- 01 7月, 2015 3 次提交
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由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
Reset req->waiting in fuse_put_request(). This is needed for correct accounting in fc->num_waiting for reserved requests. Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> -
由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
request_end() expects fc->num_background and fc->active_background to have been incremented, which is not the case in fuse_request_send_nowait() failure path. So instead just call the ->end() callback (which is actually set by all callers). Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: NAshish Samant <ashish.samant@oracle.com>
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由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
fc->release is called from fuse_conn_put() which was used in the error cleanup before fc->release was initialized. [Jeremiah Mahler <jmmahler@gmail.com>: assign fc->release after calling fuse_conn_init(fc) instead of before.] Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Fixes: a325f9b9 ("fuse: update fuse_conn_init() and separate out fuse_conn_kill()") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v2.6.31+
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- 03 6月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Sasha Levin 提交于
We used to read file_handle twice. Once to get the amount of extra bytes, and once to fetch the entire structure. This may be problematic since we do size verifications only after the first read, so if the number of extra bytes changes in userspace between the first and second calls, we'll have an incoherent view of file_handle. Instead, read the constant size once, and copy that over to the final structure without having to re-read it again. Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 29 5月, 2015 12 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
when we find that a child has died while we'd been trying to ascend, we should go into the first live sibling itself, rather than its sibling. Off-by-one in question had been introduced in "deal with deadlock in d_walk()" and the fix needs to be backported to all branches this one has been backported to. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.2 and later Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> -
由 Bob Copeland 提交于
Both 'i' and 'bits_per_entry' are signed integers but the result is a u64 block number. Cast i to u64 to avoid truncation on 32-bit targets. Found by Coverity (CID 200679). Signed-off-by: NBob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Bob Copeland 提交于
The count variable is used to iterate down to (below) zero from the size of the bitmap and handle the one-filling the remainder of the last partial bitmap block. The loop conditional expects count to be signed in order to detect when the final block is processed, after which count goes negative. Unfortunately, a recent change made this unsigned along with some other related fields. The result of is this is that during mount, omfs_get_imap will overrun the bitmap array and corrupt memory unless number of blocks happens to be a multiple of 8 * blocksize. Fix by changing count back to signed: it is guaranteed to fit in an s32 without overflow due to an enforced limit on the number of blocks in the filesystem. Signed-off-by: NBob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Bob Copeland 提交于
A static checker found the following issue in the error path for omfs_fill_super: fs/omfs/inode.c:552 omfs_fill_super() warn: missing error code here? 'd_make_root()' failed. 'ret' = '0' Fix by returning -ENOMEM in this case. Signed-off-by: NBob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com> Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> -
由 Sasha Levin 提交于
match_token() expects a NULL terminator at the end of the token list so that it would know where to stop. Not having one causes it to overrun to invalid memory. In practice, passing a mount option that omfs didn't recognize would sometimes panic the system. Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NBob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrew Morton 提交于
load_elf_binary() returns `retval', not `error'. Fixes: a87938b2 ("fs/binfmt_elf.c: fix bug in loading of PIE binaries") Reported-by: NJames Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Michael Davidson <md@google.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Brian Foster 提交于
XFS uses the internal tmpfile() infrastructure for the whiteout inode used for RENAME_WHITEOUT operations. For tmpfile inodes, XFS allocates the inode, drops di_nlink, adds the inode to the agi unlinked list, calls d_tmpfile() which correspondingly drops i_nlink of the vfs inode, and then finishes the common inode setup (e.g., clear I_NEW and unlock). The d_tmpfile() call was originally made inxfs_create_tmpfile(), but was pulled up out of that function as part of the following commit to resolve a deadlock issue: 330033d6 xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security As a result, callers of xfs_create_tmpfile() are responsible for either calling d_tmpfile() or fixing up i_nlink appropriately. The whiteout tmpfile allocation helper does neither. As a result, the vfs ->i_nlink becomes inconsistent with the on-disk ->di_nlink once xfs_rename() links it back into the source dentry and calls xfs_bumplink(). Update the assert in xfs_rename() to help detect this problem in the future and update xfs_rename_alloc_whiteout() to decrement the link count as part of the manual tmpfile inode setup. Signed-off-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
