1. 22 10月, 2015 1 次提交
  2. 09 8月, 2015 3 次提交
    • M
      btrfs: fix clone / extent-same deadlocks · 293a8489
      Mark Fasheh 提交于
      Clone and extent same lock their source and target inodes in opposite order.
      In addition to this, the range locking in clone doesn't take ordering into
      account. Fix this by having clone use the same locking helpers as
      btrfs-extent-same.
      
      In addition, I do a small cleanup of the locking helpers, removing a case
      (both inodes being the same) which was poorly accounted for and never
      actually used by the callers.
      Signed-off-by: NMark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
      Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      293a8489
    • L
      Btrfs: fix defrag to merge tail file extent · 4a3560c4
      Liu Bo 提交于
      The file layout is
      
      [extent 1]...[extent n][4k extent][HOLE][extent x]
      
      extent 1~n and 4k extent can be merged during defrag, and the whole
      defrag bytes is larger than our defrag thresh(256k), 4k extent as a
      tail is left unmerged since we check if its next extent can be merged
      (the next one is a hole, so the check will fail), the layout thus can
      be
      
      [new extent][4k extent][HOLE][extent x]
       (1~n)
      
      To fix it, beside looking at the next one, this also looks at the
      previous one by checking @defrag_end, which is set to 0 when we
      decide to stop merging contiguous extents, otherwise, we can merge
      the previous one with our extent.
      
      Also, this makes btrfs behave consistent with how xfs and ext4 do.
      Signed-off-by: NLiu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      4a3560c4
    • N
      btrfs: fix search key advancing condition · dd81d459
      Naohiro Aota 提交于
      The search key advancing condition used in copy_to_sk() is loose. It can
      advance the key even if it reaches sk->max_*: e.g. when the max key = (512,
      1024, -1) and the current key = (512, 1025, 10), it increments the
      offset by 1, continues hopeless search from (512, 1025, 11). This issue
      make ioctl() to take unexpectedly long time scanning all the leaf a blocks
      one by one.
      
      This commit fix the problem using standard way of key comparison:
      btrfs_comp_cpu_keys()
      Signed-off-by: NNaohiro Aota <naota@elisp.net>
      Reviewed-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      dd81d459
  3. 14 7月, 2015 1 次提交
    • F
      Btrfs: fix file corruption after cloning inline extents · ed958762
      Filipe Manana 提交于
      Using the clone ioctl (or extent_same ioctl, which calls the same extent
      cloning function as well) we end up allowing copy an inline extent from
      the source file into a non-zero offset of the destination file. This is
      something not expected and that the btrfs code is not prepared to deal
      with - all inline extents must be at a file offset equals to 0.
      
      For example, the following excerpt of a test case for fstests triggers
      a crash/BUG_ON() on a write operation after an inline extent is cloned
      into a non-zero offset:
      
        _scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
        _scratch_mount
      
        # Create our test files. File foo has the same 2K of data at offset 4K
        # as file bar has at its offset 0.
        $XFS_IO_PROG -f -s -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0 4K" \
            -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 4k 2K" \
            -c "pwrite -S 0xcc 8K 4K" \
            $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
      
        # File bar consists of a single inline extent (2K size).
        $XFS_IO_PROG -f -s -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 2K" \
           $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
      
        # Now call the clone ioctl to clone the extent of file bar into file
        # foo at its offset 4K. This made file foo have an inline extent at
        # offset 4K, something which the btrfs code can not deal with in future
        # IO operations because all inline extents are supposed to start at an
        # offset of 0, resulting in all sorts of chaos.
        # So here we validate that clone ioctl returns an EOPNOTSUPP, which is
        # what it returns for other cases dealing with inlined extents.
        $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d $((4 * 1024)) -l $((2 * 1024)) \
            $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
      
        # Because of the inline extent at offset 4K, the following write made
        # the kernel crash with a BUG_ON().
        $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xdd 6K 2K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
      
        status=0
        exit
      
      The stack trace of the BUG_ON() triggered by the last write is:
      
