1. 06 2月, 2015 2 次提交
  2. 05 2月, 2015 6 次提交
  3. 04 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • V
      ipv6: Select fragment id during UFO segmentation if not set. · 0508c07f
      Vlad Yasevich 提交于
      If the IPv6 fragment id has not been set and we perform
      fragmentation due to UFO, select a new fragment id.
      We now consider a fragment id of 0 as unset and if id selection
      process returns 0 (after all the pertrubations), we set it to
      0x80000000, thus giving us ample space not to create collisions
      with the next packet we may have to fragment.
      
      When doing UFO integrity checking, we also select the
      fragment id if it has not be set yet.   This is stored into
      the skb_shinfo() thus allowing UFO to function correclty.
      
      This patch also removes duplicate fragment id generation code
      and moves ipv6_select_ident() into the header as it may be
      used during GSO.
      Signed-off-by: NVladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      0508c07f
  4. 02 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • E
      ipv4: tcp: get rid of ugly unicast_sock · bdbbb852
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      In commit be9f4a44 ("ipv4: tcp: remove per net tcp_sock")
      I tried to address contention on a socket lock, but the solution
      I chose was horrible :
      
      commit 3a7c384f ("ipv4: tcp: unicast_sock should not land outside
      of TCP stack") addressed a selinux regression.
      
      commit 0980e56e ("ipv4: tcp: set unicast_sock uc_ttl to -1")
      took care of another regression.
      
      commit b5ec8eea ("ipv4: fix ip_send_skb()") fixed another regression.
      
      commit 811230cd ("tcp: ipv4: initialize unicast_sock sk_pacing_rate")
      was another shot in the dark.
      
      Really, just use a proper socket per cpu, and remove the skb_orphan()
      call, to re-enable flow control.
      
      This solves a serious problem with FQ packet scheduler when used in
      hostile environments, as we do not want to allocate a flow structure
      for every RST packet sent in response to a spoofed packet.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      bdbbb852
  5. 31 1月, 2015 4 次提交
  6. 30 1月, 2015 3 次提交
  7. 29 1月, 2015 7 次提交
  8. 28 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  9. 27 1月, 2015 7 次提交
    • H
      ipv6: replacing a rt6_info needs to purge possible propagated rt6_infos too · 6e9e16e6
      Hannes Frederic Sowa 提交于
      Lubomir Rintel reported that during replacing a route the interface
      reference counter isn't correctly decremented.
      
      To quote bug <https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=91941>:
      | [root@rhel7-5 lkundrak]# sh -x lal
      | + ip link add dev0 type dummy
      | + ip link set dev0 up
      | + ip link add dev1 type dummy
      | + ip link set dev1 up
      | + ip addr add 2001:db8:8086::2/64 dev dev0
      | + ip route add 2001:db8:8086::/48 dev dev0 proto static metric 20
      | + ip route add 2001:db8:8088::/48 dev dev1 proto static metric 10
      | + ip route replace 2001:db8:8086::/48 dev dev1 proto static metric 20
      | + ip link del dev0 type dummy
      | Message from syslogd@rhel7-5 at Jan 23 10:54:41 ...
      |  kernel:unregister_netdevice: waiting for dev0 to become free. Usage count = 2
      |
      | Message from syslogd@rhel7-5 at Jan 23 10:54:51 ...
      |  kernel:unregister_netdevice: waiting for dev0 to become free. Usage count = 2
      
      During replacement of a rt6_info we must walk all parent nodes and check
      if the to be replaced rt6_info got propagated. If so, replace it with
      an alive one.
      
      Fixes: 4a287eba ("IPv6 routing, NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about missing CREATE flag")
      Reported-by: NLubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
      Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
      Tested-by: NLubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6e9e16e6
    • S
      ping: Fix race in free in receive path · fc752f1f
      subashab@codeaurora.org 提交于
      An exception is seen in ICMP ping receive path where the skb
      destructor sock_rfree() tries to access a freed socket. This happens
      because ping_rcv() releases socket reference with sock_put() and this
      internally frees up the socket. Later icmp_rcv() will try to free the
      skb and as part of this, skb destructor is called and which leads
      to a kernel panic as the socket is freed already in ping_rcv().
      
      -->|exception
      -007|sk_mem_uncharge
      -007|sock_rfree
      -008|skb_release_head_state
      -009|skb_release_all
      -009|__kfree_skb
      -010|kfree_skb
      -011|icmp_rcv
      -012|ip_local_deliver_finish
      
      Fix this incorrect free by cloning this skb and processing this cloned
      skb instead.
      
