations
  where there is a rule in each list.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes.  We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process.  This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label.  This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.

This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations.  We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly.  This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook.  If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

  In the embedded world there are often situations
  where libraries are updated from a variety of sources,
  for a variety of reasons, and with any number of
  security characteristics. These differences
  might include privilege required for a given library
  provided interface to function properly, as occurs
  from time to time in graphics libraries. There are
  also cases where it is important to limit use of
  libraries based on the provider of the library and
  the security aware application may make choices
  based on that criteria.

  These issues are addressed by providing an additional
  Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object,
  the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed
  if there is no such attribute.

  If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted
  only if a subject with that label has all of the access
  permitted a subject with the current task label.

  Security aware applications may from time to time
  wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use
  of privilege. One case where this arises is the
  environment in which multiple sources provide libraries
  to perform the same functions. An application may know
  that it should eschew services made available from a
  particular vendor, or of a particular version.

  In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has
  been added that is local to the task. This list is
  consulted only in the case where the global list has
  approved access. It can only further restrict access.
  Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the
  local list access is granted. An application can add
  entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self.

  The changes appear large as they involve refactoring
  the list handling to accomodate there being more
  than one rule list.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and
it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other"
during stream connects.

However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned
to NULL under the unix_state_lock().

Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead
of the forward mapping.
Reported-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Reported-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes
with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy
to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered
with files that the owner can't deal with because while
they could be written to the directory a process at the
label of the directory can't write them. This is generally
the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real
issue.

This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that
instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory
under certain circumstances.

A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to
Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat".
If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable
and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule
that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the
Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the
creating process.

Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the
label of the directory and then having the other process write
to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule
allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked.
Signed-off-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is
running.

Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked
for write access to parent task using label inherited
from the task that forked it.

Fixed issues from previous submit:
- SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set.
- inode security blob was not updated after setting
  SMACK64EXEC
- inode security blob was not updated when removing
  SMACK64EXEC

This patch addresses a number of long standing issues
    with the way Smack treats UNIX domain sockets.

    All access control was being done based on the label of
    the file system object. This is inconsistant with the
    internet domain, in which access is done based on the
    IPIN and IPOUT attributes of the socket. As a result
    of the inode label policy it was not possible to use
    a UDS socket for label cognizant services, including
    dbus and the X11 server.

    Support for SCM_PEERSEC on UDS sockets is also provided.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build
failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n.  This is because the capabilities code
which used the new option was built even though the variable in question
didn't exist.

The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the
LSM and into the caller.  All (known) LSMs should have been calling the
capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization
better to eliminate the hook altogether.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

With the (long ago) interface change to have the secid_to_secctx functions
do the string allocation instead of having the caller do the allocation we
lost the ability to query the security server for the length of the
upcoming string.  The SECMARK code would like to allocate a netlink skb
with enough length to hold the string but it is just too unclean to do the
string allocation twice or to do the allocation the first time and hold
onto the string and slen.  This patch adds the ability to call
security_secid_to_secctx() with a NULL data pointer and it will just set
the slen pointer.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of
security_task_setscheduler().  This is not only meaningless, but also
make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable.

This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from
security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is
using it.

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

SELinux needs to pass the MAY_ACCESS flag so it can handle auditting
correctly.  Presently the masking of MAY_* flags is done in the VFS.  In
order to allow LSMs to decide what flags they care about and what flags
they don't just pass them all and the each LSM mask off what they don't
need.  This patch should contain no functional changes to either the VFS or
any LSM.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch removes some unneeded code for if opt_dentry is null because
that can never happen.

The function dereferences "opt_dentry" earlier when it checks
"if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {".  That code was added in
2008.

This function called from security_d_instantiate().  I checked all the
places which call security_d_instantiate() and dentry is always non-null.
I also checked the selinux version of this hook and there is a comment
which says that dentry should be non-null if called from
d_instantiate().
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Signed-off-by: NUwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>