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  1. 24 5月, 2011 3 次提交
  3. 19 5月, 2011 10 次提交
  5. 18 5月, 2011 1 次提交
  7. 03 5月, 2011 2 次提交
  9. 29 4月, 2011 1 次提交
  11. 22 4月, 2011 1 次提交
  13. 12 4月, 2011 6 次提交
    • S
      [CIFS] Warn on requesting default security (ntlm) on mount · d9b94201
      由 Steve French 提交于 
      Warn once if default security (ntlm) requested. We will
update the default to the stronger security mechanism
(ntlmv2) in 2.6.41.  Kerberos is also stronger than
ntlm, but more servers support ntlmv2 and ntlmv2
does not require an upcall, so ntlmv2 is a better
default.
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
CC: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
      d9b94201
    • S
      [CIFS] cifs: clarify the meaning of tcpStatus == CifsGood · fd88ce93
      由 Steve French 提交于 
      When the TCP_Server_Info is first allocated and connected, tcpStatus ==
CifsGood means that the NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL request has completed and the
socket is ready for other calls. cifs_reconnect however sets tcpStatus
to CifsGood as soon as the socket is reconnected and the optional
RFC1001 session setup is done. We have no clear way to tell the
difference between these two states, and we need to know this in order
to know whether we can send an echo or not.

Resolve this by adding a new statusEnum value -- CifsNeedNegotiate. When
the socket has been connected but has not yet had a NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL
request done, set it to this value. Once the NEGOTIATE is done,
cifs_negotiate_protocol will set tcpStatus to CifsGood.

This also fixes and cleans the logic in cifs_reconnect and
cifs_reconnect_tcon. The old code checked for specific states when what
it really wants to know is whether the state has actually changed from
CifsNeedReconnect.
Reported-and-Tested-by: NJG <jg@cms.ac>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
      fd88ce93
    • J
      cifs: clean up length checks in check2ndT2 · c0c7b905
      由 Jeff Layton 提交于 
      Thus spake David Howells:

The code that follows this:

  	remaining = total_data_size - data_in_this_rsp;
	if (remaining == 0)
		return 0;
	else if (remaining < 0) {

generates better code if you drop the 'remaining' variable and compare
the values directly.

Clean it up per his recommendation...
Reported-and-acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
      c0c7b905
    • J
      cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount · 70945643
      由 Jeff Layton 提交于 
      Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.

This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath.  That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: NYogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
      70945643
    • S
      Elminate sparse __CHECK_ENDIAN__ warnings on port conversion · 6da97910
      由 Steve French 提交于 
      Ports are __be16 not unsigned short int

Eliminates the remaining fixable endian warnings:

~/cifs-2.6$ make modules C=1 M=fs/cifs CF=-D__CHECK_ENDIAN__
  CHECK   fs/cifs/connect.c
fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23:    expected unsigned short *sport
fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23:    got restricted __be16 *<noident>
fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23:    expected unsigned short *sport
fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23:    got restricted __be16 *<noident>
fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24:    expected unsigned short [unsigned] [short] <noident>
fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24:    got restricted __be16 [usertype] <noident>
fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24:    expected unsigned short [unsigned] [short] <noident>
fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24:    got restricted __be16 [usertype] <noident>
fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23:    expected unsigned short [unsigned] sport
fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23:    got restricted __be16 [usertype] sin6_port
fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23:    expected unsigned short [unsigned] sport
fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23:    got restricted __be16 [usertype] sin_port
fs/cifs/connect.c:2394:22: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
      6da97910
    • S
      Allow user names longer than 32 bytes · 8727c8a8
      由 Steve French 提交于 
      We artificially limited the user name to 32 bytes, but modern servers handle
larger.  Set the maximum length to a reasonable 256, and make the user name
string dynamically allocated rather than a fixed size in session structure.
Also clean up old checkpatch warning.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
      8727c8a8
  15. 31 3月, 2011 1 次提交
  17. 11 2月, 2011 1 次提交
    • J
      cifs: don't always drop malformed replies on the floor (try #3) · 71823baf
      由 Jeff Layton 提交于 
      Slight revision to this patch...use min_t() instead of conditional
assignment. Also, remove the FIXME comment and replace it with the
explanation that Steve gave earlier.

After receiving a packet, we currently check the header. If it's no
good, then we toss it out and continue the loop, leaving the caller
waiting on that response.

In cases where the packet has length inconsistencies, but the MID is
valid, this leads to unneeded delays. That's especially problematic now
that the client waits indefinitely for responses.

Instead, don't immediately discard the packet if checkSMB fails. Try to
find a matching mid_q_entry, mark it as having a malformed response and
issue the callback.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
      71823baf
  19. 10 2月, 2011 1 次提交
  21. 09 2月, 2011 1 次提交
  23. 05 2月, 2011 2 次提交
  25. 02 2月, 2011 1 次提交
  27. 28 1月, 2011 1 次提交
  29. 26 1月, 2011 1 次提交
  31. 24 1月, 2011 1 次提交
    • R
      Make CIFS mount work in a container. · f1d0c998
      由 Rob Landley 提交于 
      Teach cifs about network namespaces, so mounting uses adresses/routing
visible from the container rather than from init context.

A container is a chroot on steroids that changes more than just the root
filesystem the new processes see.  One thing containers can isolate is
"network namespaces", meaning each container can have its own set of
ethernet interfaces, each with its own own IP address and routing to the
outside world.  And if you open a socket in _userspace_ from processes
within such a container, this works fine.

But sockets opened from within the kernel still use a single global
networking context in a lot of places, meaning the new socket's address
and routing are correct for PID 1 on the host, but are _not_ what
userspace processes in the container get to use.

So when you mount a network filesystem from within in a container, the
mount code in the CIFS driver uses the host's networking context and not
the container's networking context, so it gets the wrong address, uses
the wrong routing, and may even try to go out an interface that the
container can't even access...  Bad stuff.

This patch copies the mount process's network context into the CIFS
structure that stores the rest of the server information for that mount
point, and changes the socket open code to use the saved network context
instead of the global network context.  I.E. "when you attempt to use
these addresses, do so relative to THIS set of network interfaces and
routing rules, not the old global context from back before we supported
containers".

The big long HOWTO sets up a test environment on the assumption you've
never used ocntainers before.  It basically says:

1) configure and build a new kernel that has container support
2) build a new root filesystem that includes the userspace container
control package (LXC)
3) package/run them under KVM (so you don't have to mess up your host
system in order to play with containers).
4) set up some containers under the KVM system
5) set up contradictory routing in the KVM system and the container so
that the host and the container see different things for the same address
6) try to mount a CIFS share from both contexts so you can both force it
to work and force it to fail.

For a long drawn out test reproduction sequence, see:

  http://landley.livejournal.com/47024.html
  http://landley.livejournal.com/47205.html
  http://landley.livejournal.com/47476.htmlSigned-off-by: NRob Landley <rlandley@parallels.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
      f1d0c998
  33. 21 1月, 2011 6 次提交