Only audit the permissions specified by the policy rules.

Before:
type=AVC msg=audit(01/28/2010 14:30:46.690:3250) : avc:  denied  { read
append } for  pid=14092 comm=foo name=test_file dev=dm-1 ino=132932
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:load_policy_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:rpm_tmp_t:s0 tclass=file

After:
type=AVC msg=audit(01/28/2010 14:52:37.448:26) : avc:  denied
{ append } for  pid=1917 comm=foo name=test_file dev=dm-1 ino=132932
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:load_policy_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:rpm_tmp_t:s0 tclass=file

Reference:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=558499Reported-by: NTom London <selinux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

TOMOYO was using own memory usage counter for detecting memory leak.
But as kernel 2.6.31 introduced memory leak detection mechanism
( CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK ), we no longer need to have own counter.

We remove usage counter for memory used for permission checks, but we keep
usage counter for memory used for policy so that we can apply quota.
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch removes dead code in type_attribute_bounds_av().

Due to the historical reason, the type boundary feature is delivered
from hierarchical types in libsepol, it has supported boundary features
both of subject type (domain; in most cases) and target type.

However, we don't have any actual use cases in bounded target types,
and it tended to make conceptual confusion.
So, this patch removes the dead code to apply boundary checks on the
target types. I makes clear the TYPEBOUNDS restricts privileges of
a certain domain bounded to any other domain.
Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |   43 +++------------------------------------
 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Per https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=548145
there are sufficient range transition rules in modern (Fedora) policy to
make mls_compute_sid a significant factor on the shmem file setup path
due to the length of the range_tr list.  Replace the simple range_tr
list with a hashtab inside the security server to help mitigate this
problem.
Signed-off-by: NStephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

If allow_unknown==deny, SELinux treats an undefined kernel security
class as an error condition rather than as a typical permission denial
and thus does not allow permissions on undefined classes even when in
permissive mode.  Change the SELinux logic so that this case is handled
as a typical permission denial, subject to the usual permissive mode and
permissive domain handling.

Also drop the 'requested' argument from security_compute_av() and
helpers as it is a legacy of the original security server interface and
is unused.

Changes:
- Handle permissive domains consistently by moving up the test for a
permissive domain.
- Make security_compute_av_user() consistent with security_compute_av();
the only difference now is that security_compute_av() performs mapping
between the kernel-private class and permission indices and the policy
values.  In the userspace case, this mapping is handled by libselinux.
- Moved avd_init inside the policy lock.

Based in part on a patch by Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>.
Reported-by: NAndrew Worsley <amworsley@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Currently, the getsecurity and setsecurity operations return zero for
kernel private inodes, where xattrs are not available directly to
userspace.

This confuses some applications, and does not conform to the
man page for getxattr(2) etc., which state that these syscalls
should return ENOTSUP if xattrs are not supported or disabled.

Note that in the listsecurity case, we still need to return zero
as we don't know which other xattr handlers may be active.

For discussion of userland confusion, see:
http://www.mail-archive.com/bug-coreutils@gnu.org/msg17988.html

This patch corrects the error returns so that ENOTSUP is reported
to userspace as required.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

Currently, TOMOYO allocates memory for list elements from memory pool allocated
by kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE). But that makes it difficult to kfree() when garbage
collector is added. Thus, remove memory pool and use kmalloc(sizeof()).
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Currently, TOMOYO allocates memory for string data from memory pool allocated
by kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE). But that makes it difficult to kfree() when garbage
collector is added. Thus, remove memory pool and use kmalloc(strlen()).
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Since readers no longer use down_read(), writers no longer
need to use rw_semaphore. Replace individual rw_semaphore by
single mutex.
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Don't pass current RLIMIT_RTTIME to update_rlimit_cpu() in
selinux_bprm_committing_creds, since update_rlimit_cpu expects
RLIMIT_CPU limit.

Use proper rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur instead to fix that.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

* pull ACC_MODE to fs.h; we have several copies all over the place
* nightmarish expression calculating f_mode by f_flags deserves a helper
too (OPEN_FMODE(flags))
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

As of commit ee18d64c ("KEYS: Add a keyctl to
install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]"), CONFIG_KEYS=y
fails to build on architectures that haven't implemented TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME yet:

security/keys/keyctl.c: In function 'keyctl_session_to_parent':
security/keys/keyctl.c:1312: error: 'TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/keys/keyctl.c:1312: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
security/keys/keyctl.c:1312: error: for each function it appears in.)

