Skip to content

R
raspberrypi-kernel

openeuler / raspberrypi-kernel

通知 13
Star 1
Fork 0
R
raspberrypi-kernel
切换分支/标签
  1. 20 4月, 2011 2 次提交
  3. 02 4月, 2011 1 次提交
  5. 20 1月, 2011 1 次提交
  7. 30 11月, 2010 1 次提交
    • S
      sctp: kill unused macros in head file · 49b4a654
      由 Shan Wei 提交于 
      1. SCTP_CMD_NUM_VERBS,SCTP_CMD_MAX
These two macros have never been used for several years since v2.6.12-rc2.

2.sctp_port_rover,sctp_port_alloc_lock
The commit 063930 abandoned global variables of port_rover and port_alloc_lock,
but still keep two macros to refer to them.
So, remove them now.

commit 06393009
Author: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Date:   Wed Oct 10 17:30:18 2007 -0700

    [SCTP]: port randomization
Signed-off-by: NShan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      49b4a654
  9. 29 11月, 2010 1 次提交
  11. 02 11月, 2010 1 次提交
  13. 24 9月, 2010 1 次提交
  15. 27 8月, 2010 1 次提交
  17. 03 6月, 2010 1 次提交
  19. 26 5月, 2010 1 次提交
    • D
      sctp: dubious bitfields in sctp_transport · ff937938
      由 Dan Carpenter 提交于 
      Sparse complains because these one-bit bitfields are signed.
  include/net/sctp/structs.h:879:24: error: dubious one-bit signed bitfield
  include/net/sctp/structs.h:889:31: error: dubious one-bit signed bitfield
  include/net/sctp/structs.h:895:26: error: dubious one-bit signed bitfield
  include/net/sctp/structs.h:898:31: error: dubious one-bit signed bitfield
  include/net/sctp/structs.h:901:27: error: dubious one-bit signed bitfield

It doesn't cause a problem in the current code, but it would be better
to clean it up.  This was introduced by c0058a35: "sctp: Save some
room in the sctp_transport by using bitfields".
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ff937938
  21. 06 5月, 2010 1 次提交
    • V
      sctp: Fix a race between ICMP protocol unreachable and connect() · 50b5d6ad
      由 Vlad Yasevich 提交于 
      ICMP protocol unreachable handling completely disregarded
the fact that the user may have locked the socket.  It proceeded
to destroy the association, even though the user may have
held the lock and had a ref on the association.  This resulted
in the following:

Attempt to release alive inet socket f6afcc00

=========================
[ BUG: held lock freed! ]
-------------------------
somenu/2672 is freeing memory f6afcc00-f6afcfff, with a lock still held
there!
 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [<c122098a>] sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c
1 lock held by somenu/2672:
 #0:  (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [<c122098a>] sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c

stack backtrace:
Pid: 2672, comm: somenu Not tainted 2.6.32-telco #55
Call Trace:
 [<c1232266>] ? printk+0xf/0x11
 [<c1038553>] debug_check_no_locks_freed+0xce/0xff
 [<c10620b4>] kmem_cache_free+0x21/0x66
 [<c1185f25>] __sk_free+0x9d/0xab
 [<c1185f9c>] sk_free+0x1c/0x1e
 [<c1216e38>] sctp_association_put+0x32/0x89
 [<c1220865>] __sctp_connect+0x36d/0x3f4
 [<c122098a>] ? sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c
 [<c102d073>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x33
 [<c12209a8>] sctp_connect+0x31/0x4c
 [<c11d1e80>] inet_dgram_connect+0x4b/0x55
 [<c11834fa>] sys_connect+0x54/0x71
 [<c103a3a2>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x88/0x239
 [<c1054026>] ? might_fault+0x42/0x7c
 [<c1054026>] ? might_fault+0x42/0x7c
 [<c11847ab>] sys_socketcall+0x6d/0x178
 [<c10da994>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0xc/0x10
 [<c1002959>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb

This was because the sctp_wait_for_connect() would aqcure the socket
lock and then proceed to release the last reference count on the
association, thus cause the fully destruction path to finish freeing
the socket.

