The hard coded inode numbers in proc currently limit its maintainability,
its flexibility, and what can be done with the rest of system.  /proc limits
pid-max to 32768 on 32 bit systems it limits fd-max to 32768 on all systems,
and placing the pid in the inode number really gets in the way of implementing
subdirectories of per process information.

Ever since people started adding to the middle of the file type enumeration we
haven't been maintaing the historical inode numbers, all we have really
succeeded in doing is keeping the pid in the proc inode number.  The pid is
already available in the directory name so no information is lost removing it
from the inode number.

So if something in user space cares if we remove the inode number from the
/proc inode it is almost certainly broken.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

To remove the hard coded proc inode numbers it is necessary to be able to
create the proc inodes during readdir.  The instantiate methods are the subset
of lookup that is needed to accomplish that.

This first step just splits the lookup methods into 2 functions.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch generalizes the concept of files in /proc that are related to
processes but live in the root directory of /proc

Ideally this would reuse infrastructure from the rest of the process specific
parts of proc but unfortunately security_task_to_inode must not be called on
files that are not strictly per process.  security_task_to_inode really needs
to be reexamined as the security label can change in important places that we
are not currently catching, but I'm not certain that simplifies this problem.

By at least matching the structure of the rest of proc we get more idiom reuse
and it becomes easier to spot problems in the way things are put together.

Later things like /proc/mounts are likely to be moved into proc_base as well.
If union mounts are ever supported we may be able to make /proc a union mount,
and properly split it into 2 filesystems.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This moves the mount namespace into the nsproxy.  The mount namespace count
now refers to the number of nsproxies point to it, rather than the number of
tasks.  As a result, the unshare_namespace() function in kernel/fork.c no
longer checks whether it is being shared.
Signed-off-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Andrey Savochkin <saw@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Currently proc_pident_lookup gets the names and types from a table and then
has a huge switch statement to get the inode and file operations it needs.
That is silly and is becoming increasingly hard to maintain so I just put all
of the information in the table.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

There were enough changes in my last round of cleaning up proc I had to break
up the patch series into smaller chunks, and my last chunk never got resent.

This patchset gives proc dynamic inode numbers (the static inode numbers were
a pain to maintain and prevent all kinds of things), and removes the horrible
switch statements that had to be kept in sync with everything else.  Being
fully table driver takes us 90% of the way of being able to register new
process specific attributes in proc.

This patch:

Group the functions by what they implement instead of by type of operation.
As it existed base.c was quickly approaching the point where it could not be
followed.

No functionality or code changes asside from adding/removing forward
declartions are implemented in this patch.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report
process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system
calls.  For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at
must exit before readdir is called again.

This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of
posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to
readdir.

Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short
of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all
happens in on system call.

This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that
guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed
while reading the directory entry will be returned.  For directory that are
either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them.
 Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen.

These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and
more importantly that user space expects.  Plus it is a simple semantic to
implement reliable service.  It is just a matter of calling readdir a
second time if you are wondering if something new has show up.

These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in
numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset.

The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is
remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm.  Given that a typical
cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids.  There
are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space.  A typical system
will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to
look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the
entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable.

If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data
structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be
sufficient.

In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than
what we are doing now.

Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed.  It is possible
to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the
thread of it's thread group leader.  This patch carefully handles that case
so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the
de_thread dance.

Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for
providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it.

[oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it]
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NKAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

At the beginning of the routine, "copied" is set to 0, but it is no good
because in lines 805 and 812 it is set to other values.  Finally, the
routine returns as if it copied 12 (=ENOMEM) bytes less than it actually
did.
Signed-off-by: NFrederik Deweerdt <frederik.deweerdt@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NEric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This just turns off chmod() on the /proc/<pid>/ files, since there is no
good reason to allow it, and had we disallowed it originally, the nasty
/proc race exploit wouldn't have been possible.

The other patches already fixed the problem chmod() could cause, so this
is really just some final mop-up..