It was missed when we converted everything in XFs to use negative error numbers, so fix it now. Bug introduced in 3.17 by commit 2451337d ("xfs: global error sign conversion"), and should go back to stable kernels. Thanks to Brian Foster for noticing it. cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.17, 3.18, 3.19, 4.0 Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
xfs_attr_inactive() is supposed to clean up the attribute fork when the inode is being freed. While it removes attribute fork extents, it completely ignores attributes in local format, which means that there can still be active attributes on the inode after xfs_attr_inactive() has run. This leads to problems with concurrent inode writeback - the in-core inode attribute fork is removed without locking on the assumption that nothing will be attempting to access the attribute fork after a call to xfs_attr_inactive() because it isn't supposed to exist on disk any more. To fix this, make xfs_attr_inactive() completely remove all traces of the attribute fork from the inode, regardless of it's state. Further, also remove the in-core attribute fork structure safely so that there is nothing further that needs to be done by callers to clean up the attribute fork. This means we can remove the in-core and on-disk attribute forks atomically. Also, on error simply remove the in-memory attribute fork. There's nothing that can be done with it once we have failed to remove the on-disk attribute fork, so we may as well just blow it away here anyway. cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.12 to 4.0 Reported-by: NWaiman Long <waiman.long@hp.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
This results in BMBT corruption, as seen by this test: # mkfs.xfs -f -d size=40051712b,agcount=4 /dev/vdc .... # mount /dev/vdc /mnt/scratch # xfs_io -ft -c "extsize 16m" -c "falloc 0 30g" -c "bmap -vp" /mnt/scratch/foo which results in this failure on a debug kernel: XFS: Assertion failed: (blockcount & xfs_mask64hi(64-BMBT_BLOCKCOUNT_BITLEN)) == 0, file: fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap_btree.c, line: 211 .... Call Trace: [<ffffffff814cf0ff>] xfs_bmbt_set_allf+0x8f/0x100 [<ffffffff814cf18d>] xfs_bmbt_set_all+0x1d/0x20 [<ffffffff814f2efe>] xfs_iext_insert+0x9e/0x120 [<ffffffff814c7956>] ? xfs_bmap_add_extent_hole_real+0x1c6/0xc70 [<ffffffff814c7956>] xfs_bmap_add_extent_hole_real+0x1c6/0xc70 [<ffffffff814caaab>] xfs_bmapi_write+0x72b/0xed0 [<ffffffff811c72ac>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x15c/0x170 [<ffffffff814fe070>] xfs_alloc_file_space+0x160/0x400 [<ffffffff81ddcc29>] ? down_write+0x29/0x60 [<ffffffff815063eb>] xfs_file_fallocate+0x29b/0x310 [<ffffffff811d2bc8>] ? __sb_start_write+0x58/0x120 [<ffffffff811e3e18>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x318/0x570 [<ffffffff811cd680>] vfs_fallocate+0x140/0x260 [<ffffffff811ce6f8>] SyS_fallocate+0x48/0x80 [<ffffffff81ddec09>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 The tracepoint that indicates the extent that triggered the assert failure is: xfs_iext_insert: idx 0 offset 0 block 16777224 count 2097152 flag 1 Clearly indicating that the extent length is greater than MAXEXTLEN, which is 2097151. A prior trace point shows the allocation was an exact size match and that a length greater than MAXEXTLEN was asked for: xfs_alloc_size_done: agno 1 agbno 8 minlen 2097152 maxlen 2097152 ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ We don't see this problem with extent size hints through the IO path because we can't do single IOs large enough to trigger MAXEXTLEN allocation. fallocate(), OTOH, is not limited in it's allocation sizes and so needs help here. The issue is that the extent size hint alignment is rounding up the extent size past MAXEXTLEN, because xfs_bmapi_write() is not taking into account extent size hints when calculating the maximum extent length to allocate. xfs_bmapi_reserve_delalloc() is already doing this, but direct extent allocation is not. Unfortunately, the calculation in xfs_bmapi_reserve_delalloc() is wrong, and it works only because delayed allocation extents are not limited in size to MAXEXTLEN in the in-core extent tree. hence this calculation does not work for direct allocation, and the delalloc code needs fixing. This may, in fact be the underlying bug that occassionally causes transaction overruns in delayed allocation extent conversion, so now we know it's wrong we should fix it, too. Many thanks to Brian Foster for finding this problem during review of this patch. Hence the fix, after much code reading, is to allow xfs_bmap_extsize_align() to align partial extents when full alignment would extend the alignment past MAXEXTLEN. We can safely do this because all callers have higher layer allocation loops that already handle short allocations, and so will simply run another allocation to cover the remainder of the requested allocation range that we ignored during alignment. The advantage of this approach is that it also removes the need for callers to do anything other than limit their requests to MAXEXTLEN - they don't really need to be aware of extent size hints at all. Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
