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  1. 13 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  3. 07 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  5. 06 1月, 2012 1 次提交
    • E
      capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely · 6a9de491
      由 Eric Paris 提交于 
      The capabilities framework is based around credentials, not necessarily the
current task.  Yet we still passed the current task down into LSMs from the
security_capable() LSM hook as if it was a meaningful portion of the security
decision.  This patch removes the 'generic' passing of current and instead
forces individual LSMs to use current explicitly if they think it is
appropriate.  In our case those LSMs are SELinux and AppArmor.

I believe the AppArmor use of current is incorrect, but that is wholely
unrelated to this patch.  This patch does not change what AppArmor does, it
just makes it clear in the AppArmor code that it is doing it.

The SELinux code still uses current in it's audit message, which may also be
wrong and needs further investigation.  Again this is NOT a change, it may
have always been wrong, this patch just makes it clear what is happening.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      6a9de491
  7. 04 1月, 2012 5 次提交
  9. 16 12月, 2011 1 次提交
  11. 09 12月, 2011 1 次提交
  13. 07 12月, 2011 1 次提交
    • A
      fix apparmor dereferencing potentially freed dentry, sanitize __d_path() API · 02125a82
      由 Al Viro 提交于 
      __d_path() API is asking for trouble and in case of apparmor d_namespace_path()
getting just that.  The root cause is that when __d_path() misses the root
it had been told to look for, it stores the location of the most remote ancestor
in *root.  Without grabbing references.  Sure, at the moment of call it had
been pinned down by what we have in *path.  And if we raced with umount -l, we
could have very well stopped at vfsmount/dentry that got freed as soon as
prepend_path() dropped vfsmount_lock.

It is safe to compare these pointers with pre-existing (and known to be still
alive) vfsmount and dentry, as long as all we are asking is "is it the same
address?".  Dereferencing is not safe and apparmor ended up stepping into
that.  d_namespace_path() really wants to examine the place where we stopped,
even if it's not connected to our namespace.  As the result, it looked
at ->d_sb->s_magic of a dentry that might've been already freed by that point.
All other callers had been careful enough to avoid that, but it's really
a bad interface - it invites that kind of trouble.

The fix is fairly straightforward, even though it's bigger than I'd like:
	* prepend_path() root argument becomes const.
	* __d_path() is never called with NULL/NULL root.  It was a kludge
to start with.  Instead, we have an explicit function - d_absolute_root().
Same as __d_path(), except that it doesn't get root passed and stops where
it stops.  apparmor and tomoyo are using it.
	* __d_path() returns NULL on path outside of root.  The main
caller is show_mountinfo() and that's precisely what we pass root for - to
skip those outside chroot jail.  Those who don't want that can (and do)
use d_path().
	* __d_path() root argument becomes const.  Everyone agrees, I hope.
	* apparmor does *NOT* try to use __d_path() or any of its variants
when it sees that path->mnt is an internal vfsmount.  In that case it's
definitely not mounted anywhere and dentry_path() is exactly what we want
there.  Handling of sysctl()-triggered weirdness is moved to that place.
	* if apparmor is asked to do pathname relative to chroot jail
and __d_path() tells it we it's not in that jail, the sucker just calls
d_absolute_path() instead.  That's the other remaining caller of __d_path(),
BTW.
        * seq_path_root() does _NOT_ return -ENAMETOOLONG (it's stupid anyway -
the normal seq_file logics will take care of growing the buffer and redoing
the call of ->show() just fine).  However, if it gets path not reachable
from root, it returns SEQ_SKIP.  The only caller adjusted (i.e. stopped
ignoring the return value as it used to do).
Reviewed-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
ACKed-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      02125a82
  15. 10 9月, 2011 5 次提交
  17. 29 6月, 2011 2 次提交
    • J
      AppArmor: Fix masking of capabilities in complain mode · 25e75dff
      由 John Johansen 提交于 
      AppArmor is masking the capabilities returned by capget against the
capabilities mask in the profile.  This is wrong, in complain mode the
profile has effectively all capabilities, as the profile restrictions are
not being enforced, merely tested against to determine if an access is
known by the profile.

This can result in the wrong behavior of security conscience applications
like sshd which examine their capability set, and change their behavior
accordingly.  In this case because of the masked capability set being
returned sshd fails due to DAC checks, even when the profile is in complain
mode.

Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
      25e75dff
    • J
      AppArmor: Fix reference to rcu protected pointer outside of rcu_read_lock · 04fdc099
      由 John Johansen 提交于 
      The pointer returned from tracehook_tracer_task() is only valid inside
the rcu_read_lock.  However the tracer pointer obtained is being passed
to aa_may_ptrace outside of the rcu_read_lock critical section.

Mover the aa_may_ptrace test into the rcu_read_lock critical section, to
fix this.

Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0
Reported-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
      04fdc099
  19. 23 6月, 2011 1 次提交
  21. 22 6月, 2011 1 次提交
    • A
      net: remove mm.h inclusion from netdevice.h · b7f080cf
      由 Alexey Dobriyan 提交于 
      Remove linux/mm.h inclusion from netdevice.h -- it's unused (I've checked manually).

To prevent mm.h inclusion via other channels also extract "enum dma_data_direction"
definition into separate header. This tiny piece is what gluing netdevice.h with mm.h
via "netdevice.h => dmaengine.h => dma-mapping.h => scatterlist.h => mm.h".
Removal of mm.h from scatterlist.h was tried and was found not feasible
on most archs, so the link was cutoff earlier.

Hope people are OK with tiny include file.

Note, that mm_types.h is still dragged in, but it is a separate story.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b7f080cf
  23. 09 6月, 2011 1 次提交
    • J
      AppArmor: Fix sleep in invalid context from task_setrlimit · 1780f2d3
      由 John Johansen 提交于 
      Affected kernels 2.6.36 - 3.0

AppArmor may do a GFP_KERNEL memory allocation with task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
held when called from security_task_setrlimit.  This will only occur when the
task's current policy has been replaced, and the task's creds have not been
updated before entering the LSM security_task_setrlimit() hook.

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:847
 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1583, name: cupsd
 2 locks held by cupsd/1583:
  #0:  (tasklist_lock){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8104dafa>] do_prlimit+0x61/0x189
  #1:  (&(&p->alloc_lock)->rlock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8104db2d>]
do_prlimit+0x94/0x189
 Pid: 1583, comm: cupsd Not tainted 3.0.0-rc2-git1 #7
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff8102ebf2>] __might_sleep+0x10d/0x112
  [<ffffffff810e6f46>] slab_pre_alloc_hook.isra.49+0x2d/0x33
  [<ffffffff810e7bc4>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x22/0x132
  [<ffffffff8105b6e6>] prepare_creds+0x35/0xe4
  [<ffffffff811c0675>] aa_replace_current_profile+0x35/0xb2
  [<ffffffff811c4d2d>] aa_current_profile+0x45/0x4c
  [<ffffffff811c4d4d>] apparmor_task_setrlimit+0x19/0x3a
  [<ffffffff811beaa5>] security_task_setrlimit+0x11/0x13
  [<ffffffff8104db6b>] do_prlimit+0xd2/0x189
  [<ffffffff8104dea9>] sys_setrlimit+0x3b/0x48
  [<ffffffff814062bb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reported-by: NMiles Lane <miles.lane@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      1780f2d3
  25. 01 6月, 2011 1 次提交
  27. 20 5月, 2011 1 次提交
    • R
      Create Documentation/security/, · d410fa4e
      由 Randy Dunlap 提交于 
      move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/
  to Documentation/security/,
add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and
update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file>
  to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
      d410fa4e
  29. 31 3月, 2011 1 次提交
  31. 24 3月, 2011 1 次提交
    • S
      userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespace · 3486740a
      由 Serge E. Hallyn 提交于 
      - Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
  user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
  user namespace.

The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces.  It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.

I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.

Changelog:
	11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
	12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
	Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
	capabilities to the user_ns he created.  THis is because we
	were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
	he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
	he was the creator.  Reverse those checks.
	12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
	01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
	01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
	02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
		    init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
		    it!  Fix the check in cap_capable().
	02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
		    fixing a compile failure.
	02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments.  Some
		    couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
		    them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY).  Add
		    a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
		    without #including cred.h.  Move all forward declarations
		    together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
		    kernel-doc format.
	02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
	02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.

