hulk inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: 9290
CVE: NA

ported from https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1037463/

-------------------------------------------------

Provide flow handlers that are NMI safe for interrupts and percpu_devid
interrupts.
Signed-off-by: NJulien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Acked-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NHanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: 9290
CVE: NA

ported from https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1037461/

-------------------------------------------------

Add support for percpu_devid interrupts treated as NMIs.

Percpu_devid NMIs need to be setup/torn down on each CPU they target.

The same restrictions as for global NMIs still apply for percpu_devid NMIs.
Signed-off-by: NJulien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NHanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: 9290
CVE: NA

ported from https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1037460/

-------------------------------------------------

Add functionality to allocate interrupt lines that will deliver IRQs
as Non-Maskable Interrupts. These allocations are only successful if
the irqchip provides the necessary support and allows NMI delivery for the
interrupt line.

Interrupt lines allocated for NMI delivery must be enabled/disabled through
enable_nmi/disable_nmi_nosync to keep their state consistent.

To treat a PERCPU IRQ as NMI, the interrupt must not be shared nor threaded,
the irqchip directly managing the IRQ must be the root irqchip and the
irqchip cannot be behind a slow bus.
Signed-off-by: NJulien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NHanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-5.0-rc1
commit 1db4909e76f64a85f4aaa187f0f683f5c85a471d
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5901
CVE: NA
---------------------------

Even though .mq_kobj, ctx->kobj and q->kobj share same lifetime
from block layer's view, actually they don't because userspace may
grab one kobject anytime via sysfs.

This patch fixes the issue by the following approach:

1) introduce 'struct blk_mq_ctxs' for holding .mq_kobj and managing
all ctxs

2) free all allocated ctxs and the 'blk_mq_ctxs' instance in release
handler of .mq_kobj

3) grab one ref of .mq_kobj before initializing each ctx->kobj, so that
.mq_kobj is always released after all ctxs are freed.

This patch fixes kernel panic issue during booting when DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE
is enabled.
Reported-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: "jianchao.wang" <jianchao.w.wang@oracle.com>
Tested-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NMing Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: NYufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NMiao Xie <miaoxie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-4.20
commit 5f26bdceb9c0
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 6468
CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

If the CPU exits the "polling" state due to the time limit in the
loop in poll_idle(), this is not a real wakeup and it just means
that the "polling" state selection was not adequate.  The governor
mispredicted short idle duration, but had a more suitable state been
selected, the CPU might have spent more time in it.  In fact, there
is no reason to expect that there would have been a wakeup event
earlier than the next timer in that case.

Handling such cases as regular wakeups in menu_update() may cause the
menu governor to make suboptimal decisions going forward, but ignoring
them altogether would not be correct either, because every time
menu_select() is invoked, it makes a separate new attempt to predict
the idle duration taking distinct time to the closest timer event as
input and the outcomes of all those attempts should be recorded.

For this reason, make menu_update() always assume that if the
"polling" state was exited due to the time limit, the next proper
wakeup event for the CPU would be the next timer event (not
including the tick).

Fixes: a37b969a "cpuidle: poll_state: Add time limit to poll_idle()"
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NDaniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-5.0-rc1
commit 7b0c03ecc42fb223baf015877fee9d517c2c8af1
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 6517
CVE: NA

---------------------------

This patch adds a new device-tree property that allows to
specify the dma protection control bits for the all of the
DMA controller's channel uniformly.

Setting the "correct" bits can have a huge impact on the
PPC460EX and APM82181 that use this DMA engine in combination
with a DesignWare' SATA-II core (sata_dwc_460ex driver).

