- 20 3月, 2014 2 次提交
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由 Richard Guy Briggs 提交于
"get" usually implies incrementing a refcount into a structure to indicate a reference being held by another part of code. Change this function name to indicate it is in fact being taken from it, returning the value while clearing it in the supplying structure. Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
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由 William Roberts 提交于
During an audit event, cache and print the value of the process's proctitle value (proc/<pid>/cmdline). This is useful in situations where processes are started via fork'd virtual machines where the comm field is incorrect. Often times, setting the comm field still is insufficient as the comm width is not very wide and most virtual machine "package names" do not fit. Also, during execution, many threads have their comm field set as well. By tying it back to the global cmdline value for the process, audit records will be more complete in systems with these properties. An example of where this is useful and applicable is in the realm of Android. With Android, their is no fork/exec for VM instances. The bare, preloaded Dalvik VM listens for a fork and specialize request. When this request comes in, the VM forks, and the loads the specific application (specializing). This was done to take advantage of COW and to not require a load of basic packages by the VM on very app spawn. When this spawn occurs, the package name is set via setproctitle() and shows up in procfs. Many of these package names are longer then 16 bytes, the historical width of task->comm. Having the cmdline in the audit records will couple the application back to the record directly. Also, on my Debian development box, some audit records were more useful then what was printed under comm. The cached proctitle is tied to the life-cycle of the audit_context structure and is built on demand. Proctitle is controllable by userspace, and thus should not be trusted. It is meant as an aid to assist in debugging. The proctitle event is emitted during syscall audits, and can be filtered with auditctl. Example: type=AVC msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=1971 comm="mkdir" name="/" dev="selinuxfs" ino=1 scontext=system_u:system_r:consolekit_t:s0-s0:c0.c255 tcontext=system_u:object_r:security_t:s0 tclass=filesystem type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): arch=c000003e syscall=137 success=yes exit=0 a0=7f019dfc8bd7 a1=7fffa6aed2c0 a2=fffffffffff4bd25 a3=7fffa6aed050 items=0 ppid=1967 pid=1971 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" subj=system_u:system_r:consolekit_t:s0-s0:c0.c255 key=(null) type=UNKNOWN[1327] msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): proctitle=6D6B646972002D70002F7661722F72756E2F636F6E736F6C65 Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> (wrt record formating) Signed-off-by: NWilliam Roberts <wroberts@tresys.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 08 3月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Richard Guy Briggs 提交于
Add pr_fmt to prefix "audit: " to output Convert printk(KERN_<LEVEL> to pr_<level> Coalesce formats Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
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- 14 1月, 2014 6 次提交
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由 Richard Guy Briggs 提交于
Remove spaces between "new", "old" label modifiers and "auid", "ses" labels in log output since userspace tools can't parse orphaned keywords. Make variable names more consistent and intuitive. Make audit_log_format() argument code easier to read. Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Right now the sessionid value in the kernel is a combination of u32, int, and unsigned int. Just use unsigned int throughout. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Paul Davies C 提交于
Currently when the coredump signals are logged by the audit system, the actual path to the executable is not logged. Without details of exe, the system admin may not have an exact idea on what program failed. This patch changes the audit_log_task() so that the path to the exe is also logged. This was copied from audit_log_task_info() and the latter enhanced to avoid disappearing text fields. Signed-off-by: NPaul Davies C <pauldaviesc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Paul Davies C 提交于
The audit_log_abend() is used only by the audit_core_dumps(). Thus there is no need of maintaining the audit_log_abend() as a separate function. This patch drops the audit_log_abend() and pushes its functionalities back to the audit_core_dumps(). Apart from that the "reason" field is also dropped from being logged since the reason can be deduced from the signal number. Signed-off-by: NPaul Davies C <pauldaviesc@gmail.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Gao feng 提交于
If audit is disabled, we shouldn't generate loginuid audit log. Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
- Always report the current process as capset now always only works on the current process. This prevents reporting 0 or a random pid in a random pid namespace. - Don't bother to pass the pid as is available. Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> (cherry picked from commit bcc85f0af31af123e32858069eb2ad8f39f90e67) (cherry picked from commit f911cac4556a7a23e0b3ea850233d13b32328692) Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [eparis: fix build error when audit disabled] Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 07 11月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
sfr pointed out that with CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS set the audit tree would not build. This is because the oldsessionid in audit_set_loginuid() was accidentally being declared as a kuid_t. This patch fixes that declaration mistake. Example of problem: kernel/auditsc.c: In function 'audit_set_loginuid': kernel/auditsc.c:2003:15: error: incompatible types when assigning to type 'kuid_t' from type 'int' oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); Reported-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 06 11月, 2013 11 次提交
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由 Richard Guy Briggs 提交于
Move the audit_bprm() call from search_binary_handler() to exec_binprm(). This allows us to get rid of the mm member of struct audit_aux_data_execve since bprm->mm will equal current->mm. This also mitigates the issue that ->argc could be modified by the load_binary() call in search_binary_handler(). audit_bprm() was being called to add an AUDIT_EXECVE record to the audit context every time search_binary_handler() was recursively called. Only one reference is necessary. Reported-by: NOleg Nesterov <onestero@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> --- This patch is against 3.11, but was developed on Oleg's post-3.11 patches that introduce exec_binprm().
