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  1. 21 5月, 2011 1 次提交
  3. 04 3月, 2011 2 次提交
  5. 18 12月, 2010 1 次提交
  7. 23 9月, 2010 1 次提交
  9. 22 5月, 2010 1 次提交
  11. 21 3月, 2010 1 次提交
  13. 05 11月, 2009 1 次提交
  15. 25 9月, 2009 1 次提交
    • J
      genetlink: fix netns vs. netlink table locking (2) · b8273570
      由 Johannes Berg 提交于 
      Similar to commit d136f1bd,
there's a bug when unregistering a generic netlink family,
which is caught by the might_sleep() added in that commit:

    BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:183
    in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1510, name: rmmod
    2 locks held by rmmod/1510:
     #0:  (genl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8138283b>] genl_unregister_family+0x2b/0x130
     #1:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8138270c>] __genl_unregister_mc_group+0x1c/0x120
    Pid: 1510, comm: rmmod Not tainted 2.6.31-wl #444
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff81044ff9>] __might_sleep+0x119/0x150
     [<ffffffff81380501>] netlink_table_grab+0x21/0x100
     [<ffffffff813813a3>] netlink_clear_multicast_users+0x23/0x60
     [<ffffffff81382761>] __genl_unregister_mc_group+0x71/0x120
     [<ffffffff81382866>] genl_unregister_family+0x56/0x130
     [<ffffffffa0007d85>] nl80211_exit+0x15/0x20 [cfg80211]
     [<ffffffffa000005a>] cfg80211_exit+0x1a/0x40 [cfg80211]

Fix in the same way by grabbing the netlink table lock
before doing rcu_read_lock().
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b8273570
  17. 15 9月, 2009 1 次提交
    • J
      genetlink: fix netns vs. netlink table locking · d136f1bd
      由 Johannes Berg 提交于 
      Since my commits introducing netns awareness into
genetlink we can get this problem:

BUG: scheduling while atomic: modprobe/1178/0x00000002
2 locks held by modprobe/1178:
 #0:  (genl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8135ee1a>] genl_register_mc_grou
 #1:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8135eeb5>] genl_register_mc_g
Pid: 1178, comm: modprobe Not tainted 2.6.31-rc8-wl-34789-g95cb731-dirty #
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8103e285>] __schedule_bug+0x85/0x90
 [<ffffffff81403138>] schedule+0x108/0x588
 [<ffffffff8135b131>] netlink_table_grab+0xa1/0xf0
 [<ffffffff8135c3a7>] netlink_change_ngroups+0x47/0x100
 [<ffffffff8135ef0f>] genl_register_mc_group+0x12f/0x290

because I overlooked that netlink_table_grab() will
schedule, thinking it was just the rwlock. However,
in the contention case, that isn't actually true.

Fix this by letting the code grab the netlink table
lock first and then the RCU for netns protection.
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d136f1bd
  19. 25 8月, 2009 1 次提交
  21. 25 3月, 2009 1 次提交
    • P
      netlink: add NETLINK_NO_ENOBUFS socket flag · 38938bfe
      由 Pablo Neira Ayuso 提交于 
      This patch adds the NETLINK_NO_ENOBUFS socket flag. This flag can
be used by unicast and broadcast listeners to avoid receiving
ENOBUFS errors.

Generally speaking, ENOBUFS errors are useful to notify two things
to the listener:

a) You may increase the receiver buffer size via setsockopt().
b) You have lost messages, you may be out of sync.

In some cases, ignoring ENOBUFS errors can be useful. For example:

a) nfnetlink_queue: this subsystem does not have any sort of resync
method and you can decide to ignore ENOBUFS once you have set a
given buffer size.

b) ctnetlink: you can use this together with the socket flag
NETLINK_BROADCAST_SEND_ERROR to stop getting ENOBUFS errors as
you do not need to resync (packets whose event are not delivered
are drop to provide reliable logging and state-synchronization).

Moreover, the use of NETLINK_NO_ENOBUFS also reduces a "go up, go down"
effect in terms of performance which is due to the netlink congestion
control when the listener cannot back off. The effect is the following:

1) throughput rate goes up and netlink messages are inserted in the
receiver buffer.
2) Then, netlink buffer fills and overruns (set on nlk->state bit 0).
3) While the listener empties the receiver buffer, netlink keeps
dropping messages. Thus, throughput goes dramatically down.
4) Then, once the listener has emptied the buffer (nlk->state
bit 0 is set off), goto step 1.

