The authentication requirement got only updated when the security level
increased. This is a wrong behavior. The authentication requirement is
read by the Bluetooth daemon to make proper decisions when handling the
IO capabilities exchange. So set the value that is currently expected by
the higher layers like L2CAP and RFCOMM.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The L2CAP layer can trigger the authentication via an ACL connection or
later on to increase the security level. When increasing the security
level it didn't use the same authentication requirements when triggering
a new ACL connection. Make sure that exactly the same authentication
requirements are used. The only exception here are the L2CAP raw sockets
which are only used for dedicated bonding.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Some of the qualification tests demand that in case of failures in L2CAP
the HCI disconnect should indicate a reason why L2CAP fails. This is a
bluntly layer violation since multiple L2CAP connections could be using
the same ACL and thus forcing a disconnect reason is not a good idea.

To comply with the Bluetooth test specification, the disconnect reason
is now stored in the L2CAP connection structure and every time a new
L2CAP channel is added it will set back to its default. So only in the
case where the L2CAP channel with the disconnect reason is really the
last one, it will propagated to the HCI layer.

The HCI layer has been extended with a disconnect indication that allows
it to ask upper layers for a disconnect reason. The upper layer must not
support this callback and in that case it will nicely default to the
existing behavior. If an upper layer like L2CAP can provide a disconnect
reason that one will be used to disconnect the ACL or SCO link.

No modification to the ACL disconnect timeout have been made. So in case
of Linux to Linux connection the initiator will disconnect the ACL link
before the acceptor side can signal the specific disconnect reason. That
is perfectly fine since Linux doesn't make use of this value anyway. The
L2CAP layer has a perfect valid error code for rejecting connection due
to a security violation. It is unclear why the Bluetooth specification
insists on having specific HCI disconnect reason.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

In preparation for L2CAP fixed channel support, the CID value of a
L2CAP connection needs to be accessible via the socket interface. The
CID is the connection identifier and exists as source and destination
value. So extend the L2CAP socket address structure with this field and
change getsockname() and getpeername() to fill it in.

The bind() and connect() functions have been modified to handle L2CAP
socket address structures of variable sizes. This makes them future
proof if additional fields need to be added.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

If the extended features mask indicates support for fixed channels,
request the list of available fixed channels. This also enables the
fixed channel features bit so remote implementations can request
information about it. Currently only the signal channel will be
listed.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The recommendation for the L2CAP PSM 1 (SDP) is to not use any kind
of authentication or encryption. So don't trigger authentication
for incoming and outgoing SDP connections.

For L2CAP PSM 3 (RFCOMM) there is no clear requirement, but with
Bluetooth 2.1 the initiator is required to enable authentication
and encryption first and this gets enforced. So there is no need
to trigger an additional authentication step. The RFCOMM service
security will make sure that a secure enough link key is present.

When the encryption gets enabled after the SDP connection setup,
then switch the security level from SDP to low security.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

If the remote L2CAP server uses authentication pending stage and
encryption is enabled it can happen that a L2CAP connection request is
sent twice due to a race condition in the connection state machine.

When the remote side indicates any kind of connection pending, then
track this state and skip sending of L2CAP commands for this period.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

When two L2CAP connections are requested quickly after the ACL link has
been established there exists a window for a race condition where a
connection request is sent before the information response has been
received. Any connection request should only be sent after an exchange
of the extended features mask has been finished.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

When no authentication requirements are selected, but an outgoing or
incoming connection has requested any kind of security enforcement,
then set these authentication requirements.

This ensures that the userspace always gets informed about the
authentication requirements (if available). Only when no security
enforcement has happened, the kernel will signal invalid requirements.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

When receiving incoming connection to specific services, always use
general bonding. This ensures that the link key gets stored and can be
used for further authentications.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

When attempting to setup eSCO connections it can happen that some link
manager implementations fail to properly negotiate the eSCO parameters
and thus fail the eSCO setup. Normally the link manager is responsible
for the negotiation of the parameters and actually fallback to SCO if
no agreement can be reached. In cases where the link manager is just too
stupid, then at least try to establish a SCO link if eSCO fails.

For the Bluetooth devices with EDR support this includes handling packet
types of EDR basebands. This is particular tricky since for the EDR the
logic of enabling/disabling one specific packet type is turned around.
This fix contains an extra bitmask to disable eSCO EDR packet when
trying to fallback to a SCO connection.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

For L2CAP sockets with medium and high security requirement a missing
encryption will enforce the closing of the link. For the L2CAP raw
sockets this is not needed, so skip that check.

