Change the L2CAP internals to use the new security levels and remove
the link mode details.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and
SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is
no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as
SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE.

Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this
actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends
on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your
existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of
course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place
is a security issue.

The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now
used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this
way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation
is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also
enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since
this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of
the authentication can't be guaranteed.

As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level
is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on
PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with
a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be
used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level
will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only
the HIGH security level will require this.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

In order to decide if listening L2CAP sockets should be accept()ed
the BD_ADDR of the remote device needs to be known. This patch adds
a socket option which defines a timeout for deferring the actual
connection setup.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The socket option levels SOL_L2CAP, SOL_RFOMM and SOL_SCO are currently
in use by various Bluetooth applications. Going forward the common
option level SOL_BLUETOOTH should be used. This patch prepares the clean
split of the old and new option levels while keeping everything backward
compatibility.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

With the introduction of CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG it is possible to
allow debugging without having to recompile the kernel. This patch turns
all BT_DBG() calls into pr_debug() to support dynamic debug messages.

As a side effect all CONFIG_BT_*_DEBUG statements are now removed and
some broken debug entries have been fixed.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The Security Mode 4 of the Bluetooth 2.1 specification has strict
authentication and encryption requirements. It is the initiators job
to create a secure ACL link. However in case of malicious devices, the
acceptor has to make sure that the ACL is encrypted before allowing
any kind of L2CAP connection. The only exception here is the PSM 1 for
the service discovery protocol, because that is allowed to run on an
insecure ACL link.

Previously it was enough to reject a L2CAP connection during the
connection setup phase, but with Bluetooth 2.1 it is forbidden to
do any L2CAP protocol exchange on an insecure link (except SDP).

The new hci_conn_check_link_mode() function can be used to check the
integrity of an ACL link. This functions also takes care of the cases
where Security Mode 4 is disabled or one of the devices is based on
an older specification.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

With the introduction of Security Mode 4 and Simple Pairing from the
Bluetooth 2.1 specification it became mandatory that the initiator
requires authentication and encryption before any L2CAP channel can
be established. The only exception here is PSM 1 for the service
discovery protocol (SDP). It is meant to be used without any encryption
since it contains only public information. This is how Bluetooth 2.0
and before handle connections on PSM 1.

For Bluetooth 2.1 devices the pairing procedure differentiates between
no bonding, general bonding and dedicated bonding. The L2CAP layer
wrongly uses always general bonding when creating new connections, but it
should not do this for SDP connections. In this case the authentication
requirement should be no bonding and the just-works model should be used,
but in case of non-SDP connection it is required to use general bonding.

If the new connection requires man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection, it
also first wrongly creates an unauthenticated link key and then later on
requests an upgrade to an authenticated link key to provide full MITM
protection. With Simple Pairing the link key generation is an expensive
operation (compared to Bluetooth 2.0 and before) and doing this twice
during a connection setup causes a noticeable delay when establishing
a new connection. This should be avoided to not regress from the expected
Bluetooth 2.0 connection times. The authentication requirements are known
up-front and so enforce them.

To fulfill these requirements the hci_connect() function has been extended
with an authentication requirement parameter that will be stored inside
the connection information and can be retrieved by userspace at any
time. This allows the correct IO capabilities exchange and results in
the expected behavior.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The Bluetooth entries for the MAINTAINERS file are a little bit too
much. Consolidate them into two entries. One for Bluetooth drivers and
another one for the Bluetooth subsystem.

Also the MODULE_AUTHOR should indicate the current maintainer of the
module and actually not the original author. Fix all Bluetooth modules
to provide current maintainer information.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

When requested the L2CAP layer will now enforce authentication and
encryption on outgoing connections. The usefulness of this feature
is kinda limited since it will not allow proper connection ownership
tracking until the authentication procedure has been finished. This
is a limitation of Bluetooth 2.0 and before and can only be fixed by
using Simple Pairing.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Enable the common timestamp functionality that the network subsystem
provides for L2CAP, RFCOMM and SCO sockets. It is possible to either
use SO_TIMESTAMP or the IOCTLs to retrieve the timestamp of the
current packet.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

With the Simple Pairing support, the authentication requirements are
an explicit setting during the bonding process. Track and enforce the
requirements and allow higher layers like L2CAP and RFCOMM to increase
them if needed.

This patch introduces a new IOCTL that allows to query the current
authentication requirements. It is also possible to detect Simple
Pairing support in the kernel this way.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The Bluetooth specification allows to enable or disable the encryption
of an ACL link at any time by either the peer or the remote device. If
a L2CAP or RFCOMM connection requested an encrypted link, they will now
disconnect that link if the encryption gets disabled. Higher protocols
that don't care about encryption (like SDP) are not affected.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Getting the remote L2CAP features mask is really important, but doing
this as less intrusive as possible is tricky. To play nice with older
systems and Bluetooth qualification testing, the features mask is now
only retrieved in two specific cases and only once per lifetime of an
ACL link.

When trying to establish a L2CAP connection and the remote features mask
is unknown, the L2CAP information request is sent when the ACL link goes
into connected state. This applies only to outgoing connections and also
only for the connection oriented channels.

