- 16 12月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
Currently all architectures but microblaze unconditionally define USE_ELF_CORE_DUMP. The microblaze omission seems like an error to me, so let's kill this ifdef and make sure we are the same everywhere. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: NHugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@petalogix.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 john stultz 提交于
Setting a thread's comm to be something unique is a very useful ability and is helpful for debugging complicated threaded applications. However currently the only way to set a thread name is for the thread to name itself via the PR_SET_NAME prctl. However, there may be situations where it would be advantageous for a thread dispatcher to be naming the threads its managing, rather then having the threads self-describe themselves. This sort of behavior is available on other systems via the pthread_setname_np() interface. This patch exports a task's comm via proc/pid/comm and proc/pid/task/tid/comm interfaces, and allows thread siblings to write to these values. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] Signed-off-by: NJohn Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Mike Fulton <fultonm@ca.ibm.com> Cc: Sean Foley <Sean_Foley@ca.ibm.com> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 12 11月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Sukadev Bhattiprolu 提交于
Daniel Lezcano reported a leak in 'struct pid' and 'struct pid_namespace' that is discussed in: http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/10/2/159. To summarize the thread, when container-init is terminated, it sets the PF_EXITING flag, zaps other processes in the container and waits to reap them. As a part of reaping, the container-init should flush any /proc dentries associated with the processes. But because the container-init is itself exiting and the following PF_EXITING check, the dentries are not flushed, resulting in leak in /proc inodes and dentries. This fix reverts the commit 7766755a ("Fix /proc dcache deadlock in do_exit") which introduced the check for PF_EXITING. At the time of the commit, shrink_dcache_parent() flushed dentries from other filesystems also and could have caused a deadlock which the commit fixed. But as pointed out by Eric Biederman, after commit 0feae5c4, shrink_dcache_parent() no longer affects other filesystems. So reverting the commit is now safe. As pointed out by Jan Kara, the leak is not as critical since the unclaimed space will be reclaimed under memory pressure or by: echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches But since this check is no longer required, its best to remove it. Signed-off-by: NSukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Reported-by: NDaniel Lezcano <dlezcano@fr.ibm.com> Acked-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: NJan Kara <jack@ucw.cz> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 23 9月, 2009 3 次提交
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由 Vincent Li 提交于
Remove obfuscated zero-length input check and return -EINVAL instead of -EIO error to make the error message clear to user. Add whitespace stripping. No functionality changes. The old code: echo 1 > /proc/pid/make-it-fail (ok) echo 1foo > /proc/pid/make-it-fail (-bash: echo: write error: Input/output error) The new code: echo 1 > /proc/pid/make-it-fail (ok) echo 1foo > /proc/pid/make-it-fail (-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument) This patch is conservative in changes to not breaking existing scripts/applications. Signed-off-by: NVincent Li <macli@brc.ubc.ca> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
The exiting sub-thread flushes /proc/pid only, but this doesn't buy too much: ps and friends mostly use /proc/tid/task/pid. Remove "if (thread_group_leader())" checks from proc_flush_task() path, this means we always remove /proc/tid/task/pid dentry on exit, and this actually matches the comment above proc_flush_task(). The test-case: static void* tfunc(void *arg) { char name[256]; sprintf(name, "/proc/%d/task/%ld/status", getpid(), gettid()); close(open(name, O_RDONLY)); return NULL; } int main(void) { pthread_t t; for (;;) { if (!pthread_create(&t, NULL, &tfunc, NULL)) pthread_join(t, NULL); } } slabtop shows that pid/proc_inode_cache/etc grow quickly and "indefinitely" until the task is killed or shrink_slab() is called, not good. And the main thread needs a lot of time to exit. The same can happen if something like "ps -efL" runs continuously, while some application spawns short-living threads. Reported-by: N"James M. Leddy" <jleddy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Dominic Duval <dduval@redhat.com> Cc: Frank Hirtz <fhirtz@redhat.com> Cc: "Fuller, Johnray" <Johnray.Fuller@gs.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Batkowski <pbatkowski@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
