/proc/pid/oom_adj is deprecated and scheduled for removal in August 2012
according to Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt.

This patch makes the warning more verbose by making it appear as a more
serious problem (the presence of a stack trace and being multiline should
attract more attention) so that applications still using the old interface
can get fixed.

Very popular users of the old interface have been converted since the oom
killer rewrite has been introduced.  udevd switched to the
/proc/pid/oom_score_adj interface for v162, kde switched in 4.6.1, and
opensshd switched in 5.7p1.

At the start of 2012, this should be changed into a WARN() to emit all
such incidents and then finally remove the tunable in August 2012 as
scheduled.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Moving the event counter into the dynamically allocated 'struc seq_file'
allows poll() support without the need to allocate its own tracking
structure.

All current users are switched over to use the new counter.

Requested-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org
Acked-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Tested-by: Lucas De Marchi lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi
Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

not used by the instances anymore.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

redundant; all callers get it duplicated in mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK and none of
them removes that bit.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

its value depends only on inode and does not change; we might as
well store it in ->i_op->check_acl and be done with that.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information.  E.g.  for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length.  Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.

ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

tracehook.h is on the way out.  Rename tracehook_tracer_task() to
ptrace_parent() and move it from tracehook.h to ptrace.h.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>

nothing blocking except generic_permission()
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This change introduces a few of the less controversial /proc and
/proc/sys interfaces for tile, along with sysfs attributes for
various things that were originally proposed as /proc/tile files.
It also adjusts the "hardwall" proc API.

Arnd Bergmann reviewed the initial arch/tile submission, which
included a complete set of all the /proc/tile and /proc/sys/tile
knobs that we had added in a somewhat ad hoc way during initial
development, and provided feedback on where most of them should go.

One knob turned out to be similar enough to the existing
/proc/sys/debug/exception-trace that it was re-implemented to use
that model instead.

Another knob was /proc/tile/grid, which reported the "grid" dimensions
of a tile chip (e.g. 8x8 processors = 64-core chip).  Arnd suggested
looking at sysfs for that, so this change moves that information
to a pair of sysfs attributes (chip_width and chip_height) in the
/sys/devices/system/cpu directory.  We also put the "chip_serial"
and "chip_revision" information from our old /proc/tile/board file
as attributes in /sys/devices/system/cpu.

Other information collected via hypervisor APIs is now placed in
/sys/hypervisor.  We create a /sys/hypervisor/type file (holding the
constant string "tilera") to be parallel with the Xen use of
/sys/hypervisor/type holding "xen".  We create three top-level files,
"version" (the hypervisor's own version), "config_version" (the
version of the configuration file), and "hvconfig" (the contents of
the configuration file).  The remaining information from our old
/proc/tile/board and /proc/tile/switch files becomes an attribute
group appearing under /sys/hypervisor/board/.

Finally, after some feedback from Arnd Bergmann for the previous
version of this patch, the /proc/tile/hardwall file is split up into
two conceptual parts.  First, a directory /proc/tile/hardwall/ which
contains one file per active hardwall, each file named after the
hardwall's ID and holding a cpulist that says which cpus are enclosed by
the hardwall.  Second, a /proc/PID file "hardwall" that is either
empty (for non-hardwall-using processes) or contains the hardwall ID.

Finally, this change pushes the /proc/sys/tile/unaligned_fixup/
directory, with knobs controlling the kernel code for handling the
fixup of unaligned exceptions.
Reviewed-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NChris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>

It whould be better if put check_mem_permission after __get_free_page in
mem_write, to be same as function mem_read.

Hugh Dickins explained the reason.

    check_mem_permission gets a reference to the mm.  If we __get_free_page
    after check_mem_permission, imagine what happens if the system is out
    of memory, and the mm we're looking at is selected for killing by the
    OOM killer: while we wait in __get_free_page for more memory, no memory
    is freed from the selected mm because it cannot reach exit_mmap while
    we hold that reference.
Reported-by: NJovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NStephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Convert fs/proc/ from strict_strto*() to kstrto*() functions.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Setup and cleanup of mm_struct->exe_file is currently done in fs/proc/.
This was because exe_file was needed only for /proc/<pid>/exe.  Since we
will need the exe_file functionality also for core dumps (so core name can
contain full binary path), built this functionality always into the
kernel.

