Remove SELinux hooks which do nothing except defer to the capabilites
hooks (or in one case, replicates the function).
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Remove secondary ops call to shm_shmat, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to unix_stream_connect, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to task_kill, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to task_setrlimit, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove unused cred_commit hook from SELinux.   This
currently calls into the capabilities hook, which is a noop.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to task_create, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to file_mprotect, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to inode_setattr, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to inode_permission, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to inode_follow_link, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to inode_mknod, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to inode_unlink, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to inode_link, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to sb_umount, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to sb_mount, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to bprm_committed_creds, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove secondary ops call to bprm_committing_creds, which is
a noop in capabilities.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove unused bprm_check_security hook from SELinux.   This
currently calls into the capabilities hook, which is a noop.
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Context mounts and genfs labeled file systems behave differently with respect to
setting file system labels. This patch brings genfs labeled file systems in line
with context mounts in that setxattr calls to them should return EOPNOTSUPP and
fscreate calls will be ignored.
Signed-off-by: NDavid P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@macbook.localdomain>

There is no easy way to tell if a file system supports SELinux security labeling.
Because of this a new flag is being added to the super block security structure
to indicate that the particular super block supports labeling. This flag is set
for file systems using the xattr, task, and transition labeling methods unless
that behavior is overridden by context mounts.
Signed-off-by: NDavid P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@macbook.localdomain>

The super block security structure currently has three fields for what are
essentially flags.  The flags field is used for mount options while two other
char fields are used for initialization and proc flags. These latter two fields are
essentially bit fields since the only used values are 0 and 1.  These fields
have been collapsed into the flags field and new bit masks have been added for
them. The code is also fixed to work with these new flags.
Signed-off-by: NDavid P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@macbook.localdomain>

Add url to the security subsystem wiki.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to:

	commit 3b11a1de
	Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
	Date:   Fri Nov 14 10:39:26 2008 +1100

	    CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task

The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of
credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when
accessing current's creds.

There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the
real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current
task.

Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current
point to the same set of creds.  However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this
facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test,
without affecting the creds as seen from other processes.

One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the
effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores.

The affected capability check is in generic_permission():

	if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))
		if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
			return 0;

This change passes the set of credentials to be tested down into the commoncap
and SELinux code.  The security functions called by capable() and
has_capability() select the appropriate set of credentials from the process
being checked.

This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite:

/*
 *  t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug.
 *
 *  Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued.
 *  Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html
 */
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>

#define UID 500
#define GID 100
#define PERM 0
#define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access"

static void
errExit(char *msg)
{
    perror(msg);
    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} /* errExit */

static void
accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr)
{
    printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask));
} /* accessTest */

int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int fd, perm, uid, gid;
    char *testpath;
    char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20];

    testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH;
    perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM;
    uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID;
    gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID;

    unlink(testpath);

    fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0);
    if (fd == -1) errExit("open");

    if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown");
    if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod");
    close(fd);

    snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath);
    system(cmd);

    if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid");

    accessTest(testpath, 0, "0");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK");

    exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} /* main */

This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS
filesystem.  If successful, it will show:

	[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
	---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx
	access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1

If unsuccessful, it will show:

	[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
	---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx
	access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1

I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This reverts commit 14eaddc9.

David has a better version to come.

I started playing with pahole today and decided to put it against the
selinux structures.  Found we could save a little bit of space on x86_64
(and no harm on i686) just reorganizing some structs.

Object size changes:
av_inherit: 24 -> 16
selinux_class_perm: 48 -> 40
context: 80 -> 72

Admittedly there aren't many of av_inherit or selinux_class_perm's in
the kernel (33 and 1 respectively) But the change to the size of struct
context reverberate out a bit.  I can get some hard number if they are
needed, but I don't see why they would be.  We do change which cacheline
context->len and context->str would be on, but I don't see that as a
problem since we are clearly going to have to load both if the context
is to be of any value.  I've run with the patch and don't seem to be
having any problems.