/proc/$pid/limits should show RLIMIT_CPU as seconds, which is the unit used in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c: unsigned long psecs = cputime_to_secs(ptime); ... if (psecs >= sig->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_max) { ... __group_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_PRIV, tsk); Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: NWANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 22 9月, 2009 3 次提交
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由 KOSAKI Motohiro 提交于
Andrew Morton pointed out oom_adjust_write() has very strange EIO and new line handling. this patch fixes it. Signed-off-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 KOSAKI Motohiro 提交于
oom-killer kills a process, not task. Then oom_score should be calculated as per-process too. it makes consistency more and makes speed up select_bad_process(). Signed-off-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 KOSAKI Motohiro 提交于
Currently, OOM logic callflow is here. __out_of_memory() select_bad_process() for each task badness() calculate badness of one task oom_kill_process() search child oom_kill_task() kill target task and mm shared tasks with it example, process-A have two thread, thread-A and thread-B and it have very fat memory and each thread have following oom_adj and oom_score. thread-A: oom_adj = OOM_DISABLE, oom_score = 0 thread-B: oom_adj = 0, oom_score = very-high Then, select_bad_process() select thread-B, but oom_kill_task() refuse kill the task because thread-A have OOM_DISABLE. Thus __out_of_memory() call select_bad_process() again. but select_bad_process() select the same task. It mean kernel fall in livelock. The fact is, select_bad_process() must select killable task. otherwise OOM logic go into livelock. And root cause is, oom_adj shouldn't be per-thread value. it should be per-process value because OOM-killer kill a process, not thread. Thus This patch moves oomkilladj (now more appropriately named oom_adj) from struct task_struct to struct signal_struct. it naturally prevent select_bad_process() choose wrong task. Signed-off-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 19 8月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 KOSAKI Motohiro 提交于
The commit 2ff05b2b (oom: move oom_adj value) moveed the oom_adj value to the mm_struct. It was a very good first step for sanitize OOM. However Paul Menage reported the commit makes regression to his job scheduler. Current OOM logic can kill OOM_DISABLED process. Why? His program has the code of similar to the following. ... set_oom_adj(OOM_DISABLE); /* The job scheduler never killed by oom */ ... if (vfork() == 0) { set_oom_adj(0); /* Invoked child can be killed */ execve("foo-bar-cmd"); } .... vfork() parent and child are shared the same mm_struct. then above set_oom_adj(0) doesn't only change oom_adj for vfork() child, it's also change oom_adj for vfork() parent. Then, vfork() parent (job scheduler) lost OOM immune and it was killed. Actually, fork-setting-exec idiom is very frequently used in userland program. We must not break this assumption. Then, this patch revert commit 2ff05b2b and related commit. Reverted commit list --------------------- - commit 2ff05b2b (oom: move oom_adj value from task_struct to mm_struct) - commit 4d8b9135 (oom: avoid unnecessary mm locking and scanning for OOM_DISABLE) - commit 81236810 (oom: only oom kill exiting tasks with attached memory) - commit 933b787b (mm: copy over oom_adj value at fork time) Signed-off-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 10 8月, 2009 5 次提交
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
The problem is minor, but without ->cred_guard_mutex held we can race with exec() and get the new ->mm but check old creds. Now we do not need to re-check task->mm after ptrace_may_access(), it can't be changed to the new mm under us. Strictly speaking, this also fixes another very minor problem. Unless security check fails or the task exits mm_for_maps() should never return NULL, the caller should get either old or new ->mm. Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
mm_for_maps() takes ->mmap_sem after security checks, this looks strange and obfuscates the locking rules. Move this lock to its single caller, m_start(). Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
It would be nice to kill __ptrace_may_access(). It requires task_lock(), but this lock is only needed to read mm->flags in the middle. Convert mm_for_maps() to use ptrace_may_access(), this also simplifies the code a little bit. Also, we do not need to take ->mmap_sem in advance. In fact I think mm_for_maps() should not play with ->mmap_sem at all, the caller should take this lock. With or without this patch, without ->cred_guard_mutex held we can race with exec() and get the new ->mm but check old creds. Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
