- 27 10月, 2010 11 次提交
-
-
由 Eric Paris 提交于
Current logic looks like this: rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK); if (rc < 0) goto out; if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) { if (inode->i_readcount) send_tomtou = true; goto out; } if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) send_writers = true; Lets assume we have a policy which states that all files opened for read by root must be measured. Lets assume the file has permissions 777. Lets assume that root has the given file open for read. Lets assume that a non-root process opens the file write. The non-root process will get to ima_counts_get() and will check the ima_must_measure(). Since it is not supposed to measure it will goto out. We should check the i_readcount no matter what since we might be causing a ToMToU voilation! This is close to correct, but still not quite perfect. The situation could have been that root, which was interested in the mesurement opened and closed the file and another process which is not interested in the measurement is the one holding the i_readcount ATM. This is just overly strict on ToMToU violations, which is better than not strict enough... Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
由 Eric Paris 提交于
Currently for every removed inode IMA must take a global lock and search the IMA rbtree looking for an associated integrity structure. Instead we explicitly mark an inode when we add an integrity structure so we only have to take the global lock and do the removal if it exists. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
由 Eric Paris 提交于
Since finding a struct ima_iint_cache requires a valid struct inode, and the struct ima_iint_cache is supposed to have the same lifetime as a struct inode (technically they die together but don't need to be created at the same time) we don't have to worry about the ima_iint_cache outliving or dieing before the inode. So the refcnt isn't useful. Just get rid of it and free the structure when the inode is freed. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eapris@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
由 Eric Paris 提交于
IMA always allocates an integrity structure to hold information about every inode, but only needed this structure to track the number of readers and writers currently accessing a given inode. Since that information was moved into struct inode instead of the integrity struct this patch stops allocating the integrity stucture until it is needed. Thus greatly reducing memory usage. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
由 Eric Paris 提交于
IMA currently allocated an inode integrity structure for every inode in core. This stucture is about 120 bytes long. Most files however (especially on a system which doesn't make use of IMA) will never need any of this space. The problem is that if IMA is enabled we need to know information about the number of readers and the number of writers for every inode on the box. At the moment we collect that information in the per inode iint structure and waste the rest of the space. This patch moves those counters into the struct inode so we can eventually stop allocating an IMA integrity structure except when absolutely needed. This patch does the minimum needed to move the location of the data. Further cleanups, especially the location of counter updates, may still be possible. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
由 Eric Paris 提交于
IMA tracks the number of struct files which are holding a given inode readonly and the number which are holding the inode write or r/w. It needs this information so when a new reader or writer comes in it can tell if this new file will be able to invalidate results it already made about existing files. aka if a task is holding a struct file open RO, IMA measured the file and recorded those measurements and then a task opens the file RW IMA needs to note in the logs that the old measurement may not be correct. It's called a "Time of Measure Time of Use" (ToMToU) issue. The same is true is a RO file is opened to an inode which has an open writer. We cannot, with any validity, measure the file in question since it could be changing. This patch attempts to use the i_writecount field to track writers. The i_writecount field actually embeds more information in it's value than IMA needs but it should work for our purposes and allow us to shrink the struct inode even more. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
由 Eric Paris 提交于
Currently IMA used the iint->mutex to protect the i_readcount and i_writecount. This patch uses the inode->i_lock since we are going to start using in inode objects and that is the most appropriate lock. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
由 Eric Paris 提交于
The IMA flags is an unsigned long but there is only 1 flag defined. Lets save a little space and make it a char. This packs nicely next to the array of u8's. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
由 Eric Paris 提交于
Currently IMA uses 2 longs in struct inode. To save space (and as it seems impossible to overflow 32 bits) we switch these to unsigned int. The switch to unsigned does require slightly different checks for underflow, but it isn't complex. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
由 Eric Paris 提交于
The opencount was used to help debugging to make sure that everything which created a struct file also correctly made the IMA calls. Since we moved all of that into the VFS this isn't as necessary. We should be able to get the same amount of debugging out of just the reader and write count. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
