If a NFSv4.x server returns NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID in response to a
CREATE_SESSION or SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM in order to tell us that it rebooted
a second time, then the client will currently take this to mean that it must
declare all locks to be stale, and hence ineligible for reboot recovery.

RFC3530 and RFC5661 both suggest that the client should instead rely on the
server to respond to inelegible open share, lock and delegation reclaim
requests with NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE in this situation.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

This reverts commit 49a4bda2.

Christoph reported an oops due to the above commit:

generic/089 242s ...[ 2187.041239] general protection fault: 0000 [#1]
SMP
[ 2187.042899] Modules linked in:
[ 2187.044000] CPU: 0 PID: 11913 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.16.0-rc6+ #1151
[ 2187.044287] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
[ 2187.044287] Workqueue: nfsiod free_lock_state_work
[ 2187.044287] task: ffff880072b50cd0 ti: ffff88007a4ec000 task.ti: ffff88007a4ec000
[ 2187.044287] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81361ca6>]  [<ffffffff81361ca6>] free_lock_state_work+0x16/0x30
[ 2187.044287] RSP: 0018:ffff88007a4efd58  EFLAGS: 00010296
[ 2187.044287] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff88007a947ac0 RCX: 8000000000000000
[ 2187.044287] RDX: ffffffff826af9e0 RSI: ffff88007b093c00 RDI: ffff88007b093db8
[ 2187.044287] RBP: ffff88007a4efd58 R08: ffffffff832d3e10 R09: 000001c40efc0000
[ 2187.044287] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000059e30 R12: ffff88007fc13240
[ 2187.044287] R13: ffff88007fc18b00 R14: ffff88007b093db8 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 2187.044287] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2187.044287] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 2187.044287] CR2: 00007f93ec33fb80 CR3: 0000000079dc2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 2187.044287] Stack:
[ 2187.044287]  ffff88007a4efdd8 ffffffff810cc877 ffffffff810cc80d ffff88007fc13258
[ 2187.044287]  000000007a947af0 0000000000000000 ffffffff8353ccc8 ffffffff82b6f3d0
[ 2187.044287]  0000000000000000 ffffffff82267679 ffff88007a4efdd8 ffff88007fc13240
[ 2187.044287] Call Trace:
[ 2187.044287]  [<ffffffff810cc877>] process_one_work+0x1c7/0x490
[ 2187.044287]  [<ffffffff810cc80d>] ? process_one_work+0x15d/0x490
[ 2187.044287]  [<ffffffff810cd569>] worker_thread+0x119/0x4f0
[ 2187.044287]  [<ffffffff810fbbad>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 2187.044287]  [<ffffffff810cd450>] ? init_pwq+0x190/0x190
[ 2187.044287]  [<ffffffff810d3c6f>] kthread+0xdf/0x100
[ 2187.044287]  [<ffffffff810d3b90>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70
[ 2187.044287]  [<ffffffff81d9873c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 2187.044287]  [<ffffffff810d3b90>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70
[ 2187.044287] Code: 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 c0 5d c3 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 8d b7 48 fe ff ff 48 8b 87 58 fe ff ff 48 89 e5 48 8b 40 30 <48> 8b 00 48 8b 10 48 89 c7 48 8b 92 90 03 00 00 ff 52 28 5d c3
[ 2187.044287] RIP  [<ffffffff81361ca6>] free_lock_state_work+0x16/0x30
[ 2187.044287]  RSP <ffff88007a4efd58>
[ 2187.103626] ---[ end trace 0f11326d28e5d8fa ]---

The original reason for this patch was because the fl_release_private
operation couldn't sleep. With commit ed9814d8 (locks: defer freeing
locks in locks_delete_lock until after i_lock has been dropped), this is
no longer a problem so we can revert this patch.
Reported-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Tested-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

The current "wait_on_bit" interface requires an 'action'
function to be provided which does the actual waiting.
There are over 20 such functions, many of them identical.
Most cases can be satisfied by one of just two functions, one
which uses io_schedule() and one which just uses schedule().

So:
 Rename wait_on_bit and        wait_on_bit_lock to
        wait_on_bit_action and wait_on_bit_lock_action
 to make it explicit that they need an action function.