      This patch was suggested by Eric Dumazet
      Signed-off-by: NSubash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      fc752f1f
    • H
      udp_diag: Fix socket skipping within chain · 86f3cddb
      Herbert Xu 提交于
      While working on rhashtable walking I noticed that the UDP diag
      dumping code is buggy.  In particular, the socket skipping within
      a chain never happens, even though we record the number of sockets
      that should be skipped.
      
      As this code was supposedly copied from TCP, this patch does what
      TCP does and resets num before we walk a chain.
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      86f3cddb
    • H
      ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect · df4d9254
      Hannes Frederic Sowa 提交于
      Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
      on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
      since commit f8864972 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
      
      Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
      will force dst_release to free them via RCU.  Unfortunately waiting for
      RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
      waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
      catch up under high softirq load.
      
      Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
      us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
      and deallocation.
      
      This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
      
      Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
      Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
      Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJulian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      df4d9254
    • D
      net: sctp: fix slab corruption from use after free on INIT collisions · 600ddd68
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as
      already described in detail in commit 1be9a950 ("net: sctp: inherit
      auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally
      still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to
      have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950 ...
      
      [  533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
      [  533.913657] IP: [<ffffffff811ac385>] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230
      [  533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0
      [  533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      [  533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...]
      [  534.939704] Call Trace:
      [  534.951833]  [<ffffffff81294e30>] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
      [  534.984213]  [<ffffffff81294e30>] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
      [  535.015025]  [<ffffffff8128c8ed>] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170
      [  535.045661]  [<ffffffff8128d12c>] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0
      [  535.074593]  [<ffffffff8160bd42>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50
      [  535.105239]  [<ffffffffa0418c11>] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp]
      [  535.138606]  [<ffffffff814e43bd>] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0
      [  535.166848]  [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      
      ... or depending on the the application, for example this one:
      
      [ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
      [ 1370.026506] IP: [<ffffffff811ab455>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0
      [ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0
      [ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      [ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...]
      [ 1370.963431] Call Trace:
      [ 1370.974632]  [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
      [ 1371.000863]  [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
      [ 1371.027154]  [<ffffffff812100d3>] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170
      [ 1371.054679]  [<ffffffff811e3d67>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130
      [ 1371.080183]  [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      
      With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten:
      
      [  669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G        W     ): Poison overwritten
      [  669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b
      [  669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494
      [  669.826424]  __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566
      [  669.826433]  __kmalloc+0x280/0x310
      [  669.826453]  sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp]
      [  669.826471]  sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp]
      [  669.826488]  sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp]
      [  669.826505]  sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...]
      [  669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494
      [  669.826635]  __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8
      [  669.826643]  kfree+0x1d6/0x230
      [  669.826650]  kzfree+0x31/0x40
      [  669.826666]  sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp]
      [  669.826681]  sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp]
      [  669.826695]  sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp]
      
      Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at
      heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice
      when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again
      from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on
      the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation
      of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected
      at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation).
      
      Reference counting of auth keys revisited:
      
      Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations
      in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being
      added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached
      and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds
      a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which
      keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc
      or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and
      the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped.
      
      User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct
      sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or
      adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes
      with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old
      sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt()
      on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either
      endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places)
      sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key().
      
      sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's
      and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key
      directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops
      the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we
      eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with
      intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in
      sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to
      set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
      
      To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret
      material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track
      of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a7
      ("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of
      this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures
      being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly
      on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are
      being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount
      of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is
      to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics.
      
      Fixes: 730fc3d0 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      600ddd68
    • D
      net: cls_bpf: fix auto generation of per list handles · 3f2ab135
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      When creating a bpf classifier in tc with priority collisions and
      invoking automatic unique handle assignment, cls_bpf_grab_new_handle()
      will return a wrong handle id which in fact is non-unique. Usually
      altering of specific filters is being addressed over major id, but
      in case of collisions we result in a filter chain, where handle ids
      address individual cls_bpf_progs inside the classifier.
      
      Issue is, in cls_bpf_grab_new_handle() we probe for head->hgen handle
      in cls_bpf_get() and in case we found a free handle, we're supposed
      to use exactly head->hgen. In case of insufficient numbers of handles,
      we bail out later as handle id 0 is not allowed.
      