        [152154.035903] ------------[ cut here ]------------
        [152154.036424] kernel BUG at mm/page-writeback.c:2286!
        [152154.036424] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
        [152154.036424] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_flakey dm_mod crc32c_generic xor raid6_pq nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc loop fuse parport_pc acpi_cpu$
        [152154.036424] CPU: 2 PID: 17873 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G        W       4.1.0-rc6-btrfs-next-11+ #2
        [152154.036424] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.1-0-g4adadbd-20150316_085822-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
        [152154.036424] task: ffff880429f70990 ti: ffff880429efc000 task.ti: ffff880429efc000
        [152154.036424] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8111a9d5>]  [<ffffffff8111a9d5>] clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x1e/0x90
        [152154.036424] RSP: 0018:ffff880429effc68  EFLAGS: 00010246
        [152154.036424] RAX: 0200000000000806 RBX: ffffea0006a6d8f0 RCX: 0000000000000001
        [152154.036424] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff81155d1b RDI: ffffea0006a6d8f0
        [152154.036424] RBP: ffff880429effc78 R08: ffff8801ce389fe0 R09: 0000000000000001
        [152154.036424] R10: 0000000000002000 R11: ffffffffffffffff R12: ffff8800200dce68
        [152154.036424] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8800200dcc88 R15: ffff8803d5736d80
        [152154.036424] FS:  00007fbf119f6700(0000) GS:ffff88043d280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
        [152154.036424] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
        [152154.036424] CR2: 0000000001bdc000 CR3: 00000003aa555000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
        [152154.036424] Stack:
        [152154.036424]  ffff8803d5736d80 0000000000000001 ffff880429effcd8 ffffffffa04e97c1
        [152154.036424]  ffff880429effd68 ffff880429effd60 0000000000000001 ffff8800200dc9c8
        [152154.036424]  0000000000000001 ffff8800200dcc88 0000000000000000 0000000000001000
        [152154.036424] Call Trace:
        [152154.036424]  [<ffffffffa04e97c1>] lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need+0x147/0x18d [btrfs]
        [152154.036424]  [<ffffffffa04ea82c>] __btrfs_buffered_write+0x245/0x4c8 [btrfs]
        [152154.036424]  [<ffffffffa04ed14b>] ? btrfs_file_write_iter+0x150/0x3e0 [btrfs]
        [152154.036424]  [<ffffffffa04ed15a>] ? btrfs_file_write_iter+0x15f/0x3e0 [btrfs]
        [152154.036424]  [<ffffffffa04ed2c7>] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x2cc/0x3e0 [btrfs]
        [152154.036424]  [<ffffffff81165a4a>] __vfs_write+0x7c/0xa5
        [152154.036424]  [<ffffffff81165f89>] vfs_write+0xa0/0xe4
        [152154.036424]  [<ffffffff81166855>] SyS_pwrite64+0x64/0x82
        [152154.036424]  [<ffffffff81465197>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
        [152154.036424] Code: 48 89 c7 e8 0f ff ff ff 5b 41 5c 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 53 48 89 fb e8 ae ef 00 00 49 89 c4 48 8b 03 a8 01 75 02 <0f> 0b 4d 85 e4 74 59 49 8b 3c 2$
        [152154.036424] RIP  [<ffffffff8111a9d5>] clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x1e/0x90
        [152154.036424]  RSP <ffff880429effc68>
        [152154.242621] ---[ end trace e3d3376b23a57041 ]---
      
      Fix this by returning the error EOPNOTSUPP if an attempt to copy an
      inline extent into a non-zero offset happens, just like what is done for
      other scenarios that would require copying/splitting inline extents,
      which were introduced by the following commits:
      
         00fdf13a ("Btrfs: fix a crash of clone with inline extents's split")
         3f9e3df8 ("btrfs: replace error code from btrfs_drop_extents")
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      ed958762
  4. 12 7月, 2015 1 次提交
  5. 02 7月, 2015 4 次提交
  6. 10 6月, 2015 3 次提交
    • M
      btrfs: Handle unaligned length in extent_same · e1d227a4
      Mark Fasheh 提交于
      The extent-same code rejects requests with an unaligned length. This
      poses a problem when we want to dedupe the tail extent of files as we
      skip cloning the portion between i_size and the extent boundary.
      
      If we don't clone the entire extent, it won't be deleted. So the
      combination of these behaviors winds up giving us worst-case dedupe on
      many files.
      