To achieve that move that out of proc FS to the kernel/ where in fact it
should belong.  By doing that we can make dup_mm_exe_file static.  Also we
can drop linux/proc_fs.h inclusion in fs/exec.c and kernel/fork.c.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Create files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ to allow controlling the
namespaces of a process.

This addresses three specific problems that can make namespaces hard to
work with.
- Namespaces require a dedicated process to pin them in memory.
- It is not possible to use a namespace unless you are the child
  of the original creator.
- Namespaces don't have names that userspace can use to talk about
  them.

The namespace files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ can be opened and the
file descriptor can be used to talk about a specific namespace, and
to keep the specified namespace alive.

A namespace can be kept alive by either holding the file descriptor
open or bind mounting the file someplace else.  aka:
mount --bind /proc/self/ns/net /some/filesystem/path
mount --bind /proc/self/fd/<N> /some/filesystem/path

This allows namespaces to be named with userspace policy.

It requires additional support to make use of these filedescriptors
and that will be comming in the following patches.
Acked-by: NDaniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Rather than pass in some random truncated offset to the pid-related
functions, check that the offset is in range up-front.

This is just cleanup, the previous commit fixed the real problem.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed.
Signed-off-by: NLucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>

[root@wei 1]# cat /proc/1/mem
cat: /proc/1/mem: No such process

error code -ESRCH is wrong in this situation.  Return -EPERM instead.
Signed-off-by: NJovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This file is readable for the task owner.  Hide kernel addresses from
unprivileged users, leave them function names and offsets.
Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

All of those are rw-r--r-- and all are broken for suid - if you open
a file before the target does suid-root exec, you'll be still able
to access it.  For personality it's not a big deal, but for syscall
and stack it's a real problem.

Fix: check that task is tracable for you at the time of read().
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

With recent changes there is no longer a security hazard with writing to
/proc/pid/mem.  Remove the #ifdef.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This change allows us to take advantage of access_remote_vm(), which in turn
eliminates a security issue with the mem_write() implementation.

The previous implementation of mem_write() was insecure since the target task
could exec a setuid-root binary between the permission check and the actual
write.  Holding a reference to the target mm_struct eliminates this
vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Avoid a potential race when task exec's and we get a new ->mm but check against
the old credentials in ptrace_may_access().

Holding of the mutex is implemented by factoring out the body of the code into a
helper function __check_mem_permission().  Performing this factorization now
simplifies upcoming changes and minimizes churn in the diff's.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This change makes mem_write() observe the same constraints as mem_read().  This
is particularly important for mem_write as an accidental leak of the fd across
an exec could result in arbitrary modification of the target process' memory.
IOW, /proc/pid/mem is implicitly close-on-exec.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

same as for environ, except that we didn't do any checks to
prevent access after suid execve
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Switch to mm_for_maps().  Maybe we ought to make it r--r--r--,
since we do checks on IO anyway...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

just use mm_for_maps()
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

We'd like to be able to oom_score_adj a process up/down as it
enters/leaves the foreground.  Currently, it is not possible to oom_adj
down without CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.  This patch allows a task to decrease its
oom_score_adj back to the value that a CAP_SYS_RESOURCE thread set it to
or its inherited value at fork.  Assuming the thread that has forked it
has oom_score_adj of 0, each process could decrease it back from 0 upon
activation unless a CAP_SYS_RESOURCE thread elevated it to something
higher.

Alternative considered:

* a setuid binary
* a daemon with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE

Since you don't wan't all processes to be able to reduce their oom_adj, a
setuid or daemon implementation would be complex.  The alternatives also
have much higher overhead.

This patch updated from original patch based on feedback from David
Rientjes.
Signed-off-by: NMandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

single_open()'s third argument is for copying into seq_file->private.  Use
that, rather than open-coding it.
Signed-off-by: NJovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

For string without format specifiers, use seq_puts().
For seq_printf("\n"), use seq_putc('\n').

   text	   data	    bss	    dec	    hex	filename
  61866	    488	    112	  62466	   f402	fs/proc/proc.o
  61729	    488	    112	  62329	   f379	fs/proc/proc.o
  ----------------------------------------------------
  			   -139
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Use temporary lr for struct latency_record for improved readability and
fewer columns used.  Removed trailing space from output.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <trivial@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>

Require filesystems be aware of .d_revalidate being called in rcu-walk
mode (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU). For now do a simple push down, returning
-ECHILD from all implementations.
Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>

Reduce some branches and memory accesses in dcache lookup by adding dentry
flags to indicate common d_ops are set, rather than having to check them.
This saves a pointer memory access (dentry->d_op) in common path lookup
situations, and saves another pointer load and branch in cases where we
have d_op but not the particular operation.