This effect is easy to trigger with netlink broadcast under heavy
load, and it is more noticeable when using a big receiver buffer.
You can find some results in [1] that show this problem.

[1] http://1984.lsi.us.es/linux/netlink/

This patch also includes the use of sk_drop to account the number of
netlink messages drop due to overrun. This value is shown in
/proc/net/netlink.
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      38938bfe
  23. 20 2月, 2009 1 次提交
    • P
      netlink: add NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket option · be0c22a4
      由 Pablo Neira Ayuso 提交于 
      This patch adds NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR which is a netlink
socket option that the listener can set to make netlink_broadcast()
return errors in the delivery to the caller. This option is useful
if the caller of netlink_broadcast() do something with the result
of the message delivery, like in ctnetlink where it drops a network
packet if the event delivery failed, this is used to enable reliable
logging and state-synchronization. If this socket option is not set,
netlink_broadcast() only reports ESRCH errors and silently ignore
ENOBUFS errors, which is what most netlink_broadcast() callers
should do.

This socket option is based on a suggestion from Patrick McHardy.
Patrick McHardy can exchange this patch for a beer from me ;).
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      be0c22a4
  25. 20 11月, 2008 1 次提交
  27. 01 10月, 2008 1 次提交
    • H
      ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list · 12a169e7
      由 Herbert Xu 提交于 
      Herbert Xu came up with the idea and the original patch to make
xfrm_state dump list contain also dumpers:

As it is we go to extraordinary lengths to ensure that states
don't go away while dumpers go to sleep.  It's much easier if
we just put the dumpers themselves on the list since they can't
go away while they're going.

I've also changed the order of addition on new states to prevent
a never-ending dump.

Timo Teräs improved the patch to apply cleanly to latest tree,
modified iteration code to be more readable by using a common
struct for entries in the list, implemented the same idea for
xfrm_policy dumping and moved the af_key specific "last" entry
caching to af_key.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NTimo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      12a169e7
  29. 23 9月, 2008 1 次提交
    • H
      ipsec: Fix xfrm_state_walk race · 5c182458
      由 Herbert Xu 提交于 
      As discovered by Timo Teräs, the currently xfrm_state_walk scheme
is racy because if a second dump finishes before the first, we
may free xfrm states that the first dump would walk over later.

This patch fixes this by storing the dumps in a list in order
to calculate the correct completion counter which cures this
problem.

I've expanded netlink_cb in order to accomodate the extra state
related to this.  It shouldn't be a big deal since netlink_cb
is kmalloced for each dump and we're just increasing it by 4 or
8 bytes.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5c182458
  31. 06 6月, 2008 1 次提交
  33. 28 4月, 2008 1 次提交
  35. 01 2月, 2008 1 次提交
  37. 29 1月, 2008 2 次提交
  39. 07 11月, 2007 1 次提交
  41. 11 10月, 2007 4 次提交
  43. 19 7月, 2007 2 次提交
  45. 06 5月, 2007 1 次提交
  47. 26 4月, 2007 5 次提交
  49. 13 2月, 2007 1 次提交
    • M
      [PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key transport mechanism · 88b4a07e
      由 Michael Halcrow 提交于 
      This is the transport code for public key functionality in eCryptfs.  It
manages encryption/decryption request queues with a transport mechanism.
Currently, netlink is the only implemented transport.

Each inode has a unique File Encryption Key (FEK).  Under passphrase, a File
Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEKEK) is generated from a salt/passphrase
combo on mount.  This FEKEK encrypts each FEK and writes it into the header of
each file using the packet format specified in RFC 2440.  This is all
symmetric key encryption, so it can all be done via the kernel crypto API.

These new patches introduce public key encryption of the FEK.  There is no
asymmetric key encryption support in the kernel crypto API, so eCryptfs pushes
the FEK encryption and decryption out to a userspace daemon.  After
considering our requirements and determining the complexity of using various
transport mechanisms, we settled on netlink for this communication.

eCryptfs stores authentication tokens into the kernel keyring.  These tokens
correlate with individual keys.  For passphrase mode of operation, the
authentication token contains the symmetric FEKEK.  For public key, the
authentication token contains a PKI type and an opaque data blob managed by
individual PKI modules in userspace.

