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  1. 17 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  3. 01 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  5. 29 3月, 2009 1 次提交
    • H
      fix setuid sometimes wouldn't · 7c2c7d99
      由 Hugh Dickins 提交于 
      check_unsafe_exec() also notes whether the fs_struct is being
shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so
sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid.
But /proc/<pid>/cwd and /proc/<pid>/root lookups make transient
use of get_fs_struct(), which also raises that sharing count.

This might occasionally cause a setuid program not to change euid,
in the same way as happened with files->count (check_unsafe_exec
also looks at sighand->count, but /proc doesn't raise that one).

We'd prefer exec not to unshare fs_struct: so fix this in procfs,
replacing get_fs_struct() by get_fs_path(), which does path_get
while still holding task_lock, instead of raising fs->count.
Signed-off-by: NHugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
___

 fs/proc/base.c |   50 +++++++++++++++--------------------------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      7c2c7d99
  7. 28 3月, 2009 1 次提交
  9. 18 3月, 2009 1 次提交
    • L
      Avoid 64-bit "switch()" statements on 32-bit architectures · ee568b25
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      Commit ee6f779b ("filp->f_pos not
correctly updated in proc_task_readdir") changed the proc code to use
filp->f_pos directly, rather than through a temporary variable.  In the
process, that caused the operations to be done on the full 64 bits, even
though the offset is never that big.

That's all fine and dandy per se, but for some unfathomable reason gcc
generates absolutely horrid code when using 64-bit values in switch()
statements.  To the point of actually calling out to gcc helper
functions like __cmpdi2 rather than just doing the trivial comparisons
directly the way gcc does for normal compares.  At which point we get
link failures, because we really don't want to support that kind of
crazy code.

Fix this by just casting the f_pos value to "unsigned long", which
is plenty big enough for /proc, and avoids the gcc code generation issue.
Reported-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Zhang Le <r0bertz@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ee568b25
  11. 16 3月, 2009 1 次提交
    • Z
      filp->f_pos not correctly updated in proc_task_readdir · ee6f779b
      由 Zhang Le 提交于 
      filp->f_pos only get updated at the end of the function. Thus d_off of those
dirents who are in the middle will be 0, and this will cause a problem in
glibc's readdir implementation, specifically endless loop. Because when overflow
occurs, f_pos will be set to next dirent to read, however it will be 0, unless
the next one is the last one. So it will start over again and again.

There is a sample program in man 2 gendents. This is the output of the program
running on a multithread program's task dir before this patch is applied:

  $ ./a.out /proc/3807/task
  --------------- nread=128 ---------------
  i-node#  file type  d_reclen  d_off   d_name
    506442  directory    16          1  .
    506441  directory    16          0  ..
    506443  directory    16          0  3807
    506444  directory    16          0  3809
    506445  directory    16          0  3812
    506446  directory    16          0  3861
    506447  directory    16          0  3862
    506448  directory    16          8  3863

This is the output after this patch is applied

  $ ./a.out /proc/3807/task
  --------------- nread=128 ---------------
  i-node#  file type  d_reclen  d_off   d_name
    506442  directory    16          1  .
    506441  directory    16          2  ..
    506443  directory    16          3  3807
    506444  directory    16          4  3809
    506445  directory    16          5  3812
    506446  directory    16          6  3861
    506447  directory    16          7  3862
    506448  directory    16          8  3863
Signed-off-by: NZhang Le <r0bertz@gentoo.org>
Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ee6f779b
  13. 06 1月, 2009 1 次提交
  15. 05 1月, 2009 5 次提交
  17. 22 12月, 2008 1 次提交
    • I
      sched: fix warning in fs/proc/base.c · 826e08b0
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      Stephen Rothwell reported this new (harmless) build warning on platforms that
define u64 to long:

 fs/proc/base.c: In function 'proc_pid_schedstat':
 fs/proc/base.c:352: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 3 has type 'u64'

asm-generic/int-l64.h platforms strike again: that file should be eliminated.

Fix it by casting the parameters to long long.
Reported-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      826e08b0
  19. 18 12月, 2008 1 次提交
  21. 11 12月, 2008 1 次提交
  23. 14 11月, 2008 2 次提交
  25. 21 10月, 2008 1 次提交
  27. 10 10月, 2008 3 次提交
  29. 06 8月, 2008 1 次提交
    • A
      proc: fix warnings · 7c44319d
      由 Alexander Beregalov 提交于 
      proc: fix warnings

 fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 3 has type 'u64'
 fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 4 has type 'u64'
 fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 5 has type 'u64'
 fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 6 has type 'u64'
 fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 7 has type 'u64'
 fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 8 has type 'u64'
 fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 9 has type 'u64'
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Beregalov <a.beregalov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAndrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      7c44319d
  31. 28 7月, 2008 2 次提交
  33. 27 7月, 2008 4 次提交
  35. 26 7月, 2008 1 次提交
  37. 14 7月, 2008 1 次提交
    • S
      Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach · 006ebb40
      由 Stephen Smalley 提交于 
      Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested.  This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access.  The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.

Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target.  The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.

In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label.  This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit).  At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).

This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).

Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0).  I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      006ebb40
  39. 07 6月, 2008 1 次提交
  41. 17 5月, 2008 1 次提交
  43. 02 5月, 2008 1 次提交
  45. 29 4月, 2008 2 次提交
    • R
      procfs: mem permission cleanup · 638fa202
      由 Roland McGrath 提交于 
      This cleans up the permission checks done for /proc/PID/mem i/o calls.  It
puts all the logic in a new function, check_mem_permission().

The old code repeated the (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task))
magical expression multiple times.  The new function does all that work in one
place, with clear comments.

The old code called security_ptrace() twice on successful checks, once in
MAY_PTRACE() and once in __ptrace_may_attach().  Now it's only called once,
and only if all other checks have succeeded.
Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      638fa202
    • M
      procfs task exe symlink · 925d1c40
      由 Matt Helsley 提交于 
      The kernel implements readlink of /proc/pid/exe by getting the file from
the first executable VMA.  Then the path to the file is reconstructed and
reported as the result.

Because of the VMA walk the code is slightly different on nommu systems.
This patch avoids separate /proc/pid/exe code on nommu systems.  Instead of
walking the VMAs to find the first executable file-backed VMA we store a
reference to the exec'd file in the mm_struct.

That reference would prevent the filesystem holding the executable file
from being unmounted even after unmapping the VMAs.  So we track the number
of VM_EXECUTABLE VMAs and drop the new reference when the last one is
unmapped.  This avoids pinning the mounted filesystem.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: improve comments]
[yamamoto@valinux.co.jp: fix dup_mmap]
Signed-off-by: NMatt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc:"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: NYAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      925d1c40
  47. 23 4月, 2008 3 次提交
    • R
      [patch 6/7] vfs: mountinfo: add /proc/<pid>/mountinfo · 2d4d4864
      由 Ram Pai 提交于 
      [mszeredi@suse.cz] rewrite and split big patch into managable chunks

/proc/mounts in its current form lacks important information:

 - propagation state
 - root of mount for bind mounts
 - the st_dev value used within the filesystem
 - identifier for each mount and it's parent

It also suffers from the following problems:

 - not easily extendable
 - ambiguity of mountpoints within a chrooted environment
 - doesn't distinguish between filesystem dependent and independent options
 - doesn't distinguish between per mount and per super block options

This patch introduces /proc/<pid>/mountinfo which attempts to address
all these deficiencies.

Code shared between /proc/<pid>/mounts and /proc/<pid>/mountinfo is
extracted into separate functions.

Thanks to Al Viro for the help in getting the design right.
Signed-off-by: NRam Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      2d4d4864
    • M
      [patch 5/7] vfs: mountinfo: allow using process root · a1a2c409
      由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于 
      Allow /proc/<pid>/mountinfo to use the root of <pid> to calculate
mountpoints.

 - move definition of 'struct proc_mounts' to <linux/mnt_namespace.h>
 - add the process's namespace and root to this structure
 - pass a pointer to 'struct proc_mounts' into seq_operations

In addition the following cleanups are made:

 - use a common open function for /proc/<pid>/{mounts,mountstat}
 - surround namespace.c part of these proc files with #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 - make the seq_operations structures const
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      a1a2c409
    • A
      [PATCH] proc_readfd_common() race fix · 9b4f526c
      由 Al Viro 提交于 
      Since we drop the rcu_read_lock inside the loop, we can't assume
that files->fdt will remain unchanged (and not freed) between
iterations.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      9b4f526c
  49. 21 3月, 2008 1 次提交
    • A
      [NET]: Fix permissions of /proc/net · 4f42c288
      由 Andre Noll 提交于 
      commit e9720acd ([NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3))
broke ganglia and probably other applications that read /proc/net/dev.

This is due to the change of permissions of /proc/net that was
introduced in that commit.

Before: dr-xr-xr-x 5 root root 0 Mar 19 11:30 /proc/net
After: dr-xr--r-- 5 root root 0 Mar 19 11:29 /proc/self/net

This patch restores the permissions to the old value which makes
ganglia happy again.

Pavel Emelyanov says:

	This also broke the postfix, as it was reported in bug #10286
	and described in detail by Benjamin.
Signed-off-by: NAndre Noll <maan@systemlinux.org>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      4f42c288
  51. 18 3月, 2008 1 次提交