1. 24 11月, 2014 3 次提交
    • A
      x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret · b645af2d
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      It's possible for iretq to userspace to fail.  This can happen because
      of a bad CS, SS, or RIP.
      
      Historically, we've handled it by fixing up an exception from iretq to
      land at bad_iret, which pretends that the failed iret frame was really
      the hardware part of #GP(0) from userspace.  To make this work, there's
      an extra fixup to fudge the gs base into a usable state.
      
      This is suboptimal because it loses the original exception.  It's also
      buggy because there's no guarantee that we were on the kernel stack to
      begin with.  For example, if the failing iret happened on return from an
      NMI, then we'll end up executing general_protection on the NMI stack.
      This is bad for several reasons, the most immediate of which is that
      general_protection, as a non-paranoid idtentry, will try to deliver
      signals and/or schedule from the wrong stack.
      
      This patch throws out bad_iret entirely.  As a replacement, it augments
      the existing swapgs fudge into a full-blown iret fixup, mostly written
      in C.  It's should be clearer and more correct.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b645af2d
    • A
      x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS · 6f442be2
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
      
      On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
      to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
      genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code.  The first two
      cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
      and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
      
      This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
      violation.
      
      This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      6f442be2
    • A
      x86_64, traps: Fix the espfix64 #DF fixup and rewrite it in C · af726f21
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      There's nothing special enough about the espfix64 double fault fixup to
      justify writing it in assembly.  Move it to C.
      
      This also fixes a bug: if the double fault came from an IST stack, the
      old asm code would return to a partially uninitialized stack frame.
      
      Fixes: 3891a04aSigned-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      af726f21
  2. 10 11月, 2014 2 次提交
  3. 06 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  4. 02 11月, 2014 1 次提交
    • B
      x86, microcode, AMD: Fix early ucode loading on 32-bit · 4750a0d1
      Borislav Petkov 提交于
      Konrad triggered the following splat below in a 32-bit guest on an AMD
      box. As it turns out, in save_microcode_in_initrd_amd() we're using the
      *physical* address of the container *after* we have enabled paging and
      thus we #PF in load_microcode_amd() when trying to access the microcode
      container in the ramdisk range.
      
      Because the ramdisk is exactly there:
      
      [    0.000000] RAMDISK: [mem 0x35e04000-0x36ef9fff]
      
      and we fault at 0x35e04304.
      
      And since this guest doesn't relocate the ramdisk, we don't do the
      computation which will give us the correct virtual address and we end up
      with the PA.
      
      So, we should actually be using virtual addresses on 32-bit too by the
      time we're freeing the initrd. Do that then!
      
      Unpacking initramfs...
      BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 35d4e304
      IP: [<c042e905>] load_microcode_amd+0x25/0x4a0
      *pde = 00000000
      Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      Modules linked in:
      CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.17.1-302.fc21.i686 #1
      Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.4.1 10/01/2014
      task: f5098000 ti: f50d0000 task.ti: f50d0000
      EIP: 0060:[<c042e905>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0
      EIP is at load_microcode_amd+0x25/0x4a0
      EAX: 00000000 EBX: f6e9ec4c ECX: 00001ec4 EDX: 00000000
      ESI: f5d4e000 EDI: 35d4e2fc EBP: f50d1ed0 ESP: f50d1e94
       DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
      CR0: 8005003b CR2: 35d4e304 CR3: 00e33000 CR4: 000406d0
      Stack:
       00000000 00000000 f50d1ebc f50d1ec4 f5d4e000 c0d7735a f50d1ed0 15a3d17f
       f50d1ec4 00600f20 00001ec4 bfb83203 f6e9ec4c f5d4e000 c0d7735a f50d1ed8
       c0d80861 f50d1ee0 c0d80429 f50d1ef0 c0d889a9 f5d4e000 c0000000 f50d1f04
      Call Trace:
      ? unpack_to_rootfs
      ? unpack_to_rootfs
      save_microcode_in_initrd_amd
      save_microcode_in_initrd
      free_initrd_mem
      populate_rootfs
      ? unpack_to_rootfs
      do_one_initcall
      ? unpack_to_rootfs
      ? repair_env_string
      ? proc_mkdir
      kernel_init_freeable
      kernel_init
      ret_from_kernel_thread
      ? rest_init
      Reported-and-tested-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1158204
      Fixes: 75a1ba5b ("x86, microcode, AMD: Unify valid container checks")
      Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.14+
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141101100100.GA4462@pd.tnicSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      4750a0d1
  5. 29 10月, 2014 4 次提交
  6. 28 10月, 2014 4 次提交
  7. 25 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  8. 23 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  9. 20 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  10. 19 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  11. 14 10月, 2014 4 次提交
  12. 08 10月, 2014 3 次提交
  13. 07 10月, 2014 1 次提交
    • A
      x86_64, entry: Filter RFLAGS.NT on entry from userspace · 8c7aa698
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      The NT flag doesn't do anything in long mode other than causing IRET
      to #GP.  Oddly, CPL3 code can still set NT using popf.
      
      Entry via hardware or software interrupt clears NT automatically, so
      the only relevant entries are fast syscalls.
      
      If user code causes kernel code to run with NT set, then there's at
      least some (small) chance that it could cause trouble.  For example,
      user code could cause a call to EFI code with NT set, and who knows
      what would happen?  Apparently some games on Wine sometimes do
      this (!), and, if an IRET return happens, they will segfault.  That
      segfault cannot be handled, because signal delivery fails, too.
      
      This patch programs the CPU to clear NT on entry via SYSCALL (both
      32-bit and 64-bit, by my reading of the AMD APM), and it clears NT
      in software on entry via SYSENTER.
      
      To save a few cycles, this borrows a trick from Jan Beulich in Xen:
      it checks whether NT is set before trying to clear it.  As a result,
      it seems to have very little effect on SYSENTER performance on my
      machine.
      
      There's another minor bug fix in here: it looks like the CFI
      annotations were wrong if CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=n.
      
      Testers beware: on Xen, SYSENTER with NT set turns into a GPF.
      
      I haven't touched anything on 32-bit kernels.
      
      The syscall mask change comes from a variant of this patch by Anish
      Bhatt.
      
      Note to stable maintainers: there is no known security issue here.
      A misguided program can set NT and cause the kernel to try and fail
      to deliver SIGSEGV, crashing the program.  This patch fixes Far Cry
      on Wine: https://bugs.winehq.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33275
      
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Reported-by: NAnish Bhatt <anish@chelsio.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/395749a5d39a29bd3e4b35899cf3a3c1340e5595.1412189265.git.luto@amacapital.netSigned-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      8c7aa698
  14. 03 10月, 2014 3 次提交
  15. 24 9月, 2014 10 次提交