      We can fix this by allowing a length that extents to i_size and
      internally aligining those to the end of the block. This is what
      btrfs_ioctl_clone() so we can just copy that check over.
      Signed-off-by: NMark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      e1d227a4
    • C
      Btrfs: btrfs_defrag_file: Fix calculation of max_to_defrag. · 070034bd
      chandan 提交于
      max_to_defrag represents the number of pages to defrag rather than the last
      page of the file range to be defragged.
      
      Consider a file having 10 4k blocks (i.e. blocks in the range [0 - 9]). If the
      defrag ioctl was invoked for the block range [3 - 6], then max_to_defrag
      should actually have the value 4. Instead in the current code we end up
      setting it to 6.
      
      Now, this does not (yet) cause an issue since the first part of the while loop
      condition in btrfs_defrag_file() (i.e. "i <= last_index") causes the control
      to flow out of the while loop before any buggy behavior is actually caused. So
      the patch just makes sure that max_to_defrag ends up having the right value
      rather than fixing a bug. I did run the xfstests suite to make sure that the
      code does not regress.
      
      Changelog: v1->v2:
      Provide a much descriptive commit message.
      Signed-off-by: NChandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      070034bd
    • C
      Btrfs: btrfs_defrag_file: Fix ra_index computation. · e4826a5b
      chandan 提交于
      Read-ahead is done for the pages in the range [ra_index, ra_index + cluster -
      1]. So the next read-ahead should be starting from the page at index 'ra_index
      + cluster' (unless we deemed that the extent at 'ra_index + cluster' as
      non-defraggable) rather than from the page at index 'ra_index +
      max_cluster'. This patch fixes this. I did run the xfstests suite to make sure
      that the code does not regress.
      Signed-off-by: NChandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      e4826a5b
  7. 03 6月, 2015 3 次提交
    • D
      btrfs: make root id query unprivileged · 01b810b8
      David Sterba 提交于
      The INO_LOOKUP ioctl can lookup path for a given inode number and is
      thus restricted. As a sideefect it can find the root id of the
      containing subvolume and we're using this int the 'btrfs inspect rootid'
      command.
      
      The restriction is unnecessary in case we set the ioctl args
       args::treeid    = 0
       args::objectid  = 256 (BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)
      
      Then the path will be empty and the treeid is filled with the root id of
      the inode on which the ioctl is called. This behaviour is unchanged,
      after the root restriction is removed.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      01b810b8
    • D
      btrfs: fix warnings after changes in btrfs_abort_transaction · 6d13f549
      David Sterba 提交于
      fs/btrfs/volumes.c: In function ‘btrfs_create_uuid_tree’:
      fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3909:3: warning: format ‘%d’ expects argument of type ‘int’, but argument 4 has type ‘long int’ [-Wformat=]
         btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, tree_root,
         ^
        CC [M]  fs/btrfs/ioctl.o
      fs/btrfs/ioctl.c: In function ‘create_subvol’:
      fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:549:3: warning: format ‘%d’ expects argument of type ‘int’, but argument 4 has type ‘long int’ [-Wformat=]
         btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, PTR_ERR(new_root));
      
      PTR_ERR returns long, but we're really using 'int' for the error codes
      everywhere so just set and use the local variable.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      6d13f549
    • O
      Btrfs: don't invalidate root dentry when subvolume deletion fails · 64ad6c48
      Omar Sandoval 提交于
      Since commit bafc9b75 ("vfs: More precise tests in d_invalidate"),
      mounted subvolumes can be deleted because d_invalidate() won't fail.
      However, we run into problems when we attempt to delete the default
      subvolume while it is mounted as the root filesystem:
      
      	# btrfs subvol list /
      	ID 257 gen 306 top level 5 path rootvol
      	ID 267 gen 334 top level 5 path snap1
      	# btrfs subvol get-default /
      	ID 267 gen 334 top level 5 path snap1
      	# btrfs inspect-internal rootid /
      	267
      	# mount -o subvol=/ /dev/vda1 /mnt
      	# btrfs subvol del /mnt/snap1
      	Delete subvolume (no-commit): '/mnt/snap1'
      	ERROR: cannot delete '/mnt/snap1' - Operation not permitted
      	# findmnt /
      	findmnt: can't read /proc/mounts: No such file or directory
      	# ls /proc
      	#
      
      Markus reported that this same scenario simply led to a kernel oops.
      