An example of what's going on using struct av_inherit would be:

form: to:
struct av_inherit {			struct av_inherit {
	u16 tclass;				const char **common_pts;
	const char **common_pts;		u32 common_base;
	u32 common_base;			u16 tclass;
};

(notice all I did was move u16 tclass to the end of the struct instead
of the beginning)

Memory layout before the change:
struct av_inherit {
	u16 tclass; /* 2 */
	/* 6 bytes hole */
	const char** common_pts; /* 8 */
	u32 common_base; /* 4 */
	/* 4 byes padding */

	/* size: 24, cachelines: 1 */
	/* sum members: 14, holes: 1, sum holes: 6 */
	/* padding: 4 */
};

Memory layout after the change:
struct av_inherit {
	const char ** common_pts; /* 8 */
	u32 common_base; /* 4 */
	u16 tclass; /* 2 */
	/* 2 bytes padding */

	/* size: 16, cachelines: 1 */
	/* sum members: 14, holes: 0, sum holes: 0 */
	/* padding: 2 */
};
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to:

	commit 5ff7711e635b32f0a1e558227d030c7e45b4a465
	Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
	Date:   Wed Dec 31 02:52:28 2008 +0000

	    CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task

The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of
credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when
accessing current's creds.

There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the
real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current
task.

Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current
point to the same set of creds.  However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this
facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test,
without affecting the creds as seen from other processes.

One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the
effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores.

The affected capability check is in generic_permission():

	if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))
		if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
			return 0;

This change splits capable() from has_capability() down into the commoncap and
SELinux code.  The capable() security op now only deals with the current
process, and uses the current process's subjective creds.  A new security op -
task_capable() - is introduced that can check any task's objective creds.

strictly the capable() security op is superfluous with the presence of the
task_capable() op, however it should be faster to call the capable() op since
two fewer arguments need be passed down through the various layers.

This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite:

/*
 *  t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug.
 *
 *  Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued.
 *  Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html
 */
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>

#define UID 500
#define GID 100
#define PERM 0
#define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access"

static void
errExit(char *msg)
{
    perror(msg);
    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} /* errExit */

static void
accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr)
{
    printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask));
} /* accessTest */

int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int fd, perm, uid, gid;
    char *testpath;
    char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20];

    testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH;
    perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM;
    uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID;
    gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID;

    unlink(testpath);

    fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0);
    if (fd == -1) errExit("open");

    if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown");
    if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod");
    close(fd);

    snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath);
    system(cmd);

    if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid");

    accessTest(testpath, 0, "0");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK");

    exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} /* main */

This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS
filesystem.  If successful, it will show:

	[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
	---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx
	access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1

If unsuccessful, it will show:

	[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
	---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx
	access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1

I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Fix the following sparse warning:

      CC      security/keys/key.o
    security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
    security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10:    expected char [noderef] <asn:1>*buffer
    security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10:    got char *<noident>

which appears to be caused by lack of __user annotation to the cast of
a syscall argument.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Add support for unlabeled network hosts and networks.
Relies heavily on Paul Moore's netlabel support.

Creates a new entry in /smack called netlabel. Writes to /smack/netlabel
take the form:

    A.B.C.D LABEL
or
    A.B.C.D/N LABEL

where A.B.C.D is a network address, N is an integer between 0-32,
and LABEL is the Smack label to be used. If /N is omitted /32 is
assumed. N designates the netmask for the address. Entries are
matched by the most specific address/mask pair. 0.0.0.0/0 will
match everything, while 192.168.1.117/32 will match exactly one
host.

A new system label "@", pronounced "web", is defined. Processes
can not be assigned the web label. An address assigned the web
label can be written to by any process, and packets coming from
a web address can be written to any socket. Use of the web label
is a violation of any strict MAC policy, but the web label has
been requested many times.

The nltype entry has been removed from /smack. It did not work right
and the netlabel interface can be used to specify that all hosts
be treated as unlabeled.

CIPSO labels on incoming packets will be honored, even from designated
single label hosts. Single label hosts can only be written to by
processes with labels that can write to the label of the host.
Packets sent to single label hosts will always be unlabeled.

Once added a single label designation cannot be removed, however
the label may be changed.

The behavior of the ambient label remains unchanged.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>

This patch is the first step towards removing the old "compat_net" code from
the kernel.  Secmark, the "compat_net" replacement was first introduced in
2.6.18 (September 2006) and the major Linux distributions with SELinux support
have transitioned to Secmark so it is time to start deprecating the "compat_net"
mechanism.  Testing a patched version of 2.6.28-rc6 with the initial release of
Fedora Core 5 did not show any problems when running in enforcing mode.