In the OpenWrt Forum, the user takimata reported that:
|It seems your patch unleashed the full power of the SATA port.
|Where I was previously hitting a really hard limit at around
|82 MB/s for reading and 27 MB/s for writing, I am now getting this:
|
|root@OpenWrt:/mnt# time dd if=/dev/zero of=tempfile bs=1M count=1024
|1024+0 records in
|1024+0 records out
|real    0m 13.65s
|user    0m 0.01s
|sys     0m 11.89s
|
|root@OpenWrt:/mnt# time dd if=tempfile of=/dev/null bs=1M count=1024
|1024+0 records in
|1024+0 records out
|real    0m 8.41s
|user    0m 0.01s
|sys     0m 4.70s
|
|This means: 121 MB/s reading and 75 MB/s writing!
|
|The drive is a WD Green WD10EARX taken from an older MBL Single.
|I repeated the test a few times with even larger files to rule out
|any caching, I'm still seeing the same great performance. OpenWrt is
|now completely on par with the original MBL firmware's performance.

Another user And.short reported:
|I can report that your fix worked! Boots up fine with two
|drives even with more partitions, and no more reboot on
|concurrent disk access!

A closer look into the sata_dwc_460ex code revealed that
the driver did initally set the correct protection control
bits. However, this feature was lost when the sata_dwc_460ex
driver was converted to the generic DMA driver framework.

BugLink: https://forum.openwrt.org/t/wd-mybook-live-duo-two-disks/16195/55
BugLink: https://forum.openwrt.org/t/wd-mybook-live-duo-two-disks/16195/50
Fixes: 8b344485 ("sata_dwc_460ex: move to generic DMA driver")
Reviewed-by: NAndy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NVinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-4.20-rc1
commit 94e297c50b529f5d01cfd1dbc808d61e95180ab7
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5542
CVE: NA

---------------------------

ctags indexing ("make tags" command) throws this warning:

    ctags: Warning: include/linux/notifier.h:125:
    null expansion of name pattern "\1"

This is the result of DEFINE_PER_CPU() macro expansion.  Fix that by
getting rid of line break.

Similar fix was already done in commit 25528213 ("tags: Fix
DEFINE_PER_CPU expansions"), but this one probably wasn't noticed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181030202808.28027-1-semen.protsenko@linaro.org
Fixes: 9c80172b ("kernel/SRCU: provide a static initializer")
Signed-off-by: NSam Protsenko <semen.protsenko@linaro.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-4.20-rc1
commit edfa87281f4fa1b78a21f6db999935a2faa2f6b8
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5544
CVE: NA

---------------------------

Unprotected naming of local variables within bit_clear_unless() can easily
lead to using the wrong scope.

Noticed this by code review after having hit this issue in set_mask_bits()
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 85ad1d13 ("md: set MD_CHANGE_PENDING in a atomic region")
Cc: Guoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-4.20-rc1
commit d9873969fa8725dc6a5a21ab788c057fd8719751
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5555
CVE: NA

---------------------------

Most other bitmap API, including the OOL version __bitmap_shift_right,
take unsigned nbits.  This was accidentally left out from 2fbad299.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180818131623.8755-5-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk
Fixes: 2fbad299 ("lib: bitmap: change bitmap_shift_right to take unsigned parameters")
Signed-off-by: NRasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Reported-by: NYury Norov <ynorov@caviumnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-4.20-rc1
commit f366d322aea782cf786aa821d5accdc1609f9e10
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5557
CVE: NA

---------------------------

The macro PAGE_SIZE isn't valid outside of the kernel, so it should not
appear in UAPI headers.

Furthermore, the actual machine page size could theoretically change from
an application's point of view if it's running in a container that gets
migrated to another machine (say 4K/ppc64 to 64K/ppc64).

Fixes: f2ba5a5b ("libnvdimm, namespace: make min namespace size 4K")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-4.20-rc1
commit 18127429a854e7607b859484880b8e26cee9ddab
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5559
CVE: NA

---------------------------

Unprotected naming of local variables within the set_mask_bits() can easily
lead to using the wrong scope.

Noticed this when "set_mask_bits(&foo->bar, 0, mask)" behaved as no-op.
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 00a1a053 ("ext4: atomically set inode->i_flags in ext4_set_inode_flags()")
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-4.20-rc1
commit aa7e80b220f3a543eefbe4b7e2c5d2b73e2e2ef7
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5560
CVE: NA

---------------------------

The field atomic_mode is 4 bits wide and therefore can hold values
from 0x0 to 0xf. Remove the unnecessary 20 bit shift that made the values
be incorrect. While that, remove unused enum values.

