At some point I think I messed up and dropped the calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()
which are necessary for CIPSO to send error notifications to remote systems.
This patch re-introduces the error handling calls into the SELinux code.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This reverts commit 811f3799.

From Eric Paris:

"Please drop this patch for now.  It deadlocks on ntfs-3g.  I need to
rework it to handle fuse filesystems better.  (casey was right)"

Currently if a FS is mounted for which SELinux policy does not define an
fs_use_* that FS will either be genfs labeled or not labeled at all.
This decision is based on the existence of a genfscon rule in policy and
is irrespective of the capabilities of the filesystem itself.  This
patch allows the kernel to check if the filesystem supports security
xattrs and if so will use those if there is no fs_use_* rule in policy.
An fstype with a no fs_use_* rule but with a genfs rule will use xattrs
if available and will follow the genfs rule.

This can be particularly interesting for things like ecryptfs which
actually overlays a real underlying FS.  If we define excryptfs in
policy to use xattrs we will likely get this wrong at times, so with
this path we just don't need to define it!

Overlay ecryptfs on top of NFS with no xattr support:
SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses genfs_contexts
Overlay ecryptfs on top of ext4 with xattr support:
SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses xattr

It is also useful as the kernel adds new FS we don't need to add them in
policy if they support xattrs and that is how we want to handle them.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove inherit field from inode_security_struct, per Stephen Smalley:
"Let's just drop inherit altogether - dead field."
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

reorder inode_security_struct to remove padding on 64 bit builds

size reduced from 72 to 64 bytes increasing objects per slab to 64.
Signed-off-by: NRichard Kennedy <richard@rsk.demon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Formatting and syntax changes

whitespace, tabs to spaces, trailing space
put open { on same line as struct def
remove unneeded {} after if statements
change printk("Lu") to printk("llu")
convert asm/uaccess.h to linux/uaacess.h includes
remove unnecessary asm/bug.h includes
convert all users of simple_strtol to strict_strtol
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Introduce SELinux support for deferred mapping of security contexts in
the SID table upon policy reload, and use this support for inode
security contexts when the context is not yet valid under the current
policy.  Only processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in
policy can set undefined security contexts on inodes.  Inodes with
such undefined contexts are treated as having the unlabeled context
until the context becomes valid upon a policy reload that defines the
context.  Context invalidation upon policy reload also uses this
support to save the context information in the SID table and later
recover it upon a subsequent policy reload that defines the context
again.

This support is to enable package managers and similar programs to set
down file contexts unknown to the system policy at the time the file
is created in order to better support placing loadable policy modules
in packages and to support build systems that need to create images of
different distro releases with different policies w/o requiring all of
the contexts to be defined or legal in the build host policy.

With this patch applied, the following sequence is possible, although
in practice it is recommended that this permission only be allowed to
specific program domains such as the package manager.

# rmdir baz
# rm bar
# touch bar
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined
chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# cat setundefined.te
policy_module(setundefined, 1.0)
require {
	type unconfined_t;
	type unlabeled_t;
}
files_type(unlabeled_t)
allow unconfined_t self:capability2 mac_admin;
# make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile setundefined.pp
# semodule -i setundefined.pp
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r--  root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t    bar
drwxr-xr-x  root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t    baz
# cat foo.te
policy_module(foo, 1.0)
type foo_exec_t;
files_type(foo_exec_t)
# make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile foo.pp
# semodule -i foo.pp # defines foo_exec_t
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r--  root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t       bar
drwxr-xr-x  root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t    baz
# semodule -r foo
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r--  root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t    bar
drwxr-xr-x  root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t    baz
# semodule -i foo.pp
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r--  root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t       bar
drwxr-xr-x  root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t    baz
# semodule -r setundefined foo
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # no longer defined and not allowed
chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# rmdir baz
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add missing consts to xattr function arguments.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This patch changes selinux/include/security.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
location of { around structs and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
no assignments in if statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch changes objsec.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
location of { around structs and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
no assignments in if statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch changes netlabel.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

spaces used instead of tabs
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch changes avc_ss.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
location of { around structs and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
no assignments in if statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to
lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NAhmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Thank you, git.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Much like we added a network node cache, this patch adds a network port
cache. The design is taken almost completely from the network node cache
which in turn was taken from the network interface cache.  The basic idea is
to cache entries in a hash table based on protocol/port information.  The
hash function only takes the port number into account since the number of
different protocols in use at any one time is expected to be relatively
small.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Convert the strings used for mount options into #defines rather than
retyping the string throughout the SELinux code.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Introduce the concept of a permissive type.  A new ebitmap is introduced to
the policy database which indicates if a given type has the permissive bit
set or not.  This bit is tested for the scontext of any denial.  The bit is
meaningless on types which only appear as the target of a decision and never
the source.  A domain running with a permissive type will be allowed to
perform any action similarly to when the system is globally set permissive.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This changes checks related to ptrace to get rid of the ptrace_sid tracking.
It's good to disentangle the security model from the ptrace implementation
internals.  It's sufficient to check against the SID of the ptracer at the
time a tracee attempts a transition.
Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file.  The idea
is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same
thing.  Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to /tmp/output
than if the program tried to directly open /tmp/output. This should allow
policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the
policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so
good at catching today.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove unused backpoiters from security objects.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The RCU/spinlock locking approach for the nlbl_state in the sk_security_struct
was almost certainly overkill.  This patch removes both the RCU and spinlock
locking, relying on the existing socket locks to handle the case of multiple
writers.  This change also makes several code reductions possible.