 Introduce new wait_on_bit{,_lock} and wait_on_bit{,_lock}_io
 which are *not* given an action function but implicitly use
 a standard one.
 The decision to error-out if a signal is pending is now made
 based on the 'mode' argument rather than being encoded in the action
 function.

 All instances of the old wait_on_bit and wait_on_bit_lock which
 can use the new version have been changed accordingly and their
 action functions have been discarded.
 wait_on_bit{_lock} does not return any specific error code in the
 event of a signal so the caller must check for non-zero and
 interpolate their own error code as appropriate.

The wait_on_bit() call in __fscache_wait_on_invalidate() was
ambiguous as it specified TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE but used
fscache_wait_bit_interruptible as an action function.
David Howells confirms this should be uniformly
"uninterruptible"

The main remaining user of wait_on_bit{,_lock}_action is NFS
which needs to use a freezer-aware schedule() call.

A comment in fs/gfs2/glock.c notes that having multiple 'action'
functions is useful as they display differently in the 'wchan'
field of 'ps'. (and /proc/$PID/wchan).
As the new bit_wait{,_io} functions are tagged "__sched", they
will not show up at all, but something higher in the stack.  So
the distinction will still be visible, only with different
function names (gds2_glock_wait versus gfs2_glock_dq_wait in the
gfs2/glock.c case).

Since first version of this patch (against 3.15) two new action
functions appeared, on in NFS and one in CIFS.  CIFS also now
uses an action function that makes the same freezer aware
schedule call as NFS.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> (fscache, keys)
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> (gfs2)
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140707051603.28027.72349.stgit@notabene.brownSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

We got a report of the following warning in Fedora:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:969
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 533, name: bash
3 locks held by bash/533:
 #0:  (&sp->so_delegreturn_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa033da62>] nfs4_proc_lock+0x262/0x910 [nfsv4]
 #1:  (&nfsi->rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffffa033da6a>] nfs4_proc_lock+0x26a/0x910 [nfsv4]
 #2:  (&sb->s_type->i_lock_key#23){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff812998dc>] flock_lock_file_wait+0x8c/0x3a0
CPU: 0 PID: 533 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.15.0-0.rc1.git1.1.fc21.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 0000000000000000 00000000d664ff3c ffff880078b69a70 ffffffff817e82e0
 0000000000000000 ffff880078b69a98 ffffffff810cf1a4 0000000000000050
 0000000000000050 ffff88007cc01a00 ffff880078b69ad8 ffffffff8121449e
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff817e82e0>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66
 [<ffffffff810cf1a4>] __might_sleep+0x184/0x240
 [<ffffffff8121449e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x4e/0x330
 [<ffffffffa0331124>] ? nfs4_release_lockowner+0x74/0x110 [nfsv4]
 [<ffffffffa0331124>] nfs4_release_lockowner+0x74/0x110 [nfsv4]
 [<ffffffffa0352340>] nfs4_put_lock_state+0x90/0xb0 [nfsv4]
 [<ffffffffa0352375>] nfs4_fl_release_lock+0x15/0x20 [nfsv4]
 [<ffffffff81297515>] locks_free_lock+0x45/0x90
 [<ffffffff8129996c>] flock_lock_file_wait+0x11c/0x3a0
 [<ffffffffa033da6a>] ? nfs4_proc_lock+0x26a/0x910 [nfsv4]
 [<ffffffffa033301e>] do_vfs_lock+0x1e/0x30 [nfsv4]
 [<ffffffffa033da79>] nfs4_proc_lock+0x279/0x910 [nfsv4]
 [<ffffffff810dbb26>] ? local_clock+0x16/0x30
 [<ffffffff810f5a3f>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.28+0xf/0x200
 [<ffffffffa02f820c>] do_unlk+0x8c/0xc0 [nfs]
 [<ffffffffa02f85c5>] nfs_flock+0xa5/0xf0 [nfs]
 [<ffffffff8129a6f6>] locks_remove_file+0xb6/0x1e0
 [<ffffffff812159d8>] ? kfree+0xd8/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff8123bc63>] __fput+0xd3/0x210
 [<ffffffff8123bdee>] ____fput+0xe/0x10
 [<ffffffff810bfb6d>] task_work_run+0xcd/0xf0
 [<ffffffff81019cd1>] do_notify_resume+0x61/0x90
 [<ffffffff817fbea2>] int_signal+0x12/0x17

The problem is that NFSv4 is trying to do an allocation from
fl_release_private (in order to send a RELEASE_LOCKOWNER call). That
function can be called while holding the inode->i_lock, and it's
currently set up to do __GFP_WAIT allocations. v4.1 code has a
similar problem.