由 Eric Paris 提交于
The IMA code needs to store the number of tasks which have an open fd granting permission to write a file even when IMA is not in use. It needs this information in order to be enabled at a later point in time without losing it's integrity garantees. At the moment that means we store a little bit of data about every inode in a cache. We use a radix tree key'd on the inode's memory address. Dave Chinner pointed out that a radix tree is a terrible data structure for such a sparse key space. This patch switches to using an rbtree which should be more efficient. Bug report from Dave: "I just noticed that slabtop was reporting an awfully high usage of radix tree nodes: OBJS ACTIVE USE OBJ SIZE SLABS OBJ/SLAB CACHE SIZE NAME 4200331 2778082 66% 0.55K 144839 29 2317424K radix_tree_node 2321500 2060290 88% 1.00K 72581 32 2322592K xfs_inode 2235648 2069791 92% 0.12K 69864 32 279456K iint_cache That is, 2.7M radix tree nodes are allocated, and the cache itself is consuming 2.3GB of RAM. I know that the XFS inodei caches are indexed by radix tree node, but for 2 million cached inodes that would mean a density of 1 inode per radix tree node, which for a system with 16M inodes in the filsystems is an impossibly low density. The worst I've seen in a production system like kernel.org is about 20-25% density, which would mean about 150-200k radix tree nodes for that many inodes. So it's not the inode cache. So I looked up what the iint_cache was. It appears to used for storing per-inode IMA information, and uses a radix tree for indexing. It uses the *address* of the struct inode as the indexing key. That means the key space is extremely sparse - for XFS the struct inode addresses are approximately 1000 bytes apart, which means the closest the radix tree index keys get is ~1000. Which means that there is a single entry per radix tree leaf node, so the radix tree is using roughly 550 bytes for every 120byte structure being cached. For the above example, it's probably wasting close to 1GB of RAM...." Reported-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 27 9月, 2010 1 次提交
-
-
由 Ben Hutchings 提交于
System call entry functions sys_*() are never to be called from general kernel code. The fact that they aren't declared in header files should have been a clue. These functions also don't exist on Alpha since it has sys_getxpid() instead. Signed-off-by: NBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Acked-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 10 9月, 2010 2 次提交
-
-
由 David Howells 提交于
Fix a bug in keyctl_session_to_parent() whereby it tries to check the ownership of the parent process's session keyring whether or not the parent has a session keyring [CVE-2010-2960]. This results in the following oops: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a0 IP: [<ffffffff811ae4dd>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0x251/0x443 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff811ae2f3>] ? keyctl_session_to_parent+0x67/0x443 [<ffffffff8109d286>] ? __do_fault+0x24b/0x3d0 [<ffffffff811af98c>] sys_keyctl+0xb4/0xb8 [<ffffffff81001eab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b if the parent process has no session keyring. If the system is using pam_keyinit then it mostly protected against this as all processes derived from a login will have inherited the session keyring created by pam_keyinit during the log in procedure. To test this, pam_keyinit calls need to be commented out in /etc/pam.d/. Reported-by: NTavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: NTavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
由 David Howells 提交于
There's an protected access to the parent process's credentials in the middle of keyctl_session_to_parent(). This results in the following RCU warning: =================================================== [ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ] --------------------------------------------------- security/keys/keyctl.c:1291 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by keyctl-session-/2137: #0: (tasklist_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff811ae2ec>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0x60/0x236 stack backtrace: Pid: 2137, comm: keyctl-session- Not tainted 2.6.36-rc2-cachefs+ #1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8105606a>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb3 [<ffffffff811ae379>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0xed/0x236 [<ffffffff811af77e>] sys_keyctl+0xb4/0xb6 [<ffffffff81001eab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b The code should take the RCU read lock to make sure the parents credentials don't go away, even though it's holding a spinlock and has IRQ disabled. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 08 9月, 2010 5 次提交
-
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
commit 8262bb85da allocated the inode integrity struct (iint) before any inodes were created. Only after IMA was initialized in late_initcall were the counters updated. This patch updates the counters, whether or not IMA has been initialized, to resolve 'imbalance' messages. This patch fixes the bug as reported in bugzilla: 15673. When the i915 is builtin, the ring_buffer is initialized before IMA, causing the imbalance message on suspend. Reported-by: NThomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: NThomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de> Tested-by: David Safford<safford@watson.ibm.com> Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 John Johansen 提交于
