Pass "fd" directly, not via pointer -- one less memory read.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() is nop for TINY_RCU, but is not a nop
for, say, PREEMPT_RCU.

proc_fill_cache() is called without RCU lock, there is no need to
lock/unlock on error path, simply jump out of the loop.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

mm_access() handles this much better, and avoids some race conditions.
Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

mm_for_maps() is a simple wrapper for mm_access(), and the name is
misleading, so just remove it and use mm_access() directly.
Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Similar to e268337d ("proc: clean up and fix /proc/<pid>/mem
handling"), move the check of permission to open(), this will simplify
read() code.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The oom_score_adj scale ranges from -1000 to 1000 and represents the
proportion of memory available to the process at allocation time.  This
means an oom_score_adj value of 300, for example, will bias a process as
though it was using an extra 30.0% of available memory and a value of
-350 will discount 35.0% of available memory from its usage.

The oom killer badness heuristic also uses this scale to report the oom
score for each eligible process in determining the "best" process to
kill.  Thus, it can only differentiate each process's memory usage by
0.1% of system RAM.

On large systems, this can end up being a large amount of memory: 256MB
on 256GB systems, for example.

This can be fixed by having the badness heuristic to use the actual
memory usage in scoring threads and then normalizing it to the
oom_score_adj scale for userspace.  This results in better comparison
between eligible threads for kill and no change from the userspace
perspective.
Suggested-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Instead of doing the i_mode calculations at proc_fd_instantiate() time,
move them into tid_fd_revalidate(), which is where the other inode state
(notably uid/gid information) is updated too.

Otherwise we'll end up with stale i_mode information if an fd is re-used
while the dentry still hangs around.  Not that anything really *cares*
(symlink permissions don't really matter), but Tetsuo Handa noticed that
the owner read/write bits don't always match the state of the
readability of the file descriptor, and we _used_ to get this right a
long time ago in a galaxy far, far away.

Besides, aside from fixing an ugly detail (that has apparently been this
way since commit 61a28784: "proc: Remove the hard coded inode
numbers" in 2006), this removes more lines of code than it adds.  And it
just makes sense to update i_mode in the same place we update i_uid/gid.

Al Viro correctly points out that we could just do the inode fill in the
inode iops ->getattr() function instead.  However, that does require
somewhat slightly more invasive changes, and adds yet *another* lookup
of the file descriptor.  We need to do the revalidate() for other
reasons anyway, and have the file descriptor handy, so we might as well
fill in the information at this point.
Reported-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: NEric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

map_files/ entries are never supposed to be executed, still curious
minds might try to run them, which leads to the following deadlock

  ======================================================
  [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
  3.4.0-rc4-24406-g841e6a6 #121 Not tainted
  -------------------------------------------------------
  bash/1556 is trying to acquire lock:
   (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+.+.}, at: do_lookup+0x267/0x2b1

  but task is already holding lock:
   (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: prepare_bprm_creds+0x2d/0x69

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #1 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}:
         validate_chain+0x444/0x4f4
         __lock_acquire+0x387/0x3f8
         lock_acquire+0x12b/0x158
         __mutex_lock_common+0x56/0x3a9
         mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x40/0x45
         lock_trace+0x24/0x59
         proc_map_files_lookup+0x5a/0x165
         __lookup_hash+0x52/0x73
         do_lookup+0x276/0x2b1
         walk_component+0x3d/0x114
         do_last+0xfc/0x540
         path_openat+0xd3/0x306
         do_filp_open+0x3d/0x89
         do_sys_open+0x74/0x106
         sys_open+0x21/0x23
         tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

  -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+.+.}:
         check_prev_add+0x6a/0x1ef
         validate_chain+0x444/0x4f4
         __lock_acquire+0x387/0x3f8
         lock_acquire+0x12b/0x158
         __mutex_lock_common+0x56/0x3a9
         mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x45
         do_lookup+0x267/0x2b1
         walk_component+0x3d/0x114
         link_path_walk+0x1f9/0x48f
         path_openat+0xb6/0x306
         do_filp_open+0x3d/0x89
         open_exec+0x25/0xa0
         do_execve_common+0xea/0x2f9
         do_execve+0x43/0x45
         sys_execve+0x43/0x5a
         stub_execve+0x6c/0xc0

This is because prepare_bprm_creds grabs task->signal->cred_guard_mutex
and when do_lookup happens we try to grab task->signal->cred_guard_mutex
again in lock_trace.

