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  1. 10 6月, 2014 1 次提交
  3. 30 5月, 2014 1 次提交
  5. 13 3月, 2014 1 次提交
    • T
      fs: push sync_filesystem() down to the file system's remount_fs() · 02b9984d
      由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于 
      Previously, the no-op "mount -o mount /dev/xxx" operation when the
file system is already mounted read-write causes an implied,
unconditional syncfs().  This seems pretty stupid, and it's certainly
documented or guaraunteed to do this, nor is it particularly useful,
except in the case where the file system was mounted rw and is getting
remounted read-only.

However, it's possible that there might be some file systems that are
actually depending on this behavior.  In most file systems, it's
probably fine to only call sync_filesystem() when transitioning from
read-write to read-only, and there are some file systems where this is
not needed at all (for example, for a pseudo-filesystem or something
like romfs).
Signed-off-by: N"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: Anders Larsen <al@alarsen.net>
Cc: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>
Cc: Petr Vandrovec <petr@vandrovec.name>
Cc: xfs@oss.sgi.com
Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
Cc: codalist@coda.cs.cmu.edu
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: cluster-devel@redhat.com
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nilfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-ntfs-dev@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com
Cc: reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org
      02b9984d
  7. 16 11月, 2013 1 次提交
  9. 29 10月, 2013 7 次提交
  11. 11 9月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      fs: convert fs shrinkers to new scan/count API · 1ab6c499
      由 Dave Chinner 提交于 
      Convert the filesystem shrinkers to use the new API, and standardise some
of the behaviours of the shrinkers at the same time.  For example,
nr_to_scan means the number of objects to scan, not the number of objects
to free.

I refactored the CIFS idmap shrinker a little - it really needs to be
broken up into a shrinker per tree and keep an item count with the tree
root so that we don't need to walk the tree every time the shrinker needs
to count the number of objects in the tree (i.e.  all the time under
memory pressure).

[glommer@openvz.org: fixes for ext4, ubifs, nfs, cifs and glock. Fixes are needed mainly due to new code merged in the tree]
[assorted fixes folded in]
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGlauber Costa <glommer@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: NSteven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      1ab6c499
  13. 08 9月, 2013 3 次提交
  15. 05 9月, 2013 1 次提交
  17. 08 8月, 2013 2 次提交
  19. 29 6月, 2013 4 次提交
  21. 09 6月, 2013 4 次提交
  23. 31 5月, 2013 1 次提交
    • C
      NFS: Fix security flavor negotiation with legacy binary mounts · eb54d437
      由 Chuck Lever 提交于 
      Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> reports:
> I have a kvm-based testing setup that netboots VMs over NFS, the
> client end of which seems to have broken somehow in 3.10-rc1.  The
> server's exports file looks like this:
>
> /storage/mtr/x64	192.168.122.0/24(ro,sync,no_root_squash,no_subtree_check)
>
> On the client end (inside the VM), the initrd runs the following
> command to try to mount the rootfs over NFS:
>
> # mount -o nolock -o ro -o retrans=10 192.168.122.1:/storage/mtr/x64/ /root
>
> (Note: This is the busybox mount command.)
>
> The mount fails with -EINVAL.

Commit 4580a92d "NFS: Use server-recommended security flavor by
default (NFSv3)" introduced a behavior regression for NFS mounts
done via a legacy binary mount(2) call.

Ensure that a default security flavor is specified for legacy binary
mount requests, since they do not invoke nfs_select_flavor() in the
kernel.

Busybox uses klibc's nfsmount command, which performs NFS mounts
using the legacy binary mount data format.  /sbin/mount.nfs is not
affected by this regression.
Reported-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Tested-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
      eb54d437
  25. 07 5月, 2013 1 次提交
    • W
      NFSv3: match sec= flavor against server list · d497ab97
      由 Weston Andros Adamson 提交于 
      Older linux clients match the 'sec=' mount option flavor against the server's
flavor list (if available) and return EPERM if the specified flavor or AUTH_NULL
(which "matches" any flavor) is not found.

