ib_uverbs_ex_create_qp follows the extension verbs
mechanism. New features (for example, QP creation flags
field which is added in a downstream patch) could used
via user-space libraries without breaking the ABI.
Signed-off-by: NEran Ben Elisha <eranbe@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NHaggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

The UDP tunnel config is asymmetric wrt. to the ports used. The source and
destination ports from one direction of the tunnel are not related to the
ports of the other direction. We need to be able to respond to ARP requests
using the correct ports without involving routing.

As the consequence, UDP ports need to be fixed property of the tunnel
interface and cannot be set per route. Remove the ability to set ports per
route. This is still okay to do, as no kernel has been released with these
attributes yet.

Note that the ability to specify source and destination ports is preserved
for other users of the lwtunnel API which don't use routes for tunnel key
specification (like openvswitch).

If in the future we rework ARP handling to allow port specification, the
attributes can be added back.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add the userfaultfd syscalls to uapi asm-generic, it was tested with
postcopy live migration on aarch64 with both 4k and 64k pagesize
kernels.
Signed-off-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Here is an implementation of a new system call, sys_membarrier(), which
executes a memory barrier on all threads running on the system.  It is
implemented by calling synchronize_sched().  It can be used to
distribute the cost of user-space memory barriers asymmetrically by
transforming pairs of memory barriers into pairs consisting of
sys_membarrier() and a compiler barrier.  For synchronization primitives
that distinguish between read-side and write-side (e.g.  userspace RCU
[1], rwlocks), the read-side can be accelerated significantly by moving
the bulk of the memory barrier overhead to the write-side.

The existing applications of which I am aware that would be improved by
this system call are as follows:

* Through Userspace RCU library (http://urcu.so)
  - DNS server (Knot DNS) https://www.knot-dns.cz/
  - Network sniffer (http://netsniff-ng.org/)
  - Distributed object storage (https://sheepdog.github.io/sheepdog/)
  - User-space tracing (http://lttng.org)
  - Network storage system (https://www.gluster.org/)
  - Virtual routers (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/DPDK_RCU_0MQ.pdf)
  - Financial software (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/23/189)

Those projects use RCU in userspace to increase read-side speed and
scalability compared to locking.  Especially in the case of RCU used by
libraries, sys_membarrier can speed up the read-side by moving the bulk of
the memory barrier cost to synchronize_rcu().

* Direct users of sys_membarrier
  - core dotnet garbage collector (https://github.com/dotnet/coreclr/issues/198)

Microsoft core dotnet GC developers are planning to use the mprotect()
side-effect of issuing memory barriers through IPIs as a way to implement
Windows FlushProcessWriteBuffers() on Linux.  They are referring to
sys_membarrier in their github thread, specifically stating that
sys_membarrier() is what they are looking for.

To explain the benefit of this scheme, let's introduce two example threads:

Thread A (non-frequent, e.g. executing liburcu synchronize_rcu())
Thread B (frequent, e.g. executing liburcu
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock())

In a scheme where all smp_mb() in thread A are ordering memory accesses
with respect to smp_mb() present in Thread B, we can change each
smp_mb() within Thread A into calls to sys_membarrier() and each
smp_mb() within Thread B into compiler barriers "barrier()".

Before the change, we had, for each smp_mb() pairs:

Thread A                    Thread B
previous mem accesses       previous mem accesses
smp_mb()                    smp_mb()
following mem accesses      following mem accesses

After the change, these pairs become:

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses           prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()            barrier()
follow mem accesses         follow mem accesses

As we can see, there are two possible scenarios: either Thread B memory
accesses do not happen concurrently with Thread A accesses (1), or they
do (2).

1) Non-concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses:

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()
follow mem accesses
                            prev mem accesses
                            barrier()
                            follow mem accesses

In this case, thread B accesses will be weakly ordered. This is OK,
because at that point, thread A is not particularly interested in
ordering them with respect to its own accesses.

2) Concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses           prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()            barrier()
follow mem accesses         follow mem accesses

In this case, thread B accesses, which are ensured to be in program
order thanks to the compiler barrier, will be "upgraded" to full
smp_mb() by synchronize_sched().