Fix it using plain ptrace_may_access() helper in proc_map_files_lookup()
and in proc_map_files_readdir() instead of lock_trace(), the caller must
be CAP_SYS_ADMIN granted anyway.
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reported-by: NSasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

- Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers
- Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel
  internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed.
  * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel
    internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today,
    leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test.
- Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map
  These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added
  if a mapping does not exist.
- Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping.
  Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids
  still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't
  have local mappings.  The requirement for things to work are global uid
  and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid
  and gid mapping.
  Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies
  the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing
  the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the
  slight weirdness worth it.
- Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global
  uid/gid space explicit.  Today it is an identity mapping
  but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar
  to what we do with jiffies.
- Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and
  gid mappings.  We only allow the mappings to be set once
  and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are
  trivial but a little atypical.

Performance:

In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to
stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same.

The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where
all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and
kgids to uids and gids.  So I benchmarked that case on my laptop
with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache.

My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else
was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping
through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the
individuals files.  This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times
where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were
not in the processors cache.  My results:

v3.4-rc1:         ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled)
v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled)
v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled)

All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests
that ran in the cpu cache.

So in summary the performance impact is:
1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out.
8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Stack for a new thread is mapped by userspace code and passed via
sys_clone.  This memory is currently seen as anonymous in
/proc/<pid>/maps, which makes it difficult to ascertain which mappings
are being used for thread stacks.  This patch uses the individual task
stack pointers to determine which vmas are actually thread stacks.

For a multithreaded program like the following:

	#include <pthread.h>

	void *thread_main(void *foo)
	{
		while(1);
	}

	int main()
	{
		pthread_t t;
		pthread_create(&t, NULL, thread_main, NULL);
		pthread_join(t, NULL);
	}

proc/PID/maps looks like the following:

    00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                                  [heap]
    7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                          [vdso]
    ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                  [vsyscall]

Here, one could guess that 7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 is a stack since
the earlier vma that has no permissions (7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000) but
that is not always a reliable way to find out which vma is a thread
stack.  Also, /proc/PID/maps and /proc/PID/task/TID/maps has the same
content.

With this patch in place, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps are treated as 'maps
as the task would see it' and hence, only the vma that that task uses as
stack is marked as [stack].  All other 'stack' vmas are marked as
anonymous memory.  /proc/PID/maps acts as a thread group level view,
where all thread stack vmas are marked as [stack:TID] where TID is the
process ID of the task that uses that vma as stack, while the process
stack is marked as [stack].

So /proc/PID/maps will look like this:

    00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                                  [heap]
    7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack:1442]
    7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                          [vdso]
    ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                  [vsyscall]

Thus marking all vmas that are used as stacks by the threads in the
thread group along with the process stack.  The task level maps will
however like this:

    00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                                  [heap]
    7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                          [vdso]
    ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                  [vsyscall]

where only the vma that is being used as a stack by *that* task is
marked as [stack].

Analogous changes have been made to /proc/PID/smaps,
/proc/PID/numa_maps, /proc/PID/task/TID/smaps and
/proc/PID/task/TID/numa_maps. Relevant snippets from smaps and
numa_maps:

    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ pgrep a.out
    1441
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/smaps | grep "\[stack"
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack:1442]
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1442/smaps | grep "\[stack"
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1441/smaps | grep "\[stack"
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/numa_maps | grep "stack"
    7f8a44492000 default stack:1442 anon=2 dirty=2 N0=2
    7fff6273a000 default stack anon=3 dirty=3 N0=3
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1442/numa_maps | grep "stack"
    7f8a44492000 default stack anon=2 dirty=2 N0=2
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1441/numa_maps | grep "stack"
    7fff6273a000 default stack anon=3 dirty=3 N0=3

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: NSiddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@gmail.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pass nice as a value to proc_sched_autogroup_set_nice().