The problem is minor, but without ->cred_guard_mutex held we can race with exec() and get the new ->mm but check old creds. Now we do not need to re-check task->mm after ptrace_may_access(), it can't be changed to the new mm under us. Strictly speaking, this also fixes another very minor problem. Unless security check fails or the task exits mm_for_maps() should never return NULL, the caller should get either old or new ->mm. Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
mm_for_maps() takes ->mmap_sem after security checks, this looks strange and obfuscates the locking rules. Move this lock to its single caller, m_start(). Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 24 6月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
It would be nice to kill __ptrace_may_access(). It requires task_lock(), but this lock is only needed to read mm->flags in the middle. Convert mm_for_maps() to use ptrace_may_access(), this also simplifies the code a little bit. Also, we do not need to take ->mmap_sem in advance. In fact I think mm_for_maps() should not play with ->mmap_sem at all, the caller should take this lock. With or without this patch, without ->cred_guard_mutex held we can race with exec() and get the new ->mm but check old creds. Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 17 6月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 David Rientjes 提交于
The per-task oom_adj value is a characteristic of its mm more than the task itself since it's not possible to oom kill any thread that shares the mm. If a task were to be killed while attached to an mm that could not be freed because another thread were set to OOM_DISABLE, it would have needlessly been terminated since there is no potential for future memory freeing. This patch moves oomkilladj (now more appropriately named oom_adj) from struct task_struct to struct mm_struct. This requires task_lock() on a task to check its oom_adj value to protect against exec, but it's already necessary to take the lock when dereferencing the mm to find the total VM size for the badness heuristic. This fixes a livelock if the oom killer chooses a task and another thread sharing the same memory has an oom_adj value of OOM_DISABLE. This occurs because oom_kill_task() repeatedly returns 1 and refuses to kill the chosen task while select_bad_process() will repeatedly choose the same task during the next retry. Taking task_lock() in select_bad_process() to check for OOM_DISABLE and in oom_kill_task() to check for threads sharing the same memory will be removed in the next patch in this series where it will no longer be necessary. Writing to /proc/pid/oom_adj for a kthread will now return -EINVAL since these threads are immune from oom killing already. They simply report an oom_adj value of OOM_DISABLE. Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 29 5月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 KOSAKI Motohiro 提交于
proc_pident_instantiate() has following call flow. proc_pident_lookup() proc_pident_instantiate() proc_pid_make_inode() And, proc_pident_lookup() has following error handling. const struct pid_entry *p, *last; error = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); if (!task) goto out_no_task; Then, proc_pident_instantiate should return ENOENT too when racing against exit(2) occur. EINAL has two bad reason. - it implies caller is wrong. bad the race isn't caller's mistake. - man 2 open don't explain EINVAL. user often don't handle it. Note: Other proc_pid_make_inode() caller already use ENOENT properly. Acked-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 11 5月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Guard the setprocattr security hook against ptrace by taking the target task's cred_guard_mutex around it. The problem is that setprocattr() may otherwise note the lack of a debugger, and then perform an action on that basis whilst letting a debugger attach between the two points. Holding cred_guard_mutex across the test and the action prevents ptrace_attach() from doing that. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 05 5月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Jake Edge 提交于
By using the same test as is used for /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps, only allow processes that can ptrace() a given process to see information that might be used to bypass address space layout randomization (ASLR). These include eip, esp, wchan, and start_stack in /proc/pid/stat as well as the non-symbolic output from /proc/pid/wchan. ASLR can be bypassed by sampling eip as shown by the proof-of-concept code at http://code.google.com/p/fuzzyaslr/ As part of a presentation (http://www.cr0.org/paper/to-jt-linux-alsr-leak.pdf) esp and wchan were also noted as possibly usable information leaks as well. The start_stack address also leaks potentially useful information. Cc: Stable Team <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NJake Edge <jake@lwn.net> Acked-by: NArjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 17 4月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 KOSAKI Motohiro 提交于