This fixes a crash when pairing Bluetooth 2.0 (and earlier) devices
since the L2CAP state machine got confused and then locked up the whole
system.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

During a role change with pre-Bluetooth 2.1 devices, the remote side drops
the encryption of the RFCOMM connection. We allow a grace period for the
encryption to be re-established, before dropping the connection. During
this grace period, the RFCOMM_SEC_PENDING flag is set. Check this flag
before sending RFCOMM packets.
Signed-off-by: NJaikumar Ganesh <jaikumar@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Due to lockdep changes, the CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC ifdef is not needed
now. So just remove it here.

The following commit fixed the !lockdep build warnings:

commit e8f6fbf6
Author: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Date:   Wed Nov 12 01:38:36 2008 +0000

    lockdep: include/linux/lockdep.h - fix warning in net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c
Signed-off-by: NDave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

With the support for the enhanced security model and the support for
deferring connection setup, it is a good idea to increase various
version numbers.

This is purely cosmetic and has no effect on the behavior, but can
be really helpful when debugging problems in different kernel versions.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The new socket options should only be evaluated for SOL_BLUETOOTH level
and not for every other level. Previously this causes some minor issues
when detecting if a kernel with certain features is available.

Also restrict BT_SECURITY to SOCK_SEQPACKET for L2CAP and SOCK_STREAM for
the RFCOMM protocol.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

For L2CAP connections with high security setting, the link will be
immediately dropped when the encryption gets disabled. For L2CAP
connections with medium security there will be grace period where
the remote device has the chance to re-enable encryption. If it
doesn't happen then the link will also be disconnected.

The requirement for the grace period with medium security comes from
Bluetooth 2.0 and earlier devices that require role switching.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

A role switch with devices following the Bluetooth pre-2.1 standards
or without Encryption Pause and Resume support is not possible if
encryption is enabled. Most newer headsets require the role switch,
but also require that the connection is encrypted.

For connections with a high security mode setting, the link will be
immediately dropped. When the connection uses medium security mode
setting, then a grace period is introduced where the TX is halted and
the remote device gets a change to re-enable encryption after the
role switch. If not re-enabled the link will be dropped.

Based on initial work by Ville Tervo <ville.tervo@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Change the RFCOMM internals to use the new security levels and remove
the link mode details.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Change the L2CAP internals to use the new security levels and remove
the link mode details.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and
SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is
no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as
SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE.

Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this
actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends
on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your
existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of
course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place
is a security issue.

The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now
used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this
way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation
is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also
enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since
this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of
the authentication can't be guaranteed.

As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level
is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on
PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with
a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be
used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level
will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only
the HIGH security level will require this.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

When the remote device supports only SCO connections, on receipt of
the HCI_EV_CONN_COMPLETE event packet, the connect state is changed to
BT_CONNECTED, but the socket state is not updated. Hence, the connect()
call times out even though the SCO connection has been successfully
established.

Based on a report by Jaikumar Ganesh <jaikumar@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

All SCO and eSCO connection are auto-accepted no matter if there is a
corresponding listening socket for them. This patch changes this and
connection requests for SCO and eSCO without any socket are rejected.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

In order to decide if listening L2CAP sockets should be accept()ed
the BD_ADDR of the remote device needs to be known. This patch adds
a socket option which defines a timeout for deferring the actual
connection setup.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

In order to decide if listening RFCOMM sockets should be accept()ed
the BD_ADDR of the remote device needs to be known. This patch adds
a socket option which defines a timeout for deferring the actual
connection setup.

The connection setup is done after reading from the socket for the
first time. Until then writing to the socket returns ENOTCONN.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The L2CAP and RFCOMM applications require support for authorization
and the ability of rejecting incoming connection requests. The socket
interface is not really able to support this.

This patch does the ground work for a socket option to defer connection
setup. Setting this option allows calling of accept() and then the
first read() will trigger the final connection setup. Calling close()
would reject the connection.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The socket option levels SOL_L2CAP, SOL_RFOMM and SOL_SCO are currently
in use by various Bluetooth applications. Going forward the common
option level SOL_BLUETOOTH should be used. This patch prepares the clean
split of the old and new option levels while keeping everything backward
compatibility.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

In case of connection failures the rfcomm_sock_sendmsg() should return
an error and not a 0 value.
Signed-off-by: NVictor Shcherbatyuk <victor.shcherbatyuk@tomtom.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Convert to net_device_ops and use internal net_device_stats in bnep
device. 

Note: no need for bnep_net_ioctl since if ioctl is not set, then
dev_ifsioc handles it by returning -EOPNOTSUPP
Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Acked-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The kernel_accept() does not hold the module refcount of newsock->ops->owner,
so we need __module_get(newsock->ops->owner) code after call kernel_accept()
by hand.
In sunrpc, the module refcount is missing to hold. So this cause kernel panic.

