Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This trickles up through sctp_sm_lookup_event up to sctp_do_sm
and up further into sctp_primitiv_NAME before the code reaches
places where struct net can be reliably found.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Start with an empty sctp_net_table that will be populated as the various
tunable sysctls are made per net.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

- Fix the sctp_af operations to work in all namespaces
- Enable sctp socket creation in all network namespaces.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

- Convert all of the files under /proc/net/sctp to be per
  network namespace.

- Don't print anything for /proc/net/sctp/snmp except in
  the initial network namespaces as the snmp counters still
  have to be converted to be per network namespace.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The percpu sctp socket counter has nothing at all to do with the sctp
proc files, and having it in the wrong initialization is confusing,
and makes network namespace support a pain.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

- Kill sctp_get_ctl_sock, it is useless now.
- Pass struct net where needed so net->sctp.ctl_sock is accessible.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

- Move the address lists into struct net
- Add per network namespace initialization and cleanup
- Pass around struct net so it is everywhere I need it.
- Rename all of the global variable references into references
  to the variables moved into struct net
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

- Use struct net in the hash calculation
- Use sock_net(association.base.sk) in the association lookups.
- On receive calculate the network namespace from skb->dev.
- Pass struct net from receive down to the functions that actually
  do the association lookup.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

- Use struct net in the hash calculation
- Use sock_net(endpoint.base.sk) in the endpoint lookups.
- On receive calculate the network namespace from skb->dev.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

- Add struct net into the port hash table hash calculation
- Add struct net inot the struct sctp_bind_bucket so there
  is a memory of which network namespace a port is allocated in.
  No need for a ref count because sctp_bind_bucket only exists
  when there are sockets in the hash table and sockets can not
  change their network namspace, and sockets already ref count
  their network namespace.
- Add struct net into the key comparison when we are testing
  to see if we have found the port hash table entry we are
  looking for.

With these changes lookups in the port hash table becomes
safe to use in multiple network namespaces.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch series is based on top of "Swap-over-NBD without deadlocking
v15" as it depends on the same reservation of PF_MEMALLOC reserves logic.

When a user or administrator requires swap for their application, they
create a swap partition and file, format it with mkswap and activate it
with swapon.  In diskless systems this is not an option so if swap if
required then swapping over the network is considered.  The two likely
scenarios are when blade servers are used as part of a cluster where the
form factor or maintenance costs do not allow the use of disks and thin
clients.

The Linux Terminal Server Project recommends the use of the Network Block
Device (NBD) for swap but this is not always an option.  There is no
guarantee that the network attached storage (NAS) device is running Linux
or supports NBD.  However, it is likely that it supports NFS so there are
users that want support for swapping over NFS despite any performance
concern.  Some distributions currently carry patches that support swapping
over NFS but it would be preferable to support it in the mainline kernel.

Patch 1 avoids a stream-specific deadlock that potentially affects TCP.

Patch 2 is a small modification to SELinux to avoid using PFMEMALLOC
	reserves.

Patch 3 adds three helpers for filesystems to handle swap cache pages.
	For example, page_file_mapping() returns page->mapping for
	file-backed pages and the address_space of the underlying
	swap file for swap cache pages.

Patch 4 adds two address_space_operations to allow a filesystem
	to pin all metadata relevant to a swapfile in memory. Upon
	successful activation, the swapfile is marked SWP_FILE and
	the address space operation ->direct_IO is used for writing
	and ->readpage for reading in swap pages.

Patch 5 notes that patch 3 is bolting
	filesystem-specific-swapfile-support onto the side and that
	the default handlers have different information to what
	is available to the filesystem. This patch refactors the
	code so that there are generic handlers for each of the new
	address_space operations.

Patch 6 adds an API to allow a vector of kernel addresses to be
	translated to struct pages and pinned for IO.

Patch 7 adds support for using highmem pages for swap by kmapping
	the pages before calling the direct_IO handler.

Patch 8 updates NFS to use the helpers from patch 3 where necessary.

Patch 9 avoids setting PF_private on PG_swapcache pages within NFS.

Patch 10 implements the new swapfile-related address_space operations
	for NFS and teaches the direct IO handler how to manage
	kernel addresses.

Patch 11 prevents page allocator recursions in NFS by using GFP_NOIO
	where appropriate.