Fixes: 57cda166 ("net/mlx5: Add DCT command interface")
Signed-off-by: NMoni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NArtemy Kovalyov <artemyko@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-4.20-rc1
commit 02ad0437decf2e5dba975c23b1a89775f4b211e1
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5562
CVE: NA

---------------------------

Fix kernel-doc warning for missing struct member 'request_key':

../include/linux/gpio/driver.h:142: warning: Function parameter or member 'request_key' not described in 'gpio_irq_chip'

Fixes: 39c3fd58 ("kernel/irq: Extend lockdep class for request mutex")
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-4.20-rc1
commit 8f5be0ec23bb9ef3f96659c8dff1340b876600bf
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5564
CVE: NA

---------------------------

Now it returns the length of the full path or error code.
Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Fixes: 3abb1d90 ("kernfs: make kernfs_path*() behave in the style of strlcpy()")
Acked-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-5.0-rc1
commit 527edbc18a70e745740ef31edb0ffefb2f161afa
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 6820
CVE: NA

---------------------------

The introduction of these dummy BUILD_BUG_ON stubs dates back to commmit
903c0c7c ("sparse: define dummy BUILD_BUG_ON definition for
sparse").

At that time, BUILD_BUG_ON() was implemented with the negative array
trick *and* the link-time trick, like this:

  extern int __build_bug_on_failed;
  #define BUILD_BUG_ON(condition)                                \
          do {                                                   \
                  ((void)sizeof(char[1 - 2*!!(condition)]));     \
                  if (condition) __build_bug_on_failed = 1;      \
          } while(0)

Sparse is more strict about the negative array trick than GCC because
Sparse requires the array length to be really constant.

Here is the simple test code for the macro above:

  static const int x = 0;
  BUILD_BUG_ON(x);

GCC is absolutely fine with it (-Wvla was enabled only very recently),
but Sparse warns like this:

  error: bad constant expression
  error: cannot size expression

(If you are using a newer version of Sparse, you will see a different
warning message, "warning: Variable length array is used".)

Anyway, Sparse was producing many false positives, and noisier than it
should be at that time.

With the previous commit, the leftover negative array trick is gone.
Sparse is fine with the current BUILD_BUG_ON(), which is implemented by
using the 'error' attribute.

I am keeping the stub for BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO().  Otherwise, Sparse would
complain about the following code, which GCC is fine with:

  static const int x = 0;
  int y = BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(x);

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542856462-18836-3-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.comSigned-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NLuc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Tested-by: NNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.0-rc3
commit 3e2ffd655cc6a694608d997738989ff5572a8266
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 7094
CVE: NA

---------------------------

Since commit 815f0ddb ("include/linux/compiler*.h: make compiler-*.h
mutually exclusive") clang no longer reuses the OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR macro
from compiler-gcc - instead it gets the version in
include/linux/compiler.h.  Unfortunately that version doesn't actually
prevent compiler from optimizing out the variable.

Fix up by moving the macro out from compiler-gcc.h to compiler.h.
Compilers without incline asm support will keep working
since it's protected by an ifdef.

Also fix up comments to match reality since we are no longer overriding
any macros.

Build-tested with gcc and clang.

Fixes: 815f0ddb ("include/linux/compiler*.h: make compiler-*.h mutually exclusive")
Cc: Eli Friedman <efriedma@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-4.20-rc1
commit 5d5a0ab1a7918fce5ca5c0fb1871a3e2000f85de
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5547
CVE: NA

---------------------------

Commit 0413beda ("of: Add device_type access helper functions")
added a new helper not yet used in preparation for some treewide clean
up of accesses to 'device_type' properties. Unfortunately, there's an
error and 'type' was used for the property name. Fix this.

