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  1. 10 8月, 2016 1 次提交
    • T
      x86/mm/KASLR: Fix physical memory calculation on KASLR memory randomization · c7d2361f
      由 Thomas Garnier 提交于 
      Initialize KASLR memory randomization after max_pfn is initialized. Also
ensure the size is rounded up. It could create problems on machines
with more than 1Tb of memory on certain random addresses.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Aleksey Makarov <aleksey.makarov@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 021182e5 ("Enable KASLR for physical mapping memory regions")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470762665-88032-1-git-send-email-thgarnie@google.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      c7d2361f
  3. 14 7月, 2016 1 次提交
    • P
      x86/kernel: Audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h · 186f4360
      由 Paul Gortmaker 提交于 
      Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends.  That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.

This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.  The advantage
in doing so is that module.h itself sources about 15 other headers;
adding significantly to what we feed cpp, and it can obscure what
headers we are effectively using.

Since module.h was the source for init.h (for __init) and for
export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each obj-y/bool instance
for the presence of either and replace as needed.  Build testing
revealed some implicit header usage that was fixed up accordingly.

Note that some bool/obj-y instances remain since module.h is
the header for some exception table entry stuff, and for things
like __init_or_module (code that is tossed when MODULES=n).
Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160714001901.31603-4-paul.gortmaker@windriver.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      186f4360
  5. 08 7月, 2016 1 次提交
    • T
      x86/mm: Implement ASLR for kernel memory regions · 0483e1fa
      由 Thomas Garnier 提交于 
      Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory regions for
x86_64. This first patch adds the infrastructure and does not randomize
any region. The following patches will randomize the physical memory
mapping, vmalloc and vmemmap regions.

This security feature mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel
addresses. These addresses can be used to disclose the kernel modules
base addresses or corrupt specific structures to elevate privileges
bypassing the current implementation of KASLR. This feature can be
enabled with the CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY option.

The order of each memory region is not changed. The feature looks at the
available space for the regions based on different configuration options
and randomizes the base and space between each. The size of the physical
memory mapping is the available physical memory. No performance impact
was detected while testing the feature.

Entropy is generated using the KASLR early boot functions now shared in
the lib directory (originally written by Kees Cook). Randomization is
done on PGD & PUD page table levels to increase possible addresses. The
physical memory mapping code was adapted to support PUD level virtual
addresses. This implementation on the best configuration provides 30,000
possible virtual addresses in average for each memory region.  An
additional low memory page is used to ensure each CPU can start with a
PGD aligned virtual address (for realmode).

x86/dump_pagetable was updated to correctly display each region.

Updated documentation on x86_64 memory layout accordingly.

Performance data, after all patches in the series:

Kernbench shows almost no difference (-+ less than 1%):

Before:

Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.63 (1.2695)
User Time 1034.89 (1.18115) System Time 87.056 (0.456416) Percent CPU 1092.9
(13.892) Context Switches 199805 (3455.33) Sleeps 97907.8 (900.636)

After:

Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.489 (1.10636)
User Time 1034.86 (1.36053) System Time 87.764 (0.49345) Percent CPU 1095
(12.7715) Context Switches 199036 (4298.1) Sleeps 97681.6 (1031.11)

Hackbench shows 0% difference on average (hackbench 90 repeated 10 times):

attemp,before,after 1,0.076,0.069 2,0.072,0.069 3,0.066,0.066 4,0.066,0.068
5,0.066,0.067 6,0.066,0.069 7,0.067,0.066 8,0.063,0.067 9,0.067,0.065
10,0.068,0.071 average,0.0677,0.0677
Signed-off-by: NThomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      0483e1fa
  7. 22 6月, 2016 1 次提交
  9. 19 4月, 2016 2 次提交
    • L
      ACPI / x86: Cleanup initrd related code · af06f8b7
      由 Lv Zheng 提交于 
      In arch/x86/kernel/setup.c, the #ifdef kept for CONFIG_ACPI actually is
related to the accessibility of initrd_start/initrd_end, so the stub should
be provided from this source file and should only be dependent on
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD.