Make KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT depend on TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME until
m68k, and xtensa have implemented it.
Signed-off-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NMike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>

In NOMMU mode clamp dac_mmap_min_addr to zero to cause the tests on it to be
skipped by the compiler.  We do this as the minimum mmap address doesn't make
any sense in NOMMU mode.

mmap_min_addr and round_hint_to_min() can be discarded entirely in NOMMU mode.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

init_mmap_min_addr() is a pure_initcall and should be static.
Signed-off-by: NH Hartley Sweeten <hsweeten@visionengravers.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Return the PTR_ERR of the correct pointer.
Signed-off-by: NRoel Kluin <roel.kluin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Limit the number of imbalance messages to once per filesystem type instead of
once per system boot.  (it's actually slightly racy and could give you a
couple per fs, but this isn't a real issue)
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Kill the 'update' argument of ima_path_check(), kill
dead code in ima.

Current rules: ima counters are bumped at the same time
when the file switches from put_filp() fodder to fput()
one.  Which happens exactly in two places - alloc_file()
and __dentry_open().  Nothing else needs to do that at
all.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

ima_inode_free() has some funky #define just to confuse the crap out of me.

void ima_iint_delete(struct inode *inode)

and then things actually call ima_inode_free() and nothing calls
ima_iint_delete().
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

We currently have a lot of duplicated code around ima file counts.  Clean
that all up.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

iints are supposed to be allocated when an inode is allocated (during
security_inode_alloc())  But we have code which will attempt to allocate
an iint during measurement calls.  If we couldn't allocate the iint and we
cared, we should have died during security_inode_alloc().  Not make the
code more complex and less efficient.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

ima_inode_alloc returns 0 and 1, but the LSM hooks expects an errno.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Replace list operation with RCU primitives and replace
down_read()/up_read() with srcu_read_lock()/srcu_read_unlock().
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Please apply below one after merging 1557d330
(Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/sysctl-2.6).
----------
[PATCH for 2.6.33] TOMOYO: Compare filesystem by magic number rather than by name.

We can use magic number for checking whether the filesystem is procfs or not.
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The last return is unreachable, remove the 'return'
in default, let it fall through.
Signed-off-by: NWANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

LSM hooks for chmod()/chown()/chroot() are now ready.
This patch utilizes these hooks.
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

include/linux/security.h and security/capability.c are using "struct path *dir"
but security/security.c was using "struct path *path" by error.
This patch renames "struct path *path" to "struct path *dir".
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The size argument to kcalloc should be the size of desired structure,
not the pointer to it.

The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)

// <smpl>
@expression@
expression *x;
@@

x =
 <+...
-sizeof(x)
+sizeof(*x)
...+>// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: NJulia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

That is "success", "unknown", "through", "performance", "[re|un]mapping"
, "access", "default", "reasonable", "[con]currently", "temperature"
, "channel", "[un]used", "application", "example","hierarchy", "therefore"
, "[over|under]flow", "contiguous", "threshold", "enough" and others.
Signed-off-by: NAndré Goddard Rosa <andre.goddard@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

TOMOYO 1.7.1 has recursive directory matching operator support.
I want to add it to TOMOYO for Linux 2.6.33 .
----------
[PATCH] TOMOYO: Add recursive directory matching operator support.

This patch introduces new operator /\{dir\}/ which matches
'/' + 'One or more repetitions of dir/' (e.g. /dir/ /dir/dir/ /dir/dir/dir/ ).
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

As far as I know, all distros currently ship kernels with default
CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y.  Since having the option on
leaves a 'no_file_caps' option to boot without file capabilities,
the main reason to keep the option is that turning it off saves
you (on my s390x partition) 5k.  In particular, vmlinux sizes
came to:

without patch fscaps=n:		 	53598392
without patch fscaps=y:		 	53603406
with this patch applied:		53603342

with the security-next tree.

Against this we must weigh the fact that there is no simple way for
userspace to figure out whether file capabilities are supported,
while things like per-process securebits, capability bounding
sets, and adding bits to pI if CAP_SETPCAP is in pE are not supported
with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n, leaving a bit of a problem for
applications wanting to know whether they can use them and/or why
something failed.

It also adds another subtly different set of semantics which we must
maintain at the risk of severe security regressions.

So this patch removes the SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile
option.  It drops the kernel size by about 50k over the stock
SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y kernel, by removing the
cap_limit_ptraced_target() function.