Because the counters use a custom batch size, the comparison functions need to be aware of that batch size otherwise the comparison does not work correctly. This leads to ASSERT failures on generic/027 like this: XFS: Assertion failed: 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c, line: 1099 ------------[ cut here ]------------ .... Call Trace: [<ffffffff81522a39>] xfs_mod_icount+0x99/0xc0 [<ffffffff815285cb>] xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb+0x28b/0x5b0 [<ffffffff8152f941>] xfs_log_commit_cil+0x321/0x580 [<ffffffff81528e17>] xfs_trans_commit+0xb7/0x260 [<ffffffff81503d4d>] xfs_bmap_finish+0xcd/0x1b0 [<ffffffff8151da41>] xfs_inactive_ifree+0x1e1/0x250 [<ffffffff8151dbe0>] xfs_inactive+0x130/0x200 [<ffffffff81523a21>] xfs_fs_evict_inode+0x91/0xf0 [<ffffffff811f3958>] evict+0xb8/0x190 [<ffffffff811f433b>] iput+0x18b/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811e8853>] do_unlinkat+0x1f3/0x320 [<ffffffff811d548a>] ? filp_close+0x5a/0x80 [<ffffffff811e999b>] SyS_unlinkat+0x1b/0x40 [<ffffffff81e0892e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71 This is a regression introduced by commit 501ab323 ("xfs: use generic percpu counters for inode counter"). This patch fixes the same problem for both the inode counter and the free block counter in the superblocks. Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 George Wang 提交于
Function percpu_counter_read just return the current counter, which can be negative. This will cause the checking of "allocated inode counts <= m_maxicount" false positive. Use percpu_counter_read_positive can solve this problem, and be consistent with the purpose to introduce percpu mechanism to xfs. Signed-off-by: NGeorge Wang <xuw2015@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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- 21 5月, 2015 6 次提交
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由 Federico Sauter 提交于
This patch fixes a race condition that occurs when connecting to a NT 3.51 host without specifying a NetBIOS name. In that case a RFC1002_NEGATIVE_SESSION_RESPONSE is received and the SMB negotiation is reattempted, but under some conditions it leads SendReceive() to hang forever while waiting for srv_mutex. This, in turn, sets the calling process to an uninterruptible sleep state and makes it unkillable. The solution is to unlock the srv_mutex acquired in the demux thread *before* going to sleep (after the reconnect error) and before reattempting the connection.
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由 Nakajima Akira 提交于
Garbled characters happen by using surrogate pair for filename. (replace each 1 character to ??) [Steps to Reproduce for bug] client# touch $(echo -e '\xf0\x9d\x9f\xa3') client# touch $(echo -e '\xf0\x9d\x9f\xa4') client# ls -li You see same inode number, same filename(=?? and ??) . Fix the bug about these functions do not consider about surrogate pair (and IVS). cifs_utf16_bytes() cifs_mapchar() cifs_from_utf16() cifsConvertToUTF16() Reported-by: NNakajima Akira <nakajima.akira@nttcom.co.jp> Signed-off-by: NNakajima Akira <nakajima.akira@nttcom.co.jp> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Chengyu Song 提交于
posix_lock_file_wait may fail under certain circumstances, and its result is usually checked/returned. But given the complexity of cifs, I'm not sure if the result is intentially left unchecked and always expected to succeed. Signed-off-by: NChengyu Song <csong84@gatech.edu> Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Nakajima Akira 提交于
When you refer file directly on cifs client, (e.g. ls -li <filename>, cd <dir>, stat <filename>) the function return old inode number and filetype from old inode cache, though server has different inode number or filetype. When server is Windows, cifs client has same problem. When Server is Windows , This patch fixes bug in different filetype, but does not fix bug in different inode number. Because QUERY_PATH_INFO response by Windows does not include inode number(Index Number) . BUG INFO https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90021 https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90031Reported-by: NNakajima Akira <nakajima.akira@nttcom.co.jp> Signed-off-by: NNakajima Akira <nakajima.akira@nttcom.co.jp> Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Chris Mason 提交于
Commit 2f081088 changed btrfs_set_block_group_ro to avoid trying to allocate new chunks with the new raid profile during conversion. This fixed failures when there was no space on the drive to allocate a new chunk, but the metadata reserves were sufficient to continue the conversion. But this ended up causing a regression when the drive had plenty of space to allocate new chunks, mostly because reduce_alloc_profile isn't using the new raid profile. Fixing btrfs_reduce_alloc_profile is a bigger patch. For now, do a partial revert of 2f081088, and don't error out if we hit ENOSPC. Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com> Tested-by: NDave Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Reported-by: NHolger Hoffstaette <holger.hoffstaette@googlemail.com>
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由 Dan Carpenter 提交于