Note that when ACPI=n and BLK_DEV_INITRD=y, early_initrd_acpi_init() is
still a stub because of the stub prepared for early_acpi_table_init().
Signed-off-by: NLv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      af06f8b7
    • L
      ACPI / tables: Move table override mechanisms to tables.c · 5ae74f2c
      由 Lv Zheng 提交于 
      This patch moves acpi_os_table_override() and
acpi_os_physical_table_override() to tables.c.

Along with the mechanisms, acpi_initrd_initialize_tables() is also moved to
tables.c to form a static function. The following functions are renamed
according to this change:
 1. acpi_initrd_override() -> renamed to early_acpi_table_init(), which
    invokes acpi_table_initrd_init()
 2. acpi_os_physical_table_override() -> which invokes
    acpi_table_initrd_override()
 3. acpi_initialize_initrd_tables() -> renamed to acpi_table_initrd_scan()
Signed-off-by: NLv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      5ae74f2c
  11. 15 4月, 2016 1 次提交
  13. 07 4月, 2016 1 次提交
  15. 19 2月, 2016 1 次提交
    • D
      x86/mm/pkeys: Dump pkey from VMA in /proc/pid/smaps · c1192f84
      由 Dave Hansen 提交于 
      The protection key can now be just as important as read/write
permissions on a VMA.  We need some debug mechanism to help
figure out if it is in play.  smaps seems like a logical
place to expose it.

arch/x86/kernel/setup.c is a bit of a weirdo place to put
this code, but it already had seq_file.h and there was not
a much better existing place to put it.

We also use no #ifdef.  If protection keys is .config'd out we
will effectively get the same function as if we used the weak
generic function.
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210227.4F8EB3F8@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      c1192f84
  17. 30 1月, 2016 1 次提交
    • T
      x86/e820: Set System RAM type and descriptor · f33b14a4
      由 Toshi Kani 提交于 
      Change e820_reserve_resources() to set 'flags' and 'desc' from
e820 types.

Set E820_RESERVED_KERN and E820_RAM's (System RAM) io resource
type to IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM.

Do the same for "Kernel data", "Kernel code", and "Kernel bss",
which are child nodes of System RAM.

I/O resource descriptor is set to 'desc' for entries that are
(and will be) target ranges of walk_iomem_res() and
region_intersects().
Signed-off-by: NToshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453841853-11383-5-git-send-email-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f33b14a4
  19. 06 12月, 2015 1 次提交
  21. 23 11月, 2015 1 次提交
  23. 07 11月, 2015 1 次提交
  25. 21 10月, 2015 6 次提交
  27. 16 10月, 2015 1 次提交
    • P
      x86/setup: Extend low identity map to cover whole kernel range · f5f3497c
      由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于 
      On 32-bit systems, the initial_page_table is reused by
efi_call_phys_prolog as an identity map to call
SetVirtualAddressMap.  efi_call_phys_prolog takes care of
converting the current CPU's GDT to a physical address too.

For PAE kernels the identity mapping is achieved by aliasing the
first PDPE for the kernel memory mapping into the first PDPE
of initial_page_table.  This makes the EFI stub's trick "just work".

However, for non-PAE kernels there is no guarantee that the identity
mapping in the initial_page_table extends as far as the GDT; in this
case, accesses to the GDT will cause a page fault (which quickly becomes
a triple fault).  Fix this by copying the kernel mappings from
swapper_pg_dir to initial_page_table twice, both at PAGE_OFFSET and at
identity mapping.

For some reason, this is only reproducible with QEMU's dynamic translation
mode, and not for example with KVM.  However, even under KVM one can clearly
see that the page table is bogus:

    $ qemu-system-i386 -pflash OVMF.fd -M q35 vmlinuz0 -s -S -daemonize
    $ gdb
    (gdb) target remote localhost:1234
    (gdb) hb *0x02858f6f
    Hardware assisted breakpoint 1 at 0x2858f6f
    (gdb) c
    Continuing.

    Breakpoint 1, 0x02858f6f in ?? ()
    (gdb) monitor info registers
    ...
    GDT=     0724e000 000000ff
    IDT=     fffbb000 000007ff
    CR0=0005003b CR2=ff896000 CR3=032b7000 CR4=00000690
    ...