The locking for profile namespace removal is wrong, when removing a profile namespace, it needs to be removed from its parent's list. Lock the parent of namespace list instead of the namespace being removed. Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 John Johansen 提交于
As per Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> If we have a ns name without a following profile then in the original code it did "*ns_name = &name[1];". "name" is NULL so "*ns_name" is 0x1. That isn't useful and could cause an oops when this function is called from aa_remove_profiles(). Beyond this the assignment of the namespace name was wrong in the case where the profile name was provided as it was being set to &name[1] after name = skip_spaces(split + 1); Move the ns_name assignment before updating name for the split and also add skip_spaces, making the interface more robust. Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 John Johansen 提交于
2.6.36 introduced the abilitiy to specify the task that is having its rlimits set. Update mediation to ensure that confined tasks can only set their own group_leader as expected by current policy. Add TODO note about extending policy to support setting other tasks rlimits. Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 John Johansen 提交于
The 2.6.36 kernel has refactored __d_path() so that it no longer appends " (deleted)" to unlinked paths. So drop the hack that was used to detect and remove the appended string. Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 18 8月, 2010 4 次提交
-
-
由 Nick Piggin 提交于
tty: fix fu_list abuse tty code abuses fu_list, which causes a bug in remount,ro handling. If a tty device node is opened on a filesystem, then the last link to the inode removed, the filesystem will be allowed to be remounted readonly. This is because fs_may_remount_ro does not find the 0 link tty inode on the file sb list (because the tty code incorrectly removed it to use for its own purpose). This can result in a filesystem with errors after it is marked "clean". Taking idea from Christoph's initial patch, allocate a tty private struct at file->private_data and put our required list fields in there, linking file and tty. This makes tty nodes behave the same way as other device nodes and avoid meddling with the vfs, and avoids this bug. The error handling is not trivial in the tty code, so for this bugfix, I take the simple approach of using __GFP_NOFAIL and don't worry about memory errors. This is not a problem because our allocator doesn't fail small allocs as a rule anyway. So proper error handling is left as an exercise for tty hackers. [ Arguably filesystem's device inode would ideally be divorced from the driver's pseudo inode when it is opened, but in practice it's not clear whether that will ever be worth implementing. ] Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
由 Nick Piggin 提交于
fs: cleanup files_lock locking Lock tty_files with a new spinlock, tty_files_lock; provide helpers to manipulate the per-sb files list; unexport the files_lock spinlock. Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Acked-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
由 Nick Piggin 提交于
apparmor: use task path helpers Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
由 David Howells 提交于
Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer so that kernel_execve() compiles correctly on ARM: arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:88: warning: passing argument 1 of 'do_execve' discards qualifiers from pointer target type This also requires the argv and envp arguments to be consted twice, once for the pointer array and once for the strings the array points to. This is because do_execve() passes a pointer to the filename (now const) to copy_strings_kernel(). A simpler alternative would be to cast the filename pointer in do_execve() when it's passed to copy_strings_kernel(). do_execve() may not change any of the strings it is passed as part of the argv or envp lists as they are some of them in .rodata, so marking these strings as const should be fine. Further kernel_execve() and sys_execve() need to be changed to match. This has been test built on x86_64, frv, arm and mips. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: NRalf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Acked-by: NRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 17 8月, 2010 1 次提交
-
-
由 Jiri Slaby 提交于
After rlimits tree was merged we get the following errors: security/apparmor/lsm.c:663:2: warning: initialization from incompatible pointer type It is because AppArmor was merged in the meantime, but uses the old prototype. So fix it by adding struct task_struct as a first parameter of apparmor_task_setrlimit. NOTE that this is ONLY a compilation warning fix (and crashes caused by that). It needs proper handling in AppArmor depending on who is the 'task'. Signed-off-by: NJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 13 8月, 2010 1 次提交
-
-
由 David Howells 提交于
Add a dummy printk function for the maintenance of unused printks through gcc format checking, and also so that side-effect checking is maintained too. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 11 8月, 2010 1 次提交
-
-
由 Stephen Rothwell 提交于