Smatch complains because we dereference "ses->server" without checking some lines earlier inside the call to get_next_mid(ses->server). fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:4921 CIFSGetDFSRefer() warn: variable dereferenced before check 'ses->server' (see line 4899) There is only one caller for this function get_dfs_path() and it always passes a non-null "ses->server" pointer so this NULL check can be removed. Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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- 20 5月, 2015 3 次提交
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由 Steve French 提交于
Dan Carpenter pointed out an inconsistent null pointer check in smb2_hdr_assemble that was pointed out by static checker. Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> CC: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>w
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由 Filipe Manana 提交于
If while setting a block group read-only we end up allocating a system chunk, through check_system_chunk(), we were not doing it while holding the chunk mutex which is a problem if a concurrent chunk allocation is happening, through do_chunk_alloc(), as it means both block groups can end up using the same logical addresses and physical regions in the device(s). So make sure we hold the chunk mutex. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.0+ Fixes: 2f081088 ("btrfs: delete chunk allocation attemp when setting block group ro") Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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由 Mark Fasheh 提交于
btrfs_check_shared() is leaking a return value of '1' from find_parent_nodes(). As a result, callers (in this case, extent_fiemap()) are told extents are shared when they are not. This in turn broke fiemap on btrfs for kernels v3.18 and up. The fix is simple - we just have to clear 'ret' after we are done processing the results of find_parent_nodes(). It wasn't clear to me at first what was happening with return values in btrfs_check_shared() and find_parent_nodes() - thanks to Josef for the help on irc. I added documentation to both functions to make things more clear for the next hacker who might come across them. If we could queue this up for -stable too that would be great. Signed-off-by: NMark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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- 19 5月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
OpenWRT folks reported that overlayfs fails to mount if upper fs is full, because workdir can't be created. Wordir creation can fail for various other reasons too. There's no reason that the mount itself should fail, overlayfs can work fine without a workdir, as long as the overlay isn't modified. So mount it read-only and don't allow remounting read-write. Add a couple of WARN_ON()s for the impossible case of workdir being used despite being read-only. Reported-by: Bastian Bittorf <bittorf@bluebottle.com> Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.18+
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- 15 5月, 2015 8 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
The xfstests test suite assumes that an attempt to collapse range on the range (0, 1) will return EOPNOTSUPP if the file system does not support collapse range. Commit 280227a7: "ext4: move check under lock scope to close a race" broke this, and this caused xfstests to fail when run when testing file systems that did not have the extents feature enabled. Reported-by: NEric Whitney <enwlinux@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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由 Vladimir Davydov 提交于
root->ino_ida is used for kernfs inode number allocations. Since IDA has a layered structure, different IDs can reside on the same layer, which is currently accounted to some memory cgroup. The problem is that each kmem cache of a memory cgroup has its own directory on sysfs (under /sys/fs/kernel/<cache-name>/cgroup). If the inode number of such a directory or any file in it gets allocated from a layer accounted to the cgroup which the cache is created for, the cgroup will get pinned for good, because one has to free all kmem allocations accounted to a cgroup in order to release it and destroy all its kmem caches. That said we must not account layers of ino_ida to any memory cgroup. Since per net init operations may create new sysfs entries directly (e.g. lo device) or indirectly (nf_conntrack creates a new kmem cache per each namespace, which, in turn, creates new sysfs entries), an easy way to reproduce this issue is by creating network namespace(s) from inside a kmem-active memory cgroup. Signed-off-by: NVladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Acked-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.0.x] Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
The journal revoke block recovery code does not check r_count for sanity, which means that an evil value of r_count could result in the kernel reading off the end of the revoke table and into whatever garbage lies beyond. This could crash the kernel, so fix that. However, in testing this fix, I discovered that the code to write out the revoke tables also was not correctly checking to see if the block was full -- the current offset check is fine so long as the revoke table space size is a multiple of the record size, but this is not true when either journal_csum_v[23] are set. Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Eryu Guan 提交于