Fixes: 0413beda ("of: Add device_type access helper functions")
Cc: Frank Rowand <frowand.list@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NRob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-5.0-rc1
commit eee3919c5f2949a8b7b1e9fa239d153be1538656
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5548
CVE: NA

---------------------------

Drop the broken to_gpio_irq_chip() container_of() helper, which would
break the build for anyone who tries to use it.

Specifically, struct gpio_irq_chip only holds a pointer to a struct
irq_chip so using container_of() on an irq-chip pointer makes no sense.

Fixes: da80ff81 ("gpio: Move irqchip into struct gpio_irq_chip")
Cc: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Cc: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NBartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-5.0-rc1
commit f3e763c3e544b73ae5c4a3842cedb9ff6ca37715
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5552
CVE: NA

---------------------------

Fix kernel-doc warnings for missing parameter descriptions:

../include/linux/srcu.h:175: warning: Function parameter or member 'p' not described in 'srcu_dereference_notrace'
../include/linux/srcu.h:175: warning: Function parameter or member 'sp' not described in 'srcu_dereference_notrace'

Fixes: 0b764a6e ("srcu: Add notrace variant of srcu_dereference")
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-4.20-rc1
commit 81b45683487a51b0f4d3b29d37f20d6d078544e4
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5553
CVE: NA

---------------------------

__compiletime_assert_fallback() is supposed to stop building earlier
by using the negative-array-size method in case the compiler does not
support "error" attribute, but has never worked like that.

You can simply try:

    BUILD_BUG_ON(1);

GCC immediately terminates the build, but Clang does not report
anything because Clang does not support the "error" attribute now.
It will later fail at link time, but __compiletime_assert_fallback()
is not working at least.

The root cause is commit 1d6a0d19 ("bug.h: prevent double evaluation
of `condition' in BUILD_BUG_ON").  Prior to that commit, BUILD_BUG_ON()
was checked by the negative-array-size method *and* the link-time trick.
Since that commit, the negative-array-size is not effective because
'__cond' is no longer constant.  As the comment in <linux/build_bug.h>
says, GCC (and Clang as well) only emits the error for obvious cases.

When '__cond' is a variable,

    ((void)sizeof(char[1 - 2 * __cond]))

... is not obvious for the compiler to know the array size is negative.

Reverting that commit would break BUILD_BUG() because negative-size-array
is evaluated before the code is optimized out.

Let's give up __compiletime_assert_fallback().  This commit does not
change the current behavior since it just rips off the useless code.
Signed-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-5.0-rc1
commit c5510b8dafce5f3f5a039c9b262ebcae0092c462
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 5539
CVE: NA

---------------------------

If CONFIG_GPOILIB is not set, the stub of gpio_to_desc() should return
the same type of error as regular version: NULL.  All the callers
compare the return value of gpio_to_desc() against NULL, so returned
ERR_PTR would be treated as non-error case leading to dereferencing of
error value.

Fixes: 79a9becd ("gpiolib: export descriptor-based GPIO interface")
Signed-off-by: NKrzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

commit b284909abad48b07d3071a9fc9b5692b3e64914b upstream.

With the following commit:

  73d5e2b4 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")

... the hotplug code attempted to detect when SMT was disabled by BIOS,
in which case it reported SMT as permanently disabled.  However, that
code broke a virt hotplug scenario, where the guest is booted with only
primary CPU threads, and a sibling is brought online later.

The problem is that there doesn't seem to be a way to reliably
distinguish between the HW "SMT disabled by BIOS" case and the virt
"sibling not yet brought online" case.  So the above-mentioned commit
was a bit misguided, as it permanently disabled SMT for both cases,
preventing future virt sibling hotplugs.

Going back and reviewing the original problems which were attempted to
be solved by that commit, when SMT was disabled in BIOS:

  1) /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control showed "on" instead of
     "notsupported"; and

  2) vmx_vm_init() was incorrectly showing the L1TF_MSG_SMT warning.

