- 28 3月, 2016 15 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
... as well as unix_mknod() and may_o_create() Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
was open-coded in several places... Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 04 3月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of enum. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Move the RSA EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding from the asymmetric-key public_key subtype to the rsa crypto module's pkcs1pad template. This means that the public_key subtype no longer has any dependencies on public key type. To make this work, the following changes have been made: (1) The rsa pkcs1pad template is now used for RSA keys. This strips off the padding and returns just the message hash. (2) In a previous patch, the pkcs1pad template gained an optional second parameter that, if given, specifies the hash used. We now give this, and pkcs1pad checks the encoded message E(M) for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding and verifies that the correct digest OID is present. (3) The crypto driver in crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c is now reduced to something that doesn't care about what the encryption actually does and and has been merged into public_key.c. (4) CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA is gone. Module signing must set CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y instead. Thoughts: (*) Should the encoding style (eg. raw, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5) also be passed to the padding template? Should there be multiple padding templates registered that share most of the code? Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NTadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 21 2月, 2016 9 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Require the IMA policy to be signed when additional rules can be added. v1: - initialize the policy flag - include IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY in the policy flag Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Add support for measuring and appraising the IMA policy itself. Changelog v4: - use braces on both if/else branches, even if single line on one of the branches - Dmitry - Use the id mapping - Dmitry Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
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由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
We currently cannot do appraisal or signature vetting of IMA policies since we currently can only load IMA policies by writing the contents of the policy directly in, as follows: cat policy-file > <securityfs>/ima/policy If we provide the kernel the path to the IMA policy so it can load the policy itself it'd be able to later appraise or vet the file signature if it has one. This patch adds support to load the IMA policy with a given path as follows: echo /etc/ima/ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy Changelog v4+: - moved kernel_read_file_from_path() error messages to callers v3: - moved kernel_read_file_from_path() to a separate patch v2: - after re-ordering the patches, replace calling integrity_kernel_read() to read the file with kernel_read_file_from_path() (Mimi) - Patch description re-written by Luis R. Rodriguez Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Add IMA policy support for measuring/appraising the kexec image and initramfs. Two new IMA policy identifiers KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK are defined. Example policy rules: measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK appraise func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK appraise_type=imasig Moving the enumeration to the vfs layer simplified the patches, allowing the IMA changes, for the most part, to be separated from the other changes. Unfortunately, passing either a kernel_read_file_id or a ima_hooks enumeration within IMA is messy. Option 1: duplicate kernel_read_file enumeration in ima_hooks enum kernel_read_file_id { ... READING_KEXEC_IMAGE, READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS, READING_MAX_ID enum ima_hooks { ... KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK Option 2: define ima_hooks as extension of kernel_read_file eg: enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = READING_MAX_ID, MMAP_CHECK, In order to pass both kernel_read_file_id and ima_hooks values, we would need to specify a struct containing a union. struct caller_id { union { enum ima_hooks func_id; enum kernel_read_file_id read_id; }; }; Option 3: incorportate the ima_hooks enumeration into kernel_read_file_id, perhaps changing the enumeration name. For now, duplicate the new READING_KEXEC_IMAGE/INITRAMFS in the ima_hooks. Changelog v4: - replaced switch statement with a kernel_read_file_id to an ima_hooks id mapping array - Dmitry - renamed ima_hook tokens KEXEC_CHECK and INITRAMFS_CHECK to KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK respectively - Dave Young Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Each time a file is read by the kernel, the file should be re-measured and the file signature re-appraised, based on policy. As there is no need to preserve the status information, this patch replaces the firmware and module specific cache status with a generic one named read_file. This change simplifies adding support for other files read by the kernel. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Replace copy_module_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd(). Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_module_from_file hook, IMA is called, based on policy, to prevent unsigned kernel modules from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall and to measure/appraise signed kernel modules. The security function security_kernel_module_from_file() was called prior to reading a kernel module. Preventing unsigned kernel modules from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall remains on the pre-read kernel_read_file() security hook. Instead of reading the kernel module twice, once for measuring/appraising and again for loading the kernel module, the signature validation is moved to the kernel_post_read_file() security hook. This patch removes the security_kernel_module_from_file() hook and security call. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