Recent changes skip this step and allow the vfs mount even though no operations
will succeed, creating a 'dud' mount.

This patch reverts back to the old behavior of matching specified flavors
against the server list and also returns EPERM when no sec= is specified and
none of the flavors returned by the server are supported by the client.

Example of behavior change:

the server's /etc/exports:

/export/krb5      *(sec=krb5,rw,no_root_squash)

old client behavior:

$ uname -a
Linux one.apikia.fake 3.8.8-202.fc18.x86_64 #1 SMP Wed Apr 17 23:25:17 UTC 2013 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
$ sudo mount -v -o sec=sys,vers=3 zero:/export/krb5 /mnt
mount.nfs: timeout set for Sun May  5 17:32:04 2013
mount.nfs: trying text-based options 'sec=sys,vers=3,addr=192.168.100.10'
mount.nfs: prog 100003, trying vers=3, prot=6
mount.nfs: trying 192.168.100.10 prog 100003 vers 3 prot TCP port 2049
mount.nfs: prog 100005, trying vers=3, prot=17
mount.nfs: trying 192.168.100.10 prog 100005 vers 3 prot UDP port 20048
mount.nfs: mount(2): Permission denied
mount.nfs: access denied by server while mounting zero:/export/krb5

recently changed behavior:

$ uname -a
Linux one.apikia.fake 3.9.0-testing+ #2 SMP Fri May 3 20:29:32 EDT 2013 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
$ sudo mount -v -o sec=sys,vers=3 zero:/export/krb5 /mnt
mount.nfs: timeout set for Sun May  5 17:37:17 2013
mount.nfs: trying text-based options 'sec=sys,vers=3,addr=192.168.100.10'
mount.nfs: prog 100003, trying vers=3, prot=6
mount.nfs: trying 192.168.100.10 prog 100003 vers 3 prot TCP port 2049
mount.nfs: prog 100005, trying vers=3, prot=17
mount.nfs: trying 192.168.100.10 prog 100005 vers 3 prot UDP port 20048
$ ls /mnt
ls: cannot open directory /mnt: Permission denied
$ sudo ls /mnt
ls: cannot open directory /mnt: Permission denied
$ sudo df /mnt
df: ‘/mnt’: Permission denied
df: no file systems processed
$ sudo umount /mnt
$
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
      d497ab97
  27. 05 4月, 2013 1 次提交
    • C
      NFS: Use server-recommended security flavor by default (NFSv3) · 4580a92d
      由 Chuck Lever 提交于 
      Since commit ec88f28d in 2009, checking if the user-specified flavor
is in the server's flavor list has been the source of a few
noticeable regressions (now fixed), but there is one that is still
vexing.

An NFS server can list AUTH_NULL in its flavor list, which suggests
a client should try to mount the server with the flavor of the
client's choice, but the server will squash all accesses.  In some
cases, our client fails to mount a server because of this check,
when the mount could have proceeded successfully.

Skip this check if the user has specified "sec=" on the mount
command line.  But do consult the server-provided flavor list to
choose a security flavor if no sec= option is specified on the mount
command.

If a server lists Kerberos pseudoflavors before "sys" in its export
options, our client now chooses Kerberos over AUTH_UNIX for mount
points, when no security flavor is specified by the mount command.
This could be surprising to some administrators or users, who would
then need to have Kerberos credentials to access the export.

Or, a client administrator may not have enabled rpc.gssd.  In this
case, auth_rpcgss.ko might still be loadable, which is enough for
the new logic to choose Kerberos over AUTH_UNIX.  But the mount
would fail since no GSS context can be created without rpc.gssd
running.