No side effect is expected, and the variable err will be overwritten with
the return value.
Signed-off-by: NHiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4F45FBB7.5090607@ct.jp.nec.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtable (for recording open files and
close-on-exec flags) so that we can move away from using fd_sets since we
abuse the fd_set structs by not allocating the full-sized structure under
normal circumstances and by non-core code looking at the internals of the
fd_sets.

The first abuse means that use of FD_ZERO() on these fd_sets is not permitted,
since that cannot be told about their abnormal lengths.

This introduces six wrapper functions for setting, clearing and testing
close-on-exec flags and fd-is-open flags:

	void __set_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __clear_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	bool close_on_exec(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __set_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __clear_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	bool fd_is_open(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);

Note that I've prepended '__' to the names of the set/clear functions because
they require the caller to hold a lock to use them.

Note also that I haven't added wrappers for looking behind the scenes at the
the array.  Possibly that should exist too.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174942.23314.1364.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.ukSigned-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This fixes the race in process_vm_core found by Oleg (see

  http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1235667/

for details).

This has been updated since I last sent it as the creation of the new
mm_access() function did almost exactly the same thing as parts of the
previous version of this patch did.

In order to use mm_access() even when /proc isn't enabled, we move it to
kernel/fork.c where other related process mm access functions already
are.
Signed-off-by: NChris Yeoh <yeohc@au1.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Once /proc/pid/mem is opened, the memory can't be released until
mem_release() even if its owner exits.

Change mem_open() to do atomic_inc(mm_count) + mmput(), this only
pins mm_struct. Change mem_rw() to do atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_count)
before access_remote_vm(), this verifies that this mm is still alive.

I am not sure what should mem_rw() return if atomic_inc_not_zero()
fails. With this patch it returns zero to match the "mm == NULL" case,
may be it should return -EINVAL like it did before e268337d.

Perhaps it makes sense to add the additional fatal_signal_pending()
check into the main loop, to ensure we do not hold this memory if
the target task was oom-killed.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

No functional changes, cleanup and preparation.

mem_read() and mem_write() are very similar. Move this code into the
new common helper, mem_rw(), which takes the additional "int write"
argument.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

mem_release() can hit mm == NULL, add the necessary check.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Jüri Aedla reported that the /proc/<pid>/mem handling really isn't very
robust, and it also doesn't match the permission checking of any of the
other related files.

This changes it to do the permission checks at open time, and instead of
tracking the process, it tracks the VM at the time of the open.  That
simplifies the code a lot, but does mean that if you hold the file
descriptor open over an execve(), you'll continue to read from the _old_
VM.

That is different from our previous behavior, but much simpler.  If
somebody actually finds a load where this matters, we'll need to revert
this commit.

I suspect that nobody will ever notice - because the process mapping
addresses will also have changed as part of the execve.  So you cannot
actually usefully access the fd across a VM change simply because all
the offsets for IO would have changed too.
Reported-by: NJüri Aedla <asd@ut.ee>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.  In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they
log in and it be impossible to ever reset.  We had to make it mutable even
after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have
to restart sshd.  Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which
logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid.

Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel
work the way it should.  With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed
to restart services directly.  The system will restart the service for
them.  Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and
sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions.

If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting
himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his
loginuid that should be used!  Since we have old systems I make this a
Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

The function always deals with current.  Don't expose an option
pretending one can use it for something.  You can't.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

get_proc_task() can fail to search the task and return NULL,
put_task_struct() will then bomb the kernel with following oops:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
  IP: [<ffffffff81217d34>] proc_pid_permission+0x64/0xe0
  PGD 112075067 PUD 112814067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP

This is a regression introduced by commit 0499680a ("procfs: add hidepid=
and gid= mount options").  The kernel should return -ESRCH if
get_proc_task() failed.
Signed-off-by: NXiaotian Feng <dannyfeng@tencent.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Acked-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add support for mount options to restrict access to /proc/PID/
directories.  The default backward-compatible "relaxed" behaviour is left
untouched.