I'd propose that we instead consider #1 above to not actually be a
problem.  Because, at least in the virt case, it's possible that SMT
wasn't disabled by BIOS and a sibling thread could be brought online
later.  So it makes sense to just always default the smt control to "on"
to allow for that possibility (assuming cpuid indicates that the CPU
supports SMT).

The real problem is #2, which has a simple fix: change vmx_vm_init() to
query the actual current SMT state -- i.e., whether any siblings are
currently online -- instead of looking at the SMT "control" sysfs value.

So fix it by:

  a) reverting the original "fix" and its followup fix:

     73d5e2b4 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")
     bc2d8d26 ("cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation")

     and

  b) changing vmx_vm_init() to query the actual current SMT state --
     instead of the sysfs control value -- to determine whether the L1TF
     warning is needed.  This also requires the 'sched_smt_present'
     variable to exported, instead of 'cpu_smt_control'.

Fixes: 73d5e2b4 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")
Reported-by: NIgor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Joe Mario <jmario@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e3a85d585da28cc333ecbc1e78ee9216e6da9396.1548794349.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 7a86dab8cf2f0fdf508f3555dddfc236623bff60 ]

Since the offset is added directly to the hva from the
gfn_to_hva_cache, a negative offset could result in an out of bounds
write. The existing BUG_ON only checks for addresses beyond the end of
the gfn_to_hva_cache, not for addresses before the start of the
gfn_to_hva_cache.

Note that all current call sites have non-negative offsets.

Fixes: 4ec6e863 ("kvm: Introduce kvm_write_guest_offset_cached()")
Reported-by: NCfir Cohen <cfir@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NCfir Cohen <cfir@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NPeter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKrish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit a52c5a16cf19d8a85831bb1b915a221dd4ffae3c ]

There are several warnings from Clang about no case statement matching
the constant 0:

In file included from drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c:48:
In file included from drivers/block/drbd/drbd_int.h:48:
In file included from ./include/linux/drbd_genl_api.h:54:
In file included from ./include/linux/genl_magic_struct.h:236:
./include/linux/drbd_genl.h:321:1: warning: no case matching constant
switch condition '0'
GENL_struct(DRBD_NLA_HELPER, 24, drbd_helper_info,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/genl_magic_struct.h:220:10: note: expanded from macro
'GENL_struct'
        switch (0) {
                ^

Silence this warning by adding a 'case 0:' statement. Additionally,
adjust the alignment of the statements in the ct_assert_unique macro to
avoid a checkpatch warning.

This solution was originally sent by Arnd Bergmann with a default case
statement: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/756723/

Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/43Suggested-by: NLars Ellenberg <lars.ellenberg@linbit.com>
Signed-off-by: NNathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 1e86ace4c140fd5a693e266c9b23409358f25381 ]

Currently the cpu affinity hint mask for completion EQs is stored and
read from the wrong place, since reading and storing is done from the
same index, there is no actual issue with that, but internal irq_info
for completion EQs stars at MLX5_EQ_VEC_COMP_BASE offset in irq_info
array, this patch changes the code to use the correct offset to store
and read the IRQ affinity hint.
Signed-off-by: NSaeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NTariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 18534df419041e6c1f4b41af56ee7d41f757815c ]

gpiod_request_commit() copies the pointer to the label passed as
an argument only to be used later. But there's a chance the caller
could immediately free the passed string(e.g., local variable).
This could trigger a use after free when we use gpio label(e.g.,
gpiochip_unlock_as_irq(), gpiochip_is_requested()).

To be on the safe side: duplicate the string with kstrdup_const()
so that if an unaware user passes an address to a stack-allocated
buffer, we won't get the arbitrary label.

Also fix gpiod_set_consumer_name().
Signed-off-by: NMuchun Song <smuchun@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-5.0
commit 13054abbaa4f1fd4e6f3b4b63439ec033b4c8035
category: bugfix
bugzilla: NA
CVE: CVE-2019-3819

-------------------------------------------------

Ring buffer implementation in hid_debug_event() and hid_debug_events_read()
is strange allowing lost or corrupted data. After commit 717adfda
("HID: debug: check length before copy_to_user()") it is possible to enter
an infinite loop in hid_debug_events_read() by providing 0 as count, this
locks up a system. Fix this by rewriting the ring buffer implementation
with kfifo and simplify the code.

