- 06 8月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
The original implementation of the Smack IPv6 port based local controls works most of the time using a sockaddr as a temporary variable, but not always as it overflows in some circumstances. The correct data is a sockaddr_in6. A struct sockaddr isn't as large as a struct sockaddr_in6. There would need to be casting one way or the other. This patch gets it the right way. Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 09 6月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 David Quigley 提交于
The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is important to make sure the requested xattr actually is a MAC label. This allows us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM. Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NMatthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: NMiguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: NPhua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: NKhin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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- 04 6月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Passion,Zhao 提交于
Bug report: https://tizendev.org/bugs/browse/TDIS-3891 The reason is userspace libsmack only use "smackfs/cipso2" long-label interface, but the code's logical is still for orginal fixed length label. Now update smack_cipso_apply() to support flexible label (<=256 including tailing '\0') There is also a bug in kernel/security/smack/smackfs.c: When smk_set_cipso() parsing the CIPSO setting from userspace, the offset of CIPSO level should be "strlen(label)+1" instead of "strlen(label)" Signed-off-by: NPassion,Zhao <passion.zhao@intel.com>
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- 29 5月, 2013 4 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC) can return NULL. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
Suppliment the smkfsroot mount option with another, smkfstransmute, that does the same thing but also marks the root inode as transmutting. This allows a freshly created filesystem to be mounted with a transmutting heirarchy. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
Each Smack label that the kernel has seen is added to a list of labels. The list of access rules for a given subject label hangs off of the label list entry for the label. This patch changes the structures that contain subject labels to point at the label list entry rather that the label itself. Doing so removes a label list lookup in smk_access() that was accounting for the largest single chunk of Smack overhead. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
Smack does not provide access controls on IPv6 communications. This patch introduces a mechanism for maintaining Smack lables for local IPv6 communications. It is based on labeling local ports. The behavior should be compatible with any future "real" IPv6 support as it provides no interfaces for users to manipulate the labeling. Remote IPv6 connections use the ambient label the same way that unlabeled IPv4 packets are treated. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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- 03 4月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
As reported for linux-next: Tree for Apr 2 (smack) Add the required include for smackfs.c Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reported-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Acked-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 20 3月, 2013 5 次提交
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由 Igor Zhbanov 提交于
This patch fixes kernel Oops because of wrong common_audit_data type in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir(). When SMACK security module is enabled and SMACK logging is on (/smack/logging is not zero) and you try to delete the file which 1) you cannot delete due to SMACK rules and logging of failures is on or 2) you can delete and logging of success is on, you will see following: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000002d7 [<...>] (strlen+0x0/0x28) [<...>] (audit_log_untrustedstring+0x14/0x28) [<...>] (common_lsm_audit+0x108/0x6ac) [<...>] (smack_log+0xc4/0xe4) [<...>] (smk_curacc+0x80/0x10c) [<...>] (smack_inode_unlink+0x74/0x80) [<...>] (security_inode_unlink+0x2c/0x30) [<...>] (vfs_unlink+0x7c/0x100) [<...>] (do_unlinkat+0x144/0x16c) The function smack_inode_unlink() (and smack_inode_rmdir()) need to log two structures of different types. First of all it does: smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry); This will set common audit data type to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY and store dentry for auditing (by function smk_curacc(), which in turn calls dump_common_audit_data(), which is actually uses provided data and logs it). /* * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking */ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad); if (rc == 0) { /* * You also need write access to the containing directory */ Then this function wants to log anoter data: smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir); The function sets inode field, but don't change common_audit_data type. rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad); } So the dump_common_audit() function incorrectly interprets inode structure as dentry, and Oops will happen. This patch reinitializes common_audit_data structures with correct type. Also I removed unneeded smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL); initialization, because both dentry and inode pointers are stored in the same union. Signed-off-by: NIgor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: NKyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com>
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由 Rafal Krypa 提交于
Rule modifications are enabled via /smack/change-rule. Format is as follows: "Subject Object rwaxt rwaxt" First two strings are subject and object labels up to 255 characters. Third string contains permissions to enable. Fourth string contains permissions to disable. All unmentioned permissions will be left unchanged. If no rule previously existed, it will be created. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NRafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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由 Jarkko Sakkinen 提交于
SMACK_MAGIC moved to a proper place for easy user space access (i.e. libsmack). Signed-off-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@iki.fi>