The kernel_read_file security hook is called prior to reading the file into memory. Changelog v4+: - export security_kernel_read_file() Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Replace the fw_read_file_contents with kernel_file_read_from_path(). Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_fw_from_file hook, IMA is called by the security function to prevent unsigned firmware from being loaded and to measure/appraise signed firmware, based on policy. Instead of reading the firmware twice, once for measuring/appraising the firmware and again for reading the firmware contents into memory, the kernel_post_read_file() security hook calculates the file hash based on the in memory file buffer. The firmware is read once. This patch removes the LSM kernel_fw_from_file() hook and security call. Changelog v4+: - revert dropped buf->size assignment - reported by Sergey Senozhatsky v3: - remove kernel_fw_from_file hook - use kernel_file_read_from_path() - requested by Luis v2: - reordered and squashed firmware patches - fix MAX firmware size (Kees Cook) Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by the normal IMA policy based processing. Changelog v5: - fail ima_post_read_file() if either file or buf is NULL v3: - rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file() v1: - split patch Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
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- 20 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Andreas Gruenbacher 提交于
The inode_getsecid hook is called from contexts in which sleeping is not allowed, so we cannot revalidate inode security labels from there. Use the non-validating version of inode_security() instead. Reported-by: NBenjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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- 19 2月, 2016 7 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Setting up ahash has some overhead. Only use ahash to calculate the hash of a buffer, if the buffer is larger than ima_ahash_minsize. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
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由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
This patch provides convenient buffer hash calculation function. Changelog v3: - fix while hash calculation - Dmitry v1: - rewrite to support loff_t sized buffers - Mimi (based on Fenguang Wu's testing) Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
To differentiate between the kernel_read_file() callers, this patch defines a new enumeration named kernel_read_file_id and includes the caller identifier as an argument. Subsequent patches define READING_KEXEC_IMAGE, READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS, READING_FIRMWARE, READING_MODULE, and READING_POLICY. Changelog v3: - Replace the IMA specific enumeration with a generic one. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
For a while it was looked down upon to directly read files from Linux. These days there exists a few mechanisms in the kernel that do just this though to load a file into a local buffer. There are minor but important checks differences on each. This patch set is the first attempt at resolving some of these differences. This patch introduces a common function for reading files from the kernel with the corresponding security post-read hook and function. Changelog v4+: - export security_kernel_post_read_file() - Fengguang Wu v3: - additional bounds checking - Luis v2: - To simplify patch review, re-ordered patches Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Cleanup the function arguments by using "ima_hooks" enumerator as needed. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Define and call a function to display the "ima_hooks" rules. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
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由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
Instead of passing pointers to pointers to ima_collect_measurent() to read and return the 'security.ima' xattr value, this patch moves the functionality to the calling process_measurement() to directly read the xattr and pass only the hash algo to the ima_collect_measurement(). Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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- 18 2月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Paul Gortmaker 提交于
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is: config BIG_KEYS bool "Large payload keys" ...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone. Lets remove the modular code that is essentially orphaned, so that when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only. Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit. We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag since all that information is already contained at the top of the file in the comments. Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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由 Tadeusz Struk 提交于
Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api. Signed-off-by: NTadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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- 17 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 José Bollo 提交于
Before this commit, removing the access property of a file, aka, the extended attribute security.SMACK64 was not effictive until the cache had been cleaned. This patch fixes that problem. Signed-off-by: NJosé Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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- 16 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Dave Hansen 提交于
For protection keys, we need to understand whether protections should be enforced in software or not. In general, we enforce protections when working on our own task, but not when on others. We call these "current" and "remote" operations. This patch introduces a new get_user_pages() variant: get_user_pages_remote() Which is a replacement for when get_user_pages() is called on non-current tsk/mm. We also introduce a new gup flag: FOLL_REMOTE which can be used for the "__" gup variants to get this new behavior. The uprobes is_trap_at_addr() location holds mmap_sem and calls get_user_pages(current->mm) on an instruction address. This makes it a pretty unique gup caller. Being an instruction access and also really originating from the kernel (vs. the app), I opted to consider this a 'remote' access where protection keys will not be enforced. Without protection keys, this patch should not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: jack@suse.cz Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210154.3F0E51EA@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 12 2月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Ryan Ware 提交于
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp(). Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq(). Reported-by: NXiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NRyan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
Prior to the 4.2 kernel there no no harm in providing a security module hook that does nothing, as the default hook would get called if the module did not supply one. With the list based infrastructure an empty hook adds overhead. This patch removes the three Smack hooks that don't actually do anything. Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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