      Fixes: 7d1d65cb ("net: sched: cls_bpf: add BPF-based classifier")
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
      Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      3f2ab135
    • D
      net: cls_bpf: fix size mismatch on filter preparation · 7913ecf6
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      In cls_bpf_modify_existing(), we read out the number of filter blocks,
      do some sanity checks, allocate a block on that size, and copy over the
      BPF instruction blob from user space, then pass everything through the
      classic BPF checker prior to installation of the classifier.
      
      We should reject mismatches here, there are 2 scenarios: the number of
      filter blocks could be smaller than the provided instruction blob, so
      we do a partial copy of the BPF program, and thus the instructions will
      either be rejected from the verifier or a valid BPF program will be run;
      in the other case, we'll end up copying more than we're supposed to,
      and most likely the trailing garbage will be rejected by the verifier
      as well (i.e. we need to fit instruction pattern, ret {A,K} needs to be
      last instruction, load/stores must be correct, etc); in case not, we
      would leak memory when dumping back instruction patterns. The code should
      have only used nla_len() as Dave noted to avoid this from the beginning.
      Anyway, lets fix it by rejecting such load attempts.
      
      Fixes: 7d1d65cb ("net: sched: cls_bpf: add BPF-based classifier")
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7913ecf6
  10. 26 1月, 2015 3 次提交
    • P
      netfilter: nf_tables: disable preemption when restoring chain counters · e8781f70
      Pablo Neira Ayuso 提交于
      With CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT=y
      
      [22144.496057] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: iptables-compat/10406
      [22144.496061] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x1b
      [22144.496065] CPU: 2 PID: 10406 Comm: iptables-compat Not tainted 3.19.0-rc4+ #
      [...]
      [22144.496092] Call Trace:
      [22144.496098]  [<ffffffff8145b9fa>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b
      [22144.496104]  [<ffffffff81244f52>] check_preemption_disabled+0xd6/0xe8
      [22144.496110]  [<ffffffff81244f90>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x1b
      [22144.496120]  [<ffffffffa07c557e>] nft_stats_alloc+0x94/0xc7 [nf_tables]
      [22144.496130]  [<ffffffffa07c73d2>] nf_tables_newchain+0x471/0x6d8 [nf_tables]
      [22144.496140]  [<ffffffffa07c5ef6>] ? nft_trans_alloc+0x18/0x34 [nf_tables]
      [22144.496154]  [<ffffffffa063c8da>] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x2b4/0x457 [nfnetlink]
      Reported-by: NAndreas Schultz <aschultz@tpip.net>
      Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      e8781f70
    • M
      ipv6: Fix __ip6_route_redirect · b0a1ba59
      Martin KaFai Lau 提交于
      In my last commit (a3c00e46: ipv6: Remove BACKTRACK macro), the changes in
      __ip6_route_redirect is incorrect.  The following case is missed:
      1. The for loop tries to find a valid gateway rt. If it fails to find
         one, rt will be NULL.
      2. When rt is NULL, it is set to the ip6_null_entry.
      3. The newly added 'else if', from a3c00e46, will stop the backtrack from
         happening.
      Signed-off-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b0a1ba59
    • V
      net: dsa: set slave MII bus PHY mask · 24df8986
      Vivien Didelot 提交于
      When registering a mdio bus, Linux assumes than every port has a PHY and tries
      to scan it. If a switch port has no PHY registered, DSA will fail to register
      the slave MII bus. To fix this, set the slave MII bus PHY mask to the switch
      PHYs mask.
      
      As an example, if we use a Marvell MV88E6352 (which is a 7-port switch with no
      registered PHYs for port 5 and port 6), with the following declared names:
      
      	static struct dsa_chip_data switch_cdata = {
      		[...]
      		.port_names[0] = "sw0",
      		.port_names[1] = "sw1",
      		.port_names[2] = "sw2",
      		.port_names[3] = "sw3",
      		.port_names[4] = "sw4",
      		.port_names[5] = "cpu",
      	};
      
      DSA will fail to create the switch instance. With the PHY mask set for the
      slave MII bus, only the PHY for ports 0-4 will be scanned and the instance will
      be successfully created.
      Signed-off-by: NVivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@savoirfairelinux.com>
      Tested-by: NFlorian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NFlorian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      24df8986
  11. 25 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  12. 23 1月, 2015 4 次提交