Changelog:
	Nov 20: remove cap_limit_ptraced_target() as it's logic
		was ifndef'ed.
Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NAndrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Historically we've seen cases where permissions are requested for classes
where they do not exist.  In particular we have seen CIFS forget to set
i_mode to indicate it is a directory so when we later check something like
remove_name we have problems since it wasn't defined in tclass file.  This
used to result in a avc which included the permission 0x2000 or something.
Currently the kernel will deny the operations (good thing) but will not
print ANY information (bad thing).  First the auditdeny field is no
extended to include unknown permissions.  After that is fixed the logic in
avc_dump_query to output this information isn't right since it will remove
the permission from the av and print the phrase "<NULL>".  This takes us
back to the behavior before the classmap rewrite.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

To help grep games, rename iif to skb_iif
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Now that sys_sysctl is an emulation on top of proc sys all sysctl
operations look like normal filesystem operations and we don't need
to use the special sysctl hook to authenticate them.
Acked-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

With the change of sys_sysctl going through the internal proc mount we no
longer need to handle security_sysctl in tomoyo as we have valid pathnames
for all sysctl accesses.  There is one slight caveat to that in that
all of the paths from the internal mount look like
"/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range" instead of
"/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range" so tomoyo needs to add the
"/proc" portion manually when resolving to full path names to get what it expects.

This change teaches tomoyo perform that modification.
Acked-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

While running fsstress tests on the NFSv4 mounted ext3 and ext4
filesystem, the following call trace was generated on the nfs
server machine.

Replace GFP_KERNEL with GFP_NOFS in ima_iint_insert() to avoid a
potential deadlock.

     =================================
    [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
    2.6.31-31.el6.x86_64 #1
    ---------------------------------
    inconsistent {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} -> {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} usage.
    kswapd2/75 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
     (jbd2_handle){+.+.?.}, at: [<ffffffff811edd5e>] jbd2_journal_start+0xfe/0x13f
    {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} state was registered at:
      [<ffffffff81091e40>] mark_held_locks+0x65/0x99
      [<ffffffff81091f31>] lockdep_trace_alloc+0xbd/0xf5
      [<ffffffff81126fdd>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x40/0x185
      [<ffffffff812344d7>] ima_iint_insert+0x3d/0xf1
      [<ffffffff812345b0>] ima_inode_alloc+0x25/0x44
      [<ffffffff811484ac>] inode_init_always+0xec/0x271
      [<ffffffff81148682>] alloc_inode+0x51/0xa1
      [<ffffffff81148700>] new_inode+0x2e/0x94
      [<ffffffff811b2f08>] ext4_new_inode+0xb8/0xdc9
      [<ffffffff811be611>] ext4_create+0xcf/0x175
      [<ffffffff8113e2cd>] vfs_create+0x82/0xb8
      [<ffffffff8113f337>] do_filp_open+0x32c/0x9ee
      [<ffffffff811309b9>] do_sys_open+0x6c/0x12c
      [<ffffffff81130adc>] sys_open+0x2e/0x44
      [<ffffffff81011e42>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
    irq event stamp: 90371
    hardirqs last  enabled at (90371): [<ffffffff8112708d>]
    kmem_cache_alloc+0xf0/0x185
    hardirqs last disabled at (90370): [<ffffffff81127026>]
    kmem_cache_alloc+0x89/0x185
    softirqs last  enabled at (89492): [<ffffffff81068ecf>]
    __do_softirq+0x1bf/0x1eb
    softirqs last disabled at (89477): [<ffffffff8101312c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30

    other info that might help us debug this:
    2 locks held by kswapd2/75:
     #0:  (shrinker_rwsem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff810f98ba>] shrink_slab+0x44/0x177
     #1:  (&type->s_umount_key#25){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff811450ba>]
Reported-by: NMuni P. Beerakam <mbeeraka@in.ibm.com>
Reported-by: NAmit K. Arora <amitarora@in.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

For consistency drop & in front of every proc_handler.  Explicity
taking the address is unnecessary and it prevents optimizations
like stubbing the proc_handlers to NULL.

Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

ctl_name field was removed. Always use procname field.
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Now that sys_sysctl is a generic wrapper around /proc/sys  .ctl_name
and .strategy members of sysctl tables are dead code.  Remove them.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the
module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request.

Example output:

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc:  denied  { module_request } for  pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The LSM currently requires setting a kernel parameter at boot to select
a specific LSM.  This adds a config option that allows specifying a default
LSM that is used unless overridden with the security= kernel parameter.
If the the config option is not set the current behavior of first LSM
to register is used.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>