Preparation for the next patches.

Move the callsite of uprobe_copy_process() in copy_process() down
to the succesfull return. We do not care if copy_process() fails,
uprobe_free_utask() won't be called in this case so the wrong
->utask != NULL doesn't matter.

OTOH, with this change we know that copy_process() can't fail when
uprobe_copy_process() is called, the new task should either return
to user-mode or call do_exit(). This way uprobe_copy_process() can:

	1. setup p->utask != NULL if necessary

	2. setup uprobes_state.xol_area

	3. use task_work_add(p)

Also, move the definition of uprobe_copy_process() down so that it
can see get_utask().
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSrikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Simple cleanup.  Every user of vma_set_policy() does the same work, this
looks a bit annoying imho.  And the new trivial helper which does
mpol_dup() + vma_set_policy() to simplify the callers.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

do_fork() denies CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_PARENT if NEWUSER | NEWPID.

Then later copy_process() denies CLONE_SIGHAND if the new process will
be in a different pid namespace (task_active_pid_ns() doesn't match
current->nsproxy->pid_ns).

This looks confusing and inconsistent.  CLONE_NEWPID is very similar to
the case when ->pid_ns was already unshared, we want the same
restrictions so copy_process() should also nack CLONE_PARENT.

And it would be better to deny CLONE_NEWUSER && CLONE_SIGHAND as well
just for consistency.

Kill the "CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWPID" check in do_fork() and change
copy_process() to do the same check along with ->pid_ns check we already
have.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit 8382fcac ("pidns: Outlaw thread creation after
unshare(CLONE_NEWPID)") nacks CLONE_NEWPID if the forking process
unshared pid_ns.  This is correct but unnecessary, copy_pid_ns() does
the same check.

Remove the CLONE_NEWPID check to cleanup the code and prepare for the
next change.

Test-case:

	static int child(void *arg)
	{
		return 0;
	}

	static char stack[16 * 1024];

	int main(void)
	{
		pid_t pid;

		assert(unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWPID) == 0);

		pid = clone(child, stack + sizeof(stack) / 2,
				CLONE_NEWPID | SIGCHLD, NULL);
		assert(pid < 0 && errno == EINVAL);

		return 0;
	}

clone(CLONE_NEWPID) correctly fails with or without this change.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit 8382fcac ("pidns: Outlaw thread creation after
unshare(CLONE_NEWPID)") nacks CLONE_VM if the forking process unshared
pid_ns, this obviously breaks vfork:

	int main(void)
	{
		assert(unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWPID) == 0);
		assert(vfork() >= 0);
		_exit(0);
		return 0;
	}

fails without this patch.

Change this check to use CLONE_SIGHAND instead.  This also forbids
CLONE_THREAD automatically, and this is what the comment implies.

We could probably even drop CLONE_SIGHAND and use CLONE_THREAD, but it
would be safer to not do this.  The current check denies CLONE_SIGHAND
implicitely and there is no reason to change this.

Eric said "CLONE_SIGHAND is fine.  CLONE_THREAD would be even better.
Having shared signal handling between two different pid namespaces is
the case that we are fundamentally guarding against."
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NColin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

I goofed when I made unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) only work in a
single-threaded process.  There is no need for that requirement and in
fact I analyzied things right for setns.  The hard requirement
is for tasks that share a VM to all be in the pid namespace and
we properly prevent that in do_fork.

Just to be certain I took a look through do_wait and
forget_original_parent and there are no cases that make it any harder
for children to be in the multiple pid namespaces than it is for
children to be in the same pid namespace.  I also performed a check to
see if there were in uses of task->nsproxy_pid_ns I was not familiar
with, but it is only used when allocating a new pid for a new task,
and in checks to prevent craziness from happening.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

nsproxy.pid_ns is *not* the task's pid namespace.  The name should clarify
that.

This makes it more obvious that setns on a pid namespace is weird --
it won't change the pid namespace shown in procfs.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fix inadvertent breakage in the clone syscall ABI for Microblaze that
was introduced in commit f3268edb ("microblaze: switch to generic
fork/vfork/clone").

