1. 19 12月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      net: Allow accepted sockets to be bound to l3mdev domain · 6dd9a14e
      David Ahern 提交于
      Allow accepted sockets to derive their sk_bound_dev_if setting from the
      l3mdev domain in which the packets originated. A sysctl setting is added
      to control the behavior which is similar to sk_mark and
      sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept.
      
      This effectively allow a process to have a "VRF-global" listen socket,
      with child sockets bound to the VRF device in which the packet originated.
      A similar behavior can be achieved using sk_mark, but a solution using marks
      is incomplete as it does not handle duplicate addresses in different L3
      domains/VRFs. Allowing sockets to inherit the sk_bound_dev_if from l3mdev
      domain provides a complete solution.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6dd9a14e
  2. 18 12月, 2015 1 次提交
  3. 17 12月, 2015 1 次提交
  4. 16 12月, 2015 6 次提交
  5. 15 12月, 2015 2 次提交
    • E
      net: fix IP early demux races · 5037e9ef
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      David Wilder reported crashes caused by dst reuse.
      
      <quote David>
        I am seeing a crash on a distro V4.2.3 kernel caused by a double
        release of a dst_entry.  In ipv4_dst_destroy() the call to
        list_empty() finds a poisoned next pointer, indicating the dst_entry
        has already been removed from the list and freed. The crash occurs
        18 to 24 hours into a run of a network stress exerciser.
      </quote>
      
      Thanks to his detailed report and analysis, we were able to understand
      the core issue.
      
      IP early demux can associate a dst to skb, after a lookup in TCP/UDP
      sockets.
      
      When socket cache is not properly set, we want to store into
      sk->sk_dst_cache the dst for future IP early demux lookups,
      by acquiring a stable refcount on the dst.
      
      Problem is this acquisition is simply using an atomic_inc(),
      which works well, unless the dst was queued for destruction from
      dst_release() noticing dst refcount went to zero, if DST_NOCACHE
      was set on dst.
      
      We need to make sure current refcount is not zero before incrementing
      it, or risk double free as David reported.
      
      This patch, being a stable candidate, adds two new helpers, and use
      them only from IP early demux problematic paths.
      
      It might be possible to merge in net-next skb_dst_force() and
      skb_dst_force_safe(), but I prefer having the smallest patch for stable
      kernels : Maybe some skb_dst_force() callers do not expect skb->dst
      can suddenly be cleared.
      
      Can probably be backported back to linux-3.6 kernels
      Reported-by: NDavid J. Wilder <dwilder@us.ibm.com>
      Tested-by: NDavid J. Wilder <dwilder@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5037e9ef
    • H
      net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument · 79462ad0
      Hannes Frederic Sowa 提交于
      郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
      using a simple program:
      
      	int socket_fd;
      	struct sockaddr_in addr;
      	addr.sin_port = 0;
      	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
      	addr.sin_family = 10;
      
      	socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
      	connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
      
      AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
      identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
      thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
      store a zero in the protocol fields.
      
      This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
      the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
      is NULL for raw sockets.
      
      kernel: Call Trace:
      kernel:  [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
      kernel:  [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
      kernel:  [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
      kernel:  [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
      kernel:  [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
      kernel:  [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
      kernel:  [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
      
      I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
      
      CVE: CVE-2015-8543
      Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
      Reported-by: N郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
      Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      79462ad0
  6. 14 12月, 2015 1 次提交
  7. 11 12月, 2015 1 次提交
  8. 04 12月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      ipv4: igmp: Allow removing groups from a removed interface · 4eba7bb1
      Andrew Lunn 提交于
      When a multicast group is joined on a socket, a struct ip_mc_socklist
      is appended to the sockets mc_list containing information about the
      joined group.
      
      If the interface is hot unplugged, this entry becomes stale. Prior to
      commit 52ad353a ("igmp: fix the problem when mc leave group") it
      was possible to remove the stale entry by performing a
      IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP, passing either the old ifindex or ip address on
      the interface. However, this fix enforces that the interface must
      still exist. Thus with time, the number of stale entries grows, until
      sysctl_igmp_max_memberships is reached and then it is not possible to
      join and more groups.
      
      The previous patch fixes an issue where a IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP is
      performed without specifying the interface, either by ifindex or ip
      address. However here we do supply one of these. So loosen the
      restriction on device existence to only apply when the interface has
      not been specified. This then restores the ability to clean up the
      stale entries.
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
      Fixes: 52ad353a "(igmp: fix the problem when mc leave group")
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      4eba7bb1
  9. 03 12月, 2015 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: suppress too verbose messages in tcp_send_ack() · 7450aaf6
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      If tcp_send_ack() can not allocate skb, we properly handle this
      and setup a timer to try later.
      