(Original written and signed off by Eric;  latest, modified version
acked by him)

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      3486740a
  33. 09 3月, 2011 2 次提交
  35. 05 3月, 2011 1 次提交
  37. 11 1月, 2011 2 次提交
  39. 11 11月, 2010 2 次提交
  41. 02 11月, 2010 1 次提交
  43. 26 10月, 2010 1 次提交
  45. 21 10月, 2010 2 次提交
  47. 15 10月, 2010 1 次提交
    • A
      llseek: automatically add .llseek fop · 6038f373
      由 Arnd Bergmann 提交于 
      All file_operations should get a .llseek operation so we can make
nonseekable_open the default for future file operations without a
.llseek pointer.

The three cases that we can automatically detect are no_llseek, seq_lseek
and default_llseek. For cases where we can we can automatically prove that
the file offset is always ignored, we use noop_llseek, which maintains
the current behavior of not returning an error from a seek.

New drivers should normally not use noop_llseek but instead use no_llseek
and call nonseekable_open at open time.  Existing drivers can be converted
to do the same when the maintainer knows for certain that no user code
relies on calling seek on the device file.

The generated code is often incorrectly indented and right now contains
comments that clarify for each added line why a specific variant was
chosen. In the version that gets submitted upstream, the comments will
be gone and I will manually fix the indentation, because there does not
seem to be a way to do that using coccinelle.

Some amount of new code is currently sitting in linux-next that should get
the same modifications, which I will do at the end of the merge window.

Many thanks to Julia Lawall for helping me learn to write a semantic
patch that does all this.

===== begin semantic patch =====
// This adds an llseek= method to all file operations,
// as a preparation for making no_llseek the default.
//
// The rules are
// - use no_llseek explicitly if we do nonseekable_open
// - use seq_lseek for sequential files
// - use default_llseek if we know we access f_pos
// - use noop_llseek if we know we don't access f_pos,
//   but we still want to allow users to call lseek
//
@ open1 exists @
identifier nested_open;
@@
nested_open(...)
{
<+...
nonseekable_open(...)
...+>
}

@ open exists@
identifier open_f;
identifier i, f;
identifier open1.nested_open;
@@
int open_f(struct inode *i, struct file *f)
{
<+...
(
nonseekable_open(...)
|
nested_open(...)
)
...+>
}

@ read disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
   *off = E
|
   *off += E
|
   func(..., off, ...)
|
   E = *off
)
...+>
}

@ read_no_fpos disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}

@ write @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
  *off = E
|
  *off += E
|
  func(..., off, ...)
|
  E = *off
)
...+>
}

@ write_no_fpos @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}

@ fops0 @
identifier fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
 ...
};

@ has_llseek depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier llseek_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
 .llseek = llseek_f,
...
};

@ has_read depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
 .read = read_f,
...
};

@ has_write depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
 .write = write_f,
...
};

@ has_open depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
 .open = open_f,
...
};

// use no_llseek if we call nonseekable_open
////////////////////////////////////////////
@ nonseekable1 depends on !has_llseek && has_open @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier nso ~= "nonseekable_open";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...  .open = nso, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* nonseekable */
};

@ nonseekable2 depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open.open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...  .open = open_f, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* open uses nonseekable */
};

// use seq_lseek for sequential files
/////////////////////////////////////
@ seq depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier sr ~= "seq_read";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...  .read = sr, ...
+.llseek = seq_lseek, /* we have seq_read */
};

// use default_llseek if there is a readdir
///////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops1 depends on !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier readdir_e;
@@
// any other fop is used that changes pos
struct file_operations fops = {
... .readdir = readdir_e, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* readdir is present */
};

// use default_llseek if at least one of read/write touches f_pos
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops2 depends on !fops1 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read.read_f;
@@
// read fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* read accesses f_pos */
};

@ fops3 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+	.llseek = default_llseek, /* write accesses f_pos */
};

// Use noop_llseek if neither read nor write accesses f_pos
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

@ fops4 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !fops3 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
...
 .write = write_f,
 .read = read_f,
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read and write both use no f_pos */
};

@ depends on has_write && !has_read && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* write uses no f_pos */
};

@ depends on has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read uses no f_pos */
};

@ depends on !has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* no read or write fn */
};
===== End semantic patch =====
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
      6038f373
  49. 08 9月, 2010 3 次提交