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由 Rafal Krypa 提交于
This fixes audit logs for granting or denial of permissions to show information about transmute bit. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NRafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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由 Rafal Krypa 提交于
Special file /smack/revoke-subject will silently accept labels that are not present on the subject label list. Nothing has to be done for such labels, as there are no rules for them to revoke. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NRafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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- 23 2月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 15 12月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
There are a number of "conventions" for where to put LSM filesystems. Smack adheres to none of them. Create a mount point at /sys/fs/smackfs for mounting smackfs so that Smack can be conventional. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
The components NETLABEL and SECURITY_NETWORK are required by Smack. Using "depends" in Kconfig hides the Smack option if the user hasn't figured out that they need to be enabled while using make menuconfig. Using select is a better choice. Because select is not recursive depends on NET and SECURITY are added. The reflects similar usage in TOMOYO and AppArmor. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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- 12 10月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 19 9月, 2012 3 次提交
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
The data structure allocations being done in prepare_creds are duplicated in smack_setprocattr. This results in the structure allocated in prepare_creds being orphaned and never freed. The duplicate code is removed from smack_setprocattr. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 Rafal Krypa 提交于
Add /smack/revoke-subject special file. Writing a SMACK label to this file will set the access to '-' for all access rules with that subject label. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NRafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
On 12/20/2011 11:20 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > Allow SIGCHLD to be passed to child process without > explicit policy. This will help to keep the access > control policy simple and easily maintainable with > complex applications that require use of multiple > security contexts. It will also help to keep them > as isolated as possible. > > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com> I have a slightly different version that applies to the current smack-next tree. Allow SIGCHLD to be passed to child process without explicit policy. This will help to keep the access control policy simple and easily maintainable with complex applications that require use of multiple security contexts. It will also help to keep them as isolated as possible. Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 37 ++++++++----------------------------- 1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
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- 30 7月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Alan Cox 提交于
Consider the input case of a rule that consists entirely of non space symbols followed by a \0. Say 64 + \0 In this case strlen(data) = 64 kzalloc of subject and object are 64 byte objects sscanfdata, "%s %s %s", subject, ...) will put 65 bytes into subject. Signed-off-by: NAlan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 14 7月, 2012 4 次提交
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由 Rafal Krypa 提交于
This patch removes empty rules (i.e. with access set to '-') from the rule list presented to user space. Smack by design never removes labels nor rules from its lists. Access for a rule may be set to '-' to effectively disable it. Such rules would show up in the listing generated when /smack/load or /smack/load2 is read. This may cause clutter if many rules were disabled. As a rule with access set to '-' is equivalent to no rule at all, they may be safely hidden from the listing. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NRafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
Some of the bounds checking used on the /smack/access interface was lost when support for long labels was added. No kernel access checks are affected, however this is a case where /smack/access could be used incorrectly and fail to detect the error. This patch reintroduces the original checks. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
Smack is integrated with the POSIX capabilities scheme, using the capabilities CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_MAC_ADMIN to determine if a process is allowed to ignore Smack checks or change Smack related data respectively. Smack provides an additional restriction that if an onlycap value is set by writing to /smack/onlycap only tasks with that Smack label are allowed to use CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE. This change adds CAP_MAC_ADMIN as a capability that is affected by the onlycap mechanism. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
In January of 2012 Al Viro pointed out three bits of code that he titled "new_inode_smack bogosities". This patch repairs these errors. 1. smack_sb_kern_mount() included a NULL check that is impossible. The check and NULL case are removed. 2. smack_kb_kern_mount() included pointless locking. The locking is removed. Since this is the only place that lock was used the lock is removed from the superblock_smack structure. 3. smk_fill_super() incorrectly and unnecessarily set the Smack label for the smackfs root inode. The assignment has been removed. Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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- 01 6月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
... switch callers. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 15 5月, 2012 3 次提交
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