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由 Richard Guy Briggs 提交于
audit_bprm() was being called to add an AUDIT_EXECVE record to the audit context every time search_binary_handler() was recursively called. Only one reference is necessary, so just update it. Move the the contents of audit_aux_data_execve into the union in audit_context, removing dependence on a kmalloc along the way. Reported-by: NOleg Nesterov <onestero@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Richard Guy Briggs 提交于
Get rid of write-only audit_aux_data_exeve structure member envc. Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> (cherry picked from ebiederman commit 6904431d6b41190e42d6b94430b67cb4e7e6a4b7) Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Richard Guy Briggs 提交于
It appears this one comparison function got missed in f368c07d (and 9c937dcc). Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
This adds a new 'audit_feature' bit which allows userspace to set it such that the loginuid is absolutely immutable, even if you have CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
This is a new audit feature which only grants processes with CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL the ability to unset their loginuid. They cannot directly set it from a valid uid to another valid uid. The ability to unset the loginuid is nice because a priviledged task, like that of container creation, can unset the loginuid and then priv is not needed inside the container when a login daemon needs to set the loginuid. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
If a task has CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL allow that task to unset their loginuid. This would allow a child of that task to set their loginuid without CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. Thus when launching a new login daemon, a priviledged helper would be able to unset the loginuid and then the daemon, which may be malicious user facing, do not need priv to function correctly. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
After trying to use this feature in Fedora we found the hard coding policy like this into the kernel was a bad idea. Surprise surprise. We ran into these problems because it was impossible to launch a container as a logged in user and run a login daemon inside that container. This reverts back to the old behavior before this option was added. The option will be re-added in a userspace selectable manor such that userspace can choose when it is and when it is not appropriate. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
This is just a code rework. It makes things more readable. It does not make any functional changes. It does change the log messages to include both the old session id as well the new and it includes a new res field, which means we get messages even when the user did not have permission to change the loginuid. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
If audit_filter_task() nacks the new thread it makes sense to clear TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT which can be copied from parent by dup_task_struct(). A wrong TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT is not really bad but it triggers the "slow" audit paths in entry.S to ensure the task can not miss audit_syscall_*() calls, this is pointless if the task has no ->audit_context. Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 10 7月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
The old audit PATH records for mq_open looked like this: type=PATH msg=audit(1366282323.982:869): item=1 name=(null) inode=6777 dev=00:0c mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023 type=PATH msg=audit(1366282323.982:869): item=0 name="test_mq" inode=26732 dev=00:0c mode=0100700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023 ...with the audit related changes that went into 3.7, they now look like this: type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=2 name=(null) inode=66655 dev=00:0c mode=0100700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023 type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=1 name=(null) inode=6926 dev=00:0c mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023 type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=0 name="test_mq" Both of these look wrong to me. As Steve Grubb pointed out: "What we need is 1 PATH record that identifies the MQ. The other PATH records probably should not be there." Fix it to record the mq root as a parent, and flag it such that it should be hidden from view when the names are logged, since the root of the mq filesystem isn't terribly interesting. With this change, we get a single PATH record that looks more like this: type=PATH msg=audit(1368021604.836:484): item=0 name="test_mq" inode=16914 dev=00:0c mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s0 In order to do this, a new audit_inode_parent_hidden() function is added. If we do it this way, then we avoid having the existing callers of audit_inode needing to do any sort of flag conversion if auditing is inactive. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reported-by: NJiri Jaburek <jjaburek@redhat.com> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 08 5月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
audit rule additions containing "-F auid!=4294967295" were failing with EINVAL because of a regression caused by e1760bd5. Apparently some userland audit rule sets want to know if loginuid uid has been set and are using a test for auid != 4294967295 to determine that. In practice that is a horrible way to ask if a value has been set, because it relies on subtle implementation details and will break every time the uid implementation in the kernel changes. So add a clean way to test if the audit loginuid has been set, and silently convert the old idiom to the cleaner and more comprehensible new idiom. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.7 Reported-By: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Tested-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 01 5月, 2013 2 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