The following commit introduced a bug when checking for zero length extent 5946d089 ext4: check for overlapping extents in ext4_valid_extent_entries() Zero length extent could pass the check if lblock is zero. Adding the explicit check for zero length back. Signed-off-by: NEryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Lukas Czerner 提交于
Currently when journal restart fails, we'll have the h_transaction of the handle set to NULL to indicate that the handle has been effectively aborted. We handle this situation quietly in the jbd2_journal_stop() and just free the handle and exit because everything else has been done before we attempted (and failed) to restart the journal. Unfortunately there are a number of problems with that approach introduced with commit 41a5b913 "jbd2: invalidate handle if jbd2_journal_restart() fails" First of all in ext4 jbd2_journal_stop() will be called through __ext4_journal_stop() where we would try to get a hold of the superblock by dereferencing h_transaction which in this case would lead to NULL pointer dereference and crash. In addition we're going to free the handle regardless of the refcount which is bad as well, because others up the call chain will still reference the handle so we might potentially reference already freed memory. Moreover it's expected that we'll get aborted handle as well as detached handle in some of the journalling function as the error propagates up the stack, so it's unnecessary to call WARN_ON every time we get detached handle. And finally we might leak some memory by forgetting to free reserved handle in jbd2_journal_stop() in the case where handle was detached from the transaction (h_transaction is NULL). Fix the NULL pointer dereference in __ext4_journal_stop() by just calling jbd2_journal_stop() quietly as suggested by Jan Kara. Also fix the potential memory leak in jbd2_journal_stop() and use proper handle refcounting before we attempt to free it to avoid use-after-free issues. And finally remove all WARN_ON(!transaction) from the code so that we do not get random traces when something goes wrong because when journal restart fails we will get to some of those functions. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NLukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
The ext4_extent_tree_init() function hasn't been in the ext4 code for a long time ago, except in an unused function prototype in ext4.h Google-Bug-Id: 4530137 Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> -
由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Google-Bug-Id: 20939131 Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> -
由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
We had a fencepost error in the lazytime optimization which means that timestamp would get written to the wrong inode. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 14 5月, 2015 3 次提交
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由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
When removing an opaque directory we can't just call rmdir() to check for emptiness, because the directory will need to be replaced with a whiteout. The replacement is done with RENAME_EXCHANGE, which doesn't check emptiness. Solution is just to check emptiness by reading the directory. In the future we could add a new rename flag to check for emptiness even for RENAME_EXCHANGE to optimize this case. Reported-by: NVincent Batts <vbatts@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Tested-by: NJordi Pujol Palomer <jordipujolp@gmail.com> Fixes: 263b4a0f ("ovl: dont replace opaque dir") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.0+
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
We had a report of a crash while stress testing the NFS client: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000150 IP: [<ffffffff8127b698>] locks_get_lock_context+0x8/0x90 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs fscache ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ebtable_filter ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ebtables ip6table_security ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 ip6table_raw ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_security iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_raw coretemp crct10dif_pclmul ppdev crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel vmw_balloon serio_raw vmw_vmci i2c_piix4 shpchp parport_pc acpi_cpufreq parport nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi scsi_transport_spi mptscsih mptbase e1000 ata_generic pata_acpi CPU: 1 PID: 399 Comm: kworker/1:1H Not tainted 4.1.0-0.rc1.git0.1.fc23.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/30/2013 Workqueue: rpciod rpc_async_schedule [sunrpc] task: ffff880036aea7c0 ti: ffff8800791f4000 task.ti: ffff8800791f4000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8127b698>] [<ffffffff8127b698>] locks_get_lock_context+0x8/0x90 RSP: 0018:ffff8800791f7c00 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffff8800791f7c40 RBX: ffff88001f2ad8c0 RCX: ffffe8ffffc80305 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8800791f7c88 R08: ffff88007fc971d8 R09: 279656d600000000 R10: 0000034a01000000 R11: 279656d600000000 R12: ffff88001f2ad918 R13: ffff88001f2ad8c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000100e73040 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000150 CR3: 0000000001c0b000 CR4: 00000000000407e0 Stack: ffffffff8127c5b0 ffff8800791f7c18 ffffffffa0171e29 ffff8800791f7c58 ffffffffa0171ef8 ffff8800791f7c78 0000000000000246 