Also makes use of copy_sec_ctx() in another place and removes
duplicated code.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This simplifies successful return codes from >0 to 0.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Similar to the issue we had with template families which
specified the inner families of policies, we need to set
the inner families of states as the main xfrm user Openswan
leaves it as zero.

af_key is unaffected because the inner family is set by it
and not the KM.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Currently we check for permission before deleting entries from SAD and
SPD, (see security_xfrm_policy_delete() security_xfrm_state_delete())
However we are not checking for authorization when flushing the SPD and
the SAD completely. It was perhaps missed in the original security hooks
patch.

This patch adds a security check when flushing entries from the SAD and
SPD.  It runs the entire database and checks each entry for a denial.
If the process attempting the flush is unable to remove all of the
entries a denial is logged the the flush function returns an error
without removing anything.

This is particularly useful when a process may need to create or delete
its own xfrm entries used for things like labeled networking but that
same process should not be able to delete other entries or flush the
entire database.

Signed-off-by: Joy Latten<latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Aggregate the SPD info TLVs.
Signed-off-by: NJamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Aggregate the SAD info TLVs.
Signed-off-by: NJamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

With this patch you can use iproute2 in user space to efficiently see
how many policies exist in different directions.
Signed-off-by: NJamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This brings the SAD info in sync with net-2.6.22/net-2.6
Signed-off-by: NJamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

On a system with a lot of SAs, counting SAD entries chews useful
CPU time since you need to dump the whole SAD to user space;
i.e something like ip xfrm state ls | grep -i src | wc -l
I have seen taking literally minutes on a 40K SAs when the system
is swapping.
With this patch, some of the SAD info (that was already being tracked)
is exposed to user space. i.e you do:
ip xfrm state count
And you get the count; you can also pass -s to the command line and
get the hash info.
Signed-off-by: NJamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Spring cleaning time...

There seems to be a lot of places in the network code that have
extra bogus semicolons after conditionals.  Most commonly is a
bogus semicolon after: switch() { }
Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Switch cb_lock to mutex and allow netlink kernel users to override it
with a subsystem specific mutex for consistent locking in dump callbacks.
All netlink_dump_start users have been audited not to rely on any
side-effects of the previously used spinlock.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Now that all users of netlink_dump_start() use netlink_run_queue()
to process the receive queue, it is possible to return -EINTR from
netlink_dump_start() directly, therefore simplying the callers.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The error pointer argument in netlink message handlers is used
to signal the special case where processing has to be interrupted
because a dump was started but no error happened. Instead it is
simpler and more clear to return -EINTR and have netlink_run_queue()
deal with getting the queue right.

nfnetlink passed on this error pointer to its subsystem handlers
but only uses it to signal the start of a netlink dump. Therefore
it can be removed there as well.

This patch also cleans up the error handling in the affected
message handlers to be consistent since it had to be touched anyway.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Changes netlink_rcv_skb() to skip netlink controll messages and don't
pass them on to the message handler.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

netlink_rcv_skb() is changed to skip messages which don't have the
NLM_F_REQUEST bit to avoid every netlink family having to perform this
check on their own.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

So that it is also an offset from skb->head, reduces its size from 8 to 4 bytes
on 64bit architectures, allowing us to combine the 4 bytes hole left by the
layer headers conversion, reducing struct sk_buff size to 256 bytes, i.e. 4
64byte cachelines, and since the sk_buff slab cache is SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN...
:-)

Many calculations that previously required that skb->{transport,network,
mac}_header be first converted to a pointer now can be done directly, being
meaningful as offsets or pointers.
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When sending a security context of 50+ characters in an ACQUIRE 
message, following kernel panic occurred.

kernel BUG in xfrm_send_acquire at net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1781!
cpu 0x3: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c0000000421bb2e0]
    pc: c00000000033b074: .xfrm_send_acquire+0x240/0x2c8
    lr: c00000000033b014: .xfrm_send_acquire+0x1e0/0x2c8
    sp: c0000000421bb560
   msr: 8000000000029032
  current = 0xc00000000fce8f00
  paca    = 0xc000000000464b00
    pid   = 2303, comm = ping
kernel BUG in xfrm_send_acquire at net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1781!
enter ? for help
3:mon> t
[c0000000421bb650] c00000000033538c .km_query+0x6c/0xec
[c0000000421bb6f0] c000000000337374 .xfrm_state_find+0x7f4/0xb88
[c0000000421bb7f0] c000000000332350 .xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0xc4/0x21c
[c0000000421bb8d0] c0000000003326e8 .xfrm_lookup+0x1a0/0x5b0
[c0000000421bba00] c0000000002e6ea0 .ip_route_output_flow+0x88/0xb4
[c0000000421bbaa0] c0000000003106d8 .ip4_datagram_connect+0x218/0x374
[c0000000421bbbd0] c00000000031bc00 .inet_dgram_connect+0xac/0xd4
[c0000000421bbc60] c0000000002b11ac .sys_connect+0xd8/0x120
[c0000000421bbd90] c0000000002d38d0 .compat_sys_socketcall+0xdc/0x214
[c0000000421bbe30] c00000000000869c syscall_exit+0x0/0x40
--- Exception: c00 (System Call) at 0000000007f0ca9c
SP (fc0ef8f0) is in userspace

