- 07 2月, 2018 15 次提交
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由 Yury Norov 提交于
with bitmap_{from,to}_arr32 over the kernel. Additionally to it: * __check_eq_bitmap() now takes single nbits argument. * __check_eq_u32_array is not used in new test but may be used in future. So I don't remove it here, but annotate as __used. Tested on arm64 and 32-bit BE mips. [arnd@arndb.de: perf: arm_dsu_pmu: convert to bitmap_from_arr32] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180201172508.5739-2-ynorov@caviumnetworks.com [ynorov@caviumnetworks.com: fix net/core/ethtool.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180205071747.4ekxtsbgxkj5b2fz@yury-thinkpad Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171228150019.27953-2-ynorov@caviumnetworks.comSigned-off-by: NYury Norov <ynorov@caviumnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: David Decotigny <decot@googlers.com>, Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>, Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
Now that we've standardised on SMCCC v1.1 to perform the branch prediction invalidation, let's drop the previous band-aid. If vendors haven't updated their firmware to do SMCCC 1.1, they haven't updated PSCI either, so we don't loose anything. Tested-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
Add the detection and runtime code for ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1. It is lovely. Really. Tested-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
It is possible to take an IRQ from EL0 following a branch to a kernel address in such a way that the IRQ is prioritised over the instruction abort. Whilst an attacker would need to get the stars to align here, it might be sufficient with enough calibration so perform BP hardening in the rare case that we see a kernel address in the ELR when handling an IRQ from EL0. Reported-by: NDan Hettena <dhettena@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Software-step and PC alignment fault exceptions have higher priority than instruction abort exceptions, so apply the BP hardening hooks there too if the user PC appears to reside in kernel space. Reported-by: NDan Hettena <dhettena@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Like we've done for get_user and put_user, ensure that user pointers are masked before invoking the underlying __arch_{clear,copy_*}_user operations. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
In a similar manner to array_index_mask_nospec, this patch introduces an assembly macro (mask_nospec64) which can be used to bound a value under speculation. This macro is then used to ensure that the indirect branch through the syscall table is bounded under speculation, with out-of-range addresses speculating as calls to sys_io_setup (0). Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Robin Murphy 提交于
Currently, USER_DS represents an exclusive limit while KERNEL_DS is inclusive. In order to do some clever trickery for speculation-safe masking, we need them both to behave equivalently - there aren't enough bits to make KERNEL_DS exclusive, so we have precisely one option. This also happens to correct a longstanding false negative for a range ending on the very top byte of kernel memory. Mark Rutland points out that we've actually got the semantics of addresses vs. segments muddled up in most of the places we need to amend, so shuffle the {USER,KERNEL}_DS definitions around such that we can correct those properly instead of just pasting "-1"s everywhere. Signed-off-by: NRobin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
The identity map is mapped as both writeable and executable by the SWAPPER_MM_MMUFLAGS and this is relied upon by the kpti code to manage a synchronisation flag. Update the .pushsection flags to reflect the actual mapping attributes. Reported-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
pte_to_phys lives in assembler.h and takes its destination register as the first argument. Move phys_to_pte out of head.S to sit with its counterpart and rejig it to follow the same calling convention. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
We don't fully understand the Cavium ThunderX erratum, but it appears that mapping the kernel as nG can lead to horrible consequences such as attempting to execute userspace from kernel context. Since kpti isn't enabled for these CPUs anyway, simplify the comment justifying the lack of post_ttbr_update_workaround in the exception trampoline. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Since AArch64 assembly instructions take the destination register as their first operand, do the same thing for the phys_to_ttbr macro. Acked-by: NRobin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
