1. 30 11月, 2011 1 次提交
    • X
      sctp: better integer overflow check in sctp_auth_create_key() · c89304b8
      Xi Wang 提交于
      The check from commit 30c2235c is incomplete and cannot prevent
      cases like key_len = 0x80000000 (INT_MAX + 1).  In that case, the
      left-hand side of the check (INT_MAX - key_len), which is unsigned,
      becomes 0xffffffff (UINT_MAX) and bypasses the check.
      
      However this shouldn't be a security issue.  The function is called
      from the following two code paths:
      
       1) setsockopt()
      
       2) sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret()
      
      In case (1), sca_keylength is never going to exceed 65535 since it's
      bounded by a u16 from the user API.  As such, the key length will
      never overflow.
      
      In case (2), sca_keylength is computed based on the user key (1 short)
      and 2 * key_vector (3 shorts) for a total of 7 * USHRT_MAX, which still
      will not overflow.
      
      In other words, this overflow check is not really necessary.  Just
      make it more correct.
      Signed-off-by: NXi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
      Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c89304b8
  2. 29 11月, 2011 4 次提交
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