      Use __GFP_NOWARN to avoid polluting syslog in the case host is
      under memory pressure, so that pertinent messages are not lost under
      a flood of useless information.
      
      sk_gfp_atomic() can use its gfp_mask argument (all callers currently
      were using GFP_ATOMIC before this patch)
      
      We rename sk_gfp_atomic() to sk_gfp_mask() to clearly express this
      function now takes into account its second argument (gfp_mask)
      
      Note that when tcp_transmit_skb() is called with clone_it set to false,
      we do not attempt memory allocations, so can pass a 0 gfp_mask, which
      most compilers can emit faster than a non zero or constant value.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7450aaf6
  10. 02 12月, 2015 1 次提交
    • E
      net: rename SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE and SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA · 9cd3e072
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      This patch is a cleanup to make following patch easier to
      review.
      
      Goal is to move SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE and SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA
      from (struct socket)->flags to a (struct socket_wq)->flags
      to benefit from RCU protection in sock_wake_async()
      
      To ease backports, we rename both constants.
      
      Two new helpers, sk_set_bit(int nr, struct sock *sk)
      and sk_clear_bit(int net, struct sock *sk) are added so that
      following patch can change their implementation.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      9cd3e072
  11. 01 12月, 2015 7 次提交
  12. 25 11月, 2015 2 次提交
  13. 24 11月, 2015 9 次提交
  14. 23 11月, 2015 1 次提交
    • N
      net: ipmr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table destruction · 0e615e96
      Nikolay Aleksandrov 提交于
      When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static
      devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed
      (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example:
      unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192):
        comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s)
        hex dump (first 32 bytes):
          98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff  .S.4.....S.4....
          ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  ................
        backtrace:
          [<ffffffff815c1b9e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
          [<ffffffff811ea6e0>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300
          [<ffffffff815931cb>] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910
          [<ffffffff8153d575>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0
          [<ffffffff8153e490>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0
          [<ffffffff81564e13>] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90
          [<ffffffff814d1e14>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
          [<ffffffff814d0b51>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0
          [<ffffffff815cdbf6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
          [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
      
      Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction.
      Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
      Reviewed-by: NCong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      0e615e96
  15. 20 11月, 2015 3 次提交
  16. 19 11月, 2015 2 次提交
    • E
      tcp: md5: fix lockdep annotation · 1b8e6a01
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      When a passive TCP is created, we eventually call tcp_md5_do_add()
      with sk pointing to the child. It is not owner by the user yet (we
      will add this socket into listener accept queue a bit later anyway)
      
      But we do own the spinlock, so amend the lockdep annotation to avoid
      following splat :
      
      [ 8451.090932] net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:923 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
      [ 8451.090932]
      [ 8451.090932] other info that might help us debug this:
      [ 8451.090932]
      [ 8451.090934]
      [ 8451.090934] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
      [ 8451.090936] 3 locks held by socket_sockopt_/214795:
      [ 8451.090936]  #0:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff855c6ac1>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x151/0xe90
      [ 8451.090947]  #1:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff85618143>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
      [ 8451.090952]  #2:  (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff855acda5>] sk_clone_lock+0x1c5/0x500
      [ 8451.090958]
      [ 8451.090958] stack backtrace:
      [ 8451.090960] CPU: 7 PID: 214795 Comm: socket_sockopt_
      
      [ 8451.091215] Call Trace:
      [ 8451.091216]  <IRQ>  [<ffffffff856fb29c>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76
      [ 8451.091229]  [<ffffffff85123b5b>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xeb/0x110
      [ 8451.091235]  [<ffffffff8564544f>] tcp_md5_do_add+0x1bf/0x1e0
      [ 8451.091239]  [<ffffffff85645751>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x1f1/0x4c0
      [ 8451.091242]  [<ffffffff85642b27>] ? tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb+0x167/0x190
      [ 8451.091246]  [<ffffffff85647c78>] tcp_check_req+0x3c8/0x500
      [ 8451.091249]  [<ffffffff856451ae>] ? tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash+0x11e/0x190
      [ 8451.091253]  [<ffffffff85647170>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3c0/0x9f0
      [ 8451.091256]  [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
      [ 8451.091260]  [<ffffffff856181b6>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb6/0x2b0
      [ 8451.091263]  [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
      [ 8451.091267]  [<ffffffff85618d38>] ip_local_deliver+0x48/0x80
      [ 8451.091270]  [<ffffffff85618510>] ip_rcv_finish+0x160/0x700
      [ 8451.091273]  [<ffffffff8561900e>] ip_rcv+0x29e/0x3d0
      [ 8451.091277]  [<ffffffff855c74b7>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb47/0xe90
      
      Fixes: a8afca03 ("tcp: md5: protects md5sig_info with RCU")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      1b8e6a01
    • S
      945fae44