This patch adds an entry to the feature-removal-schedule.txt file and removes
the SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT configuration option, forcing
Secmark on by default although it can still be disabled at runtime.  The patch
also makes the Secmark permission checks "dynamic" in the sense that they are
only executed when Secmark is configured; this should help prevent problems
with older distributions that have not yet migrated to Secmark.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Update the NetLabel kernel API to expose the new features added in kernel
releases 2.6.25 and 2.6.28: the static/fallback label functionality and network
address based selectors.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>

* 'for-linus' of git://oss.sgi.com/xfs/xfs: (184 commits)
  [XFS] Fix race in xfs_write() between direct and buffered I/O with DMAPI
  [XFS] handle unaligned data in xfs_bmbt_disk_get_all
  [XFS] avoid memory allocations in xfs_fs_vcmn_err
  [XFS] Fix speculative allocation beyond eof
  [XFS] Remove XFS_BUF_SHUT() and friends
  [XFS] Use the incore inode size in xfs_file_readdir()
  [XFS] set b_error from bio error in xfs_buf_bio_end_io
  [XFS] use inode_change_ok for setattr permission checking
  [XFS] add a FMODE flag to make XFS invisible I/O less hacky
  [XFS] resync headers with libxfs
  [XFS] simplify projid check in xfs_rename
  [XFS] replace b_fspriv with b_mount
  [XFS] Remove unused tracing code
  [XFS] Remove unnecessary assertion
  [XFS] Remove unused variable in ktrace_free()
  [XFS] Check return value of xfs_buf_get_noaddr()
  [XFS] Fix hang after disallowed rename across directory quota domains
  [XFS] Fix compile with CONFIG_COMPAT enabled
  move inode tracing out of xfs_vnode.
  move vn_iowait / vn_iowake into xfs_aops.c
  ...

* git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/nfs-2.6: (70 commits)
  fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c: make nfs4_map_errors() static
  rpc: add service field to new upcall
  rpc: add target field to new upcall
  nfsd: support callbacks with gss flavors
  rpc: allow gss callbacks to client
  rpc: pass target name down to rpc level on callbacks
  nfsd: pass client principal name in rsc downcall
  rpc: implement new upcall
  rpc: store pointer to pipe inode in gss upcall message
  rpc: use count of pipe openers to wait for first open
  rpc: track number of users of the gss upcall pipe
  rpc: call release_pipe only on last close
  rpc: add an rpc_pipe_open method
  rpc: minor gss_alloc_msg cleanup
  rpc: factor out warning code from gss_pipe_destroy_msg
  rpc: remove unnecessary assignment
  NFS: remove unused status from encode routines
  NFS: increment number of operations in each encode routine
  NFS: fix comment placement in nfs4xdr.c
  NFS: fix tabs in nfs4xdr.c
  ...

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/roland/infiniband:
  IB/mlx4: Fix reading SL field out of cqe->sl_vid
  RDMA/addr: Fix build breakage when IPv6 is disabled

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi-misc-2.6: (104 commits)
  [SCSI] fcoe: fix configuration problems
  [SCSI] cxgb3i: fix select/depend problem
  [SCSI] fcoe: fix incorrect use of struct module
  [SCSI] cxgb3i: remove use of skb->sp
  [SCSI] cxgb3i: Add cxgb3i iSCSI driver.
  [SCSI] zfcp: Remove unnecessary warning message
  [SCSI] zfcp: Add support for unchained FSF requests
  [SCSI] zfcp: Remove busid macro
  [SCSI] zfcp: remove DID_DID flag
  [SCSI] zfcp: Simplify mask lookups for incoming RSCNs
  [SCSI] zfcp: Remove initial device data from zfcp_data
  [SCSI] zfcp: fix compile warning
  [SCSI] zfcp: Remove adapter list
  [SCSI] zfcp: Simplify SBAL allocation to fix sparse warnings
  [SCSI] zfcp: register with SCSI layer on ccw registration
  [SCSI] zfcp: Fix message line break
  [SCSI] qla2xxx: changes in multiq code
  [SCSI] eata: fix the data buffer accessors conversion regression
  [SCSI] ibmvfc: Improve async event handling
  [SCSI] lpfc : correct printk types on PPC compiles
  ...