This patch adds a work_struct to the nfs4_lock_state and has the code
queue the free_lock_state operation to nfsiod.
Reported-by: NJosh Stone <jistone@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

Do the following set of ops with a file on a NFSv4 mount:

    exec 3>>/file/on/nfsv4
    flock -x 3
    exec 3>&-

You'll see the LOCK request go across the wire, but no LOCKU when the
file is closed.

What happens is that the fd is passed across a fork, and the final close
is done in a different process than the opener. That makes
__nfs4_find_lock_state miss finding the correct lock state because it
uses the fl_pid as a search key. A new one is created, and the locking
code treats it as a delegation stateid (because NFS_LOCK_INITIALIZED
isn't set).

The root cause of this breakage seems to be commit 77041ed9
(NFSv4: Ensure the lockowners are labelled using the fl_owner and/or
fl_pid).

That changed it so that flock lockowners are allocated based on the
fl_pid. I think this is incorrect. flock locks should be "owned" by the
struct file, and that is already accounted for in the fl_owner field of
the lock request when it comes through nfs_flock.

This patch basically reverts the above commit and with it, a LOCKU is
sent in the above reproducer.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

The addition of lockdep code to write_seqcount_begin/end has lead to
a bunch of false positive claims of ABBA deadlocks with the so_lock
spinlock. Audits show that this simply cannot happen because the
read side code does not spin while holding so_lock.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.13.x
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

Mostly scripted conversion of the smp_mb__* barriers.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-55dhyhocezdw1dg7u19hmh1u@git.kernel.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Tested-by: NSteve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

In commit 5521abfd (NFSv4: Resend the READ/WRITE RPC call
if a stateid change causes an error), we overloaded the return value of
nfs4_select_rw_stateid() to cause it to return -EWOULDBLOCK if an RPC
call is outstanding that would cause the NFSv4 lock or open stateid
to change.
That is all redundant when we actually copy the stateid used in the
read/write RPC call that failed, and check that against the current
stateid. It is doubly so, when we consider that in the NFSv4.1 case,
we also set the stateid's seqid to the special value '0', which means
'match the current valid stateid'.
Reported-by: NAndy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1393954269-3974-1-git-send-email-andros@netapp.comSigned-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

RFC3530 and RFC5661 both prescribe that the 'opaque' field of the
open stateid returned by new OPEN/OPEN_DOWNGRADE/CLOSE calls for
the same file and open owner should match.
If this is not the case, assume that the open state has been lost,
and that we need to recover it.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

Do not return an error when nfs4_copy_delegation_stateid succeeds.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392737765-41942-1-git-send-email-andros@netapp.com
Fixes: ef1820f9 (NFSv4: Don't try to recover NFSv4 locks when...)
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

Signed-off-by: NToralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

Use this new function to make code more comprehensible, since we are
reinitialzing the completion, not initializing.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: linux-next resyncs]
Signed-off-by: NWolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> (personally at LCE13)
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Currently, when we try to mount and get back NFS4ERR_CLID_IN_USE or
NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, we create a new rpc_clnt and then try the call again.
There is no guarantee that doing so will work however, so we can end up
retrying the call in an infinite loop.

Worse yet, we create the new client using rpc_clone_client_set_auth,
which creates the new client as a child of the old one. Thus, we can end
up with a *very* long lineage of rpc_clnts. When we go to put all of the
references to them, we can end up with a long call chain that can smash
the stack as each rpc_free_client() call can recurse back into itself.

This patch fixes this by simply ensuring that the SETCLIENTID call will
only be retried in this situation if the last attempt did not use
RPC_AUTH_UNIX.