This particular version is based off a patch by Eugene and Marcel which
had much better naming than my original equivalent one.
Signed-off-by: NEugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Clearign all of i_mode was a bit draconian. We only really care about
S_ISUID/ISGID, after all.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

We have a bad interaction with both the kernel and user space being able
to change some of the /proc file status.  This fixes the most obvious
part of it, but I expect we'll also make it harder for users to modify
even their "own" files in /proc.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Signed-off-by: NJörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>

Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a
context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled
with that context.  This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a
process can specify the label of a file about to be created.  At this time one
envisioned user of this will be xinetd.  It will be able to better label
sockets for the actual services.  At this time all sockets take the label of
the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same.

I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener.  The sender was able to
write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label.
I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages
kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission
setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label
of the running process.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Try to make next_tid() a bit more readable and deletes unnecessary
"pid_alive(pos)" check.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

first_tid:

	/* If nr exceeds the number of threads there is nothing todo */
	if (nr) {
		if (nr >= get_nr_threads(leader))
			goto done;
	}

This is not reliable: sub-threads can exit after this check, so the
'for' loop below can overlap and proc_task_readdir() can return an
already filldir'ed dirents.

	for (; pos && pid_alive(pos); pos = next_thread(pos)) {
		if (--nr > 0)
			continue;

Off-by-one error, will return 'leader' when nr == 1.

This patch tries to fix these problems and simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This is just like my previous removal of tasklist_lock from first_tgid, and
next_tgid.  It simply had to wait until it was rcu safe to walk the thread
list.

This should be the last instance of the tasklist_lock in proc.  So user
processes should not be able to influence the tasklist lock hold times.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

In process of getting proc_fd_access_allowed to work it has developed a few
warts.  In particular the special case that always allows introspection and
the special case to allow inspection of kernel threads.

The special case for introspection is needed for /proc/self/mem.

The special case for kernel threads really should be overridable
by security modules.

So consolidate these checks into ptrace.c:may_attach().

The check to always allow introspection is trivial.

The check to allow access to kernel threads, and zombies is a little
trickier.  mem_read and mem_write already verify an mm exists so it isn't
needed twice.  proc_fd_access_allowed only doesn't want a check to verify
task->mm exits, s it prevents all access to kernel threads.  So just move
the task->mm check into ptrace_attach where it is needed for practical
reasons.

I did a quick audit and none of the security modules in the kernel seem to
care if they are passed a task without an mm into security_ptrace.  So the
above move should be safe and it allows security modules to come up with
more restrictive policy.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Since 2.2 we have been doing a chroot check to see if it is appropriate to
return a read or follow one of these magic symlinks.  The chroot check was
asking a question about the visibility of files to the calling process and
it was actually checking the destination process, and not the files
themselves.  That test was clearly bogus.

In my first pass through I simply fixed the test to check the visibility of
the files themselves.  That naive approach to fixing the permissions was
too strict and resulted in cases where a task could not even see all of
it's file descriptors.

What has disturbed me about relaxing this check is that file descriptors
are per-process private things, and they are occasionaly used a user space
capability tokens.  Looking a little farther into the symlink path on /proc
I did find userid checks and a check for capability (CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) so
there were permissions checking this.

But I was still concerned about privacy.  Besides /proc there is only one
other way to find out this kind of information, and that is ptrace.  ptrace
has been around for a long time and it has a well established security
model.

So after thinking about it I finally realized that the permission checks
that make sense are the permission checks applied to ptrace_attach.  The
checks are simple per process, and won't cause nasty surprises for people
coming from less capable unices.

Unfortunately there is one case that the current ptrace_attach test does
not cover: Zombies and kernel threads.  Single stepping those kinds of
processes is impossible.  Being able to see which file descriptors are open
on these tasks is important to lsof, fuser and friends.  So for these
special processes I made the rule you can't find out unless you have
CAP_SYS_PTRACE.