The page directory is sane:

    (gdb) x/4wx 0x32b7000
    0x32b7000:	0x03398063	0x03399063	0x0339a063	0x0339b063
    (gdb) x/4wx 0x3398000
    0x3398000:	0x00000163	0x00001163	0x00002163	0x00003163
    (gdb) x/4wx 0x3399000
    0x3399000:	0x00400003	0x00401003	0x00402003	0x00403003

but our particular page directory entry is empty:

    (gdb) x/1wx 0x32b7000 + (0x724e000 >> 22) * 4
    0x32b7070:	0x00000000

[ It appears that you can skate past this issue if you don't receive
  any interrupts while the bogus GDT pointer is loaded, or if you avoid
  reloading the segment registers in general.

  Andy Lutomirski provides some additional insight:

   "AFAICT it's entirely permissible for the GDTR and/or LDT
    descriptor to point to unmapped memory.  Any attempt to use them
    (segment loads, interrupts, IRET, etc) will try to access that memory
    as if the access came from CPL 0 and, if the access fails, will
    generate a valid page fault with CR2 pointing into the GDT or
    LDT."

  Up until commit 23a0d4e8 ("efi: Disable interrupts around EFI
  calls, not in the epilog/prolog calls") interrupts were disabled
  around the prolog and epilog calls, and the functional GDT was
  re-installed before interrupts were re-enabled.

  Which explains why no one has hit this issue until now. ]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NLaszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
[ Updated changelog. ]
      f5f3497c
  29. 12 10月, 2015 1 次提交
    • T
      efi: Add "efi_fake_mem" boot option · 0f96a99d
      由 Taku Izumi 提交于 
      This patch introduces new boot option named "efi_fake_mem".
By specifying this parameter, you can add arbitrary attribute
to specific memory range.
This is useful for debugging of Address Range Mirroring feature.

For example, if "efi_fake_mem=2G@4G:0x10000,2G@0x10a0000000:0x10000"
is specified, the original (firmware provided) EFI memmap will be
updated so that the specified memory regions have
EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE attribute (0x10000):

 <original>
   efi: mem36: [Conventional Memory|  |  |  |  |  |   |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000100000000-0x00000020a0000000) (129536MB)

 <updated>
   efi: mem36: [Conventional Memory|  |MR|  |  |  |   |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000100000000-0x0000000180000000) (2048MB)
   efi: mem37: [Conventional Memory|  |  |  |  |  |   |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000180000000-0x00000010a0000000) (61952MB)
   efi: mem38: [Conventional Memory|  |MR|  |  |  |   |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x00000010a0000000-0x0000001120000000) (2048MB)
   efi: mem39: [Conventional Memory|  |  |  |  |  |   |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000001120000000-0x00000020a0000000) (63488MB)

And you will find that the following message is output:

   efi: Memory: 4096M/131455M mirrored memory
Signed-off-by: NTaku Izumi <izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Cc: Kamezawa Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      0f96a99d
  31. 11 9月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      kexec: split kexec_load syscall from kexec core code · 2965faa5
      由 Dave Young 提交于 
      There are two kexec load syscalls, kexec_load another and kexec_file_load.
 kexec_file_load has been splited as kernel/kexec_file.c.  In this patch I
split kexec_load syscall code to kernel/kexec.c.

And add a new kconfig option KEXEC_CORE, so we can disable kexec_load and
use kexec_file_load only, or vice verse.

The original requirement is from Ted Ts'o, he want kexec kernel signature
being checked with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.  But kexec-tools use
kexec_load syscall can bypass the checking.

Vivek Goyal proposed to create a common kconfig option so user can compile
in only one syscall for loading kexec kernel.  KEXEC/KEXEC_FILE selects
KEXEC_CORE so that old config files still work.

Because there's general code need CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE, so I updated all the
architecture Kconfig with a new option KEXEC_CORE, and let KEXEC selects
KEXEC_CORE in arch Kconfig.  Also updated general kernel code with to
kexec_load syscall.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      2965faa5
  33. 09 9月, 2015 1 次提交
    • M
      x86: use generic early mem copy · 5dd2c4bd
      由 Mark Salter 提交于 
      The early_ioremap library now has a generic copy_from_early_mem()
function.  Use the generic copy function for x86 relocate_initrd().

