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  1. 31 10月, 2006 5 次提交
  3. 25 10月, 2006 2 次提交
    • P
      [NETFILTER]: Fix ip6_tables extension header bypass bug · 6d381634
      由 Patrick McHardy 提交于 
      As reported by Mark Dowd <Mark_Dowd@McAfee.com>, ip6_tables is susceptible
to a fragmentation attack causing false negatives on extension header matches.

When extension headers occur in the non-first fragment after the fragment
header (possibly with an incorrect nexthdr value in the fragment header)
a rule looking for this extension header will never match.

Drop fragments that are at offset 0 and don't contain the final protocol
header regardless of the ruleset, since this should not happen normally.
Since all extension headers are before the protocol header this makes sure
an extension header is either not present or in the first fragment, where
we can properly parse it.

With help from Yasuyuki KOZAKAI <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6d381634
    • P
      [NETFILTER]: Fix ip6_tables protocol bypass bug · 51d8b1a6
      由 Patrick McHardy 提交于 
      As reported by Mark Dowd <Mark_Dowd@McAfee.com>, ip6_tables is susceptible
to a fragmentation attack causing false negatives on protocol matches.

When the protocol header doesn't follow the fragment header immediately,
the fragment header contains the protocol number of the next extension
header. When the extension header and the protocol header are sent in
a second fragment a rule like "ip6tables .. -p udp -j DROP" will never
match.

Drop fragments that are at offset 0 and don't contain the final protocol
header regardless of the ruleset, since this should not happen normally.

With help from Yasuyuki KOZAKAI <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      51d8b1a6
  5. 22 10月, 2006 1 次提交
  7. 19 10月, 2006 6 次提交
  9. 16 10月, 2006 3 次提交
  11. 12 10月, 2006 5 次提交
    • Y
      [NET]: Use typesafe inet_twsk() inline function instead of cast. · 9469c7b4
      由 YOSHIFUJI Hideaki 提交于 
      Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      9469c7b4
    • Y
      [TCP]: Use TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED macro instead of magic number. · 4244f8a9
      由 YOSHIFUJI Hideaki 提交于 
      Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      4244f8a9
    • J
      [IPV6]: Seperate sit driver to extra module (addrconf.c changes) · 0be669bb
      由 Joerg Roedel 提交于 
      This patch contains the changes to net/ipv6/addrconf.c to remove sit
specific code if the sit driver is not selected.
Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <joro-lkml@zlug.org>
Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      0be669bb
    • J
      [IPV6]: Seperate sit driver to extra module · 989e5b96
      由 Joerg Roedel 提交于 
      This patch removes the driver of the IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnel driver (sit)
from the IPv6 module. It adds an option to Kconfig which makes it
possible to compile it as a seperate module.
Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <joro-lkml@zlug.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      989e5b96
    • V
      IPsec: correct semantics for SELinux policy matching · 5b368e61
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
xfrm(s) applied.

The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
"deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
default" in the above case.

This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.

With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).

Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
such as -EINVAL.  We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.

The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.

Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely).  This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).

This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.

This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
with the IPSec policy rule.

Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
is now handled properly.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      5b368e61
  13. 04 10月, 2006 4 次提交
  15. 29 9月, 2006 9 次提交
  17. 23 9月, 2006 5 次提交