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  1. 07 8月, 2014 27 次提交
  3. 06 8月, 2014 9 次提交
    • W
      net-timestamp: ACK timestamp for bytestreams · e1c8a607
      由 Willem de Bruijn 提交于 
      Add SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_ACK, a request for a tstamp when the last byte
in the send() call is acknowledged. It implements the feature for TCP.

The timestamp is generated when the TCP socket cumulative ACK is moved
beyond the tracked seqno for the first time. The feature ignores SACK
and FACK, because those acknowledge the specific byte, but not
necessarily the entire contents of the buffer up to that byte.
Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e1c8a607
    • W
      net-timestamp: SCHED timestamp on entering packet scheduler · e7fd2885
      由 Willem de Bruijn 提交于 
      Kernel transmit latency is often incurred in the packet scheduler.
Introduce a new timestamp on transmission just before entering the
scheduler. When data travels through multiple devices (bonding,
tunneling, ...) each device will export an individual timestamp.
Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e7fd2885
    • W
      net-timestamp: add key to disambiguate concurrent datagrams · 09c2d251
      由 Willem de Bruijn 提交于 
      Datagrams timestamped on transmission can coexist in the kernel stack
and be reordered in packet scheduling. When reading looped datagrams
from the socket error queue it is not always possible to unique
correlate looped data with original send() call (for application
level retransmits). Even if possible, it may be expensive and complex,
requiring packet inspection.

Introduce a data-independent ID mechanism to associate timestamps with
send calls. Pass an ID alongside the timestamp in field ee_data of
sock_extended_err.

The ID is a simple 32 bit unsigned int that is associated with the
socket and incremented on each send() call for which software tx
timestamp generation is enabled.

The feature is enabled only if SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID is set, to
avoid changing ee_data for existing applications that expect it 0.
The counter is reset each time the flag is reenabled. Reenabling
does not change the ID of already submitted data. It is possible
to receive out of order IDs if the timestamp stream is not quiesced
first.
Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      09c2d251
    • W
      net-timestamp: move timestamp flags out of sk_flags · b9f40e21
      由 Willem de Bruijn 提交于 
      sk_flags is reaching its limit. New timestamping options will not fit.
Move all of them into a new field sk->sk_tsflags.

Added benefit is that this removes boilerplate code to convert between
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_.. and SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_.. in getsockopt/setsockopt.

SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE is also used to toggle the receive
timestamp logic (netstamp_needed). That can be simplified and this
last key removed, but will leave that for a separate patch.
Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>

----

The u16 in sock can be moved into a 16-bit hole below sk_gso_max_segs,
though that scatters tstamp fields throughout the struct.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b9f40e21
    • W
      net-timestamp: extend SCM_TIMESTAMPING ancillary data struct · f24b9be5
      由 Willem de Bruijn 提交于 
      Applications that request kernel tx timestamps with SO_TIMESTAMPING
read timestamps as recvmsg() ancillary data. The response is defined
implicitly as timespec[3].

1) define struct scm_timestamping explicitly and

2) add support for new tstamp types. On tx, scm_timestamping always
   accompanies a sock_extended_err. Define previously unused field
   ee_info to signal the type of ts[0]. Introduce SCM_TSTAMP_SND to
   define the existing behavior.

The reception path is not modified. On rx, no struct similar to
sock_extended_err is passed along with SCM_TIMESTAMPING.
Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f24b9be5
    • N
      tcp: reduce spurious retransmits due to transient SACK reneging · 5ae344c9
      由 Neal Cardwell 提交于 
      This commit reduces spurious retransmits due to apparent SACK reneging
by only reacting to SACK reneging that persists for a short delay.

When a sequence space hole at snd_una is filled, some TCP receivers
send a series of ACKs as they apparently scan their out-of-order queue
and cumulatively ACK all the packets that have now been consecutiveyly
received. This is essentially misbehavior B in "Misbehaviors in TCP
SACK generation" ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, April
2011, so we suspect that this is from several common OSes (Windows
2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows XP). However, this issue has also
been seen in other cases, e.g. the netdev thread "TCP being hoodwinked
into spurious retransmissions by lack of timestamps?" from March 2014,
where the receiver was thought to be a BSD box.

Since snd_una would temporarily be adjacent to a previously SACKed
range in these scenarios, this receiver behavior triggered the Linux
SACK reneging code path in the sender. This led the sender to clear
the SACK scoreboard, enter CA_Loss, and spuriously retransmit
(potentially) every packet from the entire write queue at line rate
just a few milliseconds before the ACK for each packet arrives at the
sender.