These proc permission checks should now conform to the principle of least
surprise.  As well as using much less code to implement :)
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The code doesn't need to sleep to when making this check so I can just do the
comparison and not worry about the reference counts.

TODO: While looking at this I realized that my original cleanup did not push
the permission check far enough down into the stack.  The call of
proc_check_dentry_visible needs to move out of the generic proc
readlink/follow link code and into the individual get_link instances.
Otherwise the shared resources checks are not quite correct (shared
files_struct does not require a shared fs_struct), and there are races with
unshare.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Incrementally update my proc-dont-lock-task_structs-indefinitely patches so
that they work with struct pid instead of struct task_ref.

Mostly this is a straight 1-1 substitution.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Every inode in /proc holds a reference to a struct task_struct.  If a
directory or file is opened and remains open after the the task exits this
pinning continues.  With 8K stacks on a 32bit machine the amount pinned per
file descriptor is about 10K.

Normally I would figure a reasonable per user process limit is about 100
processes.  With 80 processes, with a 1000 file descriptors each I can trigger
the 00M killer on a 32bit kernel, because I have pinned about 800MB of useless
data.

This patch replaces the struct task_struct pointer with a pointer to a struct
task_ref which has a struct task_struct pointer.  The so the pinning of dead
tasks does not happen.

The code now has to contend with the fact that the task may now exit at any
time.  Which is a little but not muh more complicated.

With this change it takes about 1000 processes each opening up 1000 file
descriptors before I can trigger the OOM killer.  Much better.

[mlp@google.com: task_mmu small fixes]
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Albert Cahalan <acahalan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPrasanna Meda <mlp@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Currently in /proc at several different places we define buffers to hold a
process id, or a file descriptor .  In most of them we use either a hard coded
number or a different define.  Modify them all to use PROC_NUMBUF, so the code
has a chance of being maintained.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Like the bug Oleg spotted in first_tid there was also a small off by one
error in first_tgid, when a seek was done on the /proc directory.  This
fixes that and changes the code structure to make it a little more obvious
what is going on.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Since we no longer need the tasklist_lock for get_task_struct the lookup
methods no longer need the tasklist_lock.

This just depends on my previous patch that makes get_task_struct() rcu
safe.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

We don't need the tasklist_lock to safely iterate through processes
anymore.

This depends on my previous to task patches that make get_task_struct rcu
safe, and that make next_task() rcu safe.  I haven't gotten
first_tid/next_tid yet only because next_thread is missing an
rcu_dereference.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

There are a couple of problems this patch addresses.
- /proc/<tgid>/task currently does not work correctly if you stop reading
  in the middle of a directory.

- /proc/ currently requires a full pass through the task list with
  the tasklist lock held, to determine there are no more processes to read.

- The hand rolled integer to string conversion does not properly running
  out of buffer space.

- We seem to be batching reading of pids from the tasklist without reason,
  and complicating the logic of the code.

This patch addresses that by changing how tasks are processed.  A
first_<task_type> function is built that handles restarts, and a
next_<task_type> function is built that just advances to the next task.

first_<task_type> when it detects a restart usually uses find_task_by_pid.  If
that doesn't work because there has been a seek on the directory, or we have
already given a complete directory listing, it first checks the number tasks
of that type, and only if we are under that count does it walk through all of
the tasks to find the one we are interested in.

The code that fills in the directory is simpler because there is only a single
for loop.

The hand rolled integer to string conversion is replaced by snprintf which
should handle the the out of buffer case correctly.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

proc_lookup and task exiting are not synchronized, although some of the
previous code may have suggested that.  Every time before we reuse a dentry
namei.c calls d_op->derevalidate which prevents us from reusing a stale dcache
entry.  Unfortunately it does not prevent us from returning a stale dcache
entry.  This race has been explicitly plugged in proc_pid_lookup but there is
nothing to confine it to just that proc lookup function.

