Fix build error on i386 by moving function prototypes:

arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c: In function 'aesni_init':
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c:1263: error: implicit declaration of function 'crypto_fpu_init'
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c: In function 'aesni_exit':
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c:1373: error: implicit declaration of function 'crypto_fpu_exit'
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Loading fpu without aesni-intel does nothing.  Loading aesni-intel
without fpu causes modes like xts to fail.  (Unloading
aesni-intel will restore those modes.)

One solution would be to make aesni-intel depend on fpu, but it
seems cleaner to just combine the modules.

This is probably responsible for bugs like:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=589390Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This patch fixes problem with packets that are not multiple of 64bytes.
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Hoban <adrian.hoban@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAidan O'Mahony <aidan.o.mahony@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGabriele Paoloni <gabriele.paoloni@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NTadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Fix up previous patch that failed to properly fix mem leak in 
rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(). This add-on patch; fixes the leak. moves 
kfree() out of the error path, returns -ENOMEM rather than -EINVAL when 
ablkcipher_request_alloc() fails.
Signed-off-by: NJesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

There's a small memory leak in 
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c::rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(). If the call 
to kmalloc() fails and returns NULL then the memory allocated previously 
by ablkcipher_request_alloc() is not freed when we leave the function.

I could have just added a call to ablkcipher_request_free() before we 
return -ENOMEM, but that started to look too much like the code we 
already had at the end of the function, so I chose instead to rework the 
code a bit so that there are now a few labels at the end that we goto when 
various allocations fail, so we don't have to repeat the same blocks of 
code (this also reduces the object code size slightly).
Signed-off-by: NJesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Exclude AES-GCM code for x86-32 due to heavy usage of 64-bit registers
not available on x86-32.

While at it, fixed unregister order in aesni_exit().
Signed-off-by: NMathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The AES-NI instructions are also available in legacy mode so the 32-bit
architecture may profit from those, too.

To illustrate the performance gain here's a short summary of a dm-crypt
speed test on a Core i7 M620 running at 2.67GHz comparing both assembler
implementations:

x86:                   i568       aes-ni    delta
ECB, 256 bit:     93.8 MB/s   123.3 MB/s   +31.4%
CBC, 256 bit:     84.8 MB/s   262.3 MB/s  +209.3%
LRW, 256 bit:    108.6 MB/s   222.1 MB/s  +104.5%
XTS, 256 bit:    105.0 MB/s   205.5 MB/s   +95.7%

Additionally, due to some minor optimizations, the 64-bit version also
got a minor performance gain as seen below:

x86-64:           old impl.    new impl.    delta
ECB, 256 bit:    121.1 MB/s   123.0 MB/s    +1.5%
CBC, 256 bit:    285.3 MB/s   290.8 MB/s    +1.9%
LRW, 256 bit:    263.7 MB/s   265.3 MB/s    +0.6%
XTS, 256 bit:    251.1 MB/s   255.3 MB/s    +1.7%
Signed-off-by: NMathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: NHuang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This patch adds an optimized RFC4106 AES-GCM implementation for 64-bit
kernels. It supports 128-bit AES key size. This leverages the crypto
AEAD interface type to facilitate a combined AES & GCM operation to
be implemented in assembly code. The assembly code leverages Intel(R)
AES New Instructions and the PCLMULQDQ instruction.
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Hoban <adrian.hoban@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NTadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGabriele Paoloni <gabriele.paoloni@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAidan O'Mahony <aidan.o.mahony@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NErdinc Ozturk <erdinc.ozturk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Guilford <james.guilford@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NWajdi Feghali <wajdi.k.feghali@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

To take advantage of the hardware pipeline implementation of AES-NI
instructions. CTR mode cryption is implemented in ASM to schedule
multiple AES-NI instructions one after another. This way, some latency
of AES-NI instruction can be eliminated.

Performance testing based on dm-crypt should 50% reduction of
ecryption/decryption time.
Signed-off-by: NHuang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When renaming kernel_fpu_using to irq_fpu_usable, the semantics of the
function is changed too, from mesuring whether kernel is using FPU,
that is, the FPU is NOT available, to measuring whether FPU is usable,
that is, the FPU is available.

But the usage of irq_fpu_usable in aesni-intel_glue.c is not changed
accordingly. This patch fixes this.
Signed-off-by: NHuang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This function measures whether the FPU/SSE state can be touched in
interrupt context. If the interrupted code is in user space or has no
valid FPU/SSE context (CR0.TS == 1), FPU/SSE state can be used in IRQ
or soft_irq context too.

This is used by AES-NI accelerated AES implementation and PCLMULQDQ
accelerated GHASH implementation.

v3:
 - Renamed to irq_fpu_usable to reflect the purpose of the function.

v2:
 - Renamed to irq_is_fpu_using to reflect the real situation.
Signed-off-by: NHuang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
CC: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>

When the aes-intel module is loaded on a system that does not have the
AES instructions, it prints

    Intel AES-NI instructions are not detected.

at level KERN_ERR.  Since aes-intel is aliased to "aes" it will be tried
whenever anything uses AES and spam the console.  This doesn't match
existing practice for how to handle "no hardware" when initializing a
module, so downgrade the message to KERN_INFO.
Signed-off-by: NRoland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Because AES-NI instructions will touch XMM state, corresponding code
must be enclosed within kernel_fpu_begin/end, which used
preempt_disable/enable. So sleep should be prevented between
kernel_fpu_begin/end.
Signed-off-by: NHuang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Because kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() operations are too
slow, the performance gain of general mode implementation + aes-aesni
is almost all compensated.

The AES-NI support for more modes are implemented as follow:

- Add a new AES algorithm implementation named __aes-aesni without
  kernel_fpu_begin/end()

- Use fpu(<mode>(AES)) to provide kenrel_fpu_begin/end() invoking

- Add <mode>(AES) ablkcipher, which uses cryptd(fpu(<mode>(AES))) to
  defer cryption to cryptd context in soft_irq context.

Now the ctr, lrw, pcbc and xts support are added.

Performance testing based on dm-crypt shows that cryption time can be
reduced to 50% of general mode implementation + aes-aesni implementation.
Signed-off-by: NHuang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Intel AES-NI is a new set of Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD)
instructions that are going to be introduced in the next generation of
Intel processor, as of 2009. These instructions enable fast and secure
data encryption and decryption, using the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES), defined by FIPS Publication number 197.  The architecture
introduces six instructions that offer full hardware support for
AES. Four of them support high performance data encryption and
decryption, and the other two instructions support the AES key
expansion procedure.

The white paper can be downloaded from:

http://softwarecommunity.intel.com/isn/downloads/intelavx/AES-Instructions-Set_WP.pdf

AES may be used in soft_irq context, but MMX/SSE context can not be
touched safely in soft_irq context. So in_interrupt() is checked, if
in IRQ or soft_irq context, the general x86_64 implementation are used
instead.
Signed-off-by: NHuang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>