Each user who opens a file under an eCryptfs partition mounted in public key
mode must be running a daemon.  That daemon has the user's credentials and has
access to all of the keys to which the user should have access.  The daemon,
when started, initializes the pluggable PKI modules available on the system
and registers itself with the eCryptfs kernel module.  Userspace utilities
register public key authentication tokens into the user session keyring.
These authentication tokens correlate key signatures with PKI modules and PKI
blobs.  The PKI blobs contain PKI-specific information necessary for the PKI
module to carry out asymmetric key encryption and decryption.

When the eCryptfs module parses the header of an existing file and finds a Tag
1 (Public Key) packet (see RFC 2440), it reads in the public key identifier
(signature).  The asymmetrically encrypted FEK is in the Tag 1 packet;
eCryptfs puts together a decrypt request packet containing the signature and
the encrypted FEK, then it passes it to the daemon registered for the
current->euid via a netlink unicast to the PID of the daemon, which was
registered at the time the daemon was started by the user.

The daemon actually just makes calls to libecryptfs, which implements request
packet parsing and manages PKI modules.  libecryptfs grabs the public key
authentication token for the given signature from the user session keyring.
This auth tok tells libecryptfs which PKI module should receive the request.
libecryptfs then makes a decrypt() call to the PKI module, and it passes along
the PKI block from the auth tok.  The PKI uses the blob to figure out how it
should decrypt the data passed to it; it performs the decryption and passes
the decrypted data back to libecryptfs.  libecryptfs then puts together a
reply packet with the decrypted FEK and passes that back to the eCryptfs
module.

The eCryptfs module manages these request callouts to userspace code via
message context structs.  The module maintains an array of message context
structs and places the elements of the array on two lists: a free and an
allocated list.  When eCryptfs wants to make a request, it moves a msg ctx
from the free list to the allocated list, sets its state to pending, and fires
off the message to the user's registered daemon.

When eCryptfs receives a netlink message (via the callback), it correlates the
msg ctx struct in the alloc list with the data in the message itself.  The
msg->index contains the offset of the array of msg ctx structs.  It verifies
that the registered daemon PID is the same as the PID of the process that sent
the message.  It also validates a sequence number between the received packet
and the msg ctx.  Then, it copies the contents of the message (the reply
packet) into the msg ctx struct, sets the state in the msg ctx to done, and
wakes up the process that was sleeping while waiting for the reply.

The sleeping process was whatever was performing the sys_open().  This process
originally called ecryptfs_send_message(); it is now in
ecryptfs_wait_for_response().  When it wakes up and sees that the msg ctx
state was set to done, it returns a pointer to the message contents (the reply
packet) and returns.  If all went well, this packet contains the decrypted
FEK, which is then copied into the crypt_stat struct, and life continues as
normal.

The case for creation of a new file is very similar, only instead of a decrypt
request, eCryptfs sends out an encrypt request.

> - We have a great clod of key mangement code in-kernel.  Why is that
>   not suitable (or growable) for public key management?

eCryptfs uses Howells' keyring to store persistent key data and PKI state
information.  It defers public key cryptographic transformations to userspace
code.  The userspace data manipulation request really is orthogonal to key
management in and of itself.  What eCryptfs basically needs is a secure way to
communicate with a particular daemon for a particular task doing a syscall,
based on the UID.  Nothing running under another UID should be able to access
that channel of communication.

> - Is it appropriate that new infrastructure for public key
> management be private to a particular fs?

The messaging.c file contains a lot of code that, perhaps, could be extracted
into a separate kernel service.  In essence, this would be a sort of
request/reply mechanism that would involve a userspace daemon.  I am not aware
of anything that does quite what eCryptfs does, so I was not aware of any
existing tools to do just what we wanted.

>   What happens if one of these daemons exits without sending a quit
>   message?

There is a stale uid<->pid association in the hash table for that user.  When
the user registers a new daemon, eCryptfs cleans up the old association and
generates a new one.  See ecryptfs_process_helo().

> - _why_ does it use netlink?

Netlink provides the transport mechanism that would minimize the complexity of
the implementation, given that we can have multiple daemons (one per user).  I
explored the possibility of using relayfs, but that would involve having to
introduce control channels and a protocol for creating and tearing down
channels for the daemons.  We do not have to worry about any of that with
netlink.
Signed-off-by: NMichael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      88b4a07e
  51. 03 12月, 2006 2 次提交
  53. 03 9月, 2006 1 次提交
  55. 23 6月, 2006 1 次提交
  57. 01 5月, 2006 1 次提交