* Benchmarks

On Intel Xeon E5405 (8 cores)
(one thread is calling sys_membarrier, the other 7 threads are busy
looping)

1000 non-expedited sys_membarrier calls in 33s =3D 33 milliseconds/call.

* User-space user of this system call: Userspace RCU library

Both the signal-based and the sys_membarrier userspace RCU schemes
permit us to remove the memory barrier from the userspace RCU
rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock() primitives, thus significantly
accelerating them. These memory barriers are replaced by compiler
barriers on the read-side, and all matching memory barriers on the
write-side are turned into an invocation of a memory barrier on all
active threads in the process. By letting the kernel perform this
synchronization rather than dumbly sending a signal to every process
threads (as we currently do), we diminish the number of unnecessary wake
ups and only issue the memory barriers on active threads. Non-running
threads do not need to execute such barrier anyway, because these are
implied by the scheduler context switches.

Results in liburcu:

Operations in 10s, 6 readers, 2 writers:

memory barriers in reader:    1701557485 reads, 2202847 writes
signal-based scheme:          9830061167 reads,    6700 writes
sys_membarrier:               9952759104 reads,     425 writes
sys_membarrier (dyn. check):  7970328887 reads,     425 writes

The dynamic sys_membarrier availability check adds some overhead to
the read-side compared to the signal-based scheme, but besides that,
sys_membarrier slightly outperforms the signal-based scheme. However,
this non-expedited sys_membarrier implementation has a much slower grace
period than signal and memory barrier schemes.

Besides diminishing the number of wake-ups, one major advantage of the
membarrier system call over the signal-based scheme is that it does not
need to reserve a signal. This plays much more nicely with libraries,
and with processes injected into for tracing purposes, for which we
cannot expect that signals will be unused by the application.

An expedited version of this system call can be added later on to speed
up the grace period. Its implementation will likely depend on reading
the cpu_curr()->mm without holding each CPU's rq lock.

This patch adds the system call to x86 and to asm-generic.

[1] http://urcu.so

membarrier(2) man page:

MEMBARRIER(2)              Linux Programmer's Manual             MEMBARRIER(2)

NAME
       membarrier - issue memory barriers on a set of threads

SYNOPSIS
       #include <linux/membarrier.h>

       int membarrier(int cmd, int flags);

DESCRIPTION
       The cmd argument is one of the following:

       MEMBARRIER_CMD_QUERY
              Query  the  set  of  supported commands. It returns a bitmask of
              supported commands.

       MEMBARRIER_CMD_SHARED
              Execute a memory barrier on all threads running on  the  system.
              Upon  return from system call, the caller thread is ensured that
              all running threads have passed through a state where all memory
              accesses  to  user-space  addresses  match program order between
              entry to and return from the system  call  (non-running  threads
              are de facto in such a state). This covers threads from all pro=E2=80=90
              cesses running on the system.  This command returns 0.

       The flags argument needs to be 0. For future extensions.

       All memory accesses performed  in  program  order  from  each  targeted
       thread is guaranteed to be ordered with respect to sys_membarrier(). If
       we use the semantic "barrier()" to represent a compiler barrier forcing
       memory  accesses  to  be performed in program order across the barrier,
       and smp_mb() to represent explicit memory barriers forcing full  memory
       ordering  across  the barrier, we have the following ordering table for
       each pair of barrier(), sys_membarrier() and smp_mb():

       The pair ordering is detailed as (O: ordered, X: not ordered):

                              barrier()   smp_mb() sys_membarrier()
              barrier()          X           X            O
              smp_mb()           X           O            O
              sys_membarrier()   O           O            O

RETURN VALUE
       On success, these system calls return zero.  On error, -1 is  returned,
       and errno is set appropriately. For a given command, with flags
       argument set to 0, this system call is guaranteed to always return the
       same value until reboot.

ERRORS
       ENOSYS System call is not implemented.

       EINVAL Invalid arguments.

