1. 23 9月, 2006 14 次提交
  2. 21 9月, 2006 3 次提交
  3. 18 6月, 2006 3 次提交
  4. 15 4月, 2006 1 次提交
  5. 01 4月, 2006 2 次提交
  6. 29 3月, 2006 1 次提交
    • H
      [INET]: Introduce tunnel4/tunnel6 · d2acc347
      Herbert Xu 提交于
      Basically this patch moves the generic tunnel protocol stuff out of
      xfrm4_tunnel/xfrm6_tunnel and moves it into the new files of tunnel4.c
      and tunnel6 respectively.
      
      The reason for this is that the problem that Hugo uncovered is only
      the tip of the iceberg.  The real problem is that when we removed the
      dependency of ipip on xfrm4_tunnel we didn't really consider the module
      case at all.
      
      For instance, as it is it's possible to build both ipip and xfrm4_tunnel
      as modules and if the latter is loaded then ipip simply won't load.
      
      After considering the alternatives I've decided that the best way out of
      this is to restore the dependency of ipip on the non-xfrm-specific part
      of xfrm4_tunnel.  This is acceptable IMHO because the intention of the
      removal was really to be able to use ipip without the xfrm subsystem.
      This is still preserved by this patch.
      
      So now both ipip/xfrm4_tunnel depend on the new tunnel4.c which handles
      the arbitration between the two.  The order of processing is determined
      by a simple integer which ensures that ipip gets processed before
      xfrm4_tunnel.
      
      The situation for ICMP handling is a little bit more complicated since
      we may not have enough information to determine who it's for.  It's not
      a big deal at the moment since the xfrm ICMP handlers are basically
      no-ops.  In future we can deal with this when we look at ICMP caching
      in general.
      
      The user-visible change to this is the removal of the TUNNEL Kconfig
      prompts.  This makes sense because it can only be used through IPCOMP
      as it stands.
      
      The addition of the new modules shouldn't introduce any problems since
      module dependency will cause them to be loaded.
      
      Oh and I also turned some unnecessary pskb's in IPv6 related to this
      patch to skb's.
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d2acc347
  7. 21 3月, 2006 6 次提交
  8. 28 2月, 2006 1 次提交
    • H
      [IPSEC]: Kill post_input hook and do NAT-T in esp_input directly · 752c1f4c
      Herbert Xu 提交于
      The only reason post_input exists at all is that it gives us the
      potential to adjust the checksums incrementally in future which
      we ought to do.
      
      However, after thinking about it for a bit we can adjust the
      checksums without using this post_input stuff at all.  The crucial
      point is that only the inner-most NAT-T SA needs to be considered
      when adjusting checksums.  What's more, the checksum adjustment
      comes down to a single u32 due to the linearity of IP checksums.
      
      We just happen to have a spare u32 lying around in our skb structure :)
      When ip_summed is set to CHECKSUM_NONE on input, the value of skb->csum
      is currently unused.  All we have to do is to make that the checksum
      adjustment and voila, there goes all the post_input and decap structures!
      
      I've left in the decap data structures for now since it's intricately
      woven into the sec_path stuff.  We can kill them later too.
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      752c1f4c
  9. 24 2月, 2006 1 次提交
  10. 16 2月, 2006 1 次提交
    • P
      [XFRM]: Fix SNAT-related crash in xfrm4_output_finish · 48d5cad8
      Patrick McHardy 提交于
      When a packet matching an IPsec policy is SNATed so it doesn't match any
      policy anymore it looses its xfrm bundle, which makes xfrm4_output_finish
      crash because of a NULL pointer dereference.
      
      This patch directs these packets to the original output path instead. Since
      the packets have already passed the POST_ROUTING hook, but need to start at
      the beginning of the original output path which includes another
      POST_ROUTING invocation, a flag is added to the IPCB to indicate that the
      packet was rerouted and doesn't need to pass the POST_ROUTING hook again.
      Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      48d5cad8
  11. 08 1月, 2006 3 次提交
  12. 04 1月, 2006 2 次提交
    • A
      [INET_SOCK]: Move struct inet_sock & helper functions to net/inet_sock.h · 14c85021
      Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 提交于
      To help in reducing the number of include dependencies, several files were
      touched as they were getting needed headers indirectly for stuff they use.
      
      Thanks also to Alan Menegotto for pointing out that net/dccp/proto.c had
      linux/dccp.h include twice.
      Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      14c85021
    • T
      [LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. · df71837d
      Trent Jaeger 提交于
      This patch series implements per packet access control via the
      extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
      the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
      associations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
      included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
      
      This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
      pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
      socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
      association) to send/receive network packets.
      
      Patch purpose:
      
      The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
      the strongly authenticated IPSec security association.  Such access
      controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
      address.  The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
      spoofed.  By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
      hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
      This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
      if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
      enforce the access control policy.
      
      Patch design approach:
      
      The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
      user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
      security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
      subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
      security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
      policies.
      
      A presentation available at
      www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
      from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
      
      Patch implementation details:
      
      On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
      xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
      the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
      security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
      ipsec-tools).  This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.
      
      On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
      (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
      also match the security association being used.
      
      The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
      The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
      before.
      
      Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
      minimal.  The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
      combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
      processing proceeds as in the original case.
      
      Testing:
      
      The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools.  ipsec-tools have
      been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
      0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
      associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
      using the security contexts via racoon.
      
      The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
      security contexts.  These programs are also available from me, and
      contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
      this interface.  Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
      behavior.
      Signed-off-by: NTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      df71837d
  13. 20 12月, 2005 1 次提交
  14. 09 10月, 2005 1 次提交