      This happens because in btrfs_ioctl_snap_destroy(), we call
      d_invalidate() before we check may_destroy_subvol(), which means that we
      detach the submounts and drop the dentry before erroring out. Instead,
      we should only invalidate the dentry once the deletion has succeeded.
      Additionally, the shrink_dcache_sb() isn't necessary; d_invalidate()
      will prune the dcache for the deleted subvolume.
      
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Fixes: bafc9b75 ("vfs: More precise tests in d_invalidate")
      Reported-by: NMarkus Schauler <mschauler@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NOmar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      64ad6c48
  8. 26 4月, 2015 1 次提交
    • O
      btrfs: unlock i_mutex after attempting to delete subvolume during send · 909e26dc
      Omar Sandoval 提交于
      Whenever the check for a send in progress introduced in commit
      521e0546 (btrfs: protect snapshots from deleting during send) is
      hit, we return without unlocking inode->i_mutex. This is easy to see
      with lockdep enabled:
      
      [  +0.000059] ================================================
      [  +0.000028] [ BUG: lock held when returning to user space! ]
      [  +0.000029] 4.0.0-rc5-00096-g3c435c1e #93 Not tainted
      [  +0.000026] ------------------------------------------------
      [  +0.000029] btrfs/211 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
      [  +0.000029] 1 lock held by btrfs/211:
      [  +0.000023]  #0:  (&type->i_mutex_dir_key){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8135b8df>] btrfs_ioctl_snap_destroy+0x2df/0x7a0
      
      Make sure we unlock it in the error path.
      Reviewed-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NOmar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      909e26dc
  9. 16 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  10. 13 4月, 2015 7 次提交
    • Q
      btrfs: quota: Update quota tree after qgroup relationship change. · e082f563
      Qu Wenruo 提交于
      Previous patch modified the in memory struct but it's not written in
      quota tree until next commit.
      So user will still get old data using "btrfs qgroup show" after
      assign/remove.
      
      This patch will call btrfs_run_qgroups in assign ioctl so it will be
      updated to in memory quota trees and user will get up-to-date results.
      Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      e082f563
    • Q
      btrfs: Don't allow subvolid >= (1 << BTRFS_QGROUP_LEVEL_SHIFT) to be created · e09fe2d2
      Qu Wenruo 提交于
      Btrfs will create qgroup on subvolume creation if quota is enabled, but
      qgroup uses the high bits(currently 16 bits) as level, to build the
      inheritance.
      
      However it is fully possible a subvolume can be created with a
      subvolumeid larger than 1 << BTRFS_QGROUP_LEVEL_SHIFT, so it will be
      considered as level 1 and can't be assigned to other qgroup in level 1.
      
      This patch will prevent such things so qgroup inheritance will not be
      screwed up.
      The downside is very clear, btrfs subvolume number limit will decrease
      from (u64 max - 256(fisrt free objectid) - 256(last free objectid)) to
      (u48 max -256(first free objectid)).
      But we still have near u48(that's 15 digits in dec), so that should not
      be a huge problem.
      Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      e09fe2d2
    • D
    • C
      Btrfs: fix uninit variable in clone ioctl · de249e66
      Chris Mason 提交于
      Commit 0d97a64e0 creates a new variable but doesn't always set it up.
      This puts it back to the original method (key.offset + 1) for the cases
      not covered by Filipe's new logic.
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      de249e66
    • F
      Btrfs: fix inode eviction infinite loop after cloning into it · ccccf3d6
      Filipe Manana 提交于
      If we attempt to clone a 0 length region into a file we can end up
      inserting a range in the inode's extent_io tree with a start offset
      that is greater then the end offset, which triggers immediately the
      following warning:
      