Linux                             2015-04-15                     MEMBARRIER(2)
Signed-off-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Nicholas Miell <nmiell@comcast.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NDavid Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Acked-by: NAndy Grover <agrover@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NNicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>

As noted by Minchan, a benefit of reading idle flag from /proc/kpageflags
is that one can easily filter dirty and/or unevictable pages while
estimating the size of unused memory.

Note that idle flag read from /proc/kpageflags may be stale in case the
page was accessed via a PTE, because it would be too costly to iterate
over all page mappings on each /proc/kpageflags read to provide an
up-to-date value.  To make sure the flag is up-to-date one has to read
/sys/kernel/mm/page_idle/bitmap first.
Signed-off-by: NVladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

IEEE 1722 describes AVB (later renamed to TSN - Time Sensitive
Networking), a protocol, encapsualtion and synchronization to utilize
standard networks for audio/video (and later other time-sensitive)
streams.

This standard uses ethertype 0x22F0.

http://standards.ieee.org/develop/regauth/ethertype/eth.txt

This is a respin of a previous patch ("ether: add AVB frame type
ETH_P_AVB")

CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NHenrik Austad <henrik@austad.us>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The linux/audit.h header uses EM_MICROBLAZE in order to define
AUDIT_ARCH_MICROBLAZE, but it's only available in the microblaze
asm headers.  Move it to the common elf-em.h header so that the
define can be used on non-microblaze systems.  Otherwise we get
build errors that EM_MICROBLAZE isn't defined when we try to use
the AUDIT_ARCH_MICROBLAZE symbol.
Signed-off-by: NMike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>

The privcmd code is mixing the usage of GFN and MFN within the same
functions which make the code difficult to understand when you only work
with auto-translated guests.

The privcmd driver is only dealing with GFN so replace all the mention
of MFN into GFN.

The ioctl structure used to map foreign change has been left unchanged
given that the userspace is using it. Nonetheless, add a comment to
explain the expected value within the "mfn" field.
Signed-off-by: NJulien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>

This implements the uABI of UFFDIO_COPY and UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE.
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

I had requests to return the full address (not the page aligned one) to
userland.

It's not entirely clear how the page offset could be relevant because
userfaults aren't like SIGBUS that can sigjump to a different place and it
actually skip resolving the fault depending on a page offset.  There's
currently no real way to skip the fault especially because after a
UFFDIO_COPY|ZEROPAGE, the fault is optimized to be retried within the
kernel without having to return to userland first (not even self modifying
code replacing the .text that touched the faulting address would prevent
the fault to be repeated).  Userland cannot skip repeating the fault even
more so if the fault was triggered by a KVM secondary page fault or any
get_user_pages or any copy-user inside some syscall which will return to
kernel code.  The second time FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT won't be set leading
to a SIGBUS being raised because the userfault can't wait if it cannot
release the mmap_map first (and FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT is required for
that).

Still returning userland a proper structure during the read() on the uffd,
can allow to use the current UFFD_API for the future non-cooperative
extensions too and it looks cleaner as well.  Once we get additional
fields there's no point to return the fault address page aligned anymore
to reuse the bits below PAGE_SHIFT.

The only downside is that the read() syscall will read 32bytes instead of
8bytes but that's not going to be measurable overhead.

The total number of new events that can be extended or of new future bits
for already shipped events, is limited to 64 by the features field of the
uffdio_api structure.  If more will be needed a bump of UFFD_API will be
required.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use __packed]
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This is (seems to be) the minimal thing that is required to unblock
standard uffd usage from the non-cooperative one.  Now more bits can be
added to the features field indicating e.g.  UFFD_FEATURE_FORK and others
needed for the latter use-case.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Defines the uAPI of the userfaultfd, notably the ioctl numbers and protocol.
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Per Andrew Morgan's request, add a securebit to allow admins to disable
PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE.  This securebit will prevent processes from adding
capabilities to their ambient set.

For simplicity, this disables PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE entirely rather than
just disabling setting previously cleared bits.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NAndrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn.  This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.

===== The status quo =====

On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel.  To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.

Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X).  When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE.  The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.

Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time.  If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.

Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities.  A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.

A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e.  the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value.  The rules are:

  pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
  pI' = pI
  pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
  X is unchanged

For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior.  Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set).  For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.

As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.

This is rather messy.  We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.

===== The problem =====

Capability inheritance is basically useless.

If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'.  This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.

On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files.  This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works.  No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.

If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.

This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.

===== The proposed change =====

This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.

pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI.  Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA.  This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication.  Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities.  Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set.  Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.

The capability evolution rules are changed:

  pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
  pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
  pI' = pI
  pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
  X is unchanged

If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA.  If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE.  For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports.  Hallelujah!

Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees.  This is currently more or less
impossible.  Hallelujah!

You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.

Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability.  If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.

It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems.  Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities.  This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects.  (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route.  We can revisit this later.

An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities.  I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.

===== Footnotes =====

[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.

[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong.  fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit.  This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.

[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me.  The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.

Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2

Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):

/*
 * Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
 * that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
 *
 * (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
 * Released under: GPL v3 or later.
 *
 *
 * Compile using:
 *
 *	gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
 *
 * This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
 * Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
 *
 * A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
 *
 *	setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
 *
 *
 * To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
 *
 *	./ambient_test /bin/bash
 *
 *
 * Verifying that it works:
 *
 * From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
 *
 *	cat /proc/$$/status
 *
 * and have a look at the capabilities.
 */

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <cap-ng.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>

/*
 * Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
 * when the /usr/include files have these defined.
 */
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4

static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
	int rc;

	capng_get_caps_process();
	rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
	if (rc) {
		printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
		exit(2);
	}
	capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);

	/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
	if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
		perror("Cannot set cap");
		exit(1);
	}
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	int rc;

	set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
	set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
	set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);

	printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
	if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
		perror("Cannot exec");

	return 0;
}

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When the hfi1 driver was added a user space header file (hfi1_user.h) was added
to be shared between PSM2 and the driver.  However, the file was not added to
the header install.  Add it now.

Fixes: d4ab3470 ("IB/core: Add core header changes needed for OPA")
Signed-off-by: NIra Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

commit 346add78
Author: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Date:   Tue Jul 14 18:07:30 2015 +0200

    drm/i915: Use expcitly fixed type in compat32 structs

changed the type of param field in drm_i915_getparam from int to
s32. This header is exported to userspace and needs to use userspace
type __s32 instead.

This fixes userspace compilation errors like the following:
include/drm/i915_drm.h:361:2: error: unknown type name 's32'
  s32 param;
Signed-off-by: NArtem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDaniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: NJani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>

Feature bits that are invalid should not be accepted by the kernel,
only the lower 4 bits may be configured, but not the remaining ones.
Even from these 4, 2 of them are unused.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch adds netlink defines for local service client, local service
group, local service operations, and related attributes.
Signed-off-by: NKaike Wan <kaike.wan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Fleck <john.fleck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NIra Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

Since commit c05cdb1b ("netlink: allow large data transfers from
user-space"), the kernel may fail to allocate the necessary room for the
acknowledgment message back to userspace. This patch introduces a new
socket option that trims off the payload of the original netlink message.

The netlink message header is still included, so the user can guess from
the sequence number what is the message that has triggered the
acknowledgment.
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: NChristophe Ricard <christophe-h.ricard@st.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch adds the value of the CNP opcode to the existing list of enumerated
opcodes in ib_pack.h

Add common OPA header definitions for driver
build:
- opa_port_info.h
- opa_smi.h
- hfi1_user.h

Additionally, ib_mad.h, has additional definitions
that are common to ib_drivers including:
- trap support
- cca support

The qib driver has the duplication removed in favor
those in ib_mad.h
Reviewed-by: NMike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn, Jubin <jubin.john@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NIra Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

v4.1/v4.2 have define attributes at word2, nfs client also support
security label now.

v3, same as v2.
Signed-off-by: NKinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

Following patch create new tunnel flag which enable
tunnel metadata collection on given device. These devices
can be used by tunnel metadata based routing or by OVS.
Geneve Consolidation patch get rid of collect_md_tun to
simplify tunnel lookup further.
Signed-off-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Reviewed-by: NJesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add netlink interface to configure Geneve UDP port number.
So that user can configure it for a Gevene device.
Signed-off-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Reviewed-by: NJesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: NJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This enables bridge vlan_protocol to be configured through netlink.

