- 20 3月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Rafal Krypa 提交于
Rule modifications are enabled via /smack/change-rule. Format is as follows: "Subject Object rwaxt rwaxt" First two strings are subject and object labels up to 255 characters. Third string contains permissions to enable. Fourth string contains permissions to disable. All unmentioned permissions will be left unchanged. If no rule previously existed, it will be created. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NRafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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- 18 12月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Jarkko Sakkinen 提交于
keys-ecryptfs.txt was missing from 00-INDEX. Signed-off-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 08 10月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the provision of two new key type operations: int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first was called. preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure: struct key_preparsed_payload { char *description; void *type_data[2]; void *payload; const void *data; size_t datalen; size_t quotalen; }; Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared, the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen. The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update() ops. The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or "" description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update() function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description to tell the upcall about the key to be created. This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key. The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this: int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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- 03 10月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings now that it has a permissions parameter rather than using key_alloc() + key_instantiate_and_link(). Also document and export keyring_alloc() so that modules can use it too. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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- 27 9月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Daniel Wagner 提交于
The userland git repository has been moved to a new place. Signed-off-by: NDaniel Wagner <daniel.wagner@bmw-carit.de> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml@vger.kernel.org
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- 19 9月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Rafal Krypa 提交于
Add /smack/revoke-subject special file. Writing a SMACK label to this file will set the access to '-' for all access rules with that subject label. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NRafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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- 13 9月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the provision of two new key type operations: int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first was called. preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure: struct key_preparsed_payload { char *description; void *type_data[2]; void *payload; const void *data; size_t datalen; size_t quotalen; }; Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared, the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen. The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update() ops. The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or "" description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update() function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description to tell the upcall about the key to be created. This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key. The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this: int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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- 10 8月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
The higher ptrace restriction levels should be blocking even PTRACE_TRACEME requests. The comments in the LSM documentation are misleading about when the checks happen (the parent does not go through security_ptrace_access_check() on a PTRACE_TRACEME call). Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5.x and later Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 15 5月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
V4 updated to current linux-security#next Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Modern application runtime environments like to use naming schemes that are structured and generated without human intervention. Even though the Smack limit of 23 characters for a label name is perfectly rational for human use there have been complaints that the limit is a problem in environments where names are composed from a set or sources, including vendor, author, distribution channel and application name. Names like softwarehouse-pgwodehouse-coolappstore-mellowmuskrats are becoming harder to avoid. This patch introduces long label support in Smack. Labels are now limited to 255 characters instead of the old 23. The primary reason for limiting the labels to 23 characters was so they could be directly contained in CIPSO category sets. This is still done were possible, but for labels that are too large a mapping is required. This is perfectly safe for communication that stays "on the box" and doesn't require much coordination between boxes beyond what would have been required to keep label names consistent. The bulk of this patch is in smackfs, adding and updating administrative interfaces. Because existing APIs can't be changed new ones that do much the same things as old ones have been introduced. The Smack specific CIPSO data representation has been removed and replaced with the data format used by netlabel. The CIPSO header is now computed when a label is imported rather than on use. This results in improved IP performance. The smack label is now allocated separately from the containing structure, allowing for larger strings. Four new /smack interfaces have been introduced as four of the old interfaces strictly required labels be specified in fixed length arrays. The access interface is supplemented with the check interface: access "Subject Object rwxat" access2 "Subject Object rwaxt" The load interface is supplemented with the rules interface: load "Subject Object rwxat" load2 "Subject Object rwaxt" The load-self interface is supplemented with the self-rules interface: load-self "Subject Object rwxat" load-self2 "Subject Object rwaxt" The cipso interface is supplemented with the wire interface: cipso "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..." cipso2 "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..." The old interfaces are maintained for compatibility. Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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- 11 5月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Add support for invalidating a key - which renders it immediately invisible to further searches and causes the garbage collector to immediately wake up, remove it from keyrings and then destroy it when it's no longer referenced. It's better not to do this with keyctl_revoke() as that marks the key to start returning -EKEYREVOKED to searches when what is actually desired is to have the key refetched. To invalidate a key the caller must be granted SEARCH permission by the key. This may be too strict. It may be better to also permit invalidation if the caller has any of READ, WRITE or SETATTR permission. The primary use for this is to evict keys that are cached in special keyrings, such as the DNS resolver or an ID mapper. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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- 26 4月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
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- 19 4月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
This expands the available Yama ptrace restrictions to include two more modes. Mode 2 requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE for PTRACE_ATTACH, and mode 3 completely disables PTRACE_ATTACH (and locks the sysctl). Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 07 3月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Masanari Iida 提交于
Signed-off-by: NMasanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com> Acked-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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- 16 2月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
For a process to entirely disable Yama ptrace restrictions, it can use the special PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY pid to indicate that any otherwise allowed process may ptrace it. This is stronger than calling PR_SET_PTRACER with pid "1" because it includes processes in external pid namespaces. This is currently needed by the Chrome renderer, since its crash handler (Breakpad) runs external to the renderer's pid namespace. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 10 2月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 19 1月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
The kernel contains some special internal keyrings, for instance the DNS resolver keyring : 2a93faf1 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .dns_resolver: empty It would occasionally be useful to allow the contents of such keyrings to be flushed by root (cache invalidation). Allow a flag to be set on a keyring to mark that someone possessing the sysadmin capability can clear the keyring, even without normal write access to the keyring. Set this flag on the special keyrings created by the DNS resolver, the NFS identity mapper and the CIFS identity mapper. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: NSteve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 16 11月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
Clarify the purpose of the LSM interface with some brief examples and pointers to additional documentation. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 28 9月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Paul Bolle 提交于
There are numerous broken references to Documentation files (in other Documentation files, in comments, etc.). These broken references are caused by typo's in the references, and by renames or removals of the Documentation files. Some broken references are simply odd. Fix these broken references, sometimes by dropping the irrelevant text they were part of. Signed-off-by: NPaul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl> Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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- 30 6月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Move keys-ecryptfs.txt to Documentation/security. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 27 6月, 2011 2 次提交
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由 Roberto Sassu 提交于
The 'encrypted' key type defines its own payload format which contains a symmetric key randomly generated that cannot be used directly to mount an eCryptfs filesystem, because it expects an authentication token structure. This patch introduces the new format 'ecryptfs' that allows to store an authentication token structure inside the encrypted key payload containing a randomly generated symmetric key, as the same for the format 'default'. More details about the usage of encrypted keys with the eCryptfs filesystem can be found in the file 'Documentation/keys-ecryptfs.txt'. Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: NGianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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由 Roberto Sassu 提交于
This patch introduces a new parameter, called 'format', that defines the format of data stored by encrypted keys. The 'default' format identifies encrypted keys containing only the symmetric key, while other formats can be defined to support additional information. The 'format' parameter is written in the datablob produced by commands 'keyctl print' or 'keyctl pipe' and is integrity protected by the HMAC. Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: NGianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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- 20 5月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Randy Dunlap 提交于
move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
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