We are using size of security context from xfrm_policy to determine
how much space to alloc skb and then putting security context from
xfrm_state into skb. Should have been using size of security context 
from xfrm_state to alloc skb. Following fix does that
Signed-off-by: NJoy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Turning up the warnings on gcc makes it emit warnings
about the placement of 'inline' in function declarations.
Here's everything that was under net/
Signed-off-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Inside pfkey_delete and xfrm_del_sa the audit hooks were not called if
there was any permission/security failures in attempting to do the del
operation (such as permission denied from security_xfrm_state_delete).
This patch moves the audit hook to the exit path such that all failures
(and successes) will actually get audited.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The security hooks to check permissions to remove an xfrm_policy were
actually done after the policy was removed.  Since the unlinking and
deletion are done in xfrm_policy_by* functions this moves the hooks
inside those 2 functions.  There we have all the information needed to
do the security check and it can be done before the deletion.  Since
auditing requires the result of that security check err has to be passed
back and forth from the xfrm_policy_by* functions.

This patch also fixes a bug where a deletion that failed the security
check could cause improper accounting on the xfrm_policy
(xfrm_get_policy didn't have a put on the exit path for the hold taken
by xfrm_policy_by*)

It also fixes the return code when no policy is found in
xfrm_add_pol_expire.  In old code (at least back in the 2.6.18 days) err
wasn't used before the return when no policy is found and so the
initialization would cause err to be ENOENT.  But since err has since
been used above when we don't get a policy back from the xfrm_policy_by*
function we would always return 0 instead of the intended ENOENT.  Also
fixed some white space damage in the same area.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

As noted by Kent Yoder, this function will always return an
error.  Make sure it returns zero on success.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Make sure that this function is called correctly, and
add BUG() checking to ensure the arguments are sane.

Based upon a patch by Joy Latten.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add user interface for handling XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE. The message is issued
by user application. When kernel receives the message, procedure of
updating XFRM databases will take place.
Signed-off-by: NShinta Sugimoto <shinta.sugimoto@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: NMasahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

All ->doit handlers want a struct rtattr **, so pass down the right
type.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

An audit message occurs when an ipsec SA
or ipsec policy is created/deleted.
Signed-off-by: NJoy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Since we never checked the ->family value of templates
before, many applications simply leave it at zero.
Detect this and fix it up to be the pol->family value.

Also, do not clobber xp->family while reading in templates,
that is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

aevents can not uniquely identify an SA. We break the ABI with this
patch, but consensus is that since it is not yet utilized by any
(known) application then it is fine (better do it now than later).
Signed-off-by: NJamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NMiika Komu <miika@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: NDiego Beltrami <Diego.Beltrami@hiit.fi>
Signed-off-by: NKazunori Miyazawa <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Caught by the EyeBalls(tm) of Thomas Graf
Signed-off-by: NJamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Might as well make flush notifier prettier when subpolicy used
Signed-off-by: NJamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The destination PID is passed directly to netlink_unicast()
respectively netlink_multicast().
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>

Make copy_to_user_policy_type take a type instead a policy and
fix its users to pass the type
Signed-off-by: NJamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When application uses XFRM_MSG_GETSA to get state entry through
netlink socket and kernel has no matching one, the application expects
reply message with error status by kernel.

Kernel doesn't send the message back in the case of Mobile IPv6 route
optimization protocols (i.e. routing header or destination options
header). This is caused by incorrect return code "0" from
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c(xfrm_user_state_lookup) and it makes kernel skip
to acknowledge at net/netlink/af_netlink.c(netlink_rcv_skb).

This patch fix to reply ESRCH to application.
Signed-off-by: NMasahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NTAKAMIYA Noriaki <takamiya@po.ntts.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>