When CONFIG_BRIDGE_VLAN_FILTERING is disabled, kernel behaves the
same way as this feature is not implemented.
Signed-off-by: NToshiaki Makita <makita.toshiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add support for using conntrack helpers to assist protocol detection.
The new OVS_CT_ATTR_HELPER attribute of the CT action specifies a helper
to be used for this connection. If no helper is specified, then helpers
will be automatically applied as per the sysctl configuration of
net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_helper.

The helper may be specified as part of the conntrack action, eg:
ct(helper=ftp). Initial packets for related connections should be
committed to allow later packets for the flow to be considered
established.

Example ovs-ofctl flows allowing FTP connections from ports 1->2:
in_port=1,tcp,action=ct(helper=ftp,commit),2
in_port=2,tcp,ct_state=-trk,action=ct(recirc)
in_port=2,tcp,ct_state=+trk-new+est,action=1
in_port=2,tcp,ct_state=+trk+rel,action=1
Signed-off-by: NJoe Stringer <joestringer@nicira.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Allow matching and setting the ct_label field. As with ct_mark, this is
populated by executing the CT action. The label field may be modified by
specifying a label and mask nested under the CT action. It is stored as
metadata attached to the connection. Label modification occurs after
lookup, and will only persist when the conntrack entry is committed by
providing the COMMIT flag to the CT action. Labels are currently fixed
to 128 bits in size.
Signed-off-by: NJoe Stringer <joestringer@nicira.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Allow matching and setting the ct_mark field. As with ct_state and
ct_zone, these fields are populated when the CT action is executed. To
write to this field, a value and mask can be specified as a nested
attribute under the CT action. This data is stored with the conntrack
entry, and is executed after the lookup occurs for the CT action. The
conntrack entry itself must be committed using the COMMIT flag in the CT
action flags for this change to persist.
Signed-off-by: NJustin Pettit <jpettit@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NJoe Stringer <joestringer@nicira.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Expose the kernel connection tracker via OVS. Userspace components can
make use of the CT action to populate the connection state (ct_state)
field for a flow. This state can be subsequently matched.

Exposed connection states are OVS_CS_F_*:
- NEW (0x01) - Beginning of a new connection.
- ESTABLISHED (0x02) - Part of an existing connection.
- RELATED (0x04) - Related to an established connection.
- INVALID (0x20) - Could not track the connection for this packet.
- REPLY_DIR (0x40) - This packet is in the reply direction for the flow.
- TRACKED (0x80) - This packet has been sent through conntrack.

When the CT action is executed by itself, it will send the packet
through the connection tracker and populate the ct_state field with one
or more of the connection state flags above. The CT action will always
set the TRACKED bit.

When the COMMIT flag is passed to the conntrack action, this specifies
that information about the connection should be stored. This allows
subsequent packets for the same (or related) connections to be
correlated with this connection. Sending subsequent packets for the
connection through conntrack allows the connection tracker to consider
the packets as ESTABLISHED, RELATED, and/or REPLY_DIR.

The CT action may optionally take a zone to track the flow within. This
allows connections with the same 5-tuple to be kept logically separate
from connections in other zones. If the zone is specified, then the
"ct_zone" match field will be subsequently populated with the zone id.

IP fragments are handled by transparently assembling them as part of the
CT action. The maximum received unit (MRU) size is tracked so that
refragmentation can occur during output.

IP frag handling contributed by Andy Zhou.