This fixes CVE-2019-3819.

v2: fix an execution logic and add a comment
v3: use __set_current_state() instead of set_current_state()

Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1669187
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.18+
Fixes: cd667ce2 ("HID: use debugfs for events/reports dumping")
Fixes: 717adfda ("HID: debug: check length before copy_to_user()")
Signed-off-by: NVladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Nzhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-5.0-rc1
commit fed84c78527009d4f799a3ed9a566502fa026d82
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 7440
CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

Kmemleak does not play well with KASAN (tested on both HPE Apollo 70 and
Huawei TaiShan 2280 aarch64 servers).

After calling start_kernel()->setup_arch()->kasan_init(), kmemleak early
log buffer went from something like 280 to 260000 which caused kmemleak
disabled and crash dump memory reservation failed.  The multitude of
kmemleak_alloc() calls is from nested loops while KASAN is setting up full
memory mappings, so let early kmemleak allocations skip those
memblock_alloc_internal() calls came from kasan_init() given that those
early KASAN memory mappings should not reference to other memory.  Hence,
no kmemleak false positives.

kasan_init
  kasan_map_populate [1]
    kasan_pgd_populate [2]
      kasan_pud_populate [3]
        kasan_pmd_populate [4]
          kasan_pte_populate [5]
            kasan_alloc_zeroed_page
              memblock_alloc_try_nid
                memblock_alloc_internal
                  kmemleak_alloc

[1] for_each_memblock(memory, reg)
[2] while (pgdp++, addr = next, addr != end)
[3] while (pudp++, addr = next, addr != end && pud_none(READ_ONCE(*pudp)))
[4] while (pmdp++, addr = next, addr != end && pmd_none(READ_ONCE(*pmdp)))
[5] while (ptep++, addr = next, addr != end && pte_none(READ_ONCE(*ptep)))

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1543442925-17794-1-git-send-email-cai@gmx.usSigned-off-by: NQian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZengruan Ye <yezengruan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NHanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
[yyl: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

commit 144552c786925314c1e7cb8f91a71dae1aca8798 upstream.

Add checks:
  - attempted kfree due to refcount reaching zero before overlay
    is removed
  - properties linked to an overlay node when the node is removed
  - node refcount > one during node removal in a changeset destroy,
    if the node was created by the changeset

After applying this patch, several validation warnings will be
reported from the devicetree unittest during boot due to
pre-existing devicetree bugs. The warnings will be similar to:

  OF: ERROR: of_node_release(), unexpected properties in /testcase-data/overlay-node/test-bus/test-unittest11
  OF: ERROR: memory leak, expected refcount 1 instead of 2, of_node_get()/of_node_put() unbalanced - destroy cset entry: attach overlay node /testcase-data-2/substation@100/
  hvac-medium-2
Tested-by: NAlan Tull <atull@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NFrank Rowand <frank.rowand@sony.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

commit 9bcdeb51bd7d2ae9fe65ea4d60643d2aeef5bfe3 upstream.

Arkadiusz reported that enabling memcg's group oom killing causes
strange memcg statistics where there is no task in a memcg despite the
number of tasks in that memcg is not 0.  It turned out that there is a
bug in wake_oom_reaper() which allows enqueuing same task twice which
makes impossible to decrease the number of tasks in that memcg due to a
refcount leak.