Cavium ThunderX's erratum 27456 results in a corruption of icache entries that are loaded from memory that is mapped as non-global (i.e. ASID-tagged). As KPTI is based on memory being mapped non-global, let's prevent it from kicking in if this erratum is detected. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> [will: Update comment] Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Defaulting to global mappings for kernel space is generally good for performance and appears to be necessary for Cavium ThunderX. If we subsequently decide that we need to enable kpti, then we need to rewrite our existing page table entries to be non-global. This is fiddly, and made worse by the possible use of contiguous mappings, which require a strict break-before-make sequence. Since the enable callback runs on each online CPU from stop_machine context, we can have all CPUs enter the idmap, where secondaries can wait for the primary CPU to rewrite swapper with its MMU off. It's all fairly horrible, but at least it only runs once. Tested-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Shanker Donthineni 提交于
The ARM architecture defines the memory locations that are permitted to be accessed as the result of a speculative instruction fetch from an exception level for which all stages of translation are disabled. Specifically, the core is permitted to speculatively fetch from the 4KB region containing the current program counter 4K and next 4K. When translation is changed from enabled to disabled for the running exception level (SCTLR_ELn[M] changed from a value of 1 to 0), the Falkor core may errantly speculatively access memory locations outside of the 4KB region permitted by the architecture. The errant memory access may lead to one of the following unexpected behaviors. 1) A System Error Interrupt (SEI) being raised by the Falkor core due to the errant memory access attempting to access a region of memory that is protected by a slave-side memory protection unit. 2) Unpredictable device behavior due to a speculative read from device memory. This behavior may only occur if the instruction cache is disabled prior to or coincident with translation being changed from enabled to disabled. The conditions leading to this erratum will not occur when either of the following occur: 1) A higher exception level disables translation of a lower exception level (e.g. EL2 changing SCTLR_EL1[M] from a value of 1 to 0). 2) An exception level disabling its stage-1 translation if its stage-2 translation is enabled (e.g. EL1 changing SCTLR_EL1[M] from a value of 1 to 0 when HCR_EL2[VM] has a value of 1). To avoid the errant behavior, software must execute an ISB immediately prior to executing the MSR that will change SCTLR_ELn[M] from 1 to 0. Signed-off-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 06 2月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Mathieu Desnoyers 提交于
Signed-off-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Cc: David Sehr <sehr@google.com> Cc: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Maged Michael <maged.michael@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180129202020.8515-11-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 24 1月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Jayachandran C 提交于
Whitelist Broadcom Vulcan/Cavium ThunderX2 processors in unmap_kernel_at_el0(). These CPUs are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-5754 and do not need KPTI when KASLR is off. Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NJayachandran C <jnair@caviumnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Jayachandran C 提交于
Use PSCI based mitigation for speculative execution attacks targeting the branch predictor. We use the same mechanism as the one used for Cortex-A CPUs, we expect the PSCI version call to have a side effect of clearing the BTBs. Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NJayachandran C <jnair@caviumnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
When a CPU is brought up after we have finalised the system wide capabilities (i.e, features and errata), we make sure the new CPU doesn't need a new errata work around which has not been detected already. However we don't run enable() method on the new CPU for the errata work arounds already detected. This could cause the new CPU running without potential work arounds. It is upto the "enable()" method to decide if this CPU should do something about the errata. Fixes: commit 6a6efbb4 ("arm64: Verify CPU errata work arounds on hotplugged CPU") Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cc: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 23 1月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
There are so many places that build struct siginfo by hand that at least one of them is bound to get it wrong. A handful of cases in the kernel arguably did just that when using the errno field of siginfo to pass no errno values to userspace. The usage is limited to a single si_code so at least does not mess up anything else. Encapsulate this questionable pattern in a helper function so that the userspace ABI is preserved. Update all of the places that use this pattern to use the new helper function. Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
The siginfo structure has all manners of holes with the result that a structure initializer is not guaranteed to initialize all of the bits. As we have to copy the structure to userspace don't even try to use a structure initializer. Instead use clear_siginfo followed by initializing selected fields. This gives a guarantee that uninitialized kernel memory is not copied to userspace. Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Instead of jumpping while !is_compat_task placee all of the code inside of an if (is_compat_task) block. This allows the int i variable to be properly limited to the compat block no matter how the rest of ptrace_hbptriggered changes. In a following change a non-variable declaration will preceed was made independent to ensure the code is easy to review. Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 17 1月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Catalin Marinas 提交于
With ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN enabled, the exception entry code checks the active ASID to decide whether user access was enabled (non-zero ASID) when the exception was taken. On return from exception, if user access was previously disabled, it re-instates TTBR0_EL1 from the per-thread saved value (updated in switch_mm() or efi_set_pgd()). Commit 7655abb9 ("arm64: mm: Move ASID from TTBR0 to TTBR1") makes a TTBR0_EL1 + ASID switching non-atomic. Subsequently, commit 27a921e7 ("arm64: mm: Fix and re-enable ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN") changes the __uaccess_ttbr0_disable() function and asm macro to first write the reserved TTBR0_EL1 followed by the ASID=0 update in TTBR1_EL1. If an exception occurs between these two, the exception return code will re-instate a valid TTBR0_EL1. Similar scenario can happen in cpu_switch_mm() between setting the reserved TTBR0_EL1 and the ASID update in cpu_do_switch_mm(). This patch reverts the entry.S check for ASID == 0 to TTBR0_EL1 and disables the interrupts around the TTBR0_EL1 and ASID switching code in __uaccess_ttbr0_disable(). It also ensures that, when returning from the EFI runtime services, efi_set_pgd() doesn't leave a non-zero ASID in TTBR1_EL1 by using uaccess_ttbr0_{enable,disable}. The accesses to current_thread_info()->ttbr0 are updated to use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE. As a safety measure, __uaccess_ttbr0_enable() always masks out any existing non-zero ASID TTBR1_EL1 before writing in the new ASID. Fixes: 27a921e7 ("arm64: mm: Fix and re-enable ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN") Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reported-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Tested-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Co-developed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 16 1月, 2018 11 次提交
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由 James Morse 提交于
We expect to have firmware-first handling of RAS SErrors, with errors notified via an APEI method. For systems without firmware-first, add some minimal handling to KVM. There are two ways KVM can take an SError due to a guest, either may be a RAS error: we exit the guest due to an SError routed to EL2 by HCR_EL2.AMO, or we take an SError from EL2 when we unmask PSTATE.A from __guest_exit. The current SError from EL2 code unmasks SError and tries to fence any pending SError into a single instruction window. It then leaves SError unmasked. With the v8.2 RAS Extensions we may take an SError for a 'corrected' error, but KVM is only able to handle SError from EL2 if they occur during this single instruction window... The RAS Extensions give us a new instruction to synchronise and consume SErrors. The RAS Extensions document (ARM DDI0587), '2.4.1 ESB and Unrecoverable errors' describes ESB as synchronising SError interrupts generated by 'instructions, translation table walks, hardware updates to the translation tables, and instruction fetches on the same PE'. This makes ESB equivalent to KVMs existing 'dsb, mrs-daifclr, isb' sequence. Use the alternatives to synchronise and consume any SError using ESB instead of unmasking and taking the SError. Set ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT in the exit_code so that we can restart the vcpu if it turns out this SError has no impact on the vcpu. Reviewed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 James Morse 提交于
KVM would like to consume any pending SError (or RAS error) after guest exit. Today it has to unmask SError and use dsb+isb to synchronise the CPU. With the RAS extensions we can use ESB to synchronise any pending SError. Add the necessary macros to allow DISR to be read and converted to an ESR. We clear the DISR register when we enable the RAS cpufeature, and the kernel has not executed any ESB instructions. Any value we find in DISR must have belonged to firmware. Executing an ESB instruction is the only way to update DISR, so we can expect firmware to have handled any deferred SError. By the same logic we clear DISR in the idle path. Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 James Morse 提交于
Prior to v8.2, SError is an uncontainable fatal exception. The v8.2 RAS extensions use SError to notify software about RAS errors, these can be contained by the Error Syncronization Barrier. An ACPI system with firmware-first may use SError as its 'SEI' notification. Future patches may add code to 'claim' this SError as a notification. Other systems can distinguish these RAS errors from the SError ESR and use the AET bits and additional data from RAS-Error registers to handle the error. Future patches may add this kernel-first handling. Without support for either of these we will panic(), even if we received a corrected error. Add code to decode the severity of RAS errors. We can safely ignore contained errors where the CPU can continue to make progress. For all other errors we continue to panic(). Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Xie XiuQi 提交于