      [ 3914.619057] WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 4199 at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:435 insert_state+0x4b/0x10b [btrfs]()
      [ 3914.620886] BTRFS: end < start 4095 4096
      (...)
      [ 3914.638093] Call Trace:
      [ 3914.638636]  [<ffffffff81425fd9>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65
      [ 3914.639620]  [<ffffffff81045390>] warn_slowpath_common+0xa1/0xbb
      [ 3914.640789]  [<ffffffffa03ca44f>] ? insert_state+0x4b/0x10b [btrfs]
      [ 3914.642041]  [<ffffffff810453f0>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x48
      [ 3914.643236]  [<ffffffffa03ca44f>] insert_state+0x4b/0x10b [btrfs]
      [ 3914.644441]  [<ffffffffa03ca729>] __set_extent_bit+0x107/0x3f4 [btrfs]
      [ 3914.645711]  [<ffffffffa03cb256>] lock_extent_bits+0x65/0x1bf [btrfs]
      [ 3914.646914]  [<ffffffff8142b2fb>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x28/0x33
      [ 3914.648058]  [<ffffffffa03cbac4>] ? test_range_bit+0xcc/0xde [btrfs]
      [ 3914.650105]  [<ffffffffa03cb3c3>] lock_extent+0x13/0x15 [btrfs]
      [ 3914.651361]  [<ffffffffa03db39e>] lock_extent_range+0x3d/0xcd [btrfs]
      [ 3914.652761]  [<ffffffffa03de1fe>] btrfs_ioctl_clone+0x278/0x388 [btrfs]
      [ 3914.654128]  [<ffffffff811226dd>] ? might_fault+0x58/0xb5
      [ 3914.655320]  [<ffffffffa03e0909>] btrfs_ioctl+0xb51/0x2195 [btrfs]
      (...)
      [ 3914.669271] ---[ end trace 14843d3e2e622fc1 ]---
      
      This later makes the inode eviction handler enter an infinite loop that
      keeps dumping the following warning over and over:
      
      [ 3915.117629] WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 4228 at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:435 insert_state+0x4b/0x10b [btrfs]()
      [ 3915.119913] BTRFS: end < start 4095 4096
      (...)
      [ 3915.137394] Call Trace:
      [ 3915.137913]  [<ffffffff81425fd9>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65
      [ 3915.139154]  [<ffffffff81045390>] warn_slowpath_common+0xa1/0xbb
      [ 3915.140316]  [<ffffffffa03ca44f>] ? insert_state+0x4b/0x10b [btrfs]
      [ 3915.141505]  [<ffffffff810453f0>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x48
      [ 3915.142709]  [<ffffffffa03ca44f>] insert_state+0x4b/0x10b [btrfs]
      [ 3915.143849]  [<ffffffffa03ca729>] __set_extent_bit+0x107/0x3f4 [btrfs]
      [ 3915.145120]  [<ffffffffa038c1e3>] ? btrfs_kill_super+0x17/0x23 [btrfs]
      [ 3915.146352]  [<ffffffff811548f6>] ? deactivate_locked_super+0x3b/0x50
      [ 3915.147565]  [<ffffffffa03cb256>] lock_extent_bits+0x65/0x1bf [btrfs]
      [ 3915.148785]  [<ffffffff8142b7e2>] ? _raw_write_unlock+0x28/0x33
      [ 3915.149931]  [<ffffffffa03bc325>] btrfs_evict_inode+0x196/0x482 [btrfs]
      [ 3915.151154]  [<ffffffff81168904>] evict+0xa0/0x148
      [ 3915.152094]  [<ffffffff811689e5>] dispose_list+0x39/0x43
      [ 3915.153081]  [<ffffffff81169564>] evict_inodes+0xdc/0xeb
      [ 3915.154062]  [<ffffffff81154418>] generic_shutdown_super+0x49/0xef
      [ 3915.155193]  [<ffffffff811546d1>] kill_anon_super+0x13/0x1e
      [ 3915.156274]  [<ffffffffa038c1e3>] btrfs_kill_super+0x17/0x23 [btrfs]
      (...)
      [ 3915.167404] ---[ end trace 14843d3e2e622fc2 ]---
      
      So just bail out of the clone ioctl if the length of the region to clone
      is zero, without locking any extent range, in order to prevent this issue
      (same behaviour as a pwrite with a 0 length for example).
      