The first mount option is called "hidepid" and its value defines how much
info about processes we want to be available for non-owners:

hidepid=0 (default) means the old behavior - anybody may read all
world-readable /proc/PID/* files.

hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but
their own.  Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected
against other users.  As permission checking done in proc_pid_permission()
and files' permissions are left untouched, programs expecting specific
files' modes are not confused.

hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/PID/ will be invisible to other
users.  It doesn't mean that it hides whether a process exists (it can be
learned by other means, e.g.  by kill -0 $PID), but it hides process' euid
and egid.  It compicates intruder's task of gathering info about running
processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, whether
another user runs some sensitive program, whether other users run any
program at all, etc.

gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info
(as in hidepid=0 mode).  This group should be used instead of putting
nonroot user in sudoers file or something.  However, untrusted users (like
daemons, etc.) which are not supposed to monitor the tasks in the whole
system should not be added to the group.

hidepid=1 or higher is designed to restrict access to procfs files, which
might reveal some sensitive private information like precise keystrokes
timings:

http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3

hidepid=1/2 doesn't break monitoring userspace tools.  ps, top, pgrep, and
conky gracefully handle EPERM/ENOENT and behave as if the current user is
the only user running processes.  pstree shows the process subtree which
contains "pstree" process.

Note: the patch doesn't deal with setuid/setgid issues of keeping
preopened descriptors of procfs files (like
https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/7/368).  We rely on that the leaked
information like the scheduling counters of setuid apps doesn't threaten
anybody's privacy - only the user started the setuid program may read the
counters.
Signed-off-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
"vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.

For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/

 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so

This *helps* checkpointing process in three ways:

1. When dumping a task mappings we do know exact file that is mapped
   by particular region.  We do this by opening
   /proc/$pid/map_files/$address symlink the way we do with file
   descriptors.

2. This also helps in determining which anonymous shared mappings are
   shared with each other by comparing the inodes of them.

3. When restoring a set of processes in case two of them has a mapping
   shared, we map the memory by the 1st one and then open its
   /proc/$pid/map_files/$address file and map it by the 2nd task.

Using /proc/$pid/maps for this is quite inconvenient since it brings
repeatable re-reading and reparsing for this text file which slows down
restore procedure significantly.  Also as being pointed in (3) it is a way
easier to use top level shared mapping in children as
/proc/$pid/map_files/$address when needed.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[gorcunov@openvz.org: make map_files depend on CHECKPOINT_RESTORE]
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Reviewed-by: N"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Prepare the ground for the next "map_files" patch which needs a name of a
link file to analyse.
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

oom_score_adj is used for guarding processes from OOM-Killer.  One of
problem is that it's inherited at fork().  When a daemon set oom_score_adj
and make children, it's hard to know where the value is set.

This patch adds some tracepoints useful for debugging. This patch adds
3 trace points.
  - creating new task
  - renaming a task (exec)
  - set oom_score_adj

To debug, users need to enable some trace pointer. Maybe filtering is useful as

# EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/task/
# echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_newtask/filter
# echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_rename/filter
# echo 1 > $EVENT/enable
# EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/oom/
# echo 1 > $EVENT/enable

output will be like this.
# grep oom /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
bash-7699  [007] d..3  5140.744510: oom_score_adj_update: pid=7699 comm=bash oom_score_adj=-1000
bash-7699  [007] ...1  5151.818022: task_newtask: pid=7729 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000
ls-7729  [003] ...2  5151.818504: task_rename: pid=7729 oldcomm=bash newcomm=ls oom_score_adj=-1000
bash-7699  [002] ...1  5175.701468: task_newtask: pid=7730 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000
grep-7730  [007] ...2  5175.701993: task_rename: pid=7730 oldcomm=bash newcomm=grep oom_score_adj=-1000
Signed-off-by: NKAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

rationale: that stuff is far tighter bound to fs/namespace.c than to
the guts of procfs proper.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

both proc_dir_entry ->mode and populating functions
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This reverts commit aa6afca5.

It escalates of some of the google-chrome SELinux problems with ptrace
("Check failed: pid_ > 0.  Did not find zygote process"), and Andrew
says that it is also causing mystery lockdep reports.
Reported-by: NAlex Villacís Lasso <a_villacis@palosanto.com>
Requested-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Requested-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

fd* files are restricted to the task's owner, and other users may not get
direct access to them.  But one may open any of these files and run any
setuid program, keeping opened file descriptors.  As there are permission
checks on open(), but not on readdir() and read(), operations on the kept
file descriptors will not be checked.  It makes it possible to violate
procfs permission model.