To avoid such situations, now when a sender sees apparent reneging it
does not yet retransmit, but rather adjusts the RTO timer to give the
receiver a little time (max(RTT/2, 10ms)) to send us some more ACKs
that will restore sanity to the SACK scoreboard. If the reneging
persists until this RTO then, as before, we clear the SACK scoreboard
and enter CA_Loss.

A 10ms delay tolerates a receiver sending such a stream of ACKs at
56Kbit/sec. And to allow for receivers with slower or more congested
paths, we wait for at least RTT/2.

We validated the resulting max(RTT/2, 10ms) delay formula with a mix
of North American and South American Google web server traffic, and
found that for ACKs displaying transient reneging:

 (1) 90% of inter-ACK delays were less than 10ms
 (2) 99% of inter-ACK delays were less than RTT/2

In tests on Google web servers this commit reduced reneging events by
75%-90% (as measured by the TcpExtTCPSACKReneging counter), without
any measurable impact on latency for user HTTP and SPDY requests.
Signed-off-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5ae344c9
    • T
      random: introduce getrandom(2) system call · c6e9d6f3
      由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于 
      The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers.  It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.

The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
/dev/[u]random is not available.  Since the fallback code is often not
well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
entirely.

The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
/dev/urandom entropy pool.  Historically, the emphasis in the
/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
before the init scripts start execution.

This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
acceptable.  In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not).  However,
on an embedded system, this may not be the case.  And so with this new
interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
urandom pool has been initialized.  Any userspace program which uses
this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.

SYNOPSIS
	#include <linux/random.h>

	int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);

DESCRIPTION
	The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
	with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
	space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
	cryptographic uses.  It should not be used for Monte Carlo
	simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
	probabilistic sampling.

	If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
	/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool.  The
	/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
	obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
	entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
	If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
	either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
	the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.

	If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
	will be used.  Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
	/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
	initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
	errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).

	The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
	the following function:

            int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
            {
                    int     ret;

                    if (buflen > 256)
                            goto failure;
                    ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
                    if (ret < 0)
                            return ret;
                    if (ret == buflen)
                            return 0;
            failure:
                    errno = EIO;
                    return -1;
            }

RETURN VALUE
       On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
       returned.  This may not be all the bytes requested by the
       caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
       /dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
       signal.

       On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.

ERRORS
	EINVAL		An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)

	EFAULT		buf is outside the accessible address space.

	EAGAIN		The requested entropy was not available, and
			getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
			GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.

	EINTR		While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
			interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
			of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
			are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
			in the signal(7) man page.

NOTES
	For small requests (buflen <= 256) getrandom(2) will not
	return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
	entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
	the bytes that have been requested.  This is the recommended
	way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
	with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.

	However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
	block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
	environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
	will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
	who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime.  Since it may
	block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply.  The
	user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
	so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
	would be unfriendly.

	For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
	the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
	bytes than requested was returned.  In the case of
	!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
	happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
	should be careful) should check for this anyway!

	Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
	perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
	GRND_RANDOM.  The cryptographic algorithms used for
	/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
	sufficient for all purposes.  The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
	is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
	deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NZach Brown <zab@zabbo.net>
      c6e9d6f3
    • B
      regulator: act8865: add support for act8846 · ac0c0ea8
      由 Beniamino Galvani 提交于 
      Add device id and definition of registers and regulators to support
the act8846 PMU.
Signed-off-by: NBeniamino Galvani <b.galvani@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NWenyou Yang <wenyou.yang@atmel.com>
Reviewed-by: NAxel Lin <axel.lin@ingics.com>
Signed-off-by: NMark Brown <broonie@linaro.org>
      ac0c0ea8
    • B
      regulator: act8865: prepare support for other act88xx devices · 50a03e35
      由 Beniamino Galvani 提交于 
      This patch prepares support for other devices in the act88xx family of
PMUs manufactured by Active-Semi.

http://www.active-semi.com/products/power-management-units/act88xx/Signed-off-by: NBeniamino Galvani <b.galvani@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NWenyou Yang <wenyou.yang@atmel.com>
Reviewed-by: NAxel Lin <axel.lin@ingics.com>
Signed-off-by: NMark Brown <broonie@linaro.org>
      50a03e35
  5. 04 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  7. 03 8月, 2014 3 次提交