ffff88001ea0ba00 ffff8800791f7c40 ffff8800791f7c40 00000000ff5d86a3 ffff8800791f7ca8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8127c5b0>] ? __posix_lock_file+0x40/0x760 [<ffffffffa0171e29>] ? rpc_make_runnable+0x99/0xa0 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa0171ef8>] ? rpc_wake_up_task_queue_locked.part.35+0xc8/0x250 [sunrpc] [<ffffffff8127cd3a>] posix_lock_file_wait+0x4a/0x120 [<ffffffffa03e4f12>] ? nfs41_wake_and_assign_slot+0x32/0x40 [nfsv4] [<ffffffffa03bf108>] ? nfs41_sequence_done+0xd8/0x2d0 [nfsv4] [<ffffffffa03c116d>] do_vfs_lock+0x2d/0x30 [nfsv4] [<ffffffffa03c251d>] nfs4_lock_done+0x1ad/0x210 [nfsv4] [<ffffffffa0171a30>] ? __rpc_sleep_on_priority+0x390/0x390 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa0171a30>] ? __rpc_sleep_on_priority+0x390/0x390 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa0171a5c>] rpc_exit_task+0x2c/0xa0 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa0167450>] ? call_refreshresult+0x150/0x150 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa0172640>] __rpc_execute+0x90/0x460 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa0172a25>] rpc_async_schedule+0x15/0x20 [sunrpc] [<ffffffff810baa1b>] process_one_work+0x1bb/0x410 [<ffffffff810bacc3>] worker_thread+0x53/0x480 [<ffffffff810bac70>] ? process_one_work+0x410/0x410 [<ffffffff810bac70>] ? process_one_work+0x410/0x410 [<ffffffff810c0b38>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0 [<ffffffff810c0a60>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x180/0x180 [<ffffffff817a1aa2>] ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70 [<ffffffff810c0a60>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x180/0x180 Jean says: "Running locktests with a large number of iterations resulted in a client crash. The test run took a while and hasn't finished after close to 2 hours. The crash happened right after I gave up and killed the test (after 107m) with Ctrl+C." The crash happened because a NULL inode pointer got passed into locks_get_lock_context. The call chain indicates that file_inode(filp) returned NULL, which means that f_inode was NULL. Since that's zeroed out in __fput, that suggests that this filp pointer outlived the last reference. Looking at the code, that seems possible. We copy the struct file_lock that's passed in, but if the task is signalled at an inopportune time we can end up trying to use that file_lock in rpciod context after the process that requested it has already returned (and possibly put its filp reference). Fix this by taking an extra reference to the filp when we allocate the lock info, and put it in nfs4_lock_release. Reported-by: NJean Spector <jean@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> -
由 Chuck Lever 提交于
When running the Connectathon basic tests against a Solaris NFS server over NFSv4.0, test5 reports that stat(2) returns a file size of zero instead of 1MB. On success, nfs_commit_inode() can return a positive result; see other call sites such as nfs_file_fsync_commit() and nfs_commit_unstable_pages(). The call site recently added in nfs_wb_all() does not prevent that positive return value from leaking to its callers. If it leaks through nfs_sync_inode() back to nfs_getattr(), that causes stat(2) to return a positive return value to user space while also not filling in the passed-in struct stat. Additional clean up: the new logic in nfs_wb_all() is rewritten in bfields-normal form. Fixes: 5bb89b47 ("NFSv4.1/pnfs: Separate out metadata . . .") Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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- 13 5月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Helge Deller 提交于
On architectures where the stack grows upwards (CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP=y, currently parisc and metag only) stack randomization sometimes leads to crashes when the stack ulimit is set to lower values than STACK_RND_MASK (which is 8 MB by default if not defined in arch-specific headers). The problem is, that when the stack vm_area_struct is set up in fs/exec.c, the additional space needed for the stack randomization (as defined by the value of STACK_RND_MASK) was not taken into account yet and as such, when the stack randomization code added a random offset to the stack start, the stack effectively got smaller than what the user defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK) which then sometimes leads to out-of-stack situations and crashes. This patch fixes it by adding the maximum possible amount of memory (based on STACK_RND_MASK) which theoretically could be added by the stack randomization code to the initial stack size. That way, the user-defined stack size is always guaranteed to be at minimum what is defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK). This bug is currently not visible on the metag architecture, because on metag STACK_RND_MASK is defined to 0 which effectively disables stack randomization. The changes to fs/exec.c are inside an "#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP" section, so it does not affect other platformws beside those where the stack grows upwards (parisc and metag). Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
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- 11 5月, 2015 2 次提交
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由 Filipe Manana 提交于