      This is trivial to reproduce. For example, the steps for the test I just
      made for fstests:
      
        mkfs.btrfs -f SCRATCH_DEV
        mount SCRATCH_DEV $SCRATCH_MNT
      
        touch $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
        touch $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
      
        $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 4096 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
        umount $SCRATCH_MNT
      
      A test case for fstests follows soon.
      
      CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      Reviewed-by: NOmar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      ccccf3d6
    • F
      Btrfs: fix inode eviction infinite loop after extent_same ioctl · 113e8283
      Filipe Manana 提交于
      If we pass a length of 0 to the extent_same ioctl, we end up locking an
      extent range with a start offset greater then its end offset (if the
      destination file's offset is greater than zero). This results in a warning
      from extent_io.c:insert_state through the following call chain:
      
        btrfs_extent_same()
          btrfs_double_lock()
            lock_extent_range()
              lock_extent(inode->io_tree, offset, offset + len - 1)
                lock_extent_bits()
                  __set_extent_bit()
                    insert_state()
                      --> WARN_ON(end < start)
      
      This leads to an infinite loop when evicting the inode. This is the same
      problem that my previous patch titled
      "Btrfs: fix inode eviction infinite loop after cloning into it" addressed
      but for the extent_same ioctl instead of the clone ioctl.
      
      CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      Reviewed-by: NOmar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      113e8283
    • F
      Btrfs: fix range cloning when same inode used as source and destination · df858e76
      Filipe Manana 提交于
      While searching for extents to clone we might find one where we only use
      a part of it coming from its tail. If our destination inode is the same
      the source inode, we end up removing the tail part of the extent item and
      insert after a new one that point to the same extent with an adjusted
      key file offset and data offset. After this we search for the next extent
      item in the fs/subvol tree with a key that has an offset incremented by
      one. But this second search leaves us at the new extent item we inserted
      previously, and since that extent item has a non-zero data offset, it
      it can make us call btrfs_drop_extents with an empty range (start == end)
      which causes the following warning:
      
      [23978.537119] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 16251 at fs/btrfs/file.c:550 btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x43/0x385 [btrfs]()
      (...)
      [23978.557266] Call Trace:
      [23978.557978]  [<ffffffff81425fd9>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65
      [23978.559191]  [<ffffffff81045390>] warn_slowpath_common+0xa1/0xbb
      [23978.560699]  [<ffffffffa047f0ea>] ? btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x43/0x385 [btrfs]
      [23978.562389]  [<ffffffff8104544d>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x1c
      [23978.563613]  [<ffffffffa047f0ea>] btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x43/0x385 [btrfs]
      [23978.565103]  [<ffffffff810e3a18>] ? time_hardirqs_off+0x15/0x28
      [23978.566294]  [<ffffffff81079ff8>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0xf
      [23978.567438]  [<ffffffffa047f73d>] __btrfs_drop_extents+0x6b/0x9e1 [btrfs]
      [23978.568702]  [<ffffffff8107c03f>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf
      [23978.569763]  [<ffffffff811441c0>] ? ____cache_alloc+0x69/0x2eb
      [23978.570817]  [<ffffffff81142269>] ? virt_to_head_page+0x9/0x36
      [23978.571872]  [<ffffffff81143c15>] ? cache_alloc_debugcheck_after.isra.42+0x16c/0x1cb
      [23978.573466]  [<ffffffff811420d5>] ? kmemleak_alloc_recursive.constprop.52+0x16/0x18
      [23978.574962]  [<ffffffffa0480d07>] btrfs_drop_extents+0x66/0x7f [btrfs]
      [23978.576179]  [<ffffffffa049aa35>] btrfs_clone+0x516/0xaf5 [btrfs]
      [23978.577311]  [<ffffffffa04983dc>] ? lock_extent_range+0x7b/0xcd [btrfs]
      [23978.578520]  [<ffffffffa049b2a2>] btrfs_ioctl_clone+0x28e/0x39f [btrfs]
      [23978.580282]  [<ffffffffa049d9ae>] btrfs_ioctl+0xb51/0x219a [btrfs]
      (...)
      [23978.591887] ---[ end trace 988ec2a653d03ed3 ]---
      
      Then we attempt to insert a new extent item with a key that already
      exists, which makes btrfs_insert_empty_item return -EEXIST resulting in
      abortion of the current transaction:
      