The userspace audit tools didn't like the existing formatting of the AUDIT_ANOM_LINK event. It needed to be expanded to emit an AUDIT_PATH event as well, so this implements the change. The bulk of the patch is moving code out of auditsc.c into audit.c and audit.h for general use. It expands audit_log_name to include an optional "struct path" argument for the simple case of just needing to report a pathname. This also makes audit_log_task_info available when syscall auditing is not enabled, since it is needed in either case for process details. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
We have a number of places we were reimplementing the same code to write out lsm labels. Just do it one darn place. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 30 4月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Rakib Mullick 提交于
In audit_alloc_context() use kzalloc instead of kmalloc+memset. Also rename audit_zero_context() to audit_set_context(), to represent it's inner workings properly. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove audit_set_context() altogether - fold it into its caller] Signed-off-by: NRakib Mullick <rakib.mullick@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 16 4月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Looks like this one has been around since 5195d8e2: kernel/auditsc.c: In function ‘audit_free_names’: kernel/auditsc.c:998: error: ‘i’ undeclared (first use in this function) ...and this warning: kernel/auditsc.c: In function ‘audit_putname’: kernel/auditsc.c:2045: warning: ‘i’ may be used uninitialized in this function Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 12 4月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
RHBZ: 785936 If the audit system collects a record about one process sending a signal to another process it includes in that collection the 'secid' or 'an int used to represet an LSM label.' If there is no LSM enabled it will collect a 0. The problem is that when we attempt to print that record we ask the LSM to convert the secid back to a string. Since there is no LSM it returns EOPNOTSUPP. Most code in the audit system checks if the secid is 0 and does not print LSM info in that case. The signal information code however forgot that check. Thus users will see a message in syslog indicating that converting the sid to string failed. Add the right check. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 11 4月, 2013 4 次提交
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由 Andrew Morton 提交于
> In function audit_alloc_context(), use kzalloc, instead of kmalloc+memset. Patch also renames audit_zero_context() to > audit_set_context(), to represent it's inner workings properly. Fair enough. I'd go futher... Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Rakib Mullick <rakib.mullick@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Rakib Mullick 提交于
In function audit_alloc_context(), use kzalloc, instead of kmalloc+memset. Patch also renames audit_zero_context() to audit_set_context(), to represent it's inner workings properly. Signed-off-by: NRakib Mullick <rakib.mullick@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Chen Gang 提交于
__audit_socketcall is an extern function. better to check its parameters by itself. also can return error code, when fail (find invalid parameters). also use macro instead of real hard code number also give related comments for it. Signed-off-by: NChen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com> [eparis: fix the return value when !CONFIG_AUDIT] Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Dmitry Monakhov 提交于
filename should be destroyed via final_putname() instead of __putname() Otherwise this result in following BUGON() in case of long names: kernel BUG at mm/slab.c:3006! Call Trace: kmem_cache_free+0x1c1/0x850 audit_putname+0x88/0x90 putname+0x73/0x80 sys_symlinkat+0x120/0x150 sys_symlink+0x16/0x20 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Introduced-in: 7950e385Signed-off-by: NDmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org> Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 09 4月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Matvejchikov Ilya 提交于
It is useful to extend GID/EGID comparation logic to be able to match not only the exact EID/EGID values but the group/egroup also. Signed-off-by: NMatvejchikov Ilya <matvejchikov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 12 1月, 2013 2 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
It's possible for audit_log_start() to return NULL. Handle it in the various callers. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@google.com> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
The seccomp path was using AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND from when seccomp mode 1 could only kill a process. While we still want to make sure an audit record is forced on a kill, this should use a separate record type since seccomp mode 2 introduces other behaviors. In the case of "handled" behaviors (process wasn't killed), only emit a record if the process is under inspection. This change also fixes userspace examination of seccomp audit events, since it was considered malformed due to missing fields of the AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND event type. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com> Acked-by: NWill Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 29 11月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 25 10月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Alan Cox 提交于
tty name is an array not a pointer Signed-off-by: NAlan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 13 10月, 2012 3 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename. Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it directly. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Currently, if we call getname() on a userland string more than once, we'll get multiple copies of the string and multiple audit_names records. Add a function that will allow the audit_names code to satisfy getname requests using info from the audit_names list, avoiding a new allocation and audit_names records. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to the string. For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled, we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not need to recopy it from userspace. This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it. Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes convenient. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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