ARM's v8.2 Extentions add support for Reliability, Availability and Serviceability (RAS). On CPUs with these extensions system software can use additional barriers to isolate errors and determine if faults are pending. Add cpufeature detection. Platform level RAS support may require additional firmware support. Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> [Rebased added config option, reworded commit message] Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 James Morse 提交于
__cpu_setup() configures SCTLR_EL1 using some hard coded hex masks, and el2_setup() duplicates some this when setting RES1 bits. Lets make this the same as KVM's hyp_init, which uses named bits. First, we add definitions for all the SCTLR_EL{1,2} bits, the RES{1,0} bits, and those we want to set or clear. Add a build_bug checks to ensures all bits are either set or clear. This means we don't need to preserve endian-ness configuration generated elsewhere. Finally, move the head.S and proc.S users of these hard-coded masks over to the macro versions. Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 James Morse 提交于
this_cpu_has_cap() tests caps->desc not caps->matches, so it stops walking the list when it finds a 'silent' feature, instead of walking to the end of the list. Prior to v4.6's 644c2ae1 ("arm64: cpufeature: Test 'matches' pointer to find the end of the list") we always tested desc to find the end of a capability list. This was changed for dubious things like PAN_NOT_UAO. v4.7's e3661b12 ("arm64: Allow a capability to be checked on single CPU") added this_cpu_has_cap() using the old desc style test. CC: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Acked-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Dave Martin 提交于
When refactoring the sigreturn code to handle SVE, I changed the sigreturn implementation to store the new FPSIMD state from the user sigframe into task_struct before reloading the state into the CPU regs. This makes it easier to convert the data for SVE when needed. However, it turns out that the fpsimd_state structure passed into fpsimd_update_current_state is not fully initialised, so assigning the structure as a whole corrupts current->thread.fpsimd_state.cpu with uninitialised data. This means that if the garbage data written to .cpu happens to be a valid cpu number, and the task is subsequently migrated to the cpu identified by the that number, and then tries to enter userspace, the CPU FPSIMD regs will be assumed to be correct for the task and not reloaded as they should be. This can result in returning to userspace with the FPSIMD registers containing data that is stale or that belongs to another task or to the kernel. Knowingly handing around a kernel structure that is incompletely initialised with user data is a potential source of mistakes, especially across source file boundaries. To help avoid a repeat of this issue, this patch adapts the relevant internal API to hand around the user-accessible subset only: struct user_fpsimd_state. To avoid future surprises, this patch also converts all uses of struct fpsimd_state that really only access the user subset, to use struct user_fpsimd_state. A few missing consts are added to function prototypes for good measure. Thanks to Will for spotting the cause of the bug here. Reported-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: NDave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Stephen Boyd 提交于
It isn't entirely obvious if we're using software PAN because we don't say anything about it in the boot log. But if we're using hardware PAN we'll print a nice CPU feature message indicating it. Add a print for software PAN too so we know if it's being used or not. Signed-off-by: NStephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Among the existing architecture specific versions of copy_siginfo_to_user32 there are several different implementation problems. Some architectures fail to handle all of the cases in in the siginfo union. Some architectures perform a blind copy of the siginfo union when the si_code is negative. A blind copy suggests the data is expected to be in 32bit siginfo format, which means that receiving such a signal via signalfd won't work, or that the data is in 64bit siginfo and the code is copying nonsense to userspace. Create a single instance of copy_siginfo_to_user32 that all of the architectures can share, and teach it to handle all of the cases in the siginfo union correctly, with the assumption that siginfo is stored internally to the kernel is 64bit siginfo format. A special case is made for x86 x32 format. This is needed as presence of both x32 and ia32 on x86_64 results in two different 32bit signal formats. By allowing this small special case there winds up being exactly one code base that needs to be maintained between all of the architectures. Vastly increasing the testing base and the chances of finding bugs. As the x86 copy of copy_siginfo_to_user32 the call of the x86 signal_compat_build_tests were moved into sigaction_compat_abi, so that they will keep running. Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