Note too that with this change, we don't need the (i > 2) check in the
-EACCES case since we now have a more reliable test as to whether we
should reattempt.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.10+
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Tested-by/Acked-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

commit 6686390b (NFS: remove incorrect "Lock reclaim failed!"
warning.) added a test for a delegation before checking to see if any
reclaimed locks failed. The test however is backward and is only doing
that check when a delegation is held instead of when one isn't.

Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Fixes: 6686390b: NFS: remove incorrect "Lock reclaim failed!" warning.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

In nfs4_wait_clnt_recover(), hold a reference to the clp being
waited on.  The state manager can reduce clp->cl_count to 1, in
which case the nfs_put_client() in nfs4_run_state_manager() can
free *clp before wait_on_bit() returns and allows
nfs4_wait_clnt_recover() to run again.

The behavior at that point is non-deterministic.  If the waited-on
bit still happens to be zero, wait_on_bit() will wake the waiter as
expected.  If the bit is set again (say, if the memory was poisoned
when freed) wait_on_bit() can leave the waiter asleep.

This is a narrow fix which ensures the safety of accessing *clp in
nfs4_wait_clnt_recover(), but does not address the continued use
of a possibly freed *clp after nfs4_wait_clnt_recover() returns
(see nfs_end_delegation_return(), for example).
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

With the advent of NFSv4 sessions in NFSv4.1 and following, a "lease
moved" condition is reported differently than it is in NFSv4.0.

NFSv4 minor version 0 servers return an error status code,
NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED, to signal that a lease has moved.  This error
causes the whole compound operation to fail.  Normal compounds
against this server continue to fail until the client performs
migration recovery on the migrated share.

Minor version 1 and later servers assert a bit flag in the reply to
a compound's SEQUENCE operation to signal LEASE_MOVED.  This is not
a fatal condition: operations against this server continue normally.
The server asserts this flag until the client performs migration
recovery on the migrated share.

Note that servers MUST NOT return NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED to NFSv4
clients not using NFSv4.0.

After the server asserts any of the sr_status_flags in the SEQUENCE
operation in a typical compound, our client initiates standard lease
recovery.  For NFSv4.1+, a stand-alone SEQUENCE operation is
performed to discover what recovery is needed.

If SEQ4_STATUS_LEASE_MOVED is asserted in this stand-alone SEQUENCE
operation, our client attempts to discover which FSIDs have been
migrated, and then performs migration recovery on each.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

A migration on the FSID in play for the current NFS operation
is reported via the error status code NFS4ERR_MOVED.

"Lease moved" means that a migration has occurred on some other
FSID than the one for the current operation.  It's a signal that
the client should take action immediately to handle a migration
that it may not have noticed otherwise.  This is so that the
client's lease does not expire unnoticed on the destination server.

In NFSv4.0, a moved lease is reported with the NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED
error status code.

To recover from NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED, check each FSID for that server
to see if it is still present.  Invoke nfs4_try_migration() if the
FSID is no longer present on the server.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Migration recovery and state recovery must be serialized, so handle
both in the state manager thread.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

As of commit 5d422301 we no longer zero the
state.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

When an NFSv4 client loses contact with the server it can lose any
locks that it holds.

Currently when it reconnects to the server it simply tries to reclaim
those locks.  This might succeed even though some other client has
held and released a lock in the mean time.  So the first client might
think the file is unchanged, but it isn't.  This isn't good.

If, when recovery happens, the locks cannot be claimed because some
other client still holds the lock, then we get a message in the kernel
logs, but the client can still write.  So two clients can both think
they have a lock and can both write at the same time.  This is equally
not good.

There was a patch a while ago
  http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.linux.nfs/41917

which tried to address some of this, but it didn't seem to go
anywhere.  That patch would also send a signal to the process.  That
might be useful but for now this patch just causes writes to fail.

For NFSv4 (unlike v2/v3) there is a strong link between the lock and
the write request so we can fairly easily fail any IO of the lock is
gone.  While some applications might not expect this, it is still
safer than allowing the write to succeed.