There's a race between releasing extent buffers that are flagged as stale and recycling them that makes us it the following BUG_ON at btrfs_release_extent_buffer_page: BUG_ON(extent_buffer_under_io(eb)) The BUG_ON is triggered because the extent buffer has the flag EXTENT_BUFFER_DIRTY set as a consequence of having been reused and made dirty by another concurrent task. Here follows a sequence of steps that leads to the BUG_ON. CPU 0 CPU 1 CPU 2 path->nodes[0] == eb X X->refs == 2 (1 for the tree, 1 for the path) btrfs_header_generation(X) == current trans id flag EXTENT_BUFFER_DIRTY set on X btrfs_release_path(path) unlocks X reads eb X X->refs incremented to 3 locks eb X btrfs_del_items(X) X becomes empty clean_tree_block(X) clear EXTENT_BUFFER_DIRTY from X btrfs_del_leaf(X) unlocks X extent_buffer_get(X) X->refs incremented to 4 btrfs_free_tree_block(X) X's range is not pinned X's range added to free space cache free_extent_buffer_stale(X) lock X->refs_lock set EXTENT_BUFFER_STALE on X release_extent_buffer(X) X->refs decremented to 3 unlocks X->refs_lock btrfs_release_path() unlocks X free_extent_buffer(X) X->refs becomes 2 __btrfs_cow_block(Y) btrfs_alloc_tree_block() btrfs_reserve_extent() find_free_extent() gets offset == X->start btrfs_init_new_buffer(X->start) btrfs_find_create_tree_block(X->start) alloc_extent_buffer(X->start) find_extent_buffer(X->start) finds eb X in radix tree free_extent_buffer(X) lock X->refs_lock test X->refs == 2 test bit EXTENT_BUFFER_STALE is set test !extent_buffer_under_io(eb) increments X->refs to 3 mark_extent_buffer_accessed(X) check_buffer_tree_ref(X) --> does nothing, X->refs >= 2 and EXTENT_BUFFER_TREE_REF is set in X clear EXTENT_BUFFER_STALE from X locks X btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty() set_extent_buffer_dirty(X) check_buffer_tree_ref(X) --> does nothing, X->refs >= 2 and EXTENT_BUFFER_TREE_REF is set sets EXTENT_BUFFER_DIRTY on X test and clear EXTENT_BUFFER_TREE_REF decrements X->refs to 2 release_extent_buffer(X) decrements X->refs to 1 unlock X->refs_lock unlock X free_extent_buffer(X) lock X->refs_lock release_extent_buffer(X) decrements X->refs to 0 btrfs_release_extent_buffer_page(X) BUG_ON(extent_buffer_under_io(X)) --> EXTENT_BUFFER_DIRTY set on X Fix this by making find_extent buffer wait for any ongoing task currently executing free_extent_buffer()/free_extent_buffer_stale() if the extent buffer has the stale flag set. A more clean alternative would be to always increment the extent buffer's reference count while holding its refs_lock spinlock but find_extent_buffer is a performance critical area and that would cause lock contention whenever multiple tasks search for the same extent buffer concurrently. A build server running a SLES 12 kernel (3.12 kernel + over 450 upstream btrfs patches backported from newer kernels) was hitting this often: [1212302.461948] kernel BUG at ../fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4507! (...) [1212302.470219] CPU: 1 PID: 19259 Comm: bs_sched Not tainted 3.12.36-38-default #1 [1212302.540792] Hardware name: Supermicro PDSM4/PDSM4, BIOS 6.00 04/17/2006 [1212302.540792] task: ffff8800e07e0100 ti: ffff8800d6412000 task.ti: ffff8800d6412000 [1212302.540792] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0507081>] [<ffffffffa0507081>] btrfs_release_extent_buffer_page.constprop.51+0x101/0x110 [btrfs] (...) [1212302.630008] Call Trace: [1212302.630008] [<ffffffffa05070cd>] release_extent_buffer+0x3d/0xa0 [btrfs] [1212302.630008] [<ffffffffa04c2d9d>] btrfs_release_path+0x1d/0xa0 [btrfs] [1212302.630008] [<ffffffffa04c5c7e>] read_block_for_search.isra.33+0x13e/0x3a0 [btrfs] [1212302.630008] [<ffffffffa04c8094>] btrfs_search_slot+0x3f4/0xa80 [btrfs] [1212302.630008] [<ffffffffa04cf5d8>] lookup_inline_extent_backref+0xf8/0x630 [btrfs] [1212302.630008] [<ffffffffa04d13dd>] __btrfs_free_extent+0x11d/0xc40 [btrfs] [1212302.630008] [<ffffffffa04d64a4>] __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x394/0x11d0 [btrfs] [1212302.630008] [<ffffffffa04db379>] btrfs_run_delayed_refs.part.66+0x69/0x280 [btrfs] [1212302.630008] [<ffffffffa04ed2ad>] __btrfs_end_transaction+0x2ad/0x3d0 [btrfs] [1212302.630008] [<ffffffffa04f7505>] btrfs_evict_inode+0x4a5/0x500 [btrfs] [1212302.630008] [<ffffffff811b9e28>] evict+0xa8/0x190 [1212302.630008] [<ffffffff811b0330>] do_unlinkat+0x1a0/0x2b0 I was also able to reproduce this on a 3.19 kernel, corresponding to Chris' integration branch from about a month ago, running the following stress test on a qemu/kvm guest (with 4 virtual cpus and 16Gb of ram): while true; do mkfs.btrfs -l 4096 -f -b `expr 20 \* 1024 \* 1024 \* 1024` /dev/sdd mount /dev/sdd /mnt snapshot_cmd="btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt" snapshot_cmd="$snapshot_cmd /mnt/snap_\`date +'%H_%M_%S_%N'\`" fsstress -d /mnt -n 25000 -p 8 -x "$snapshot_cmd" -X 100 umount /mnt done Which usually triggers the BUG_ON within less than 24 hours: [49558.618097] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [49558.619732] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4551! (...) [49558.620031] CPU: 3 PID: 23908 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 3.19.0-btrfs-next-7+ #3 [49558.620031] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014 [49558.620031] task: ffff8800319fc0d0 ti: ffff880220da8000 task.ti: ffff880220da8000 [49558.620031] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0476b1a>] [<ffffffffa0476b1a>] btrfs_release_extent_buffer_page+0x20/0xe9 [btrfs] (...) [49558.620031] Call Trace: [49558.620031] [<ffffffffa0476c73>] release_extent_buffer+0x90/0xd3 [btrfs] [49558.620031] [<ffffffff8142b10c>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x3b/0x43 [49558.620031] [<ffffffffa0477052>] ? free_extent_buffer+0x37/0x94 [btrfs] [49558.620031] [<ffffffffa04770ab>] free_extent_buffer+0x90/0x94 [btrfs] [49558.620031] [<ffffffffa04396d5>] btrfs_release_path+0x4a/0x69 [btrfs] [49558.620031] [<ffffffffa0444907>] __btrfs_free_extent+0x778/0x80c [btrfs] [49558.620031] [<ffffffffa044a485>] __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xad2/0xc62 [btrfs] [49558.728054] [<ffffffff811420d5>] ? kmemleak_alloc_recursive.constprop.52+0x16/0x18 [49558.728054] [<ffffffffa044c1e8>] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x6d/0x1ba [btrfs] [49558.728054] [<ffffffffa045917f>] ? join_transaction.isra.9+0xb9/0x36b [btrfs] [49558.728054] [<ffffffffa045a75c>] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4c/0x981 [btrfs] [49558.728054] [<ffffffffa0434f86>] btrfs_sync_fs+0xd5/0x10d [btrfs] [49558.728054] [<ffffffff81155923>] ? iterate_supers+0x60/0xc4 [49558.728054] [<ffffffff8117966a>] ? do_sync_work+0x91/0x91 [49558.728054] [<ffffffff8117968a>] sync_fs_one_sb+0x20/0x22 [49558.728054] [<ffffffff81155939>] iterate_supers+0x76/0xc4 [49558.728054] [<ffffffff811798e8>] sys_sync+0x55/0x83 [49558.728054] [<ffffffff8142bbd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com> -
由 Filipe Manana 提交于
So creating a block group has 2 distinct phases: Phase 1 - creates the btrfs_block_group_cache item and adds it to the rbtree fs_info->block_group_cache_tree and to the corresponding list space_info->block_groups[]; Phase 2 - adds the block group item to the extent tree and corresponding items to the chunk tree. The first phase adds the block_group_cache_item to a list of pending block groups in the transaction handle, and phase 2 happens when btrfs_end_transaction() is called against the transaction handle. It happens that once phase 1 completes, other concurrent tasks that use their own transaction handle, but points to the same running transaction (struct btrfs_trans_handle->transaction), can use this block group for space allocations and therefore mark it dirty. Dirty block groups are tracked in a list belonging to the currently running transaction (struct btrfs_transaction) and not in the transaction handle (btrfs_trans_handle). This is a problem because once a task calls btrfs_commit_transaction(), it calls btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups() which will see all dirty block groups and attempt to start their writeout, including those that are still attached to the transaction handle of some concurrent task that hasn't called btrfs_end_transaction() yet - which means those block groups haven't gone through phase 2 yet and therefore when write_one_cache_group() is called, it won't find the block group items in the extent tree and abort the current transaction with -ENOENT, turning the fs into readonly mode and require a remount. Fix this by ignoring -ENOENT when looking for block group items in the extent tree when we attempt to start the writeout of the block group caches outside the critical section of the transaction commit. We will try again later during the critical section and if there we still don't find the block group item in the extent tree, we then abort the current transaction. This issue happened twice, once while running fstests btrfs/067 and once for btrfs/078, which produced the following trace: [ 3278.703014] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 18499 at fs/btrfs/super.c:260 __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x52/0x114 [btrfs]() [ 3278.707329] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -2) (...) [ 3278.731555] Call Trace: [ 3278.732396] [<ffffffff8142fa46>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b [ 3278.733860] [<ffffffff8108b6a2>] ? console_unlock+0x361/0x3ad [ 3278.735312] [<ffffffff81045ea5>] warn_slowpath_common+0xa1/0xbb [ 3278.736874] [<ffffffffa03ada6d>] ? __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x52/0x114 [btrfs] [ 3278.738302] [<ffffffff81045f05>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x48 [ 3278.739520] [<ffffffffa03ada6d>] __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x52/0x114 [btrfs] [ 3278.741222] [<ffffffffa03b9e56>] write_one_cache_group+0xae/0xbf [btrfs] [ 3278.742797] [<ffffffffa03c487b>] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x170/0x2b2 [btrfs] [ 3278.744492] [<ffffffffa03d309c>] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x130/0x9c9 [btrfs] [ 3278.746084] [<ffffffff8107d33d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [ 3278.747249] [<ffffffffa03e5660>] btrfs_sync_file+0x313/0x387 [btrfs] [ 3278.748744] [<ffffffff8117acad>] vfs_fsync_range+0x95/0xa4 [ 3278.749958] [<ffffffff81435b54>] ? ret_from_sys_call+0x1d/0x58 [ 3278.751218] [<ffffffff8117acd8>] vfs_fsync+0x1c/0x1e [ 3278.754197] [<ffffffff8117ae54>] do_fsync+0x34/0x4e [ 3278.755192] [<ffffffff8117b07c>] SyS_fsync+0x10/0x14 [ 3278.756236] [<ffffffff81435b32>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 [ 3278.757366] ---[ end trace 9a4d4df4969709aa ]--- Fixes: 1bbc621e ("Btrfs: allow block group cache writeout outside critical section in commit") Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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