The Microblaze syscall ABI for clone takes the parent tid address in the
4th argument; the third argument slot is used for the stack size.  The
incorrectly-used CLONE_BACKWARDS type assigned parent tid to the 3rd
slot.

This commit restores the original ABI so that existing userspace libc
code will work correctly.

All kernel versions from v3.8-rc1 were affected.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 11:14:40AM -0700, Kent Overstreet wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 02:40:55PM +0300, Octavian Purdila wrote:
> > When using a large number of threads performing AIO operations the
> > IOCTX list may get a significant number of entries which will cause
> > significant overhead. For example, when running this fio script:
> >
> > rw=randrw; size=256k ;directory=/mnt/fio; ioengine=libaio; iodepth=1
> > blocksize=1024; numjobs=512; thread; loops=100
> >
> > on an EXT2 filesystem mounted on top of a ramdisk we can observe up to
> > 30% CPU time spent by lookup_ioctx:
> >
> >  32.51%  [guest.kernel]  [g] lookup_ioctx
> >   9.19%  [guest.kernel]  [g] __lock_acquire.isra.28
> >   4.40%  [guest.kernel]  [g] lock_release
> >   4.19%  [guest.kernel]  [g] sched_clock_local
> >   3.86%  [guest.kernel]  [g] local_clock
> >   3.68%  [guest.kernel]  [g] native_sched_clock
> >   3.08%  [guest.kernel]  [g] sched_clock_cpu
> >   2.64%  [guest.kernel]  [g] lock_release_holdtime.part.11
> >   2.60%  [guest.kernel]  [g] memcpy
> >   2.33%  [guest.kernel]  [g] lock_acquired
> >   2.25%  [guest.kernel]  [g] lock_acquire
> >   1.84%  [guest.kernel]  [g] do_io_submit
> >
> > This patchs converts the ioctx list to a radix tree. For a performance
> > comparison the above FIO script was run on a 2 sockets 8 core
> > machine. This are the results (average and %rsd of 10 runs) for the
> > original list based implementation and for the radix tree based
> > implementation:
> >
> > cores         1         2         4         8         16        32
> > list       109376 ms  69119 ms  35682 ms  22671 ms  19724 ms  16408 ms
> > %rsd         0.69%      1.15%     1.17%     1.21%     1.71%     1.43%
> > radix       73651 ms  41748 ms  23028 ms  16766 ms  15232 ms   13787 ms
> > %rsd         1.19%      0.98%     0.69%     1.13%    0.72%      0.75%
> > % of radix
> > relative    66.12%     65.59%    66.63%    72.31%   77.26%     83.66%
> > to list
> >
> > To consider the impact of the patch on the typical case of having
> > only one ctx per process the following FIO script was run:
> >
> > rw=randrw; size=100m ;directory=/mnt/fio; ioengine=libaio; iodepth=1
> > blocksize=1024; numjobs=1; thread; loops=100
> >
> > on the same system and the results are the following:
> >
> > list        58892 ms
> > %rsd         0.91%
> > radix       59404 ms
> > %rsd         0.81%
> > % of radix
> > relative    100.87%
> > to list
>
> So, I was just doing some benchmarking/profiling to get ready to send
> out the aio patches I've got for 3.11 - and it looks like your patch is
> causing a ~1.5% throughput regression in my testing :/
... <snip>

I've got an alternate approach for fixing this wart in lookup_ioctx()...
Instead of using an rbtree, just use the reserved id in the ring buffer
header to index an array pointing the ioctx.  It's not finished yet, and
it needs to be tidied up, but is most of the way there.

		-ben
--
"Thought is the essence of where you are now."
--
kmo> And, a rework of Ben's code, but this was entirely his idea
kmo>		-Kent

bcrl> And fix the code to use the right mm_struct in kill_ioctx(), actually
free memory.
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>

The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense
some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings
do not offset the cost and complications.  For example, the fix in
commit 5e427ec2 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time")
is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created
with improper use of the various __init prefixes.