Because this is a fairly big change in behaviour a module parameter,
"recover_locks", is introduced which defaults to true (the current
behaviour) but can be set to "false" to tell the client not to try to
recover things that were lost.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

When CONFIG_NFS_V4_1 is not enabled, gcc emits this warning:

linux/fs/nfs/nfs4state.c:255:12: warning:
 ‘nfs4_begin_drain_session’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
 static int nfs4_begin_drain_session(struct nfs_client *clp)
            ^

Eventually NFSv4.0 migration recovery will invoke this function, but
that has not yet been merged.  Hide nfs4_begin_drain_session()
behind CONFIG_NFS_V4_1 for now.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

I'd like to re-use NFSv4.1's slot table machinery for NFSv4.0
transport blocking.  Re-organize some of nfs4session.c so the slot
table code is built even when NFS_V4_1 is disabled.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

After reclaiming state that was lost, the NFS client tries to reclaim
any locks, and then checks that each one has NFS_LOCK_INITIALIZED set
(which means that the server has confirmed the lock).
However if the client holds a delegation, nfs_reclaim_locks() simply aborts
(or more accurately it called nfs_lock_reclaim() and that returns without
doing anything).

This is because when a delegation is held, the server doesn't need to
know about locks.

So if a delegation is held, NFS_LOCK_INITIALIZED is not expected, and
its absence is certainly not an error.

So don't print the warnings if NFS_DELGATED_STATE is set.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Never try to use a non-UID 0 user credential for lease management,
as that credential can change out from under us.  The server will
block NFSv4 lease recovery with NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE.

Since the mechanism to acquire a credential for lease management
is now the same for all minor versions, replace the minor version-
specific callout with a single function.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Commit 05f4c350 "NFS: Discover NFSv4 server trunking when mounting"
Fri Sep 14 17:24:32 2012 introduced Uniform Client String support,
which forces our NFS client to establish a client ID immediately
during a mount operation rather than waiting until a user wants to
open a file.

Normally machine credentials (eg. from a keytab) are used to perform
a mount operation that is protected by Kerberos.  Before 05fc350,
SETCLIENTID used a machine credential, or fell back to a regular
user's credential if no keytab is available.

On clients that don't have a keytab, performing SETCLIENTID early
means there's no user credential to fall back on, since no regular
user has kinit'd yet.  05f4c350 seems to have broken the ability
to mount with sec=krb5 on clients that don't have a keytab in
kernels 3.7 - 3.10.

To address this regression, commit 4edaa308 (NFS: Use "krb5i" to
establish NFSv4 state whenever possible), Sat Mar 16 15:56:20 2013,
was merged in 3.10.  This commit forces the NFS client to fall back
to AUTH_SYS for lease management operations if no keytab is
available.

Neil Brown noticed that, since root is required to kinit to do a
sec=krb5 mount when a client doesn't have a keytab, we can try to
use root's Kerberos credential before AUTH_SYS.

Now, when determining a principal and flavor to use for lease
management, the NFS client tries in this order:

  1.  Flavor: AUTH_GSS, krb5i
      Principal: service principal (via keytab)

  2.  Flavor: AUTH_GSS, krb5i
      Principal: user principal established for UID 0 (via kinit)

  3.  Flavor: AUTH_SYS
      Principal: UID 0 / GID 0
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Clean up: when NFSv4.1 support is compiled out,
nfs4_end_drain_session() becomes a stub.  Make the synopsis of the
stub match the synopsis of the real version of the function.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Calling kthread_run with a single name parameter causes it to be handled
as a format string. Many callers are passing potentially dynamic string
content, so use "%s" in those cases to avoid any potential accidents.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Having a global lock that protects all of this code is a clear
scalability problem. Instead of doing that, move most of the code to be
protected by the i_lock instead. The exceptions are the global lists
that the ->fl_link sits on, and the ->fl_block list.

->fl_link is what connects these structures to the
global lists, so we must ensure that we hold those locks when iterating
over or updating these lists.

Furthermore, sound deadlock detection requires that we hold the
blocked_list state steady while checking for loops. We also must ensure
that the search and update to the list are atomic.

For the checking and insertion side of the blocked_list, push the
acquisition of the global lock into __posix_lock_file and ensure that
checking and update of the  blocked_list is done without dropping the
lock in between.