Patch 12 fixes a NULL pointer dereference that occurs when using
	swap-over-NFS.

With the patches applied, it is possible to mount a swapfile that is on an
NFS filesystem.  Swap performance is not great with a swap stress test
taking roughly twice as long to complete than if the swap device was
backed by NBD.

This patch: netvm: prevent a stream-specific deadlock

It could happen that all !SOCK_MEMALLOC sockets have buffered so much data
that we're over the global rmem limit.  This will prevent SOCK_MEMALLOC
buffers from receiving data, which will prevent userspace from running,
which is needed to reduce the buffered data.

Fix this by exempting the SOCK_MEMALLOC sockets from the rmem limit.  Once
this change it applied, it is important that sockets that set
SOCK_MEMALLOC do not clear the flag until the socket is being torn down.
If this happens, a warning is generated and the tokens reclaimed to avoid
accounting errors until the bug is fixed.

[davem@davemloft.net: Warning about clearing SOCK_MEMALLOC]
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Mike Christie <michaelc@cs.wisc.edu>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Use inet_iif() consistently, and for TCP record the input interface of
cached RX dst in inet sock.

rt->rt_iif is going to be encoded differently, so that we can
legitimately cache input routes in the FIB info more aggressively.

When the input interface is "use SKB device index" the rt->rt_iif will
be set to zero.

This forces us to move the TCP RX dst cache installation into the ipv4
specific code, and as well it should since doing the route caching for
ipv6 is pointless at the moment since it is not inspected in the ipv6
input paths yet.

Also, remove the unlikely on dst->obsolete, all ipv4 dsts have
obsolete set to a non-zero value to force invocation of the check
callback.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

I've seen several attempts recently made to do quick failover of sctp transports
by reducing various retransmit timers and counters.  While its possible to
implement a faster failover on multihomed sctp associations, its not
particularly robust, in that it can lead to unneeded retransmits, as well as
false connection failures due to intermittent latency on a network.

Instead, lets implement the new ietf quick failover draft found here:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nishida-tsvwg-sctp-failover-05

This will let the sctp stack identify transports that have had a small number of
errors, and avoid using them quickly until their reliability can be
re-established.  I've tested this out on two virt guests connected via multiple
isolated virt networks and believe its in compliance with the above draft and
works well.
Signed-off-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
CC: joe@perches.com
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add a big comment explaining how the field works, and use defines
instead of magic constants for the values assigned to it.

Suggested by Joe Perches.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This will be used so that we can compose a full flow key.

Even though we have a route in this context, we need more.  In the
future the routes will be without destination address, source address,
etc. keying.  One ipv4 route will cover entire subnets, etc.

In this environment we have to have a way to possess persistent storage
for redirects and PMTU information.  This persistent storage will exist
in the FIB tables, and that's why we'll need to be able to rebuild a
full lookup flow key here.  Using that flow key will do a fib_lookup()
and create/update the persistent entry.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fix the following sparse warning:
	* symbol 'sctp_init_cause_fixed' was not declared. Should it be
	  static?
Signed-off-by: NIoan Orghici <ioanorghici@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

A few days ago Dave Jones reported this oops:

[22766.294255] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[22766.295376] CPU 0
[22766.295384] Modules linked in:
[22766.387137]  ffffffffa169f292 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b ffff880147c03a90
ffff880147c03a74
[22766.387135] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000000000
[22766.387136] Process trinity-watchdo (pid: 10896, threadinfo ffff88013e7d2000,
[22766.387137] Stack:
[22766.387140]  ffff880147c03a10
[22766.387140]  ffffffffa169f2b6
[22766.387140]  ffff88013ed95728
[22766.387143]  0000000000000002
[22766.387143]  0000000000000000
[22766.387143]  ffff880003fad062
[22766.387144]  ffff88013c120000
[22766.387144]
[22766.387145] Call Trace:
[22766.387145]  <IRQ>
[22766.387150]  [<ffffffffa169f292>] ? __sctp_lookup_association+0x62/0xd0
[sctp]
[22766.387154]  [<ffffffffa169f2b6>] __sctp_lookup_association+0x86/0xd0 [sctp]
[22766.387157]  [<ffffffffa169f597>] sctp_rcv+0x207/0xbb0 [sctp]
[22766.387161]  [<ffffffff810d4da8>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x28/0xd0
[22766.387163]  [<ffffffff815827e3>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x133/0x210
[22766.387166]  [<ffffffff815902fc>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4c0
[22766.387168]  [<ffffffff8159043d>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x18d/0x4c0
[22766.387169]  [<ffffffff815902fc>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4c0
[22766.387171]  [<ffffffff81590a07>] ip_local_deliver+0x47/0x80
[22766.387172]  [<ffffffff8158fd80>] ip_rcv_finish+0x150/0x680
[22766.387174]  [<ffffffff81590c54>] ip_rcv+0x214/0x320
[22766.387176]  [<ffffffff81558c07>] __netif_receive_skb+0x7b7/0x910
[22766.387178]  [<ffffffff8155856c>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x11c/0x910
[22766.387180]  [<ffffffff810d423e>] ? put_lock_stats.isra.25+0xe/0x40
[22766.387182]  [<ffffffff81558f83>] netif_receive_skb+0x23/0x1f0
[22766.387183]  [<ffffffff815596a9>] ? dev_gro_receive+0x139/0x440
[22766.387185]  [<ffffffff81559280>] napi_skb_finish+0x70/0xa0
[22766.387187]  [<ffffffff81559cb5>] napi_gro_receive+0xf5/0x130
[22766.387218]  [<ffffffffa01c4679>] e1000_receive_skb+0x59/0x70 [e1000e]
[22766.387242]  [<ffffffffa01c5aab>] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x28b/0x460 [e1000e]
[22766.387266]  [<ffffffffa01c9c18>] e1000e_poll+0x78/0x430 [e1000e]
[22766.387268]  [<ffffffff81559fea>] net_rx_action+0x1aa/0x3d0
[22766.387270]  [<ffffffff810a495f>] ? account_system_vtime+0x10f/0x130
[22766.387273]  [<ffffffff810734d0>] __do_softirq+0xe0/0x420
[22766.387275]  [<ffffffff8169826c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[22766.387278]  [<ffffffff8101db15>] do_softirq+0xd5/0x110
[22766.387279]  [<ffffffff81073bc5>] irq_exit+0xd5/0xe0
[22766.387281]  [<ffffffff81698b03>] do_IRQ+0x63/0xd0
[22766.387283]  [<ffffffff8168ee2f>] common_interrupt+0x6f/0x6f
[22766.387283]  <EOI>
[22766.387284]
[22766.387285]  [<ffffffff8168eed9>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
[22766.387285] Code: c0 90 5d c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 89 c8 5d c3 0f 1f 00 55 48
89 e5 48 83
ec 20 48 89 5d e8 4c 89 65 f0 4c 89 6d f8 66 66 66 66 90 <0f> b7 87 98 00 00 00
48 89 fb
49 89 f5 66 c1 c0 08 66 39 46 02
[22766.387307]
[22766.387307] RIP
[22766.387311]  [<ffffffffa168a2c9>] sctp_assoc_is_match+0x19/0x90 [sctp]
[22766.387311]  RSP <ffff880147c039b0>
[22766.387142]  ffffffffa16ab120
[22766.599537] ---[ end trace 3f6dae82e37b17f5 ]---
[22766.601221] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

It appears from his analysis and some staring at the code that this is likely
occuring because an association is getting freed while still on the
sctp_assoc_hashtable.  As a result, we get a gpf when traversing the hashtable
while a freed node corrupts part of the list.

Nominally I would think that an mibalanced refcount was responsible for this,
but I can't seem to find any obvious imbalance.  What I did note however was
that the two places where we create an association using
sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE (__sctp_connect and sctp_sendmsg), have failure paths
which free a newly created association after calling sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE.
sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE brings us into the sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc path, which
issues a SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC side effect, which in turn adds a new association to
the aforementioned hash table.  the sctp command interpreter that process side
effects has not way to unwind previously processed commands, so freeing the
association from the __sctp_connect or sctp_sendmsg error path would lead to a
freed association remaining on this hash table.

I've fixed this but modifying sctp_[un]hash_established to use hlist_del_init,
which allows us to proerly use hlist_unhashed to check if the node is on a
hashlist safely during a delete.  That in turn alows us to safely call
sctp_unhash_established in the __sctp_connect and sctp_sendmsg error paths
before freeing them, regardles of what the associations state is on the hash
list.