* 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-2.6: (583 commits)
  V4L/DVB (10130): use USB API functions rather than constants
  V4L/DVB (10129): dvb: remove deprecated use of RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED in frontends
  V4L/DVB (10128): modify V4L documentation to be a valid XHTML
  V4L/DVB (10127): stv06xx: Avoid having y unitialized
  V4L/DVB (10125): em28xx: Don't do AC97 vendor detection for i2s audio devices
  V4L/DVB (10124): em28xx: expand output formats available
  V4L/DVB (10123): em28xx: fix reversed definitions of I2S audio modes
  V4L/DVB (10122): em28xx: don't load em28xx-alsa for em2870 based devices
  V4L/DVB (10121): em28xx: remove worthless Pinnacle PCTV HD Mini 80e device profile
  V4L/DVB (10120): em28xx: remove redundant Pinnacle Dazzle DVC 100 profile
  V4L/DVB (10119): em28xx: fix corrupted XCLK value
  V4L/DVB (10118): zoran: fix warning for a variable not used
  V4L/DVB (10116): af9013: Fix gcc false warnings
  V4L/DVB (10111a): usbvideo.h: remove an useless blank line
  V4L/DVB (10111): quickcam_messenger.c: fix a warning
  V4L/DVB (10110): v4l2-ioctl: Fix warnings when using .unlocked_ioctl = __video_ioctl2
  V4L/DVB (10109): anysee: Fix usage of an unitialized function
  V4L/DVB (10104): uvcvideo: Add support for video output devices
  V4L/DVB (10102): uvcvideo: Ignore interrupt endpoint for built-in iSight webcams.
  V4L/DVB (10101): uvcvideo: Fix bulk URB processing when the header is erroneous
  ...

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6:
  net: Fix percpu counters deadlock
  cpumask: prepare for iterators to only go to nr_cpu_ids/nr_cpumask_bits: net
  drivers/net/usb: use USB API functions rather than constants
  cls_cgroup: clean up Kconfig
  cls_cgroup: clean up for cgroup part
  cls_cgroup: fix an oops when removing a cgroup
  EtherExpress16: fix printing timed out status
  mlx4_en: Added "set_ringparam" Ethtool interface implementation
  mlx4_en: Always allocate RX ring for each interrupt vector
  mlx4_en: Verify number of RX rings doesn't exceed MAX_RX_RINGS
  IPVS: Make "no destination available" message more consistent between schedulers
  net: KS8695: removed duplicated #include
  tun: Fix SIOCSIFHWADDR error.
  smsc911x: compile fix re netif_rx signature changes
  netns: foreach_netdev_safe is insufficient in default_device_exit
  net: make xfrm_statistics_seq_show use generic snmp_fold_field
  net: Fix more NAPI interface netdev argument drop fallout.
  net: Fix unused variable warnings in pasemi_mac.c and spider_net.c

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux-2.6-for-linus:
  lguest: struct device - replace bus_id with dev_name()
  lguest: move the initial guest page table creation code to the host
  kvm-s390: implement config_changed for virtio on s390
  virtio_console: support console resizing
  virtio: add PCI device release() function
  virtio_blk: fix type warning
  virtio: block: dynamic maximum segments
  virtio: set max_segment_size and max_sectors to infinite.
  virtio: avoid implicit use of Linux page size in balloon interface
  virtio: hand virtio ring alignment as argument to vring_new_virtqueue
  virtio: use KVM_S390_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN instead of relying on pagesize
  virtio: use LGUEST_VRING_ALIGN instead of relying on pagesize
  virtio: Don't use PAGE_SIZE for vring alignment in virtio_pci.
  virtio: rename 'pagesize' arg to vring_init/vring_size
  virtio: Don't use PAGE_SIZE in virtio_pci.c
  virtio: struct device - replace bus_id with dev_name(), dev_set_name()
  virtio-pci queue allocation not page-aligned

* 'devel' of master.kernel.org:/home/rmk/linux-2.6-arm: (407 commits)
  [ARM] pxafb: add support for overlay1 and overlay2 as framebuffer devices
  [ARM] pxafb: cleanup of the timing checking code
  [ARM] pxafb: cleanup of the color format manipulation code
  [ARM] pxafb: add palette format support for LCCR4_PAL_FOR_3
  [ARM] pxafb: add support for FBIOPAN_DISPLAY by dma braching
  [ARM] pxafb: allow pxafb_set_par() to start from arbitrary yoffset
  [ARM] pxafb: allow video memory size to be configurable
  [ARM] pxa: add document on the MFP design and how to use it
  [ARM] sa1100_wdt: don't assume CLOCK_TICK_RATE to be a constant
  [ARM] rtc-sa1100: don't assume CLOCK_TICK_RATE to be a constant
  [ARM] pxa/tavorevb: update board support (smartpanel LCD + keypad)
  [ARM] pxa: Update eseries defconfig
  [ARM] 5352/1: add w90p910-plat config file
  [ARM] s3c: S3C options should depend on PLAT_S3C
  [ARM] mv78xx0: implement GPIO and GPIO interrupt support
  [ARM] Kirkwood: implement GPIO and GPIO interrupt support
  [ARM] Orion: share GPIO IRQ handling code
  [ARM] Orion: share GPIO handling code
  [ARM] s3c: define __io using the typesafe version
  [ARM] S3C64XX: Ensure CPU_V6 is selected
  ...