Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>

Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>

that lets us use this functions for SMB2.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>

...ensure that we undo things in the reverse order from the way they
were done. In truth, the ordering doesn't matter for a lot of these,
but it's still better to do it that way to be sure.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Take the #ifdef junk out of the code, and turn it into a noop macro
when CONFIG_CIFS_DFS_UPCALL isn't defined.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

It's the essential step before respecting MaxMpxCount value during
negotiating because we will keep only one extra slot for sending
echo requests. If there is no response during two echo intervals -
reconnect the tcp session.
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

that is essential for CIFS/SMB/SMB2 oplock breaks and SMB2 echos.
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

to let us kill the proccess if it hangs waiting for a credit when
the session is down and echo is disabled.
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

and send no more than credits value requests at once. For SMB/CIFS
it's trivial: increment this value by receiving any message and
decrement by sending one.
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

by making it as unsigned integer and surround access with req_lock
from server structure.
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

This patch fixes an issue when cifs_mount receives a
STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME error during cifs_get_tcon but is able to
continue after an DFS ROOT referral. In this case, the return code
variable is not reset prior to trying to mount from the system referred
to. Thus, is_path_accessible is not executed and the final DFS referral
is not performed causing a mount error.

Use case: In DNS, example.com  resolves to the secondary AD server
ad2.example.com Our primary domain controller is ad1.example.com and has
a DFS redirection set up from \\ad1\share\Users to \\files\share\Users.
Mounting \\example.com\share\Users fails.

Regression introduced by commit 724d9f1c.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru
Signed-off-by: NThomas Hadig <thomas@intapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

no need to make that iput() conditional, just take it to the right place...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Some servers sets this value less than 50 that was hardcoded and
we lost the connection if when we exceed this limit. Fix this by
respecting this value - not sending more than the server allows.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stevef@smf-gateway.(none)>

Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stevef@smf-gateway.(none)>

Reorganize the code to make the memory already allocated before
spinlock'ed loop.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Memory is allocated irrespective of whether CIFS_ACL is configured
or not. But free is happenning only if CIFS_ACL is set. This is a
possible memory leak scenario.

Fix is:
Allocate and free memory only if CIFS_ACL is configured.
Signed-off-by: NSantosh Nayak <santoshprasadnayak@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

The cifs code will attempt to open files on lookup under certain
circumstances. What happens though if we find that the file we opened
was actually a FIFO or other special file?

Currently, the open filehandle just ends up being leaked leading to
a dentry refcount mismatch and oops on umount. Fix this by having the
code close the filehandle on the server if it turns out not to be a
regular file. While we're at it, change this spaghetti if statement
into a switch too.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NCAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NCAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Currently we do inc/drop_nlink for a parent directory for every
mkdir/rmdir calls. That's wrong when Unix extensions are disabled
because in this case a server doesn't follow the same semantic and
returns the old value on the next QueryInfo request. As the result,
we update our value with the server one and then decrement it on
every rmdir call - go to negative nlink values.

Fix this by removing inc/drop_nlink for the parent directory from
mkdir/rmdir, setting it for a revalidation and ignoring NumberOfLinks
for directories when Unix extensions are disabled.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

standard_receive3 will check the validity of the response from the
server (via checkSMB). It'll pass the result of that check to handle_mid
which will dequeue it and mark it with a status of
MID_RESPONSE_MALFORMED if checkSMB returned an error. At that point,
standard_receive3 will also return an error, which will make the
demultiplex thread skip doing the callback for the mid.

This is wrong -- if we were able to identify the request and the
response is marked malformed, then we want the demultiplex thread to do
the callback. Fix this by making standard_receive3 return 0 in this
situation.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: NMark Moseley <moseleymark@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Currently, it's always set to 0 (no oplock requested).

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

For null user mounts, do not invoke string length function
during session setup.

Cc: <stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: NChris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Removed the dependency on CONFIG_EXPERIMENTAL but forgot to update
the text description to be consistent.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Fix printk format warnings for ssize_t variables:

fs/cifs/connect.c:2145:3: warning: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but argument 3 has type 'ssize_t'
fs/cifs/connect.c:2152:3: warning: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but argument 3 has type 'ssize_t'
fs/cifs/connect.c:2160:3: warning: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but argument 3 has type 'ssize_t'
fs/cifs/connect.c:2170:3: warning: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but argument 3 has type 'ssize_t'
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc:	linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org

We should check that we're not copying memory from beyond the end of the
blob.
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

We should just return directly here, the goto causes a NULL dereference.
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

to reflect the unicode encoding used by CIFS protocol.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>

The kernel contains some special internal keyrings, for instance the DNS
resolver keyring :

2a93faf1 I-----     1 perm 1f030000     0     0 keyring   .dns_resolver: empty

It would occasionally be useful to allow the contents of such keyrings to be
flushed by root (cache invalidation).

Allow a flag to be set on a keyring to mark that someone possessing the
sysadmin capability can clear the keyring, even without normal write access to
the keyring.

Set this flag on the special keyrings created by the DNS resolver, the NFS
identity mapper and the CIFS identity mapper.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSteve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CIFS ACL support and FSCACHE support have been in long enough
to be no longer considered experimental.  Remove obsolete Kconfig
dependency.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

CC: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

We'll allow a grace period of 2 releases (3.3 and 3.4) and then remove
the legacy code in 3.5.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Fix up multiuser mounts to set the secType and set the username and
password from the key payload in the vol info for non-krb5 auth types.

Look for a key of type "secret" with a description of
"cifs:a:<server address>" or "cifs:d:<domainname>". If that's found,
then scrape the username and password out of the key payload and use
that to create a new user session.

Finally, don't have the code enforce krb5 auth on multiuser mounts,
but do require a kernel with keys support.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Currently, it's not very clear whether you're allowed to have a NULL
vol->username or ses->user_name. Some places check for it and some don't.

Make it clear that a NULL pointer is OK in these fields, and ensure that
all the callers check for that.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

We've had some reports of servers (namely, the Solaris in-kernel CIFS
server) that don't deal properly with writes that are "too large" even
though they set CAP_LARGE_WRITE_ANDX. Change the default to better
mirror what windows clients do.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: NNick Davis <phireph0x@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

When coalesce_t2 returns an error, have it throw a cFYI message that
explains the reason. Also rename some variables to clarify what they
represent.
Reported-and-Tested-by: NKonstantinos Skarlatos <k.skarlatos@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

On 32 bit systems num_aces * sizeof(struct cifs_ace *) could overflow
leading to a smaller ppace buffer than we expected.
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Turned out the ntlmv2 (default security authentication)
upgrade was harder to test than expected, and we ran
out of time to test against Apple and a few other servers
that we wanted to.  Delay upgrade of default security
from ntlm to ntlmv2 (on mount) to 3.3.  Still works
fine to specify it explicitly via "sec=ntlmv2" so this
should be fine.
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>