1. 30 1月, 2014 4 次提交
  2. 29 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  3. 28 1月, 2014 20 次提交
  4. 27 1月, 2014 2 次提交
  5. 26 1月, 2014 8 次提交
  6. 25 1月, 2014 3 次提交
    • O
      introduce __fcheck_files() to fix rcu_dereference_check_fdtable(), kill rcu_my_thread_group_empty() · a8d4b834
      Oleg Nesterov 提交于
      rcu_dereference_check_fdtable() looks very wrong,
      
      1. rcu_my_thread_group_empty() was added by 844b9a87 "vfs: fix
         RCU-lockdep false positive due to /proc" but it doesn't really
         fix the problem. A CLONE_THREAD (without CLONE_FILES) task can
         hit the same race with get_files_struct().
      
         And otoh rcu_my_thread_group_empty() can suppress the correct
         warning if the caller is the CLONE_FILES (without CLONE_THREAD)
         task.
      
      2. files->count == 1 check is not really right too. Even if this
         files_struct is not shared it is not safe to access it lockless
         unless the caller is the owner.
      
         Otoh, this check is sub-optimal. files->count == 0 always means
         it is safe to use it lockless even if files != current->files,
         but put_files_struct() has to take rcu_read_lock(). See the next
         patch.
      
      This patch removes the buggy checks and turns fcheck_files() into
      __fcheck_files() which uses rcu_dereference_raw(), the "unshared"
      callers, fget_light() and fget_raw_light(), can use it to avoid
      the warning from RCU-lockdep.
      
      fcheck_files() is trivially reimplemented as rcu_lockdep_assert()
      plus __fcheck_files().
      Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      a8d4b834
    • A
      nls: have register_nls() set ->owner · 479e64c2
      Al Viro 提交于
      pass owner explicitly to __register_nls(), make register_nls() a macro passing
      THIS_MODULE as the owner argument to __register_nls().
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      479e64c2
    • A
      cramfs: take headers to fs/cramfs · f7f4f4dd
      Al Viro 提交于
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      f7f4f4dd
  7. 24 1月, 2014 2 次提交
    • E
      drivers/w1/masters/w1-gpio.c: add strong pullup emulation · 3089a4c8
      Evgeny Boger 提交于
      Strong pullup is emulated by driving pin logic high after write command
      when using tri-state push-pull GPIO.
      Signed-off-by: NEvgeny Boger <boger@contactless.ru>
      Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
      Acked-by: NDavid Fries <david@fries.net>
      Acked-by: NEvgeniy Polyakov <zbr@ioremap.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      3089a4c8
    • K
      kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec_load · 7984754b
      Kees Cook 提交于
      For general-purpose (i.e.  distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build
      with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they
      want to do with kexec.  However, in the face of trying to lock down a
      system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec_load
      (much like module loading can be disabled).  Without this, it is too easy
      for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM
      and modules_disabled are set.  With this change, it is still possible to
      load an image for use later, then disable kexec_load so the image (or lack
      of image) can't be altered.
      
      The intention is for using this in environments where "perfect"
      enforcement is hard.  Without a verified boot, along with verified
      modules, and along with verified kexec, this is trying to give a system a
      better chance to defend itself (or at least grow the window of
      discoverability) against attack in the face of a privilege escalation.
      
      In my mind, I consider several boot scenarios:
      
      1) Verified boot of read-only verified root fs loading fd-based
         verification of kexec images.
      2) Secure boot of writable root fs loading signed kexec images.
      3) Regular boot loading kexec (e.g. kcrash) image early and locking it.
      4) Regular boot with no control of kexec image at all.
      
      1 and 2 don't exist yet, but will soon once the verified kexec series has
      landed.  4 is the state of things now.  The gap between 2 and 4 is too
      large, so this change creates scenario 3, a middle-ground above 4 when 2
      and 1 are not possible for a system.
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      7984754b