1. 01 12月, 2008 1 次提交
  2. 20 10月, 2008 1 次提交
  3. 14 8月, 2008 1 次提交
    • D
      security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() · 5cd9c58f
      David Howells 提交于
      Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
      the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
      change its own flags in a different way at the same time.
      
      __capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags.  This
      patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
      PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.
      
      This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:
      
       (1) security_ptrace_may_access().  This passes judgement on whether one
           process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
           PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
           current is the parent.
      
       (2) security_ptrace_traceme().  This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
           and takes only a pointer to the parent process.  current is the child.
      
           In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
           the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
           This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.
      
      Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
      been changed to calls to capable().
      
      Of the places that were using __capable():
      
       (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
           process.  All of these now use has_capability().
      
       (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
           whether the parent was allowed to trace any process.  As mentioned above,
           these have been split.  For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
           used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.
      
       (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().
      
       (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
           after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
           switched and capable() is used instead.
      
       (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
           receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.
      
       (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
           whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.
      
      I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
      Acked-by: NAndrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
      Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      5cd9c58f
  4. 27 7月, 2008 1 次提交
  5. 17 7月, 2008 1 次提交
    • R
      ptrace children revamp · f470021a
      Roland McGrath 提交于
      ptrace no longer fiddles with the children/sibling links, and the
      old ptrace_children list is gone.  Now ptrace, whether of one's own
      children or another's via PTRACE_ATTACH, just uses the new ptraced
      list instead.
      
      There should be no user-visible difference that matters.  The only
      change is the order in which do_wait() sees multiple stopped
      children and stopped ptrace attachees.  Since wait_task_stopped()
      was changed earlier so it no longer reorders the children list, we
      already know this won't cause any new problems.
      Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
      f470021a
  6. 14 7月, 2008 1 次提交
    • S
      Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach · 006ebb40
      Stephen Smalley 提交于
      Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
      proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
      ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
      read access or full attach access is requested.  This allows security
      modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
      full ptrace access.  The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.
      
      Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
      check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
      to already be ptracing the target.  The other ptrace checks within
      proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
      read mode instead of attach.
      
      In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
      reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label.  This
      enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
      permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
      a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
      but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
      lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit).  At present we have to choose between
      allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
      or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
      via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).
      
      This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
      (change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
      mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).
      
      Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
      ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
      interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
      or -errno vs. 1 or 0).  I retained this difference to avoid any
      changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
      changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
      by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.
      Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Acked-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      006ebb40
  7. 02 5月, 2008 1 次提交
  8. 30 4月, 2008 3 次提交
  9. 29 4月, 2008 1 次提交
  10. 22 4月, 2008 1 次提交
    • R
      ptrace: compat_ptrace_request siginfo · e16b2781
      Roland McGrath 提交于
      This adds support for PTRACE_GETSIGINFO and PTRACE_SETSIGINFO in
      compat_ptrace_request.  It relies on existing arch definitions for
      copy_siginfo_to_user32 and copy_siginfo_from_user32.
      
      On powerpc, this fixes a longstanding regression of 32-bit ptrace
      calls on 64-bit kernels vs native calls (64-bit calls or 32-bit
      kernels).  This can be seen in a 32-bit call using PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
      to examine e.g. siginfo_t.si_addr from a signal that sets it.
      (This was broken as of 2.6.24 and, I presume, many or all prior versions.)
      Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      e16b2781
  11. 09 2月, 2008 2 次提交
  12. 07 2月, 2008 2 次提交
  13. 30 1月, 2008 5 次提交
  14. 25 1月, 2008 1 次提交
    • H
      ptrace: Call arch_ptrace_attach() when request=PTRACE_TRACEME · 6ea6dd93
      Haavard Skinnemoen 提交于
      arch_ptrace_attach() is a hook that allows the architecture to do
      book-keeping after a ptrace attach. This patch adds a call to this
      hook when handling a PTRACE_TRACEME request as well.
      
      Currently only one architecture, m32r, implements this hook. When
      called, it initializes a number of debug trap slots in the ptraced
      task's thread struct, and it looks to me like this is the right thing
      to do after a PTRACE_TRACEME request as well, not only after
      PTRACE_ATTACH. Please correct me if I'm wrong.
      