The simplest solution is to start a very short timer in case the socket
is owned by user.  When the timer expires, we can do some verification
and be able to do the release properly.
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      50b5d6ad
  23. 01 5月, 2010 6 次提交
  25. 29 4月, 2010 3 次提交
    • N
      sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4) · 5fa782c2
      由 Neil Horman 提交于 
      Ok, version 4

Change Notes:
1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes

Summary:

Hey-
	Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the
following way:

<5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91!
<5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1]
<5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter
ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U)
vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5
ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss
snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore
pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi
mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod
<5> CPU:    0
<5> EIP:    0060:[<c02bff27>]    Not tainted VLI
<5> EFLAGS: 00010216   (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL)
<5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d
<5> eax: 0000002c   ebx: c033f461   ecx: c0357d96   edx: c040fd44
<5> esi: c033f461   edi: df653280   ebp: 00000000   esp: c040fd40
<5> ds: 007b   es: 007b   ss: 0068
<5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0)
<5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180
e0c2947d
<5>        00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004
df653490
<5>        00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e
00000004
<5> Call Trace:
<5>  [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp]
<5>  [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233
<5>  [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp]
<5>  [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter]
<5>  [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81
<5>  [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151
<5>  [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151
<5>  [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5
<5>  [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9
<5>  [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151
<5>  [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4
<5>  [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b
<5>  [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd]
<5>  [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9
<5>  [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8
<5>  [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79
<5>  [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f
<5>  [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d

Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in
which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed.

The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param:
if (NULL == *errp)
	*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk,
					 ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length));

	if (*errp) {
		sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
				 WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)));
		sctp_addto_chunk(*errp,
			WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)),
				  param.v);

When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires
that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally,
given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter.  Unfortunately,
we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error
chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation
requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data.

The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a
listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173

I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue.  We move to a
strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't
have space to report.  Tested by me successfully
Signed-off-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5fa782c2
    • V
      sctp: Fix oops when sending queued ASCONF chunks · c0786693
      由 Vlad Yasevich 提交于 
      When we finish processing ASCONF_ACK chunk, we try to send
the next queued ASCONF.  This action runs the sctp state
machine recursively and it's not prepared to do so.

kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:790!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/module/ipv6/initstate
Modules linked in: sha256_generic sctp libcrc32c ipv6 dm_multipath
uinput 8139too i2c_piix4 8139cp mii i2c_core pcspkr virtio_net joydev
floppy virtio_blk virtio_pci [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]

Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.34-rc4 #15 /Bochs
EIP: 0060:[<c044a2ef>] EFLAGS: 00010286 CPU: 0
EIP is at add_timer+0xd/0x1b
EAX: cecbab14 EBX: 000000f0 ECX: c0957b1c EDX: 03595cf4
ESI: cecba800 EDI: cf276f00 EBP: c0957aa0 ESP: c0957aa0
 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
Process swapper (pid: 0, ti=c0956000 task=c0988ba0 task.ti=c0956000)
Stack:
 c0957ae0 d1851214 c0ab62e4 c0ab5f26 0500ffff 00000004 00000005 00000004
<0> 00000000 d18694fd 00000004 1666b892 cecba800 cecba800 c0957b14
00000004
<0> c0957b94 d1851b11 ceda8b00 cecba800 cf276f00 00000001 c0957b14
000000d0
Call Trace:
 [<d1851214>] ? sctp_side_effects+0x607/0xdfc [sctp]
 [<d1851b11>] ? sctp_do_sm+0x108/0x159 [sctp]
 [<d1863386>] ? sctp_pname+0x0/0x1d [sctp]
 [<d1861a56>] ? sctp_primitive_ASCONF+0x36/0x3b [sctp]
 [<d185657c>] ? sctp_process_asconf_ack+0x2a4/0x2d3 [sctp]
 [<d184e35c>] ? sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack+0x1dd/0x2b4 [sctp]
 [<d1851ac1>] ? sctp_do_sm+0xb8/0x159 [sctp]
 [<d1863334>] ? sctp_cname+0x0/0x52 [sctp]
 [<d1854377>] ? sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xac/0xe1 [sctp]
 [<d1858f0f>] ? sctp_inq_push+0x2d/0x30 [sctp]
 [<d186329d>] ? sctp_rcv+0x797/0x82e [sctp]
Tested-by: NWei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NYuansong Qiao <ysqiao@research.ait.ie>
Signed-off-by: NShuaijun Zhang <szhang@research.ait.ie>
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c0786693
    • W
      sctp: avoid irq lock inversion while call sk->sk_data_ready() · 561b1733
      由 Wei Yongjun 提交于 
      sk->sk_data_ready() of sctp socket can be called from both BH and non-BH
contexts, but the default sk->sk_data_ready(), sock_def_readable(), can
not be used in this case. Therefore, we have to make a new function
sctp_data_ready() to grab sk->sk_data_ready() with BH disabling.