Reading fdinfo/* may disclosure current fds' position and flags, reading
directory contents of fdinfo/ and fd/ may disclosure the number of opened
files by the target task.  This information is not sensible per se, but it
can reveal some private information (like length of a password stored in a
file) under certain conditions.

Used existing (un)lock_trace functions to check for ptrace_may_access(),
but instead of using EPERM return code from it use EACCES to be consistent
with existing proc_pid_follow_link()/proc_pid_readlink() return code.  If
they differ, attacker can guess what fds exist by analyzing stat() return
code.  Patched handlers: stat() for fd/*, stat() and read() for fdindo/*,
readdir() and lookup() for fd/ and fdinfo/.
Signed-off-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Replace remaining direct i_nlink updates with a new set_nlink()
updater function.
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Tested-by: NToshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

This removes mm->oom_disable_count entirely since it's unnecessary and
currently buggy.  The counter was intended to be per-process but it's
currently decremented in the exit path for each thread that exits, causing
it to underflow.

The count was originally intended to prevent oom killing threads that
share memory with threads that cannot be killed since it doesn't lead to
future memory freeing.  The counter could be fixed to represent all
threads sharing the same mm, but it's better to remove the count since:

 - it is possible that the OOM_DISABLE thread sharing memory with the
   victim is waiting on that thread to exit and will actually cause
   future memory freeing, and

 - there is no guarantee that a thread is disabled from oom killing just
   because another thread sharing its mm is oom disabled.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reported-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The CLOEXE bit is magical, and for performance (and semantic) reasons we
don't actually maintain it in the file descriptor itself, but in a
separate bit array.  Which means that when we show f_flags, the CLOEXE
status is shown incorrectly: we show the status not as it is now, but as
it was when the file was opened.

Fix that by looking up the bit properly in the 'fdt->close_on_exec' bit
array.

Uli needs this in order to re-implement the pfiles program:

  "For normal file descriptors (not sockets) this was the last piece of
   information which wasn't available.  This is all part of my 'give
   Solaris users no reason to not switch' effort.  I intend to offer the
   code to the util-linux-ng maintainers."
Requested-by: NUlrich Drepper <drepper@akkadia.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

WARN_ONCE() is very annoying, in that it shows the stack trace that we
don't care about at all, and also triggers various user-level "kernel
oopsed" logic that we really don't care about.  And it's not like the
user can do anything about the applications (sshd) in question, it's a
distro issue.

Requested-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> (and many others)
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

If an inode's mode permits opening /proc/PID/io and the resulting file
descriptor is kept across execve() of a setuid or similar binary, the
ptrace_may_access() check tries to prevent using this fd against the
task with escalated privileges.

Unfortunately, there is a race in the check against execve().  If
execve() is processed after the ptrace check, but before the actual io
information gathering, io statistics will be gathered from the
privileged process.  At least in theory this might lead to gathering
sensible information (like ssh/ftp password length) that wouldn't be
available otherwise.

Holding task->signal->cred_guard_mutex while gathering the io
information should protect against the race.

The order of locking is similar to the one inside of ptrace_attach():
first goes cred_guard_mutex, then lock_task_sighand().
Signed-off-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

/proc/pid/oom_adj is deprecated and scheduled for removal in August 2012
according to Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt.

This patch makes the warning more verbose by making it appear as a more
serious problem (the presence of a stack trace and being multiline should
attract more attention) so that applications still using the old interface
can get fixed.

Very popular users of the old interface have been converted since the oom
killer rewrite has been introduced.  udevd switched to the
/proc/pid/oom_score_adj interface for v162, kde switched in 4.6.1, and
opensshd switched in 5.7p1.

At the start of 2012, this should be changed into a WARN() to emit all
such incidents and then finally remove the tunable in August 2012 as
scheduled.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Moving the event counter into the dynamically allocated 'struc seq_file'
allows poll() support without the need to allocate its own tracking
structure.

All current users are switched over to use the new counter.

Requested-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org
Acked-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Tested-by: Lucas De Marchi lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi
Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

not used by the instances anymore.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

redundant; all callers get it duplicated in mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK and none of
them removes that bit.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

its value depends only on inode and does not change; we might as
well store it in ->i_op->check_acl and be done with that.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information.  E.g.  for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length.  Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.

ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>