The function copy_siginfo_from_user32 is used for two things, in ptrace since the dawn of siginfo for arbirarily modifying a signal that user space sees, and in sigqueueinfo to send a signal with arbirary siginfo data. Create a single copy of copy_siginfo_from_user32 that all architectures share, and teach it to handle all of the cases in the siginfo union. In the generic version of copy_siginfo_from_user32 ensure that all of the fields in siginfo are initialized so that the siginfo structure can be safely copied to userspace if necessary. When copying the embedded sigval union copy the si_int member. That ensures the 32bit values passes through the kernel unchanged. Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
Sometimes a single capability could be listed multiple times with differing matches(), e.g, CPU errata for different MIDR versions. This breaks verify_local_cpu_feature() and this_cpu_has_cap() as we stop checking for a capability on a CPU with the first entry in the given table, which is not sufficient. Make sure we run the checks for all entries of the same capability. We do this by fixing __this_cpu_has_cap() to run through all the entries in the given table for a match and reuse it for verify_local_cpu_feature(). Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 15 1月, 2018 6 次提交
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由 Stephen Boyd 提交于
The Kryo CPUs are also affected by the Falkor 1003 errata, so we need to do the same workaround on Kryo CPUs. The MIDR is slightly more complicated here, where the PART number is not always the same when looking at all the bits from 15 to 4. Drop the lower 8 bits and just look at the top 4 to see if it's '2' and then consider those as Kryo CPUs. This covers all the combinations without having to list them all out. Fixes: 38fd94b0 ("arm64: Work around Falkor erratum 1003") Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NStephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Steve Capper 提交于
Currently the early assembler page table code assumes that precisely 1xpgd, 1xpud, 1xpmd are sufficient to represent the early kernel text mappings. Unfortunately this is rarely the case when running with a 16KB granule, and we also run into limits with 4KB granule when building much larger kernels. This patch re-writes the early page table logic to compute indices of mappings for each level of page table, and if multiple indices are required, the next-level page table is scaled up accordingly. Also the required size of the swapper_pg_dir is computed at link time to cover the mapping [KIMAGE_ADDR + VOFFSET, _end]. When KASLR is enabled, an extra page is set aside for each level that may require extra entries at runtime. Tested-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NSteve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Steve Capper 提交于
The trampoline page tables are positioned after the early page tables in the kernel linker script. As we are about to change the early page table logic to resolve the swapper size at link time as opposed to compile time, the SWAPPER_DIR_SIZE variable (currently used to locate the trampline) will be rendered unsuitable for low level assembler. This patch solves this issue by moving the trampoline before the PAN page tables. The offset to the trampoline from ttbr1 can then be expressed by: PAGE_SIZE + RESERVED_TTBR0_SIZE, which is available to the entry assembler. Tested-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NSteve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Steve Capper 提交于
Currently one resolves the location of the reserved_ttbr0 for PAN by taking a positive offset from swapper_pg_dir. In a future patch we wish to extend the swapper s.t. its size is determined at link time rather than comile time, rendering SWAPPER_DIR_SIZE unsuitable for such a low level calculation. In this patch we re-arrange the order of the linker script s.t. instead one computes reserved_ttbr0 by subtracting RESERVED_TTBR0_SIZE from swapper_pg_dir. Tested-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NSteve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 James Morse 提交于
When CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is set the SDEI entry point and the rest of the kernel may be unmapped when we take an event. If this may be the case, use an entry trampoline that can switch to the kernel page tables. We can't use the provided PSTATE to determine whether to switch page tables as we may have interrupted the kernel's entry trampoline, (or a normal-priority event that interrupted the kernel's entry trampoline). Instead test for a user ASID in ttbr1_el1. Save a value in regs->addr_limit to indicate whether we need to restore the original ASID when returning from this event. This value is only used by do_page_fault(), which we don't call with the SDEI regs. Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 James Morse 提交于
SDEI inherits the 'use hvc' bit that is also used by PSCI. PSCI does all its initialisation early, SDEI does its late. Remove the __init annotation from acpi_psci_use_hvc(). Acked-by: NLorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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