=========================================================
[ INFO: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected ]
2.6.33-rc6 #129
---------------------------------------------------------
sctp_darn/1517 just changed the state of lock:
 (clock-AF_INET){++.?..}, at: [<c06aab60>] sock_def_readable+0x20/0x80
but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
 (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}

and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

other info that might help us debug this:
1 lock held by sctp_darn/1517:
 #0:  (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [<cdfe363d>] sctp_sendmsg+0x23d/0xc00 [sctp]
Signed-off-by: NWei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      561b1733
  27. 22 3月, 2010 1 次提交
  29. 04 12月, 2009 1 次提交
  31. 29 11月, 2009 1 次提交
    • A
      sctp: on T3_RTX retransmit all the in-flight chunks · 5fdd4bae
      由 Andrei Pelinescu-Onciul 提交于 
      When retransmitting due to T3 timeout, retransmit all the
in-flight chunks for the corresponding  transport/path, including
chunks sent less then 1 rto ago.
This is the correct behaviour according to rfc4960 section 6.3.3
E3 and
"Note: Any DATA chunks that were sent to the address for which the
 T3-rtx timer expired but did not fit in one MTU (rule E3 above)
 should be marked for retransmission and sent as soon as cwnd
 allows (normally, when a SACK arrives). ".

This fixes problems when more then one path is present and the T3
retransmission of the first chunk that timeouts stops the T3 timer
for the initial active path, leaving all the other in-flight
chunks waiting forever or until a new chunk is transmitted on the
same path and timeouts (and this will happen only if the cwnd
allows sending new chunks, but since cwnd was dropped to MTU by
the timeout => it will wait until the first heartbeat).

Example: 10 packets in flight, sent at 0.1 s intervals on the
primary path. The primary path is down and the first packet
timeouts. The first packet is retransmitted on another path, the
T3 timer for the primary path is stopped and cwnd is set to MTU.
All the other 9 in-flight packets will not be retransmitted
(unless more new packets are sent on the primary path which depend
on cwnd allowing it, and even in this case the 9 packets will be
retransmitted only after a new packet timeouts which even in the
best case would be more then RTO).

This commit reverts d0ce9291 and
also removes the now unused transport->last_rto, introduced in
 b6157d8e.

p.s  The problem is not only when multiple paths are there.  It
can happen in a single homed environment.  If the application
stops sending data, it possible to have a hung association.
Signed-off-by: NAndrei Pelinescu-Onciul <andrei@iptel.org>
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5fdd4bae
  33. 24 11月, 2009 7 次提交
  35. 14 11月, 2009 1 次提交
    • V
      sctp: Set source addresses on the association before adding transports · 409b95af
      由 Vlad Yasevich 提交于 
      Recent commit 8da645e1
	sctp: Get rid of an extra routing lookup when adding a transport
introduced a regression in the connection setup.  The behavior was

different between IPv4 and IPv6.  IPv4 case ended up working because the
route lookup routing returned a NULL route, which triggered another
route lookup later in the output patch that succeeded.  In the IPv6 case,
a valid route was returned for first call, but we could not find a valid
source address at the time since the source addresses were not set on the
association yet.  Thus resulted in a hung connection.

