Selinux has an autogenerated file, "flask.h" which is included by
two other selinux files.  The current makefile has a single dependency
on the first object file in the selinux-y list, assuming that will get
flask.h generated before anyone looks for it, but that assumption breaks
down in a "make -jN" situation and you get:

   selinux/selinuxfs.c:35: fatal error: flask.h: No such file or directory
   compilation terminated.
   remake[9]: *** [security/selinux/selinuxfs.o] Error 1

Since flask.h is included by security.h which in turn is included
nearly everywhere, make the dependency apply to all of the selinux-y
list of objs.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Fix build error caused by a stale security/selinux/av_permissions.h in the $(src)
directory which will override a more recent version in $(obj) that is it
appears to strike only when building with a separate object directory.
Signed-off-by: NRalf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add a simple utility (scripts/selinux/genheaders) and invoke it to
generate the kernel-private class and permission indices in flask.h
and av_permissions.h automatically during the kernel build from the
security class mapping definitions in classmap.h.  Adding new kernel
classes and permissions can then be done just by adding them to classmap.h.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Much like we added a network node cache, this patch adds a network port
cache. The design is taken almost completely from the network node cache
which in turn was taken from the network interface cache.  The basic idea is
to cache entries in a hash table based on protocol/port information.  The
hash function only takes the port number into account since the number of
different protocols in use at any one time is expected to be relatively
small.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the
sel_netif_*() functions.  The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are
also modified to take advantage of this new functionality.  In addition, remove
the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is
redundant since we already have the address family.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Up until this patch the functions which have provided NetLabel support to
SELinux have been integrated into the SELinux security server, which for
various reasons is not really ideal.  This patch makes an effort to extract as
much of the NetLabel support from the security server as possibile and move it
into it's own file within the SELinux directory structure.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit
system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type,
sensitivity, and clearance).  These interfaces will allow the selinux
module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs,
rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within
the audit module.  It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion
of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons.
Signed-off-by: NDarrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Make SELinux depend on SECURITY_NETWORK (which depends on SECURITY), as it
requires the socket hooks for proper operation even in the local case.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.

This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to
create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies
(xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable
control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets.

Patch purpose:

The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access
control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated
IPSec security association.  Such access controls augment the existing
ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address.  The former
are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed.  By using
IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on
cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.  This enables
access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote
machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the
access control policy.

Patch design approach:

The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec
policy based on their security contexts.  Since the communication is
implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the
security association's negotiated and used have the same security
context.  The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such
security contexts for policies and security associations.  It also
enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned.
Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a
IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be
sent in that manner.

A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.

Patch implementation details:

The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested
operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is
selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup.  The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure
that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used,
then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet,
respectively.

The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts
when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user
interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc.  When a security association
is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the
XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via
selinux_xfrm_state_alloc.

When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if
any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone.

When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if
any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or
selinux_xfrm_state_free.

Testing:

The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools.  We
created policies and security associations with particular security
contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the
authorization decision.  We also made sure that packets for which no
security context was supplied (which either did or did not use
security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context.
Signed-off-by: NTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!