After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go
the way of devinit and be phased out.  Once all the users are gone,
we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h.

This removes all the uses of the __cpuinit macros from C files in
the core kernel directories (kernel, init, lib, mm, and include)
that don't really have a specific maintainer.

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>

Since all architectures have been converted to use vm_unmapped_area(),
there is no remaining use for the free_area_cache.
Signed-off-by: NMichel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

copy_process() does a lot of "chaotic" initializations and checks
CLONE_THREAD twice before it takes tasklist.  In particular it sets
"p->group_leader = p" and then changes it again under tasklist if
!thread_group_leader(p).

This looks a bit confusing, lets create a single "if (CLONE_THREAD)" block
which initializes ->exit_signal, ->group_leader, and ->tgid.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

copy_process() adds the new child to thread_group/init_task.tasks list and
then does attach_pid(child, PIDTYPE_PID).  This means that the lockless
next_thread() or next_task() can see this thread with the wrong pid.  Say,
"ls /proc/pid/task" can list the same inode twice.

We could move attach_pid(child, PIDTYPE_PID) up, but in this case
find_task_by_vpid() can find the new thread before it was fully
initialized.

And this is already true for PIDTYPE_PGID/PIDTYPE_SID, With this patch
copy_process() initializes child->pids[*].pid first, then calls
attach_pid() to insert the task into the pid->tasks list.

attach_pid() no longer need the "struct pid*" argument, it is always
called after pid_link->pid was already set.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Cleanup and preparation for the next changes.

Move the "if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)" code down under "if
(likely(p->pid))" and turn it into into the "else" branch.  This makes the
process/thread initialization more symmetrical and removes one check.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When a task is attempting to violate the RLIMIT_NPROC limit we have a
check to see if the task is sufficiently priviledged.  The check first
looks at CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, then if the task is uid=0.

A result is that tasks which are allowed by the uid=0 check are first
checked against the security subsystem.  This results in the security
subsystem auditting a denial for sys_admin and sys_resource and then the
task passing the uid=0 check.

This patch rearranges the code to first check uid=0, since if we pass that
we shouldn't hit the security system at all.  We then check sys_resource,
since it is the smallest capability which will solve the problem.  Lastly
we check the fallback everything cap_sysadmin.  We don't want to give this
capability many places since it is so powerful.

This will eliminate many of the false positive/needless denial messages we
get when a root task tries to violate the nproc limit.  (note that
kthreads count against root, so on a sufficiently large machine we can
actually get past the default limits before any userspace tasks are
launched.)
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Faster kernel compiles by way of fewer unnecessary includes.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fallout]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: NKent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com>
Cc: Zach Brown <zab@redhat.com>
Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Asai Thambi S P <asamymuthupa@micron.com>
Cc: Selvan Mani <smani@micron.com>
Cc: Sam Bradshaw <sbradshaw@micron.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Reviewed-by: N"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Does writethrough and writeback caching, handles unclean shutdown, and
has a bunch of other nifty features motivated by real world usage.

See the wiki at http://bcache.evilpiepirate.org for more.
Signed-off-by: NKent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com>

Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace.  There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.

So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces.  We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.

This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The full dynticks cputime accounting is able to account either
using the tick or the context tracking subsystem. This way
the housekeeping CPU can keep the low overhead tick based
solution.

This latter mode has a low jiffies resolution granularity and
need to be scaled against CFS precise runtime accounting to
improve its result. We are doing this for CONFIG_TICK_CPU_ACCOUNTING,
now we also need to expand it to full dynticks accounting dynamic
off-case as well.
Signed-off-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Li Zhong <zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Kevin Hilman <khilman@linaro.org>
Cc: Mats Liljegren <mats.liljegren@enea.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

... and switch i386 to HAVE_SYSCALL_WRAPPERS, killing open-coded
uses of asmlinkage_protect() in a bunch of syscalls.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

If new_nsproxy is set we will always call switch_task_namespaces and
then set new_nsproxy back to NULL so the reassignment and fall through
check are redundant
Signed-off-by: NAlan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

While remotely reading the cputime of a task running in a
full dynticks CPU, the values stored in utime/stime fields
of struct task_struct may be stale. Its values may be those
of the last kernel <-> user transition time snapshot and
we need to add the tickless time spent since this snapshot.