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove MAX_MAP_CHUNK define, per Yinghai Lu]
Signed-off-by: NMark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      5dd2c4bd
  35. 21 7月, 2015 1 次提交
  37. 25 6月, 2015 1 次提交
  39. 11 6月, 2015 1 次提交
    • J
      x86/crash: Allocate enough low memory when crashkernel=high · 94fb9334
      由 Joerg Roedel 提交于 
      When the crash kernel is loaded above 4GiB in memory, the
first kernel allocates only 72MiB of low-memory for the DMA
requirements of the second kernel. On systems with many
devices this is not enough and causes device driver
initialization errors and failed crash dumps. Testing by
SUSE and Redhat has shown that 256MiB is a good default
value for now and the discussion has lead to this value as
well. So set this default value to 256MiB to make sure there
is enough memory available for DMA.
Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
[ Reflow comment. ]
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jörg Rödel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1433500202-25531-4-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      94fb9334
  41. 05 6月, 2015 1 次提交
  43. 29 4月, 2015 1 次提交
    • J
      x86: introduce kaslr_offset() · 4545c898
      由 Jiri Kosina 提交于 
      Offset that has been chosen for kaslr during kernel decompression can be
easily computed as a difference between _text and __START_KERNEL. We are
already making use of this in dump_kernel_offset() notifier and in
arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo().

Introduce kaslr_offset() that makes this computation instead of hard-coding
it, so that other kernel code (such as live patching) can make use of it.
Also convert existing users to make use of it.

This patch is equivalent transofrmation without any effects on the resulting
code:

	$ diff -u vmlinux.old.asm vmlinux.new.asm
	--- vmlinux.old.asm     2015-04-28 17:55:19.520983368 +0200
	+++ vmlinux.new.asm     2015-04-28 17:55:24.141206072 +0200
	@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@

	-vmlinux.old:     file format elf64-x86-64
	+vmlinux.new:     file format elf64-x86-64

	Disassembly of section .text:
	$
Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      4545c898
  45. 24 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  47. 03 4月, 2015 1 次提交
    • B
      x86/mm/KASLR: Propagate KASLR status to kernel proper · 78cac48c
      由 Borislav Petkov 提交于 
      Commit:

  e2b32e67 ("x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address")

made module base address randomization unconditional and didn't regard
disabled KKASLR due to CONFIG_HIBERNATION and command line option
"nokaslr". For more info see (now reverted) commit:

  f47233c2 ("x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation")

In order to propagate KASLR status to kernel proper, we need a single bit
in boot_params.hdr.loadflags and we've chosen bit 1 thus leaving the
top-down allocated bits for bits supposed to be used by the bootloader.

Originally-From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      78cac48c
  49. 16 3月, 2015 1 次提交
    • B
      Revert "x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation" · 69797daf
      由 Borislav Petkov 提交于 
      This reverts commit:

  f47233c2 ("x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation")

The main reason for the revert is that the new boot flag does not work
at all currently, and in order to make this work, we need non-trivial
changes to the x86 boot code which we didn't manage to get done in
time for merging.

And even if we did, they would've been too risky so instead of
rushing things and break booting 4.1 on boxes left and right, we
will be very strict and conservative and will take our time with
this to fix and test it properly.
Reported-by: NYinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Junjie Mao <eternal.n08@gmail.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150316100628.GD22995@pd.tnicSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      69797daf
  51. 24 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  53. 19 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • J
      x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation · f47233c2
      由 Jiri Kosina 提交于 
      Commit:

  e2b32e67 ("x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address")

makes the base address for module to be unconditionally randomized in
case when CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is defined and "nokaslr" option isn't
present on the commandline.

This is not consistent with how choose_kernel_location() decides whether
it will randomize kernel load base.

Namely, CONFIG_HIBERNATION disables kASLR (unless "kaslr" option is
explicitly specified on kernel commandline), which makes the state space
larger than what module loader is looking at. IOW CONFIG_HIBERNATION &&
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is a valid config option, kASLR wouldn't be applied
by default in that case, but module loader is not aware of that.