I noted, while I was doing this, that the __sctp_unhash_endpoint was using
hlist_unhsashed in a simmilar fashion, but never nullified any removed nodes
pointers to make that function work properly, so I fixed that up in a simmilar
fashion.

I attempted to test this using a virtual guest running the SCTP_RR test from
netperf in a loop while running the trinity fuzzer, both in a loop.  I wasn't
able to recreate the problem prior to this fix, nor was I able to trigger the
failure after (neither of which I suppose is suprising).  Given the trace above
however, I think its likely that this is what we hit.
Signed-off-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: davej@redhat.com
CC: davej@redhat.com
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This adjusts the call to dst_ops->update_pmtu() so that we can
transparently handle the fact that, in the future, the dst itself can
be invalidated by the PMTU update (when we have non-host routes cached
in sockets).
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

No longer necessary.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

While doing some recent work on sctp sack bundling I noted that
sctp_packet_append_chunk was pretty inefficient.  Specifially, it was called
recursively while trying to bundle auth and sack chunks.  Because of that we
call sctp_packet_bundle_sack and sctp_packet_bundle_auth a total of 4 times for
every call to sctp_packet_append_chunk, knowing that at least 3 of those calls
will do nothing.

So lets refactor sctp_packet_bundle_auth to have an outer part that does the
attempted bundling, and an inner part that just does the chunk appends.  This
saves us several calls per iteration that we just don't need.

Also, noticed that the auth and sack bundling fail to free the chunks they
allocate if the append fails, so make sure we add that in
Signed-off-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

It was noticed recently that when we send data on a transport, its possible that
we might bundle a sack that arrived on a different transport.  While this isn't
a major problem, it does go against the SHOULD requirement in section 6.4 of RFC
2960:

 An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK, HEARTBEAT ACK,
   etc.) to the same destination transport address from which it
   received the DATA or control chunk to which it is replying.  This
   rule should also be followed if the endpoint is bundling DATA chunks
   together with the reply chunk.

This patch seeks to correct that.  It restricts the bundling of sack operations
to only those transports which have moved the ctsn of the association forward
since the last sack.  By doing this we guarantee that we only bundle outbound
saks on a transport that has received a chunk since the last sack.  This brings
us into stricter compliance with the RFC.

Vlad had initially suggested that we strictly allow only sack bundling on the
transport that last moved the ctsn forward.  While this makes sense, I was
concerned that doing so prevented us from bundling in the case where we had
received chunks that moved the ctsn on multiple transports.  In those cases, the
RFC allows us to select any of the transports having received chunks to bundle
the sack on.  so I've modified the approach to allow for that, by adding a state
variable to each transport that tracks weather it has moved the ctsn since the
last sack.  This I think keeps our behavior (and performance), close enough to
our current profile that I think we can do this without a sysctl knob to
enable/disable it.
Signed-off-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Vlad Yaseivch <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NMichele Baldessari <michele@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Nsorin serban <sserban@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

net/sctp/protocol.c: In function ‘sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler’:
net/sctp/protocol.c:676: warning: label ‘free_next’ defined but not used
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Halperin <dhalperi@cs.washington.edu>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Standardize the net core ratelimited logging functions.

Coalesce formats, align arguments.
Change a printk then vprintk sequence to use printf extension %pV.
Signed-off-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

dst_check() will take care of SA (and obsolete field), hence
IPsec rekeying scenario is taken into account.
Signed-off-by: NNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yaseivch <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

sk_add_backlog() & sk_rcvqueues_full() hard coded sk_rcvbuf as the
memory limit. We need to make this limit a parameter for TCP use.

No functional change expected in this patch, all callers still using the
old sk_rcvbuf limit.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Cc: Rick Jones <rick.jones2@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This results in code with less boiler plate that is a bit easier
to read.

Additionally stops us from using compatibility code in the sysctl
core, hastening the day when the compatibility code can be removed.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This makes it clearer which sysctls are relative to your current network
namespace.

This makes it a little less error prone by not exposing sysctls for the
initial network namespace in other namespaces.

