- 18 10月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 J. Bruce Fields 提交于
If we create the object and then return failure to the client, we're left with an unexpected file in the filesystem. I'm trying to eliminate such cases but not 100% sure I have so an assertion might be helpful for now. Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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- 28 8月, 2011 2 次提交
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由 J. Bruce Fields 提交于
Acked-by: NJim Rees <rees@umich.edu> Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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由 J. Bruce Fields 提交于
A client that wants to execute a file must be able to read it. Read opens over nfs are therefore implicitly allowed for executable files even when those files are not readable. NFSv2/v3 get this right by using a passed-in NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE on read requests, but NFSv4 has gotten this wrong ever since dc730e17 "nfsd4: fix owner-override on open", when we realized that the file owner shouldn't override permissions on non-reclaim NFSv4 opens. So we can't use NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE to tell nfsd_permission to allow reads of executable files. So, do the same thing we do whenever we encounter another weird NFS permission nit: define yet another NFSD_MAY_* flag. The industry's future standardization on 128-bit processors will be motivated primarily by the need for integers with enough bits for all the NFSD_MAY_* flags. Reported-by: NLeonardo Borda <leonardoborda@gmail.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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- 30 4月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Mi Jinlong 提交于
The NFS server uses nfsd_create_v3 to handle EXCLUSIVE4_1 opens, but that function is not prepared to handle them. Rename nfsd_create_v3() to do_nfsd_create(), and add handling of EXCLUSIVE4_1. Signed-off-by: NMi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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- 11 4月, 2011 2 次提交
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由 J. Bruce Fields 提交于
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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由 J. Bruce Fields 提交于
Most of the NFSD_MAY_* flags actually request permissions, but over the years we've accreted a few that modify the behavior of the permission or open code in other ways. Distinguish the two cases a little more. In particular, allow the shortcut at the start of nfsd_permission to ignore the non-permission-requesting bits. Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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- 31 7月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 J. Bruce Fields 提交于
Christoph points that the NFSv2/v3 callers know which case they want here, so we may as well just call the file=NULL case directly instead of making this conditional. Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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- 23 3月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
This is the second attempt to fix the problem whereby a COMMIT call causes a lease break and triggers a possible deadlock. The problem is that nfsd attempts to break a lease on a COMMIT call. This triggers a delegation recall if the lease is held for a delegation. If the client is the one holding the delegation and it's the same one on which it's issuing the COMMIT, then it can't return that delegation until the COMMIT is complete. But, nfsd won't complete the COMMIT until the delegation is returned. The client and server are essentially deadlocked until the state is marked bad (due to the client not responding on the callback channel). The first patch attempted to deal with this by eliminating the open of the file altogether and simply had nfsd_commit pass a NULL file pointer to the vfs_fsync_range. That would conflict with some work in progress by Christoph Hellwig to clean up the fsync interface, so this patch takes a different approach. This declares a new NFSD_MAY_NOT_BREAK_LEASE access flag that indicates to nfsd_open that it should not break any leases when opening the file, and has nfsd_commit set that flag on the nfsd_open call. For now, this patch leaves nfsd_commit opening the file with write access since I'm not clear on what sort of access would be more appropriate. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
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- 16 12月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 J. Bruce Fields 提交于
Most of this can be trivially moved to a private header as well. Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
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由 J. Bruce Fields 提交于
As with lookup, we treat every boject as a mountpoint and pretend it doesn't exist if it isn't exported. The preexisting code here is confusing, but I haven't yet figured out how to make it clearer. Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
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- 14 11月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 J. Bruce Fields 提交于
None of this stuff is used outside nfsd, so move it out of the common linux include directory. Actually, probably none of the stuff in include/linux/nfsd/nfsd.h really belongs there, so later we may remove that file entirely. Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
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