In recently sysfs_poll discussion, Neil Brown pointed out /proc/mounts also should be fixed. SUSv3 says "Regular files shall always poll TRUE for reading and writing". see http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/009695399/functions/poll.html Then, mounts_poll()'s default should be "POLLIN | POLLRDNORM". it mean always readable. In addition, event trigger should use "POLLERR | POLLPRI" instead POLLERR. it makes consistent to mdstat_poll() and sysfs_poll(). and, select(2) can handle POLLPRI easily. Reported-by: NNeil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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- 01 4月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those can include directly. sched.h itself only needs forward declaration of struct fs_struct; Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 29 3月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Hugh Dickins 提交于
check_unsafe_exec() also notes whether the fs_struct is being shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid. But /proc/<pid>/cwd and /proc/<pid>/root lookups make transient use of get_fs_struct(), which also raises that sharing count. This might occasionally cause a setuid program not to change euid, in the same way as happened with files->count (check_unsafe_exec also looks at sighand->count, but /proc doesn't raise that one). We'd prefer exec not to unshare fs_struct: so fix this in procfs, replacing get_fs_struct() by get_fs_path(), which does path_get while still holding task_lock, instead of raising fs->count. Signed-off-by: NHugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org ___ fs/proc/base.c | 50 +++++++++++++++-------------------------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 28 3月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 18 3月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Linus Torvalds 提交于
Commit ee6f779b ("filp->f_pos not correctly updated in proc_task_readdir") changed the proc code to use filp->f_pos directly, rather than through a temporary variable. In the process, that caused the operations to be done on the full 64 bits, even though the offset is never that big. That's all fine and dandy per se, but for some unfathomable reason gcc generates absolutely horrid code when using 64-bit values in switch() statements. To the point of actually calling out to gcc helper functions like __cmpdi2 rather than just doing the trivial comparisons directly the way gcc does for normal compares. At which point we get link failures, because we really don't want to support that kind of crazy code. Fix this by just casting the f_pos value to "unsigned long", which is plenty big enough for /proc, and avoids the gcc code generation issue. Reported-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Zhang Le <r0bertz@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 16 3月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Zhang Le 提交于
filp->f_pos only get updated at the end of the function. Thus d_off of those dirents who are in the middle will be 0, and this will cause a problem in glibc's readdir implementation, specifically endless loop. Because when overflow occurs, f_pos will be set to next dirent to read, however it will be 0, unless the next one is the last one. So it will start over again and again. There is a sample program in man 2 gendents. This is the output of the program running on a multithread program's task dir before this patch is applied: $ ./a.out /proc/3807/task --------------- nread=128 --------------- i-node# file type d_reclen d_off d_name 506442 directory 16 1 . 506441 directory 16 0 .. 506443 directory 16 0 3807 506444 directory 16 0 3809 506445 directory 16 0 3812 506446 directory 16 0 3861 506447 directory 16 0 3862 506448 directory 16 8 3863 This is the output after this patch is applied $ ./a.out /proc/3807/task --------------- nread=128 --------------- i-node# file type d_reclen d_off d_name 506442 directory 16 1 . 506441 directory 16 2 .. 506443 directory 16 3 3807 506444 directory 16 4 3809 506445 directory 16 5 3812 506446 directory 16 6 3861 506447 directory 16 7 3862 506448 directory 16 8 3863 Signed-off-by: NZhang Le <r0bertz@gentoo.org> Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 06 1月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
... and don't bother in callers. Don't bother with zeroing i_blocks, while we are at it - it's already been zeroed. i_mode is not worth the effort; it has no common default value. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 05 1月, 2009 5 次提交
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由 WANG Cong 提交于
Signed-off-by: NWANG Cong <wangcong@zeuux.org> Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