This is the same way we handle all of our other network interfaces to
userspace and I can't honestly remember why we didn't do this for
sysctls right from the start.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Use of "unsigned int" is preferred to bare "unsigned" in net tree.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

getsockopt(..., SCTP_EVENTS, ...) performs a length check and returns
an error if the user provides less bytes than the size of struct
sctp_event_subscribe.

Struct sctp_event_subscribe needs to be extended by an u8 for every
new event or notification type that is added.

This obviously makes getsockopt fail for binaries that are compiled
against an older versions of <net/sctp/user.h> which do not contain
all event types.

This patch changes getsockopt behaviour to no longer return an error
if not enough bytes are being provided by the user. Instead, it
returns as much of sctp_event_subscribe as fits into the provided buffer.

This leads to the new behavior that users see what they have been aware
of at compile time.

The setsockopt(..., SCTP_EVENTS, ...) API is already behaving like this.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

lookup sctp_association within sctp_do_peeloff() to enable its use outside of
the sctp code with minimal knowledge of the former.
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.de>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When checking whether a DATA chunk fits into the estimated rwnd a
full sizeof(struct sk_buff) is added to the needed chunk size. This
quickly exhausts the available rwnd space and leads to packets being
sent which are much below the PMTU limit. This can lead to much worse
performance.

The reason for this behaviour was to avoid putting too much memory
pressure on the receiver. The concept is not completely irational
because a Linux receiver does in fact clone an skb for each DATA chunk
delivered. However, Linux also reserves half the available socket
buffer space for data structures therefore usage of it is already
accounted for.

When proposing to change this the last time it was noted that this
behaviour was introduced to solve a performance issue caused by rwnd
overusage in combination with small DATA chunks.

Trying to reproduce this I found that with the sk_buff overhead removed,
the performance would improve significantly unless socket buffer limits
are increased.

The following numbers have been gathered using a patched iperf
supporting SCTP over a live 1 Gbit ethernet network. The -l option
was used to limit DATA chunk sizes. The numbers listed are based on
the average of 3 test runs each. Default values have been used for
sk_(r|w)mem.

Chunk
Size    Unpatched     No Overhead
-------------------------------------
   4    15.2 Kbit [!]   12.2 Mbit [!]
   8    35.8 Kbit [!]   26.0 Mbit [!]
  16    95.5 Kbit [!]   54.4 Mbit [!]
  32   106.7 Mbit      102.3 Mbit
  64   189.2 Mbit      188.3 Mbit
 128   331.2 Mbit      334.8 Mbit
 256   537.7 Mbit      536.0 Mbit
 512   766.9 Mbit      766.6 Mbit
1024   810.1 Mbit      808.6 Mbit
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit 8ffd3208 voids the previous patches f6778aab and 810c0719 for
limiting the autoclose value.  If userspace passes in -1 on 32-bit
platform, the overflow check didn't work and autoclose would be set
to 0xffffffff.

This patch defines a max_autoclose (in seconds) for limiting the value
and exposes it through sysctl, with the following intentions.

1) Avoid overflowing autoclose * HZ.

2) Keep the default autoclose bound consistent across 32- and 64-bit
   platforms (INT_MAX / HZ in this patch).

3) Keep the autoclose value consistent between setsockopt() and
   getsockopt() calls.
Suggested-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NXi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Instead of testing defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The below patch fixes some typos in various parts of the kernel, as well as fixes some comments.
Please let me know if I missed anything, and I will try to get it changed and resent.
Signed-off-by: NJustin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

The check from commit 30c2235c is incomplete and cannot prevent
cases like key_len = 0x80000000 (INT_MAX + 1).  In that case, the
left-hand side of the check (INT_MAX - key_len), which is unsigned,
becomes 0xffffffff (UINT_MAX) and bypasses the check.

However this shouldn't be a security issue.  The function is called
from the following two code paths:

 1) setsockopt()

 2) sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret()

In case (1), sca_keylength is never going to exceed 65535 since it's
bounded by a u16 from the user API.  As such, the key length will
never overflow.

In case (2), sca_keylength is computed based on the user key (1 short)
and 2 * key_vector (3 shorts) for a total of 7 * USHRT_MAX, which still
will not overflow.

In other words, this overflow check is not really necessary.  Just
make it more correct.
Signed-off-by: NXi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

C assignment can handle struct in6_addr copying.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>