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  1. 25 10月, 2013 2 次提交
  3. 12 9月, 2013 1 次提交
    • R
      initmpfs: move rootfs code from fs/ramfs/ to init/ · 57f150a5
      由 Rob Landley 提交于 
      When the rootfs code was a wrapper around ramfs, having them in the same
file made sense.  Now that it can wrap another filesystem type, move it in
with the init code instead.

This also allows a subsequent patch to access rootfstype= command line
arg.
Signed-off-by: NRob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Jim Cromie <jim.cromie@gmail.com>
Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      57f150a5
  5. 09 9月, 2013 1 次提交
  7. 06 9月, 2013 1 次提交
    • M
      vfs: check unlinked ancestors before mount · eed81007
      由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于 
      We check submounts before doing d_drop() on a non-empty directory dentry in
NFS (have_submounts()), but we do not exclude a racing mount.  Nor do we
prevent mounts to be added to the disconnected subtree using relative paths
after the d_drop().

This patch fixes these issues by checking for unlinked (unhashed, non-root)
ancestors before proceeding with the mount.  This is done with rename
seqlock taken for write and with ->d_lock grabbed on each ancestor in turn,
including our dentry itself.  This ensures that the only one of
check_submounts_and_drop() or has_unlinked_ancestor() can succeed.
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      eed81007
  9. 04 9月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      vfs: allow umount to handle mountpoints without revalidating them · 8033426e
      由 Jeff Layton 提交于 
      Christopher reported a regression where he was unable to unmount a NFS
filesystem where the root had gone stale. The problem is that
d_revalidate handles the root of the filesystem differently from other
dentries, but d_weak_revalidate does not. We could simply fix this by
making d_weak_revalidate return success on IS_ROOT dentries, but there
are cases where we do want to revalidate the root of the fs.

A umount is really a special case. We generally aren't interested in
anything but the dentry and vfsmount that's attached at that point. If
the inode turns out to be stale we just don't care since the intent is
to stop using it anyway.

Try to handle this situation better by treating umount as a special
case in the lookup code. Have it resolve the parent using normal
means, and then do a lookup of the final dentry without revalidating
it. In most cases, the final lookup will come out of the dcache, but
the case where there's a trailing symlink or !LAST_NORM entry on the
end complicates things a bit.

Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Reported-by: NChristopher T Vogan <cvogan@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      8033426e
  11. 31 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  13. 27 8月, 2013 2 次提交
    • E
      userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted · e51db735
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Rely on the fact that another flavor of the filesystem is already
mounted and do not rely on state in the user namespace.

Verify that the mounted filesystem is not covered in any significant
way.  I would love to verify that the previously mounted filesystem
has no mounts on top but there are at least the directories
/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc and /sys/fs/cgroup/ that exist explicitly
for other filesystems to mount on top of.

Refactor the test into a function named fs_fully_visible and call that
function from the mount routines of proc and sysfs.  This makes this
test local to the filesystems involved and the results current of when
the mounts take place, removing a weird threading of the user
namespace, the mount namespace and the filesystems themselves.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      e51db735
    • E
      vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt between namespaces · 4ce5d2b1
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Don't copy bind mounts of /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt between namespaces.
These files hold references to a mount namespace and copying them
between namespaces could result in a reference counting loop.

The current mnt_ns_loop test prevents loops on the assumption that
mounts don't cross between namespaces.  Unfortunately unsharing a
mount namespace and shared substrees can both cause mounts to
propogate between mount namespaces.

Add two flags CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE and CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE are added to
control this behavior, and CL_COPY_ALL is redefined as both of them.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      4ce5d2b1
  15. 25 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  17. 25 7月, 2013 1 次提交
    • E
      vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users · 5ff9d8a6
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      When creating a less privileged mount namespace or propogating mounts
from a more privileged to a less privileged mount namespace lock the
submounts so they may not be unmounted individually in the child mount
namespace revealing what is under them.

This enforces the reasonable expectation that it is not possible to
see under a mount point.  Most of the time mounts are on empty
directories and revealing that does not matter, however I have seen an
occassionaly sloppy configuration where there were interesting things
concealed under a mount point that probably should not be revealed.

Expirable submounts are not locked because they will eventually
unmount automatically so whatever is under them already needs
to be safe for unprivileged users to access.

From a practical standpoint these restrictions do not appear to be
significant for unprivileged users of the mount namespace.  Recursive
bind mounts and pivot_root continues to work, and mounts that are
created in a mount namespace may be unmounted there.  All of which
means that the common idiom of keeping a directory of interesting
files and using pivot_root to throw everything else away continues to
work just fine.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      5ff9d8a6
  19. 05 5月, 2013 2 次提交
  21. 02 5月, 2013 1 次提交
  23. 10 4月, 2013 7 次提交
  25. 27 3月, 2013 4 次提交
    • E
      userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted · 87a8ebd6
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.

proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.

Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.

In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      87a8ebd6
    • E
      vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces · 132c94e3
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.

Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.

When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.

This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      132c94e3
    • E
      vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts · 90563b19
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      When a read-only bind mount is copied from mount namespace in a higher
privileged user namespace to a mount namespace in a lesser privileged
user namespace, it should not be possible to remove the the read-only
restriction.

Add a MNT_LOCK_READONLY mount flag to indicate that a mount must
remain read-only.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      90563b19
    • E
      userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted · 3151527e
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.

Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.

For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace.  Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.

Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead.  With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      3151527e
  27. 23 2月, 2013 3 次提交
  29. 21 12月, 2012 1 次提交
  31. 15 12月, 2012 1 次提交
    • E
      userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns. · 5e4a0847
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> found a nasty little bug in
the permissions of setns.  With unprivileged user namespaces it
became possible to create new namespaces without privilege.

However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
the user nameapce of the targed namespace.

Which made the following nasty sequence possible.

pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS);
if (pid == 0) { /* child */
	system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd");
}
else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */
	char path[PATH_MAX];
	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt");
	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
	setns(fd, 0);
	system("su -");
}

Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      5e4a0847
  33. 20 11月, 2012 1 次提交
    • E
      proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors. · 98f842e6
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that
inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc
inode for every namespace in proc.

A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test
to see if two processes are in the same namespace.

This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because
a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and
would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of
namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks
impossible.

We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which
appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and
migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors)
but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important.

I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so
their structures can be statically initialized.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      98f842e6
  35. 19 11月, 2012 5 次提交
  37. 13 10月, 2012 1 次提交
    • J
      vfs: define struct filename and have getname() return it · 91a27b2a
      由 Jeff Layton 提交于 
      getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.

For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.

This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.

Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      91a27b2a
  39. 12 10月, 2012 1 次提交
  41. 23 9月, 2012 1 次提交
    • A
      do_add_mount()/umount -l races · 156cacb1
      由 Al Viro 提交于 
      normally we deal with lock_mount()/umount races by checking that
mountpoint to be is still in our namespace after lock_mount() has
been done.  However, do_add_mount() skips that check when called
with MNT_SHRINKABLE in flags (i.e. from finish_automount()).  The
reason is that ->mnt_ns may be a temporary namespace created exactly
to contain automounts a-la NFS4 referral handling.  It's not the
namespace of the caller, though, so check_mnt() would fail here.
We still need to check that ->mnt_ns is non-NULL in that case,
though.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      156cacb1
  43. 31 7月, 2012 1 次提交