The solution is to set the source addresses on the association prior to
adding peers.
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      409b95af
  37. 04 11月, 2009 1 次提交
  39. 01 10月, 2009 1 次提交
  41. 05 9月, 2009 6 次提交
    • W
      sctp: turn flags in 'struct sctp_association' into bit fields · 9237ccbc
      由 Wei Yongjun 提交于 
      This shrinks the size of struct sctp_association a little.
Signed-off-by: NWei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
      9237ccbc
    • B
      sctp: Sysctl configuration for IPv4 Address Scoping · 72388433
      由 Bhaskar Dutta 提交于 
      This patch introduces a new sysctl option to make IPv4 Address Scoping
configurable <draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00.txt>.

In networking environments where DNAT rules in iptables prerouting
chains convert destination IP's to link-local/private IP addresses,
SCTP connections fail to establish as the INIT chunk is dropped by the
kernel due to address scope match failure.
For example to support overlapping IP addresses (same IP address with
different vlan id) a Layer-5 application listens on link local IP's,
and there is a DNAT rule that maps the destination IP to a link local
IP. Such applications never get the SCTP INIT if the address-scoping
draft is strictly followed.

This sysctl configuration allows SCTP to function in such
unconventional networking environments.

Sysctl options:
0 - Disable IPv4 address scoping draft altogether
1 - Enable IPv4 address scoping (default, current behavior)
2 - Enable address scoping but allow IPv4 private addresses in init/init-ack
3 - Enable address scoping but allow IPv4 link local address in init/init-ack
Signed-off-by: NBhaskar Dutta <bhaskar.dutta@globallogic.com>
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
      72388433
    • V
      sctp: Turn flags in 'sctp_packet' into bit fields · a803c942
      由 Vlad Yasevich 提交于 
      This shrinks the size of sctp_packet a little.
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
      a803c942
    • V
      sctp: Fix SCTP_MAXSEG socket option to comply to spec. · f68b2e05
      由 Vlad Yasevich 提交于 
      We had a bug that we never stored the user-defined value for
MAXSEG when setting the value on an association.  Thus future
PMTU events ended up re-writing the frag point and increasing
it past user limit.  Additionally, when setting the option on
the socket/endpoint, we effect all current associations, which
is against spec.

Now, we store the user 'maxseg' value along with the computed
'frag_point'.  We inherit 'maxseg' from the socket at association
creation and use it as an upper limit for 'frag_point' when its
set.
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
      f68b2e05
    • V
      sctp: Don't do NAGLE delay on large writes that were fragmented small · cb95ea32
      由 Vlad Yasevich 提交于 
      SCTP will delay the last part of a large write due to NAGLE, if that
part is smaller then MTU.  Since we are doing large writes, we might
as well send the last portion now instead of waiting untill the next
large write happens.  The small portion will be sent as is regardless,
so it's better to not delay it.

This is a result of much discussions with Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
and Doug Graham <dgraham@nortel.com>.  Many thanks go out to them.
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
      cb95ea32
    • V
      sctp: drop a_rwnd to 0 when receive buffer overflows. · 4d3c46e6
      由 Vlad Yasevich 提交于 
      SCTP has a problem that when small chunks are used, it is possible
to exhaust the receiver buffer without fully closing receive window.
This happens due to all overhead that we have account for with small
messages.  To fix this, when receive buffer is exceeded, we'll drop
the window to 0 and save the 'drop' portion.  When application starts
reading data and freeing up recevie buffer space, we'll wait until
we've reached the 'drop' window and then add back this 'drop' one
mtu at a time.  This worked well in testing and under stress produced
rather even recovery.
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
      4d3c46e6