Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

was open-coded in several places...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Most code already uses consts for the struct kernel_param_ops,
sweep the kernel for the last offending stragglers. Other than
include/linux/moduleparam.h and kernel/params.c all other changes
were generated with the following Coccinelle SmPL patch. Merge
conflicts between trees can be handled with Coccinelle.

In the future git could get Coccinelle merge support to deal with
patch --> fail --> grammar --> Coccinelle --> new patch conflicts
automatically for us on patches where the grammar is available and
the patch is of high confidence. Consider this a feature request.

Test compiled on x86_64 against:

	* allnoconfig
	* allmodconfig
	* allyesconfig

@ const_found @
identifier ops;
@@

const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};

@ const_not_found depends on !const_found @
identifier ops;
@@

-struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
+const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};

Generated-by: Coccinelle SmPL
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: cocci@systeme.lip6.fr
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.

The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.

The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.

The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Add a list header for each security hook. They aren't used until
later in the patch series. They are grouped together in a structure
so that there doesn't need to be an external address for each.

Macro-ize the initialization of the security_operations
for each security module in anticipation of changing out
the security_operations structure.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

The security.h header file serves two purposes,
interfaces for users of the security modules and
interfaces for security modules. Users of the
security modules don't need to know about what's
in the security_operations structure, so pull it
out into it's own header, lsm_hooks.h
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

mediated_filesystem() should use dentry->d_sb not dentry->d_inode->i_sb and
should avoid file_inode() also since it is really dealing with the path.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Make it clear this is about kernel_param_ops, not kernel_param (which
will soon have a flags field of its own). No functional changes.

Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Li Zhong <zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jon Mason <jon.mason@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: NJani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because
strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be
used.
Signed-off-by: NJingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Mediation is based off of the cred but auditing includes the current
task which may not be related to the actual request.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

The apparmor module parameters for param_ops_aabool and
param_ops_aalockpolicy are both based off of the param_ops_bool,
and can handle a NULL value passed in as val. Have it enable the
new KERNEL_PARAM_FL_NOARGS flag to allow the parameters to be set
without having to state "=y" or "=1".

Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information.
The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed
when the profile or namespace is removed.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

remove the use of replaced by chaining and move to profile invalidation
and lookup to handle task replacement.

Replacement chaining can result in large chains of profiles being pinned
in memory when one profile in the chain is use. With implicit labeling
this will be even more of a problem, so move to a direct lookup method.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

the exec file isn't processing its command arg. It should only set be
responding to a command of exec.

Also cleanup setprocattr some more while we are at it.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NSeth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

Fix a couple of warning reported by sparse
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

The "permipc" command is unused and unfinished, remove it.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: NSteve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and
gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules
only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids.

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... switch callers.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

It isn't needed.  If you don't set the type of the data associated with
that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug.  So why waste the cycles?
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Just open code it so grep on the source code works better.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop.  This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union.  Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

module_param(bool) used to counter-intuitively take an int.  In
fddd5201 (mid-2009) we allowed bool or int/unsigned int using a messy
trick.

It's time to remove the int/unsigned int option.  For this version
it'll simply give a warning, but it'll break next kernel version.
Acked-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The capabilities framework is based around credentials, not necessarily the
current task.  Yet we still passed the current task down into LSMs from the
security_capable() LSM hook as if it was a meaningful portion of the security
decision.  This patch removes the 'generic' passing of current and instead
forces individual LSMs to use current explicitly if they think it is
appropriate.  In our case those LSMs are SELinux and AppArmor.

I believe the AppArmor use of current is incorrect, but that is wholely
unrelated to this patch.  This patch does not change what AppArmor does, it
just makes it clear in the AppArmor code that it is doing it.

The SELinux code still uses current in it's audit message, which may also be
wrong and needs further investigation.  Again this is NOT a change, it may
have always been wrong, this patch just makes it clear what is happening.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>