The second case is when a connection request has been received. In this
case a connection response with the result pending and the information
request will be send. After receiving an information response or if the
timeout gets triggered, the normal connection setup process with security
setup will be initiated.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Signed-off-by: NHarvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The older RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED macros defeat lockdep state tracing so
replace them with the newer __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED macros.
Signed-off-by: NRobert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Acked-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Introduce per-sock inlines: sock_net(), sock_net_set()
and per-inet_timewait_sock inlines: twsk_net(), twsk_net_set().
Without CONFIG_NET_NS, no namespace other than &init_net exists.
Let's explicitly define them to help compiler optimizations.
Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>

When the l2cap info_timer is active the info_state will be set to
L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_SENT, and it will be unset after the timer is
deleted or timeout triggered.

Here in l2cap_conn_del only call del_timer_sync when the info_state is
set to L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_SENT.
Signed-off-by: NDave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Delete a possibly armed timer before kfree'ing the connection object.

Solves: http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/15/514Reported-by: NQuel Qun <kelk1@comcast.net>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Many-many code in the kernel initialized the timer->function
and  timer->data together with calling init_timer(timer). There
is already a helper for this. Use it for networking code.

The patch is HUGE, but makes the code 130 lines shorter
(98 insertions(+), 228 deletions(-)).
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Finally, the zero_it argument can be completely removed from
the callers and from the function prototype.

Besides, fix the checkpatch.pl warnings about using the
assignments inside if-s.

This patch is rather big, and it is a part of the previous one.
I splitted it wishing to make the patches more readable. Hope 
this particular split helped.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In case the remote entity tries to negogiate retransmission or flow
control mode, reject it and fall back to basic mode.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Indicate the support for the L2CAP features mask value when the remote
entity tries to negotiate Bluetooth 1.2 specific features.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The Bluetooth 1.2 specification introduced a specific features mask
value to interoperate with newer versions of the specification. So far
this piece of information was never needed, but future extensions will
rely on it. This patch adds a generic way to retrieve this information
only once per connection setup.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

After the change to the L2CAP configuration parameter handling the
global conf_mtu variable is no longer needed and so remove it.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The parameters of the L2CAP output configuration might not be accepted
after the first configuration round. So only indicate a finished output
configuration when acceptable settings are provided.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

This patch passes in the namespace a new socket should be created in
and has the socket code do the appropriate reference counting.  By
virtue of this all socket create methods are touched.  In addition
the socket create methods are modified so that they will fail if
you attempt to create a socket in a non-default network namespace.

Failing if we attempt to create a socket outside of the default
network namespace ensures that as we incrementally make the network stack
network namespace aware we will not export functionality that someone
has not audited and made certain is network namespace safe.
Allowing us to partially enable network namespaces before all of the
exotic protocols are supported.

Any protocol layers I have missed will fail to compile because I now
pass an extra parameter into the socket creation code.

[ Integrated AF_IUCV build fixes from Andrew Morton... -DaveM ]
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Since nobody uses it after we convert it to host-endian,
no need to do that at all.  At that point l2cap is endian-clean.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

no code changes, just documenting existing types
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

We loop through psm values, calling __l2cap_get_sock_by_addr(psm, ...)
until we get NULL; then we set ->psm of our socket to htobs(psm).
IOW, we find unused psm value and put it into our socket.  So far, so
good, but...  __l2cap_get_sock_by_addr() compares its argument with
->psm of sockets.  IOW, the entire thing works correctly only on
little-endian.  On big-endian we'll get "no socket with such psm"
on the first iteration, since we won't find a socket with ->psm == 0x1001.
We will happily conclude that 0x1001 is unused and slap htobs(0x1001)
(i.e. 0x110) into ->psm of our socket.  Of course, the next time around
the same thing will repeat and we'll just get a fsckload of sockets
with the same ->psm assigned.

Fix: pass htobs(psm) to __l2cap_get_sock_by_addr() there.  All other
callers are already passing little-endian values and all places that
store something in ->psm are storing little-endian.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The L2CAP configuration parameter handling was missing the support
for rejecting unknown options. The capability to reject unknown
options is mandatory since the Bluetooth 1.2 specification. This
patch implements its and also simplifies the parameter parsing.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The L2CAP and HCI setsockopt() implementations have a small information
leak that makes it possible to leak kernel stack memory to userspace.

If the optlen parameter is 0, no data will be copied by copy_from_user(),
but the uninitialized stack buffer will be read and stored later. A call
to getsockopt() can now retrieve the leaked information.

To fix this problem the stack buffer given to copy_from_user() must be
initialized with the current settings.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

To clearly state the intent of copying from linear sk_buffs, _offset being a
overly long variant but interesting for the sake of saving some bytes.
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The PSM values below 0x1001 of L2CAP are reserved for well known
services. Restrict the possibility to bind them to privileged
users.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The PSM value in the L2CAP socket list must be converted to host
order before printing it.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
2.6.18-1.2726.fc6 #1

Any L2CAP connection in disconnecting state shall not response
to any further config requests from the remote side. So in case
such a request is received, ignore it.
Signed-off-by: NVille Tervo <ville.tervo@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

When sending a positive config response it shall include the actual
MTU to be used on this channel. This differs from the Bluetooth 1.1
specification where it was enough to acknowledge the config request.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>