Patched with:

git grep -E '[.>]([[:space:]])*d_op([[:space:]])*=' | xargs sed -e 's/\([^\t ]*\)->d_op = \(.*\);/d_set_d_op(\1, \2);/' -e 's/\([^\t ]*\)\.d_op = \(.*\);/d_set_d_op(\&\1, \2);/' -i
Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>

Change d_delete from a dentry deletion notification to a dentry caching
advise, more like ->drop_inode. Require it to be constant and idempotent,
and not take d_lock. This is how all existing filesystems use the callback
anyway.

This makes fine grained dentry locking of dput and dentry lru scanning
much simpler.
Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>

Because it caused a chroot ttyname regression in 2.6.36.

As of 2.6.36 ttyname does not work in a chroot.  It has already been
reported that screen breaks, and for me this breaks an automated
distribution testsuite, that I need to preserve the ability to run the
existing binaries on for several more years.  glibc 2.11.3 which has a
fix for this is not an option.

The root cause of this breakage is:

    commit 8df9d1a4
    Author: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
    Date:   Tue Aug 10 11:41:41 2010 +0200

    vfs: show unreachable paths in getcwd and proc

    Prepend "(unreachable)" to path strings if the path is not reachable
    from the current root.

    Two places updated are
     - the return string from getcwd()
     - and symlinks under /proc/$PID.

    Other uses of d_path() are left unchanged (we know that some old
    software crashes if /proc/mounts is changed).
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

So remove the nice sounding, but ultimately ill advised change to how
/proc/fd symlinks work.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

A recurring complaint from CFS users is that parallel kbuild has
a negative impact on desktop interactivity.  This patch
implements an idea from Linus, to automatically create task
groups.  Currently, only per session autogroups are implemented,
but the patch leaves the way open for enhancement.

Implementation: each task's signal struct contains an inherited
pointer to a refcounted autogroup struct containing a task group
pointer, the default for all tasks pointing to the
init_task_group.  When a task calls setsid(), a new task group
is created, the process is moved into the new task group, and a
reference to the preveious task group is dropped.  Child
processes inherit this task group thereafter, and increase it's
refcount.  When the last thread of a process exits, the
process's reference is dropped, such that when the last process
referencing an autogroup exits, the autogroup is destroyed.

At runqueue selection time, IFF a task has no cgroup assignment,
its current autogroup is used.

Autogroup bandwidth is controllable via setting it's nice level
through the proc filesystem:

  cat /proc/<pid>/autogroup

Displays the task's group and the group's nice level.

  echo <nice level> > /proc/<pid>/autogroup

Sets the task group's shares to the weight of nice <level> task.
Setting nice level is rate limited for !admin users due to the
abuse risk of task group locking.

The feature is enabled from boot by default if
CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP=y is selected, but can be disabled via
the boot option noautogroup, and can also be turned on/off on
the fly via:

  echo [01] > /proc/sys/kernel/sched_autogroup_enabled

... which will automatically move tasks to/from the root task group.
Signed-off-by: NMike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
[ Removed the task_group_path() debug code, and fixed !EVENTFD build failure. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
LKML-Reference: <1290281700.28711.9.camel@maggy.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

Oleg Nesterov pointed out we have to prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec
itself and we can reuse ->cred_guard_mutex for it.  Yes, concurrent
execve() has no worth.

Let's move ->cred_guard_mutex from task_struct to signal_struct.  It
naturally prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec.
Signed-off-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The locking order in oom_adjust_write() and oom_score_adj_write() for
task->alloc_lock and task->sighand->siglock is reversed, and lockdep
notices that irqs could encounter an ABBA scenario.

This fixes the locking order so that we always take task_lock(task) prior
to lock_task_sighand(task).
Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reported-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>