To fix this, flush the cputime of the dynticks CPUs on
kernel <-> user transition and record the time / context
where we did this. Then on top of this snapshot and the current
time, perform the fixup on the reader side from task_times()
accessors.
Signed-off-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Li Zhong <zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[fixed kvm module related build errors]
Signed-off-by: NSedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The sequence:
unshare(CLONE_NEWPID)
clone(CLONE_THREAD|CLONE_SIGHAND|CLONE_VM)

Creates a new process in the new pid namespace without setting
pid_ns->child_reaper.  After forking this results in a NULL
pointer dereference.

Avoid this and other nonsense scenarios that can show up after
creating a new pid namespace with unshare by adding a new
check in copy_prodcess.
Pointed-out-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

All architectures have
	CONFIG_GENERIC_KERNEL_THREAD
	CONFIG_GENERIC_KERNEL_EXECVE
	__ARCH_WANT_SYS_EXECVE
None of them have __ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_EXECVE and there are only two callers
of kernel_execve() (which is a trivial wrapper for do_execve() now) left.
Kill the conditionals and make both callers use do_execve().
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Because those architectures will draw their stacks directly from the page
allocator, rather than the slab cache, we can directly pass __GFP_KMEMCG
flag, and issue the corresponding free_pages.

This code path is taken when the architecture doesn't define
CONFIG_ARCH_THREAD_INFO_ALLOCATOR (only ia64 seems to), and has
THREAD_SIZE >= PAGE_SIZE.  Luckily, most - if not all - of the remaining
architectures fall in this category.

This will guarantee that every stack page is accounted to the memcg the
process currently lives on, and will have the allocations to fail if they
go over limit.

For the time being, I am defining a new variant of THREADINFO_GFP, not to
mess with the other path.  Once the slab is also tracked by memcg, we can
get rid of that flag.

Tested to successfully protect against :(){ :|:& };:
Signed-off-by: NGlauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com>
Acked-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NKamezawa Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: JoonSoo Kim <js1304@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Due to the fact that migrations are driven by the CPU a task is running
on there is no point tracking NUMA faults until one task runs on a new
node. This patch tracks the first node used by an address space. Until
it changes, PTE scanning is disabled and no NUMA hinting faults are
trapped. This should help workloads that are short-lived, do not care
about NUMA placement or have bound themselves to a single node.

This takes advantage of the logic in "mm: sched: numa: Implement slow
start for working set sampling" to delay when the checks are made. This
will take advantage of processes that set their CPU and node bindings
early in their lifetime. It will also potentially allow any initial load
balancing to take place.
Signed-off-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... and get rid of idiotic struct pt_regs * in asm-generic/syscalls.h
prototypes of the same, while we are at it.  Eventually we want those
in linux/syscalls.h, of course, but that'll have to wait a bit.

Note that there are *three* variants of sys_clone() order of arguments.
Braindamage galore...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

task_cputime_adjusted() and thread_group_cputime_adjusted()
essentially share the same code. They just don't use the same
source:

* The first function uses the cputime in the task struct and the
previous adjusted snapshot that ensures monotonicity.

* The second adds the cputime of all tasks in the group and the
previous adjusted snapshot of the whole group from the signal
structure.

Just consolidate the common code that does the adjustment. These
functions just need to fetch the values from the appropriate
source.
Signed-off-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>

- Add CLONE_THREAD to the unshare flags if CLONE_NEWUSER is selected
  As changing user namespaces is only valid if all there is only
  a single thread.
- Restore the code to add CLONE_VM if CLONE_THREAD is selected and
  the code to addCLONE_SIGHAND if CLONE_VM is selected.
  Making the constraints in the code clear.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Now that we have been through every permission check in the kernel
having uid == 0 and gid == 0 in your local user namespace no
longer adds any special privileges.  Even having a full set
of caps in your local user namespace is safe because capabilies
are relative to your local user namespace, and do not confer
unexpected privileges.