Based on original design by Justin Pettit.
Signed-off-by: NJoe Stringer <joestringer@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NJustin Pettit <jpettit@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndy Zhou <azhou@nicira.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add support for physical LUN segmentation (virtual LUNs) to device
driver supporting the IBM CXL Flash adapter. This patch allows user
space applications to virtually segment a physical LUN into N virtual
LUNs, taking advantage of the translation features provided by this
adapter.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew R. Ochs <mrochs@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NManoj N. Kumar <manoj@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Reviewed-by: NWen Xiong <wenxiong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com>

Add superpipe supporting infrastructure to device driver for the IBM CXL
Flash adapter. This patch allows userspace applications to take advantage
of the accelerated I/O features that this adapter provides and bypass the
traditional filesystem stack.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew R. Ochs <mrochs@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NManoj N. Kumar <manoj@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Reviewed-by: NWen Xiong <wenxiong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrian King <brking@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com>

RFC 4443 added two new codes values for ICMPv6 type 1:

 5 - Source address failed ingress/egress policy
 6 - Reject route to destination

And RFC 7084 states in L-14 that IPv6 Router MUST send ICMPv6 Destination
Unreachable with code 5 for packets forwarded to it that use an address
from a prefix that has been invalidated.

Codes 5 and 6 are more informative subsets of code 1.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Herz <andi@geekosphere.org>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

For a userland lock request, the previous and current
lock modes are used to decide when the lvb should be
copied back to the user.  The wrong previous value was
used, so that it always matched the current value.
This caused the lvb to be copied back to the user in
the wrong cases.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>

- mcast_group: configure the multicast address, now IPv6
is supported too

- mcast_port: configure the multicast port

- mcast_ttl: configure the multicast TTL/HOP_LIMIT
Signed-off-by: NJulian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: NSimon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>

Allow setups with large MTU to send large sync packets by
adding sync_maxlen parameter. The default value is now based
on MTU but no more than 1500 for compatibility reasons.

To avoid problems if MTU changes allow fragmentation by
sending packets with DF=0. Problem reported by Dan Carpenter.
Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJulian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: NSimon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>

Allow specification of per route IP tunnel instructions also for IPv6.
This complements commit 3093fbe7 ("route: Per route IP tunnel metadata
via lightweight tunnel").
Signed-off-by: NJiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
CC: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <hideaki.yoshifuji@miraclelinux.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If the user selected the precise_timestamps or histogram options, report
it in the @stats_list message output.

If the user didn't select these options, no extra tokens are reported,
thus it is backward compatible with old software that doesn't know about
precise timestamps and histogram.
Signed-off-by: NMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2

Controllers can perform optional subsystem resets as introduced in NVMe
1.1. This patch adds an IOCTL to trigger the subsystem reset by writing
"NVMe" to the NSSR register.
Signed-off-by: NJon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>
Acked-by: NKeith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>

Since the topology API is still in sufficient flux for changes to be
identified disable the use of the userspace ABI by adding #error
statements to the code, ensuring that nobody relies on the headers as
currently defined.  It is expected that this change will be reverted for
v4.3.
Signed-off-by: NMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>

userspace programs using cxl currently have to use two strategies for
dealing with MMIO errors simultaneously. They have to check every read
for a return of all Fs in case the adapter has gone away and the kernel
has not yet noticed, and they have to deal with SIGBUS in case the
kernel has already noticed, invalidated the mapping and marked the
context as failed.

In order to simplify things, this patch adds an alternative approach
where the kernel will return a page filled with Fs instead of delivering
a SIGBUS. This allows userspace to only need to deal with one of these
two error paths, and is intended for use in libraries that use cxl
transparently and may not be able to safely install a signal handler.

This approach will only work if certain constraints are met. Namely, if
the application is both reading and writing to an address in the problem
state area it cannot assume that a non-FF read is OK, as it may just be
reading out a value it has previously written. Further - since only one
page is used per context a write to a given offset would be visible when
reading the same offset from a different page in the mapping (this only
applies within a single context, not between contexts).

An application could deal with this by e.g. making sure it also reads
from a read-only offset after any reads to a read/write offset.

Due to these constraints, this functionality must be explicitly
requested by userspace when starting the context by passing in the
CXL_START_WORK_ERR_FF flag.
Signed-off-by: NIan Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NMichael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>