To retain the use of AUTH_UNIX by default:

  o  The server administrator can ensure that "sys" is listed before
     Kerberos flavors in its export security options (see
     exports(5)),

  o  The client administrator can explicitly specify "sec=sys" on
     its mount command line (see nfs(5)),

  o  The client administrator can use "Sec=sys" in an appropriate
     section of /etc/nfsmount.conf (see nfsmount.conf(5)), or

  o  The client administrator can blacklist auth_rpcgss.ko.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
      4580a92d
  29. 02 4月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch · 094f7b69
      由 Jeff Layton 提交于 
      I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the
same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the
second context= option is ignored. For instance:

    # mount server:/export /mnt/test1
    # mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
    # ls -dZ /mnt/test1
    drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0       /mnt/test1
    # ls -dZ /mnt/test2
    drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0       /mnt/test2

When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock,
it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an
existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and
presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from
the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this
case cannot take effect.

This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int
return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has
been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on
the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return
success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the
admin why the second mount failed.

Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on
being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount
filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts,
then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways.

For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the
server:

    # mount server:/ /mnt/test1
    # mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
    mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified

...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually
walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch.
The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already
present with the wrong context.

OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work,
because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is
discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into
that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons:

    # cd /mnt/test1/scratch/
    -bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy

The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that
this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data
under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one.

Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
      094f7b69
  31. 13 3月, 2013 1 次提交
    • E
      fs: Readd the fs module aliases. · fa7614dd
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      I had assumed that the only use of module aliases for filesystems
prior to "fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules."
was in request_module.  It turns out I was wrong.  At least mkinitcpio
in Arch linux uses these aliases.

So readd the preexising aliases, to keep from breaking userspace.

Userspace eventually will have to follow and use the same aliases the
kernel does.  So at some point we may be delete these aliases without
problems.  However that day is not today.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      fa7614dd
  33. 04 3月, 2013 1 次提交
    • E
      fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules. · 7f78e035
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-"
and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules
to match.

A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code
that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many
users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel.

Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible
modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially
making things safer with no real cost.

Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which
filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf
with blacklist and alias directives.  Allowing simple, safe,
well understood work-arounds to known problematic software.

This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem
name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading
would not work.  While writing this patch I saw a handful of such
cases.  The most significant being autofs that lives in the module
autofs4.

This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request
module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and
people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case
the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module.

After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any
particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond
making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem
module.  The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module()
without regards to the users permissions.  In general all a filesystem
module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep.
Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a
filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted.  In a user
namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
which most filesystems do not set today.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: NKees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      7f78e035
  35. 26 2月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      vfs: kill FS_REVAL_DOT by adding a d_weak_revalidate dentry op · ecf3d1f1
      由 Jeff Layton 提交于 
      The following set of operations on a NFS client and server will cause

    server# mkdir a
    client# cd a
    server# mv a a.bak
    client# sleep 30  # (or whatever the dir attrcache timeout is)
    client# stat .
    stat: cannot stat `.': Stale NFS file handle

Obviously, we should not be getting an ESTALE error back there since the
inode still exists on the server. The problem is that the lookup code
will call d_revalidate on the dentry that "." refers to, because NFS has
FS_REVAL_DOT set.

nfs_lookup_revalidate will see that the parent directory has changed and
will try to reverify the dentry by redoing a LOOKUP. That of course
fails, so the lookup code returns ESTALE.

The problem here is that d_revalidate is really a bad fit for this case.
What we really want to know at this point is whether the inode is still
good or not, but we don't really care what name it goes by or whether
the dcache is still valid.

Add a new d_op->d_weak_revalidate operation and have complete_walk call
that instead of d_revalidate. The intent there is to allow for a
"weaker" d_revalidate that just checks to see whether the inode is still
good. This is also gives us an opportunity to kill off the FS_REVAL_DOT
special casing.

[AV: changed method name, added note in porting, fixed confusion re
having it possibly called from RCU mode (it won't be)]

Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      ecf3d1f1
  37. 05 2月, 2013 1 次提交
  39. 01 2月, 2013 1 次提交
  41. 28 1月, 2013 1 次提交
  43. 04 1月, 2013 1 次提交
  45. 22 12月, 2012 1 次提交
  47. 15 12月, 2012 1 次提交
  49. 06 12月, 2012 1 次提交