1. 21 7月, 2016 1 次提交
  2. 23 4月, 2016 1 次提交
    • B
      security: Introduce security_settime64() · 457db29b
      Baolin Wang 提交于
      security_settime() uses a timespec, which is not year 2038 safe
      on 32bit systems. Thus this patch introduces the security_settime64()
      function with timespec64 type. We also convert the cap_settime() helper
      function to use the 64bit types.
      
      This patch then moves security_settime() to the header file as an
      inline helper function so that existing users can be iteratively
      converted.
      
      None of the existing hooks is using the timespec argument and therefor
      the patch is not making any functional changes.
      
      Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
      Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
      Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
      Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
      Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NBaolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
      [jstultz: Reworded commit message]
      Signed-off-by: NJohn Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
      457db29b
  3. 28 3月, 2016 9 次提交
  4. 21 2月, 2016 4 次提交
  5. 19 2月, 2016 2 次提交
  6. 25 12月, 2015 3 次提交
  7. 21 9月, 2015 1 次提交
  8. 12 5月, 2015 3 次提交
  9. 11 5月, 2015 2 次提交
    • N
      security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware · bda0be7a
      NeilBrown 提交于
      inode_follow_link now takes an inode and rcu flag as well as the
      dentry.
      
      inode is used in preference to d_backing_inode(dentry), particularly
      in RCU-walk mode.
      
      selinux_inode_follow_link() gets dentry_has_perm() and
      inode_has_perm() open-coded into it so that it can call
      avc_has_perm_flags() in way that is safe if LOOKUP_RCU is set.
      
      Calling avc_has_perm_flags() with rcu_read_lock() held means
      that when avc_has_perm_noaudit calls avc_compute_av(), the attempt
      to rcu_read_unlock() before calling security_compute_av() will not
      actually drop the RCU read-lock.
      
      However as security_compute_av() is completely in a read_lock()ed
      region, it should be safe with the RCU read-lock held.
      Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      bda0be7a
    • N
      SECURITY: remove nameidata arg from inode_follow_link. · 37882db0
      NeilBrown 提交于
      No ->inode_follow_link() methods use the nameidata arg, and
      it is about to become private to namei.c.
      So remove from all inode_follow_link() functions.
      Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      37882db0
  10. 12 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  11. 21 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  12. 26 1月, 2015 1 次提交
    • S
      Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. · 79af7307
      Stephen Smalley 提交于
      Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.
      The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement
      controls over binder IPC.  The security hooks include support for
      controlling what process can become the binder context manager
      (binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process
      to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction),
      controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to
      another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability
      of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file).
      
      These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3.
      
      (Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver,
      changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and
      to add inline documentation for the hooks).
      Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Acked-by: NNick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
      Acked-by: NJeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      79af7307
  13. 10 9月, 2014 1 次提交
  14. 02 9月, 2014 1 次提交
  15. 28 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  16. 26 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  17. 10 7月, 2014 1 次提交
    • P
      selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft() · 4da6daf4
      Paul Moore 提交于
      The sock_graft() hook has special handling for AF_INET, AF_INET, and
      AF_UNIX sockets as those address families have special hooks which
      label the sock before it is attached its associated socket.
      Unfortunately, the sock_graft() hook was missing a default approach
      to labeling sockets which meant that any other address family which
      made use of connections or the accept() syscall would find the
      returned socket to be in an "unlabeled" state.  This was recently
      demonstrated by the kcrypto/AF_ALG subsystem and the newly released
      cryptsetup package (cryptsetup v1.6.5 and later).
      
      This patch preserves the special handling in selinux_sock_graft(),
      but adds a default behavior - setting the sock's label equal to the
      associated socket - which resolves the problem with AF_ALG and
      presumably any other address family which makes use of accept().
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      Tested-by: NMilan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
      4da6daf4
  18. 01 4月, 2014 1 次提交
  19. 15 3月, 2014 1 次提交
  20. 10 3月, 2014 1 次提交
    • N
      selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callers · 52a4c640
      Nikolay Aleksandrov 提交于
      security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
      allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
      callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
      needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
      security_operations and to the internal function
      selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
      callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
      The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
      security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
      all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
      selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)
      
      Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
      add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
      patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
      security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.
      
      CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
      CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
      CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
      CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
      CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
      CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
      52a4c640
  21. 26 7月, 2013 1 次提交
    • P
      lsm: split the xfrm_state_alloc_security() hook implementation · 2e5aa866
      Paul Moore 提交于
      The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a
      multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the
      arguments passed to it by the caller.  This patch splits the LSM hook
      implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the
      LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel:
      
       * xfrm_state_alloc
       * xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
      
      Also included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux
      code; no other LSMs are affected.
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      2e5aa866
  22. 25 7月, 2013 1 次提交
  23. 09 6月, 2013 1 次提交