On the removal side, when waking up blocked lock waiters, take the
global lock before walking the blocked list and dequeue the waiters from
the global list prior to removal from the fl_block list.

With this, deadlock detection should be race free while we minimize
excessive file_lock_lock thrashing.

Finally, in order to avoid a lock inversion problem when handling
/proc/locks output we must ensure that manipulations of the fl_block
list are also protected by the file_lock_lock.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

We need to ensure that we clear NFS4_SLOT_TBL_DRAINING on the back
channel when we're done recovering the session.

Regression introduced by commit 774d5f14 (NFSv4.1 Fix a pNFS session
draining deadlock)
Signed-off-by: NAndy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
[Trond: Changed order to start back-channel first. Minor code cleanup]
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>=3.10]

We want to use the same credential for reclaim_complete as we used
for the exchange_id call.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

On a CB_RECALL the callback service thread flushes the inode using
filemap_flush prior to scheduling the state manager thread to return the
delegation. When pNFS is used and I/O has not yet gone to the data server
servicing the inode, a LAYOUTGET can preceed the I/O. Unlike the async
filemap_flush call, the LAYOUTGET must proceed to completion.

If the state manager starts to recover data while the inode flush is sending
the LAYOUTGET, a deadlock occurs as the callback service thread holds the
single callback session slot until the flushing is done which blocks the state
manager thread, and the state manager thread has set the session draining bit
which puts the inode flush LAYOUTGET RPC to sleep on the forechannel slot
table waitq.

Separate the draining of the back channel from the draining of the fore channel
by moving the NFS4_SESSION_DRAINING bit from session scope into the fore
and back slot tables.  Drain the back channel first allowing the LAYOUTGET
call to proceed (and fail) so the callback service thread frees the callback
slot. Then proceed with draining the forechannel.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

This ensures that the server doesn't need to keep huge numbers of
lock stateids waiting around for the final CLOSE.
See section 8.2.4 in RFC5661.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Recently I changed the SETCLIENTID code to use AUTH_GSS(krb5i), and
then retry with AUTH_NONE if that didn't work.  This was to enable
Kerberos NFS mounts to work without forcing Linux NFS clients to
have a keytab on hand.

Rick Macklem reports that the FreeBSD server accepts AUTH_NONE only
for NULL operations (thus certainly not for SETCLIENTID).  Falling
back to AUTH_NONE means our proposed 3.10 NFS client will not
interoperate with FreeBSD servers over NFSv4 unless Kerberos is
fully configured on both ends.

If the Linux client falls back to using AUTH_SYS instead for
SETCLIENTID, all should work fine as long as the NFS server is
configured to allow AUTH_SYS for SETCLIENTID.

This may still prevent access to Kerberos-only FreeBSD servers by
Linux clients with no keytab.  Rick is of the opinion that the
security settings the server applies to its pseudo-fs should also
apply to the SETCLIENTID operation.

Linux and Solaris NFS servers do not place that limitation on
SETCLIENTID.  The security settings for the server's pseudo-fs are
determined automatically as the union of security flavors allowed on
real exports, as recommended by RFC 3530bis; and the flavors allowed
for SETCLIENTID are all flavors supported by the respective server
implementation.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Fix nfs4_select_rw_stateid() so that it chooses the open stateid
(or an all-zero stateid) if the delegation does not match the selected
read/write mode.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

When we send a RENEW or SEQUENCE operation in order to probe if the
lease is still valid, we want it to be able to time out since the
lease we are probing is likely to time out too. Currently, because
we use soft mount semantics for these RPC calls, the return value
is EIO, which causes the state manager to exit with an "unhandled
error" message.
This patch changes the call semantics, so that the RPC layer returns
ETIMEDOUT instead of EIO. We then have the state manager default to
a simple retry instead of exiting.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

When we assign a new rpc_client to clp->cl_rpcclient, we need to destroy
the old one.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>=3.7]

The expected behaviour is that the client will decide at mount time
whether or not to use a krb5i machine cred, or AUTH_NULL.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>

- Ensure that we exit with ENOENT if the call to ops->get_clid_cred()
  fails.
- Handle the case where ops->detect_trunking() exits with an
  unexpected error, and return EIO.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>