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由 Hannes Eder 提交于
fs/proc/base.c:312:4: warning: do-while statement is not a compound statement Signed-off-by: NHannes Eder <hannes@hanneseder.net> Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
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由 Ken Chen 提交于
/proc/*/stack adds the ability to query a task's stack trace. It is more useful than /proc/*/wchan as it provides full stack trace instead of single depth. Example output: $ cat /proc/self/stack [<c010a271>] save_stack_trace_tsk+0x17/0x35 [<c01827b4>] proc_pid_stack+0x4a/0x76 [<c018312d>] proc_single_show+0x4a/0x5e [<c016bdec>] seq_read+0xf3/0x29f [<c015a004>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x91 [<c015a0c1>] sys_read+0x3b/0x60 [<c0102eda>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb [<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff [add save_stack_trace_tsk() on mips, ACK Ralf --adobriyan] Signed-off-by: NKen Chen <kenchen@google.com> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
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由 Alexey Dobriyan 提交于
Inability to jump to /proc/*/foo handlers with ctags is annoying. Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
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由 Alexey Dobriyan 提交于
NULL "struct inode *" means VFS passed NULL inode to ->open. Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
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- 22 12月, 2008 1 次提交
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由 Ingo Molnar 提交于
Stephen Rothwell reported this new (harmless) build warning on platforms that define u64 to long: fs/proc/base.c: In function 'proc_pid_schedstat': fs/proc/base.c:352: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 3 has type 'u64' asm-generic/int-l64.h platforms strike again: that file should be eliminated. Fix it by casting the parameters to long long. Reported-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 18 12月, 2008 1 次提交
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由 Ken Chen 提交于
Impact: simplify code When we turn on CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS, per-task cpu runtime is accumulated twice. Once in task->se.sum_exec_runtime and once in sched_info.cpu_time. These two stats are exactly the same. Given that task->se.sum_exec_runtime is always accumulated by the core scheduler, sched_info can reuse that data instead of duplicate the accounting. Signed-off-by: NKen Chen <kenchen@google.com> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 11 12月, 2008 1 次提交
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由 Hugh Dickins 提交于
Miles Lane tailing /sys files hit a BUG which Pekka Enberg has tracked to my 966c8c12 sprint_symbol(): use less stack exposing a bug in slub's list_locations() - kallsyms_lookup() writes a 0 to namebuf[KSYM_NAME_LEN-1], but that was beyond the end of page provided. The 100 slop which list_locations() allows at end of page looks roughly enough for all the other stuff it might print after the symbol before it checks again: break out KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN earlier than before. Latencytop and ftrace and are using KSYM_NAME_LEN buffers where they need KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN buffers, and vmallocinfo a 2*KSYM_NAME_LEN buffer where it wants a KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN buffer: fix those before anyone copies them. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: ftrace.h needs module.h] Signed-off-by: NHugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc Miles Lane <miles.lane@gmail.com> Acked-by: NPekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Acked-by: NSteven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com> Acked-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 14 11月, 2008 2 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds. This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b) seeing deallocated memory. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers pointing to it. Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in entry.S via asm-offsets. With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 21 10月, 2008 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 10 10月, 2008 2 次提交
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由 Alexey Dobriyan 提交于
After commit 831830b5 aka "restrict reading from /proc/<pid>/maps to those who share ->mm or can ptrace" sysctl stopped being relevant because commit moved security checks from ->show time to ->start time (mm_for_maps()). Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
Make process personality flags visible in /proc. Since a process's personality is potentially sensitive (e.g. READ_IMPLIES_EXEC), make this file only readable by the process owner. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
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