Instead of fixing the logic in module.c, this patch takes more generic
aproach. It introduces a new bootparam setup data_type SETUP_KASLR and
uses that to pass the information whether kaslr has been applied during
kernel decompression, and sets a global 'kaslr_enabled' variable
accordingly, so that any kernel code (module loading, livepatching, ...)
can make decisions based on its value.

x86 module loader is converted to make use of this flag.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LNX.2.00.1502101411280.10719@pobox.suse.cz
[ Always dump correct kaslr status when panicking ]
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      f47233c2
  55. 14 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      x86_64: add KASan support · ef7f0d6a
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      This patch adds arch specific code for kernel address sanitizer.

16TB of virtual addressed used for shadow memory.  It's located in range
[ffffec0000000000 - fffffc0000000000] between vmemmap and %esp fixup
stacks.

At early stage we map whole shadow region with zero page.  Latter, after
pages mapped to direct mapping address range we unmap zero pages from
corresponding shadow (see kasan_map_shadow()) and allocate and map a real
shadow memory reusing vmemmap_populate() function.

Also replace __pa with __pa_nodebug before shadow initialized.  __pa with
CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y make external function call (__phys_addr)
__phys_addr is instrumented, so __asan_load could be called before shadow
area initialized.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ef7f0d6a
  57. 04 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  59. 23 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  61. 18 11月, 2014 1 次提交
    • D
      x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables · fe3d197f
      由 Dave Hansen 提交于 
      This is really the meat of the MPX patch set.  If there is one patch to
review in the entire series, this is the one.  There is a new ABI here
and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a
relatively unusual manner.  (small FAQ below).

Long Description:

This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the
management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel
allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables")
and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications
do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect
some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel
support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application
needs bounds table management from the MPX registers.  The prctl() is an
explicit signal from userspace.

PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to
require kernel's help in managing bounds tables.

PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't
want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel
won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX.

PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds
directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into
a new field (->bd_addr) in  the 'mm_struct'.  PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT
will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address.  Using this scheme, we can
use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in
kernel is enabled.

Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves,
which can be expensive.  Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce
the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time.
Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time
because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS.

==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ====

MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information.
If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to
spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this
which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers
and some new "bounds tables".

They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by
the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables
are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for
not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes
address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced
earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory
over to it.

The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because
the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely
frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to
memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall)
to access the tables would obviously destroy performance.

==== Why not do this in userspace? ====

This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel.
However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel.
It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are
a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are
practical in the real-world, but here they are.

Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so
   that we never have to allocate them?
A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual
   area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds
   directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of
   user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB,
   which is larger than the entire virtual address space today.
   This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a
   single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB
   of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely
   infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories.

Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory
   is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually
   need bounds tables?
A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every
   memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small,
   constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger
   scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the
   parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The
   kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls.

Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables
   allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel?
A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async
   handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still
   requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the
   allocation state there.

Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing
bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in
the kernel.
Based-on-patch-by: NQiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      fe3d197f
  63. 04 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  65. 28 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  67. 08 10月, 2014 1 次提交
    • B
      x86: Quark: Comment setup_arch() to document TLB/PGE bug · 2075244f
      由 Bryan O'Donoghue 提交于 
      Quark SoC X1000 advertises Page Global Enable for it's
Translation Lookaside Buffer via cpuid. The silicon does not
in fact support PGE and hence will not flush the TLB when CR4.PGE
is rewritten. The Quark documentation makes clear the necessity to
instead rewrite CR3 in order to flush any TLB entries, irrespective
of the state of CR4.PGE or an individual PTE.PGE

See Intel Quark Core DevMan_001.pdf section 6.4.11

In setup.c setup_arch() the code will load_cr3() and then do a
__flush_tlb_all().

On Quark the entire TLB will be flushed at the load_cr3().
The __flush_tlb_all() have no effect and can be safely ignored.

Later on in the boot process we switch off the flag for cpu_has_pge()
which means that subsequent calls to __flush_tlb_all() will
call __flush_tlb() not __flush_tlb_global() flushing the TLB in the
correct way via load_cr3() not CR4.PGE rewrite

This patch documents the behaviour of flushing the TLB for Quark in
setup_arch()

Comment text suggested by Thomas Gleixner
Signed-off-by: NBryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@nexus-software.ie>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: hmh@hmh.eng.br
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1412641189-12415-2-git-send-email-pure.logic@nexus-software.ieSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      2075244f