Fixes these build errors: security/apparmor/lsm.c:701: error: 'param_ops_aabool' undeclared here (not in a function) security/apparmor/lsm.c:721: error: 'param_ops_aalockpolicy' undeclared here (not in a function) security/apparmor/lsm.c:729: error: 'param_ops_aauint' undeclared here (not in a function) Signed-off-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
-
- 07 8月, 2010 2 次提交
-
-
由 Ralf Baechle 提交于
Fix build error caused by a stale security/selinux/av_permissions.h in the $(src) directory which will override a more recent version in $(obj) that is it appears to strike only when building with a separate object directory. Signed-off-by: NRalf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 David Howells 提交于
request_key() should return -ENOKEY if the key it constructs has been negatively instantiated. Without this, request_key() can return an unusable key to its caller, and if the caller then does key_validate() that won't catch the problem. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 05 8月, 2010 1 次提交
-
-
由 Randy Dunlap 提交于
SECURITY_APPARMOR should depend on NET since AUDIT needs (depends on) NET. Fixes 70-80 errors that occur when CONFIG_NET is not enabled, but APPARMOR selects AUDIT without qualification. E.g.: audit.c:(.text+0x33361): undefined reference to `netlink_unicast' (.text+0x333df): undefined reference to `netlink_unicast' audit.c:(.text+0x3341d): undefined reference to `skb_queue_tail' audit.c:(.text+0x33424): undefined reference to `kfree_skb' audit.c:(.text+0x334cb): undefined reference to `kfree_skb' audit.c:(.text+0x33597): undefined reference to `skb_put' audit.c:(.text+0x3369b): undefined reference to `__alloc_skb' audit.c:(.text+0x336d7): undefined reference to `kfree_skb' (.text+0x3374c): undefined reference to `__alloc_skb' auditfilter.c:(.text+0x35305): undefined reference to `skb_queue_tail' lsm_audit.c:(.text+0x2873): undefined reference to `init_net' lsm_audit.c:(.text+0x2878): undefined reference to `dev_get_by_index' Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 02 8月, 2010 11 次提交
-
-
由 James Morris 提交于
Fix build warnings for non-const use of get_task_cred. Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 Eric Paris 提交于
Current selinux policy can have over 3000 types. The type_attr_map in policy is an array sized by the number of types times sizeof(struct ebitmap) (12 on x86_64). Basic math tells us the array is going to be of length 3000 x 12 = 36,000 bytes. The largest 'safe' allocation on a long running system is 16k. Most of the time a 32k allocation will work. But on long running systems a 64k allocation (what we need) can fail quite regularly. In order to deal with this I am converting the type_attr_map to use flex_arrays. Let the library code deal with breaking this into PAGE_SIZE pieces. -v2 rework some of the if(!obj) BUG() to be BUG_ON(!obj) drop flex_array_put() calls and just use a _get() object directly -v3 make apply to James' tree (drop the policydb_write changes) Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 John Johansen 提交于
Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor. Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Commit c9e69318 "TOMOYO: Allow wildcard for execute permission." changed execute permission and domainname to accept wildcards. But tomoyo_find_next_domain() was using pathname passed to execve() rather than pathname specified by the execute permission. As a result, processes were not able to transit to domains which contain wildcards in their domainnames. This patch passes pathname specified by the execute permission back to tomoyo_find_next_domain() so that processes can transit to domains which contain wildcards in their domainnames. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 James Morris 提交于
Remove extraneous path_truncate arguments from the AppArmor hook, as they've been removed from the LSM API. Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 John Johansen 提交于
The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 John Johansen 提交于
AppArmor policy is loaded in a platform independent flattened binary stream. Verify and unpack the data converting it to the internal format needed for enforcement. Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 John Johansen 提交于
ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 John Johansen 提交于
AppArmor hooks to interface with the LSM, module parameters and module initialization. Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 John Johansen 提交于
Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor. Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 John Johansen 提交于
AppArmor routines for controling domain transitions, which can occur at exec or through self directed change_profile/change_hat calls. Unconfined tasks are checked at exec against the profiles in the confining profile namespace to determine if a profile should be attached to the task. Confined tasks execs are controlled by the profile which provides rules determining which execs are allowed and if so which profiles should be transitioned to. Self directed domain transitions allow a task to request transition to a given profile. If the transition is allowed then the profile will be applied, either immeditately or at exec time depending on the request. Immeditate self directed transitions have several security limitations but have uses in setting up stub transition profiles and other limited cases. Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-