      I want to use this hook on AVR32 to turn the debugging hardware on
      when a process is actually being debugged and keep it off otherwise.
      To be able to do this, I need to intercept PTRACE_TRACEME and
      PTRACE_ATTACH, as well as PTRACE_DETACH and thread exit. The latter
      two can be handled by existing hooks.
      Signed-off-by: NHaavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@atmel.com>
      6ea6dd93
  15. 03 1月, 2008 2 次提交
  16. 07 12月, 2007 1 次提交
  17. 20 10月, 2007 3 次提交
    • P
      Isolate some explicit usage of task->tgid · bac0abd6
      Pavel Emelyanov 提交于
      With pid namespaces this field is now dangerous to use explicitly, so hide
      it behind the helpers.
      
      Also the pid and pgrp fields o task_struct and signal_struct are to be
      deprecated.  Unfortunately this patch cannot be sent right now as this
      leads to tons of warnings, so start isolating them, and deprecate later.
      
      Actually the p->tgid == pid has to be changed to has_group_leader_pid(),
      but Oleg pointed out that in case of posix cpu timers this is the same, and
      thread_group_leader() is more preferable.
      Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
      Acked-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
      Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
      Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      bac0abd6
    • P
      Uninline find_task_by_xxx set of functions · 228ebcbe
      Pavel Emelyanov 提交于
      The find_task_by_something is a set of macros are used to find task by pid
      depending on what kind of pid is proposed - global or virtual one.  All of
      them are wrappers above the most generic one - find_task_by_pid_type_ns() -
      and just substitute some args for it.
      
      It turned out, that dereferencing the current->nsproxy->pid_ns construction
      and pushing one more argument on the stack inline cause kernel text size to
      grow.
      
      This patch moves all this stuff out-of-line into kernel/pid.c.  Together
      with the next patch it saves a bit less than 400 bytes from the .text
      section.
      Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
      Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
      Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
      Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      228ebcbe
    • P
      pid namespaces: changes to show virtual ids to user · b488893a
      Pavel Emelyanov 提交于
      This is the largest patch in the set. Make all (I hope) the places where
      the pid is shown to or get from user operate on the virtual pids.
      
      The idea is:
       - all in-kernel data structures must store either struct pid itself
         or the pid's global nr, obtained with pid_nr() call;
       - when seeking the task from kernel code with the stored id one
         should use find_task_by_pid() call that works with global pids;
       - when showing pid's numerical value to the user the virtual one
         should be used, but however when one shows task's pid outside this
         task's namespace the global one is to be used;
       - when getting the pid from userspace one need to consider this as
         the virtual one and use appropriate task/pid-searching functions.
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: nuther build fix]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: yet nuther build fix]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded casts]
      Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org>
      Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
      Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
      Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b488893a
  18. 17 10月, 2007 2 次提交
  19. 11 9月, 2007 1 次提交
    • R
      Fix spurious syscall tracing after PTRACE_DETACH + PTRACE_ATTACH · 7d941432
      Roland McGrath 提交于
      When PTRACE_SYSCALL was used and then PTRACE_DETACH is used, the
      TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE flag is left set on the formerly-traced task.  This
      means that when a new tracer comes along and does PTRACE_ATTACH, it's
      possible he gets a syscall tracing stop even though he's never used
      PTRACE_SYSCALL.  This happens if the task was in the middle of a system
      call when the second PTRACE_ATTACH was done.  The symptom is an
      unexpected SIGTRAP when the tracer thinks that only SIGSTOP should have
      been provoked by his ptrace calls so far.
      
      A few machines already fixed this in ptrace_disable (i386, ia64, m68k).
      But all other machines do not, and still have this bug.  On x86_64, this
      constitutes a regression in IA32 compatibility support.
      
      Since all machines now use TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE for this, I put the
      clearing of TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE in the generic ptrace_detach code rather
      than adding it to every other machine's ptrace_disable.
      Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      7d941432
  20. 20 7月, 2007 1 次提交
  21. 18 7月, 2007 2 次提交
  22. 17 7月, 2007 1 次提交
  23. 11 5月, 2007 1 次提交
  24. 30 9月, 2006 1 次提交
  25. 27 9月, 2006 1 次提交
  26. 04 7月, 2006 1 次提交
  27. 27 6月, 2006 1 次提交