1. 10 9月, 2013 2 次提交
  2. 09 9月, 2013 17 次提交
  3. 04 9月, 2013 1 次提交
  4. 07 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  5. 01 8月, 2013 2 次提交
    • J
      cifs: set sb->s_d_op before calling d_make_root() · 66ffd113
      Jeff Layton 提交于
      Currently, the s_root dentry doesn't get its d_op pointer set to
      anything. This breaks lookups in the root of case-insensitive mounts
      since that relies on having d_hash and d_compare routines that know to
      treat the filename as case-insensitive.
      
      cifs.ko has been broken this way for a long time, but commit 1c929cfe
      ("switch cifs"), added a cryptic comment which is removed in the patch
      below, which makes me wonder if this was done deliberately for some
      reason. It's not clear to me why we'd want the s_root not to have d_op
      set properly.
      
      It may have something to do with d_automount or d_revalidate on the
      root, but my suspicion in looking over the code is that Al was just
      trying to preserve the existing behavior when changing this code over to
      use s_d_op.
      
      This patch changes it so that we set s_d_op before calling d_make_root
      and removes the comment. I tested mounting, accessing and unmounting
      several types of shares (including DFS referrals) and everything still
      seemed to work OK afterward. I could be missing something however, so
      please do let me know if I am.
      Reported-by: NJan-Marek Glogowski <glogow@fbihome.de>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
      66ffd113
    • J
      cifs: fix bad error handling in crypto code · ba482029
      Jeff Layton 提交于
      Jarod reported an Oops like when testing with fips=1:
      
      CIFS VFS: could not allocate crypto hmacmd5
      CIFS VFS: could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc -2
      CIFS VFS: Error -2 during NTLMSSP authentication
      CIFS VFS: Send error in SessSetup = -2
      BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000004e
      IP: [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90
      PGD 0
      Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      Modules linked in: md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver fscache kvm serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_net mperf i2c_piix4 cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core virtio_blk ata_generic pata_acpi
      CPU: 1 PID: 639 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 3.11.0-0.rc3.git0.1.fc20.x86_64 #1
      Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
      task: ffff88007bf496e0 ti: ffff88007b080000 task.ti: ffff88007b080000
      RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812b5c7a>]  [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90
      RSP: 0018:ffff88007b081d10  EFLAGS: 00010282
      RAX: 0000000000001f1f RBX: ffff880037422000 RCX: ffff88007b081fd8
      RDX: 000000000000001f RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: fffffffffffffffe
      RBP: ffff88007b081d30 R08: ffff880037422000 R09: ffff88007c090100
      R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: fffffffffffffffe
      R13: ffff880037422000 R14: ffff880037422000 R15: 00000000fffffffe
      FS:  00007fc322f4f780(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
      CR2: 000000000000004e CR3: 000000007bdaa000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
      Stack:
       ffffffff81085845 ffff880037422000 ffff8800375e7400 ffff880037422000
       ffff88007b081d48 ffffffffa0176022 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d60
       ffffffffa015c07b ffff880037600600 ffff88007b081dc8 ffffffffa01610e1
      Call Trace:
       [<ffffffff81085845>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x75/0xf0
       [<ffffffffa0176022>] cifs_crypto_shash_release+0x82/0xf0 [cifs]
       [<ffffffffa015c07b>] cifs_put_tcp_session+0x8b/0xe0 [cifs]
       [<ffffffffa01610e1>] cifs_mount+0x9d1/0xad0 [cifs]
       [<ffffffffa014ff50>] cifs_do_mount+0xa0/0x4d0 [cifs]
       [<ffffffff811ab6e9>] mount_fs+0x39/0x1b0
       [<ffffffff811c466f>] vfs_kern_mount+0x5f/0xf0
       [<ffffffff811c6a9e>] do_mount+0x23e/0xa20
       [<ffffffff811c66e6>] ? copy_mount_options+0x36/0x170
       [<ffffffff811c7303>] SyS_mount+0x83/0xc0
       [<ffffffff8165c8d9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      Code: eb 9e 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 83 ec 08 48 85 ff 74 46 <48> 83 7e 48 00 48 8b 5e 50 74 4b 48 89 f7 e8 83 fc ff ff 4c 8b
      RIP  [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90
       RSP <ffff88007b081d10>
      CR2: 000000000000004e
      
      The cifs code allocates some crypto structures. If that fails, it
      returns an error, but it leaves the pointers set to their PTR_ERR
      values. Then later when it tries to clean up, it sees that those values
      are non-NULL and then passes them to the routine that frees them.
      
      Fix this by setting the pointers to NULL after collecting the error code
      in this situation.
      
      Cc: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
      Reported-by: NJarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
      ba482029
  6. 31 7月, 2013 3 次提交
  7. 12 7月, 2013 2 次提交
  8. 11 7月, 2013 9 次提交
  9. 05 7月, 2013 2 次提交
  10. 29 6月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      locks: protect most of the file_lock handling with i_lock · 1c8c601a
      Jeff Layton 提交于
      Having a global lock that protects all of this code is a clear
      scalability problem. Instead of doing that, move most of the code to be
      protected by the i_lock instead. The exceptions are the global lists
      that the ->fl_link sits on, and the ->fl_block list.
      
      ->fl_link is what connects these structures to the
      global lists, so we must ensure that we hold those locks when iterating
      over or updating these lists.
      
      Furthermore, sound deadlock detection requires that we hold the
      blocked_list state steady while checking for loops. We also must ensure
      that the search and update to the list are atomic.
      
      For the checking and insertion side of the blocked_list, push the
      acquisition of the global lock into __posix_lock_file and ensure that
      checking and update of the  blocked_list is done without dropping the
      lock in between.
      
      On the removal side, when waking up blocked lock waiters, take the
      global lock before walking the blocked list and dequeue the waiters from
      the global list prior to removal from the fl_block list.
      
      With this, deadlock detection should be race free while we minimize
      excessive file_lock_lock thrashing.
      
      Finally, in order to avoid a lock inversion problem when handling
      /proc/locks output we must ensure that manipulations of the fl_block
      list are also protected by the file_lock_lock.
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      1c8c601a