V4 updated to current linux-security#next Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Modern application runtime environments like to use naming schemes that are structured and generated without human intervention. Even though the Smack limit of 23 characters for a label name is perfectly rational for human use there have been complaints that the limit is a problem in environments where names are composed from a set or sources, including vendor, author, distribution channel and application name. Names like softwarehouse-pgwodehouse-coolappstore-mellowmuskrats are becoming harder to avoid. This patch introduces long label support in Smack. Labels are now limited to 255 characters instead of the old 23. The primary reason for limiting the labels to 23 characters was so they could be directly contained in CIPSO category sets. This is still done were possible, but for labels that are too large a mapping is required. This is perfectly safe for communication that stays "on the box" and doesn't require much coordination between boxes beyond what would have been required to keep label names consistent. The bulk of this patch is in smackfs, adding and updating administrative interfaces. Because existing APIs can't be changed new ones that do much the same things as old ones have been introduced. The Smack specific CIPSO data representation has been removed and replaced with the data format used by netlabel. The CIPSO header is now computed when a label is imported rather than on use. This results in improved IP performance. The smack label is now allocated separately from the containing structure, allowing for larger strings. Four new /smack interfaces have been introduced as four of the old interfaces strictly required labels be specified in fixed length arrays. The access interface is supplemented with the check interface: access "Subject Object rwxat" access2 "Subject Object rwaxt" The load interface is supplemented with the rules interface: load "Subject Object rwxat" load2 "Subject Object rwaxt" The load-self interface is supplemented with the self-rules interface: load-self "Subject Object rwxat" load-self2 "Subject Object rwaxt" The cipso interface is supplemented with the wire interface: cipso "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..." cipso2 "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..." The old interfaces are maintained for compatibility. Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Dave Chinner wrote: > Yes, because you have no idea what the calling context is except > for the fact that is from somewhere inside filesystem code and the > filesystem could be holding locks. Therefore, GFP_NOFS is really the > only really safe way to allocate memory here. I see. Thank you. I'm not sure, but can call trace happen where somewhere inside network filesystem or stackable filesystem code with locks held invokes operations that involves GFP_KENREL memory allocation outside that filesystem? ---------- [PATCH] SMACK: Fix incorrect GFP_KERNEL usage. new_inode_smack() which can be called from smack_inode_alloc_security() needs to use GFP_NOFS like SELinux's inode_alloc_security() does, for security_inode_alloc() is called from inode_init_always() and inode_init_always() is called from xfs_inode_alloc() which is using GFP_NOFS. smack_inode_init_security() needs to use GFP_NOFS like selinux_inode_init_security() does, for initxattrs() callback function (e.g. btrfs_initxattrs()) which is called from security_inode_init_security() is using GFP_NOFS. smack_audit_rule_match() needs to use GFP_ATOMIC, for security_audit_rule_match() can be called from audit_filter_user_rules() and audit_filter_user_rules() is called from audit_filter_user() with RCU read lock held. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
The transmuting directory feature of Smack requires that the transmuting attribute be explicitly set in all cases. It seems the users of this facility would expect that the transmuting attribute be inherited by subdirectories that are created in a transmuting directory. This does not seem to add any additional complexity to the understanding of how the system works. Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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- 18 4月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
A kernel with Smack enabled will fail if tmpfs has xattr support. Move the initialization of predefined Smack label list entries to the LSM initialization from the smackfs setup. This became an issue when tmpfs acquired xattr support, but was never correct. Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 11 4月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
This fixes builds where CONFIG_AUDIT is not defined and CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK=y. This got introduced by the stack-usage reducation commit 48c62af6 ("LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union"). Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 10 4月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
It isn't needed. If you don't set the type of the data associated with that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug. So why waste the cycles? Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 04 4月, 2012 3 次提交
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由 Linus Torvalds 提交于
It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the only time those fields are filled are just before calling the common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those fields. So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is initialized in hot paths. Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm not going to shrink the data union. To do this I'm going to move anything larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared separately on the calling stack. Thus hot paths which don't need more than a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded structures. I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key struct and the struct path. We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of networking. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a bigger space requirement. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 14 2月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Trim security.h Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 07 1月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 12 11月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Casey Schaufler 提交于
Commit 272cd7a8 introduced a change to the way rule lists are handled and reported in the smackfs filesystem. One of the issues addressed had to do with the termination of read requests on /smack/load. This change introduced a error in /smack/cipso, which shares some of the same list processing code. This patch updates all the file access list handling in smackfs to use the code introduced for /smack/load. Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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