      [23978.594355] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 16251 at fs/btrfs/super.c:260 __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x52/0x114 [btrfs]()
      (...)
      [23978.622589] Call Trace:
      [23978.623181]  [<ffffffff81425fd9>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65
      [23978.624359]  [<ffffffff81045390>] warn_slowpath_common+0xa1/0xbb
      [23978.625573]  [<ffffffffa044ab6c>] ? __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x52/0x114 [btrfs]
      [23978.626971]  [<ffffffff810453f0>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x48
      [23978.628003]  [<ffffffff8108a6c8>] ? vprintk_default+0x1d/0x1f
      [23978.629138]  [<ffffffffa044ab6c>] __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x52/0x114 [btrfs]
      [23978.630528]  [<ffffffffa049ad1b>] btrfs_clone+0x7fc/0xaf5 [btrfs]
      [23978.631635]  [<ffffffffa04983dc>] ? lock_extent_range+0x7b/0xcd [btrfs]
      [23978.632886]  [<ffffffffa049b2a2>] btrfs_ioctl_clone+0x28e/0x39f [btrfs]
      [23978.634119]  [<ffffffffa049d9ae>] btrfs_ioctl+0xb51/0x219a [btrfs]
      (...)
      [23978.647714] ---[ end trace 988ec2a653d03ed4 ]---
      
      This is wrong because we should not process the extent item that we just
      inserted previously, and instead process the extent item that follows it
      in the tree
      
      For example for the test case I wrote for fstests:
      
         bs=$((64 * 1024))
         mkfs.btrfs -f -l $bs -O ^no-holes /dev/sdc
         mount /dev/sdc /mnt
      
         xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa $(($bs * 2)) $(($bs * 2))" /mnt/foo
      
         $CLONER_PROG -s $((3 * $bs)) -d $((267 * $bs)) -l 0 /mnt/foo /mnt/foo
         $CLONER_PROG -s $((217 * $bs)) -d $((95 * $bs)) -l 0 /mnt/foo /mnt/foo
      
      The second clone call fails with -EEXIST, because when we process the
      first extent item (offset 262144), we drop part of it (counting from the
      end) and then insert a new extent item with a key greater then the key we
      found. The next time we search the tree we search for a key with offset
      262144 + 1, which leaves us at the new extent item we have just inserted
      but we think it refers to an extent that we need to clone.
      
      Fix this by ensuring the next search key uses an offset corresponding to
      the offset of the key we found previously plus the data length of the
      corresponding extent item. This ensures we skip new extent items that we
      inserted and works for the case of implicit holes too (NO_HOLES feature).
      
      A test case for fstests follows soon.
      Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      df858e76
  11. 04 3月, 2015 3 次提交
  12. 23 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      VFS: (Scripted) Convert S_ISLNK/DIR/REG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_*(dentry) · e36cb0b8
      David Howells 提交于
      Convert the following where appropriate:
      
       (1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry).
      
       (2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry).
      
       (3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry).  This is actually more
           complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to
           d_can_lookup() instead.  The difference is whether the directory in
           question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with
           a ->d_automount op.
      
      In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being
      NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects
      d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to
      use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer).
      
      Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than
      DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS
      manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer.  In such a
      case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the
      type of the lower dentry.
      
      However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use
      the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem.
      
      There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled
      DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE.  Strictly, this was
      intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes.
      
      The following perl+coccinelle script was used:
      
      use strict;
      
      my @callers;
      open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') ||
          die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers";
      @callers = <$fd>;
      close($fd);
      unless (@callers) {
          print "No matches\n";
          exit(0);
      }
      
      my @cocci = (
          '@@',
          'expression E;',
          '@@',
          '',
          '- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
          '+ d_is_symlink(E)',
          '',
          '@@',
          'expression E;',
          '@@',
          '',
          '- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
          '+ d_is_dir(E)',
          '',
          '@@',
          'expression E;',
          '@@',
          '',
          '- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
          '+ d_is_reg(E)' );
      
      my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci";
      open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile;
      print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci);
      close($fd);
      
      foreach my $file (@callers) {
          chomp $file;
          print "Processing ", $file, "\n";
          system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 ||
      	die "spatch failed";
      }
      