Used following script to reproduct:

while [ 1 ];
do
    mount -t nfs4 192.168.0.19:/ /mnt
    touch /mnt/file
    umount /mnt
    lsmod | grep ipv6
done

This patch fixed the problem by add __module_get(newsock->ops->owner) to
kernel_accept(). So we do not need to used __module_get(newsock->ops->owner)
in every place when used kernel_accept().
Signed-off-by: NWei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NIlpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

As Stephen Rothwell points out, we don't want 'sock' here but
rather we really do want 'sk'.

This local var is protected by all sorts of bluetooth debugging
kconfig vars, but BT_DBG() is just a straight pr_debug() call
which is unconditional.

pr_debug() evaluates it's args only if either DEBUG or
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is defined.

Solving this inside of the BT_DBG() macro is non-trivial since
it's varargs.  And these ifdefs are ugly.

So, just mark this 'sk' thing __maybe_unused and kill the ifdefs.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

It's 'sock' not 'sk'.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

It turns out that the following sequence of actions will reproduce the
oops:

  1. Create a new RFCOMM device (using RFCOMMCREATEDEV ioctl)
  2. (Try to) open the device
  3. Release the RFCOMM device (using RFCOMMRELEASEDEV ioctl)

At this point, the "/dev/rfcomm*" device is still in use, but it is gone
from the internal list, so the device id can be reused.

  4. Create a new RFCOMM device with the same device id as before

And now kobject will complain that the TTY already exists.

(See http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/7/13/89 for a reproducible test-case.)

This patch attempts to correct this by only removing the device from the
internal list of devices at the final unregister stage, so that the id
won't get reused until the device has been completely destructed.

This should be safe as the RFCOMM_TTY_RELEASED bit will be set for the
device and prevent the device from being reopened after it has been
released.

Based on a report from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Newer GCC versions are a little bit picky about how to deal with format
arguments:

net/bluetooth/hci_sysfs.c: In function ‘hci_register_sysfs’:
net/bluetooth/hci_sysfs.c:418: warning: format not a string literal and no format arguments

It is simple enough to fix and makes the compiler happy.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

With the introduction of CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG it is possible to
allow debugging without having to recompile the kernel. This patch turns
all BT_DBG() calls into pr_debug() to support dynamic debug messages.

As a side effect all CONFIG_BT_*_DEBUG statements are now removed and
some broken debug entries have been fixed.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The Bluetooth subsystem was not using the HCI Reset command when doing
device initialization. The Bluetooth 1.0b specification was ambiguous
on how the device firmware was suppose to handle it. Almost every device
was triggering a transport reset at the same time. In case of USB this
ended up in disconnects from the bus.

All modern Bluetooth dongles handle this perfectly fine and a lot of
them actually require that HCI Reset is sent. If not then they are
either stuck in their HID Proxy mode or their internal structures for
inquiry and paging are not correctly setup.

To handle old and new devices smoothly the Bluetooth subsystem contains
a quirk to force the HCI Reset on initialization. However maintaining
such a quirk becomes more and more complicated. This patch turns the
logic around and lets the old devices disable the HCI Reset command.

The only device where the HCI_QUIRK_NO_RESET is still needed are the
original Digianswer devices and dongles with an early CSR firmware.

CSR reported that they fixed this for version 12 firmware. The last
official release of version 11 firmware is build ID 115. The first
version 12 candidate was build ID 117.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

After adding proper lockdep annotations for Bluetooth protocols the case
when lockdep is disabled produced two compiler warnings:

net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:60: warning: ‘bt_key_strings’ defined but not used
net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:71: warning: ‘bt_slock_key_strings’ defined but not used

Fix both of them by adding a CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC conditional around
them and re-arranging the code a little bit.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

    struct hci_dev_list_req {
            __u16  dev_num;
            struct hci_dev_req dev_req[0];  /* hci_dev_req structures */
    };

sizeof(struct hci_dev_list_req) == 4, so the two bytes immediately
following "dev_num" will never be initialized. When this structure
is copied to userspace, these uninitialized bytes are leaked.

Fix by using kzalloc() instead of kmalloc(). Found using kmemcheck.
Signed-off-by: NVegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

fix this warning:

  net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c: In function ‘rfcomm_sock_ioctl’:
  net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c:795: warning: unused variable ‘sk’

perhaps BT_DEBUG() should be improved to do printf format checking
instead of the #ifdef, but that looks quite intrusive: each bluetooth
.c file undefines the macro.
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>