Less locking, less code - it's a Good Thing.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The xfrm_get_policy() and xfrm_add_pol_expire() put some rather large structs
on the stack to work around the LSM API.  This patch attempts to fix that
problem by changing the LSM API to require only the relevant "security"
pointers instead of the entire SPD entry; we do this for all of the
security_xfrm_policy*() functions to keep things consistent.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

More cases where SELinux must not re-enter the fs code. Called from the
d_instantiate security hook.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Introduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount
options.  This includes a new string parsing function exported from the
LSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security
data blob.  This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary
mount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be
handled by the loaded LSM.  Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK
when dealing with binary mount data.  If the binary mount data is less
than one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an
illegal page fault and boom.  Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code
since they were broken by past NFS changes.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

audit_log_d_path() is a d_path() wrapper that is used by the audit code.  To
use a struct path in audit_log_d_path() I need to embed it into struct
avc_audit_data.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NJan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix SELinux to handle 64-bit capabilities correctly, and to catch
future extensions of capabilities beyond 64 bits to ensure that SELinux
is properly updated.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The security_get_policycaps() functions has a couple of bugs in it and it
isn't currently used by any in-tree code, so get rid of it and all of it's
bugginess.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@localhost.localdomain>

Now that the SELinux NetLabel "base SID" is always the netmsg initial SID we
can do a big optimization - caching the SID and not just the MLS attributes.
This not only saves a lot of per-packet memory allocations and copies but it
has a nice side effect of removing a chunk of code.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch introduces a mechanism for checking when labeled IPsec or SECMARK
are in use by keeping introducing a configuration reference counter for each
subsystem.  In the case of labeled IPsec, whenever a labeled SA or SPD entry
is created the labeled IPsec/XFRM reference count is increased and when the
entry is removed it is decreased.  In the case of SECMARK, when a SECMARK
target is created the reference count is increased and later decreased when the
target is removed.  These reference counters allow SELinux to quickly determine
if either of these subsystems are enabled.

NetLabel already has a similar mechanism which provides the netlbl_enabled()
function.

This patch also renames the selinux_relabel_packet_permission() function to
selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission() as the original name and
description were misleading in that they referenced a single packet label which
is not the case.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Rework the handling of network peer labels so that the different peer labeling
subsystems work better together.  This includes moving both subsystems to a
single "peer" object class which involves not only changes to the permission
checks but an improved method of consolidating multiple packet peer labels.
As part of this work the inbound packet permission check code has been heavily
modified to handle both the old and new behavior in as sane a fashion as
possible.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add additional Flask definitions to support the new "peer" object class and
additional permissions to the netif, node, and packet object classes.  Also,
bring the kernel Flask definitions up to date with the Fedora SELinux policies
by adding the "flow_in" and "flow_out" permissions to the "packet" class.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22.  This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the
sel_netif_*() functions.  The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are
also modified to take advantage of this new functionality.  In addition, remove
the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is
redundant since we already have the address family.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex.  This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The current SELinux netif code requires the caller have a valid net_device
struct pointer to lookup network interface information.  However, we don't
always have a valid net_device pointer so convert the netif code to use
the ifindex values we always have as part of the sk_buff.  This patch also
removes the default message SID from the network interface record, it is
not being used and therefore is "dead code".
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

In order to do any sort of IP header inspection of incoming packets we need to
know which address family, AF_INET/AF_INET6/etc., it belongs to and since the
sk_buff structure does not store this information we need to pass along the
address family separate from the packet itself.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and
security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux.  This will allow
filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they
so choose.  This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so
it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future.

Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of
them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with
SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has.  I assume
future LSM's would do the same.  NFS is the primary FS which does not use
text mount data and thus must make use of this interface.

An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time
options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=.  If the LSM has no
mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops
take care of things.

An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in
security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would
need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM.  This
is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to
understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in
the FS which owns the options.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Allow policy to select, in much the same way as it selects MLS support, how
the kernel should handle access decisions which contain either unknown
classes or unknown permissions in known classes.  The three choices for the
policy flags are

0 - Deny unknown security access. (default)
2 - reject loading policy if it does not contain all definitions
4 - allow unknown security access

The policy's choice is exported through 2 booleans in
selinuxfs.  /selinux/deny_unknown and /selinux/reject_unknown.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>