Over the long term this should allow much more of the kernels
functionality to be safely used by non-root users.  Functionality
like unsharing the mount namespace that is only unsafe because
it can fool applications whose privileges are raised when they
are executed.  Since those applications have no privileges in
a user namespaces it becomes safe to spoof and confuse those
applications all you want.

Those capabilities will still need to be enabled carefully because
we may still need things like rlimits on the number of unprivileged
mounts but that is to avoid DOS attacks not to avoid fooling root
owned processes.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Unsharing of the pid namespace unlike unsharing of other namespaces
does not take affect immediately.  Instead it affects the children
created with fork and clone.  The first of these children becomes the init
process of the new pid namespace, the rest become oddball children
of pid 0.  From the point of view of the new pid namespace the process
that created it is pid 0, as it's pid does not map.

A couple of different semantics were considered but this one was
settled on because it is easy to implement and it is usable from
pam modules.  The core reasons for the existence of unshare.

I took a survey of the callers of pam modules and the following
appears to be a representative sample of their logic.
{
	setup stuff include pam
	child = fork();
	if (!child) {
		setuid()
                exec /bin/bash
        }
        waitpid(child);

        pam and other cleanup
}

As you can see there is a fork to create the unprivileged user
space process.  Which means that the unprivileged user space
process will appear as pid 1 in the new pid namespace.  Further
most login processes do not cope with extraneous children which
means shifting the duty of reaping extraneous child process to
the creator of those extraneous children makes the system more
comprehensible.

The practical reason for this set of pid namespace semantics is
that it is simple to implement and verify they work correctly.
Whereas an implementation that requres changing the struct
pid on a process comes with a lot more races and pain.  Not
the least of which is that glibc caches getpid().

These semantics are implemented by having two notions
of the pid namespace of a proces.  There is task_active_pid_ns
which is the pid namspace the process was created with
and the pid namespace that all pids are presented to
that process in.  The task_active_pid_ns is stored
in the struct pid of the task.

Then there is the pid namespace that will be used for children
that pid namespace is stored in task->nsproxy->pid_ns.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Instead of setting child_reaper and SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE one way
for the system init process, and another way for pid namespace
init processes test pid->nr == 1 and use the same code for both.

For the global init this results in SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE being set
much earlier in the initialization process.

This is a small cleanup and it paves the way for allowing unshare and
enter of the pid namespace as that path like our global init also will
not set CLONE_NEWPID.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Track the number of pids in the proc hash table.  When the number of
pids goes to 0 schedule work to unmount the kernel mount of proc.

Move the mount of proc into alloc_pid when we allocate the pid for
init.

Remove the surprising calls of pid_ns_release proc in fork and
proc_flush_task.  Those code paths really shouldn't know about proc
namespace implementation details and people have demonstrated several
times that finding and understanding those code paths is difficult and
non-obvious.

Because of the call path detach pid is alwasy called with the
rtnl_lock held free_pid is not allowed to sleep, so the work to
unmounting proc is moved to a work queue.  This has the side benefit
of not blocking the entire world waiting for the unnecessary
rcu_barrier in deactivate_locked_super.

In the process of making the code clear and obvious this fixes a bug
reported by Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> where we would leak a
mount of proc during clone(CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWNET) if copy_pid_ns
succeeded and copy_net_ns failed.
Acked-by: N"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

The expressions tsk->nsproxy->pid_ns and task_active_pid_ns
aka ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk)) should have the same number of
cache line misses with the practical difference that
ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk)) is released later in a processes life.

Furthermore by using task_active_pid_ns it becomes trivial
to write an unshare implementation for the the pid namespace.

So I have used task_active_pid_ns everywhere I can.

In fork since the pid has not yet been attached to the
process I use ns_of_pid, to achieve the same effect.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>