      [AV: overlayfs parts skipped]
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      e36cb0b8
  13. 25 11月, 2014 2 次提交
    • F
      Btrfs: fix snapshot inconsistency after a file write followed by truncate · 9ea24bbe
      Filipe Manana 提交于
      If right after starting the snapshot creation ioctl we perform a write against a
      file followed by a truncate, with both operations increasing the file's size, we
      can get a snapshot tree that reflects a state of the source subvolume's tree where
      the file truncation happened but the write operation didn't. This leaves a gap
      between 2 file extent items of the inode, which makes btrfs' fsck complain about it.
      
      For example, if we perform the following file operations:
      
          $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/vdd
          $ mount /dev/vdd /mnt
          $ xfs_io -f \
                -c "pwrite -S 0xaa -b 32K 0 32K" \
                -c "fsync" \
                -c "pwrite -S 0xbb -b 32770 16K 32770" \
                -c "truncate 90123" \
                /mnt/foobar
      
      and the snapshot creation ioctl was just called before the second write, we often
      can get the following inode items in the snapshot's btree:
      
              item 120 key (257 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 7987 itemsize 160
                      inode generation 146 transid 7 size 90123 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 flags 0x0
              item 121 key (257 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 7967 itemsize 20
                      inode ref index 282 namelen 10 name: foobar
              item 122 key (257 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 7914 itemsize 53
                      extent data disk byte 1104855040 nr 32768
                      extent data offset 0 nr 32768 ram 32768
                      extent compression 0
              item 123 key (257 EXTENT_DATA 53248) itemoff 7861 itemsize 53
                      extent data disk byte 0 nr 0
                      extent data offset 0 nr 40960 ram 40960
                      extent compression 0
      
      There's a file range, corresponding to the interval [32K; ALIGN(16K + 32770, 4096)[
      for which there's no file extent item covering it. This is because the file write
      and file truncate operations happened both right after the snapshot creation ioctl
      called btrfs_start_delalloc_inodes(), which means we didn't start and wait for the
      ordered extent that matches the write and, in btrfs_setsize(), we were able to call
      btrfs_cont_expand() before being able to commit the current transaction in the
      snapshot creation ioctl. So this made it possibe to insert the hole file extent
      item in the source subvolume (which represents the region added by the truncate)
      right before the transaction commit from the snapshot creation ioctl.
      
      Btrfs' fsck tool complains about such cases with a message like the following:
      
          "root 331 inode 257 errors 100, file extent discount"
      
      >From a user perspective, the expectation when a snapshot is created while those
      file operations are being performed is that the snapshot will have a file that
      either:
      
      1) is empty
      2) only the first write was captured
      3) only the 2 writes were captured
      4) both writes and the truncation were captured
      
      But never capture a state where only the first write and the truncation were
      captured (since the second write was performed before the truncation).
      
      A test case for xfstests follows.
      Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      9ea24bbe
    • F
      Btrfs: ensure send always works on roots without orphans · e5fa8f86
      Filipe Manana 提交于
      Move the logic from the snapshot creation ioctl into send. This avoids
      doing the transaction commit if send isn't used, and ensures that if
      a crash/reboot happens after the transaction commit that created the
      snapshot and before the transaction commit that switched the commit
      root, send will not get a commit root that differs from the main root
      (that has orphan items).
      Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      e5fa8f86
  14. 20 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  15. 24 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  16. 17 10月, 2014 1 次提交
    • C
      Revert "Btrfs: race free update of commit root for ro snapshots" · d3797308
      Chris Mason 提交于
      This reverts commit 9c3b306e.
      
      Switching only one commit root during a transaction is wrong because it
      leads the fs into an inconsistent state. All commit roots should be
      switched at once, at transaction commit time, otherwise backref walking
      can often miss important references that were only accessible through
      the old commit root.  Plus, the root item for the snapshot's root wasn't
      getting updated and preventing the next transaction commit to do it.
      
      This made several users get into random corruption issues after creation
      of readonly snapshots.
      
      A regression test for xfstests will follow soon.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17
      Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      d3797308
  17. 09 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  18. 02 10月, 2014 3 次提交
  19. 18 9月, 2014 2 次提交