So to prevent the race I call revalidate explictily in all of the proc lookup
functions after I call d_add, and report an error if the revalidate does not
succeed.

Years ago Al Viro did something similar but those changes got lost in the
churn.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

To keep the dcache from filling up with dead /proc entries we flush them on
process exit.  However over the years that code has gotten hairy with a
dentry_pointer and a lock in task_struct and misdocumented as a correctness
feature.

I have rewritten this code to look and see if we have a corresponding entry in
the dcache and if so flush it on process exit.  This removes the extra fields
in the task_struct and allows me to trivially handle the case of a
/proc/<tgid>/task/<pid> entry as well as the current /proc/<pid> entries.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

All of the functions for proc_maps_operations are already defined in
task_mmu.c so move the operations structure to keep the functionality
together.

Since task_nommu.c implements a dummy version of /proc/<pid>/maps give it a
simplified version of proc_maps_operations that it can modify to best suit its
needs.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Use getattr to get an accurate link count when needed.  This is cheaper and
more accurate than trying to derive it by walking the thread list of a
process.

Especially as it happens when needed stat instead of at readdir time.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Long ago and far away in 2.2 we started checking to ensure the files we
displayed in /proc were visible to the current process.  It was an
unsophisticated time and no one was worried about functions full of FIXMES in
a stable kernel.  As time passed the function became sacred and was enshrined
in the shrine of how things have always been.  The fixes came in but only to
keep the function working no one really remembering or documenting why we did
things that way.

The intent and the functionality make a lot of sense.  Don't let /proc be an
access point for files a process can see no other way.  The implementation
however is completely wrong.

We are currently checking the root directories of the two processes, we are
not checking the actual file descriptors themselves.

We are strangely checking with a permission method instead of just when we use
the data.

This patch fixes the logic to actually check the file descriptors and make a
note that implementing a permission method for this part of /proc almost
certainly indicates a bug in the reasoning.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The inode operations only exist to support the proc_permission function.
Currently mem_read and mem_write have all the same permission checks as
ptrace.  The fs check makes no sense in this context, and we can trivially get
around it by calling ptrace.

So simply the code by killing the strange weird case.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

First we can access every /proc/<tgid>/task/<pid> directory as /proc/<pid> so
proc_task_permission is not usefully limiting visibility.

Second having related filesystems information should have nothing to do with
process visibility.  kill does not implement any checks like that.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The sole renaming use of proc_inode.type is to discover the file descriptor
number, so just store the file descriptor number and don't wory about
processing this field.  This removes any /proc limits on the maximum number of
file descriptors, and clears the path to make the hard coded /proc inode
numbers go away.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Currently in /proc if the task is dumpable all of files are owned by the tasks
effective users.  Otherwise the files are owned by root.  Unless it is the
/proc/<tgid>/ or /proc/<tgid>/task/<pid> directory in that case we always make
the directory owned by the effective user.

However the special case for directories is pointless except as a way to read
the effective user, because the permissions on both of those directories are
world readable, and executable.

/proc/<tgid>/status provides a much better way to read a processes effecitve
userid, so it is silly to try to provide that on the directory.

So this patch simplifies the code by removing a pointless special case and
gets us one step closer to being able to remove the hard coded /proc inode
numbers.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The removed fields are already set by proc_alloc_inode.  Initializing them in
proc_alloc_inode implies they need it for proper cleanup.  At least ei->pde
was not set on all paths making it look like proc_alloc_inode was buggy.  So
just remove the redundant assignments.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

We already call everything except do_proc_readlink outside of the BKL in
proc_pid_followlink, and there appears to be nothing in do_proc_readlink that
needs any special protection.

So remove this leftover from one of the BKL cleanup efforts.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for
newly-created keys.  Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new
entry.  Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission
for processes.  Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission
for keys.  Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can
assign to newly-created keys.  Add a new parameter to the security hook
"security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or
from userspace.  If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook
should never fail.  Update the documentation to reflect these changes.
Signed-off-by: NMichael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>