This bug existed since the OOM reaper became invokable from
task_will_free_mem(current) path in out_of_memory() in Linux 4.7,

  T1@P1     |T2@P1     |T3@P1     |OOM reaper
  ----------+----------+----------+------------
                                   # Processing an OOM victim in a different memcg domain.
                        try_charge()
                          mem_cgroup_out_of_memory()
                            mutex_lock(&oom_lock)
             try_charge()
               mem_cgroup_out_of_memory()
                 mutex_lock(&oom_lock)
  try_charge()
    mem_cgroup_out_of_memory()
      mutex_lock(&oom_lock)
                            out_of_memory()
                              oom_kill_process(P1)
                                do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, @P1)
                                mark_oom_victim(T1@P1)
                                wake_oom_reaper(T1@P1) # T1@P1 is enqueued.
                            mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
                 out_of_memory()
                   mark_oom_victim(T2@P1)
                   wake_oom_reaper(T2@P1) # T2@P1 is enqueued.
                 mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
      out_of_memory()
        mark_oom_victim(T1@P1)
        wake_oom_reaper(T1@P1) # T1@P1 is enqueued again due to oom_reaper_list == T2@P1 && T1@P1->oom_reaper_list == NULL.
      mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
                                   # Completed processing an OOM victim in a different memcg domain.
                                   spin_lock(&oom_reaper_lock)
                                   # T1P1 is dequeued.
                                   spin_unlock(&oom_reaper_lock)

but memcg's group oom killing made it easier to trigger this bug by
calling wake_oom_reaper() on the same task from one out_of_memory()
request.

Fix this bug using an approach used by commit 855b0183 ("oom,
oom_reaper: disable oom_reaper for oom_kill_allocating_task").  As a
side effect of this patch, this patch also avoids enqueuing multiple
threads sharing memory via task_will_free_mem(current) path.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e865a044-2c10-9858-f4ef-254bc71d6cc2@i-love.sakura.ne.jp
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5ee34fc6-1485-34f8-8790-903ddabaa809@i-love.sakura.ne.jp
Fixes: af8e15cc ("oom, oom_reaper: do not enqueue task if it is on the oom_reaper_list head")
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: NArkadiusz Miskiewicz <arekm@maven.pl>
Tested-by: NArkadiusz Miskiewicz <arekm@maven.pl>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: NRoman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Cc: Jay Kamat <jgkamat@fb.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit d5256083f62e2720f75bb3c5a928a0afe47d6bc3 ]

While implementing ipvlan l3 and l3s mode for kubernetes CNI plugin,
I ran into the issue that while l3 mode is working fine, l3s mode
does not have any connectivity to kube-apiserver and hence all pods
end up in Error state as well. The ipvlan master device sits on
top of a bond device and hostns traffic to kube-apiserver (also running
in hostns) is DNATed from 10.152.183.1:443 to 139.178.29.207:37573
where the latter is the address of the bond0. While in l3 mode, a
curl to https://10.152.183.1:443 or to https://139.178.29.207:37573
works fine from hostns, neither of them do in case of l3s. In the
latter only a curl to https://127.0.0.1:37573 appeared to work where
for local addresses of bond0 I saw kernel suddenly starting to emit
ARP requests to query HW address of bond0 which remained unanswered
and neighbor entries in INCOMPLETE state. These ARP requests only
happen while in l3s.

Debugging this further, I found the issue is that l3s mode is piggy-
backing on l3 master device, and in this case local routes are using
l3mdev_master_dev_rcu(dev) instead of net->loopback_dev as per commit
f5a0aab8 ("net: ipv4: dst for local input routes should use l3mdev
if relevant") and 5f02ce24 ("net: l3mdev: Allow the l3mdev to be
a loopback"). I found that reverting them back into using the
net->loopback_dev fixed ipvlan l3s connectivity and got everything
working for the CNI.

Now judging from 4fbae7d8 ("ipvlan: Introduce l3s mode") and the
l3mdev paper in [0] the only sole reason why ipvlan l3s is relying
on l3 master device is to get the l3mdev_ip_rcv() receive hook for
setting the dst entry of the input route without adding its own
ipvlan specific hacks into the receive path, however, any l3 domain
semantics beyond just that are breaking l3s operation. Note that
ipvlan also has the ability to dynamically switch its internal
operation from l3 to l3s for all ports via ipvlan_set_port_mode()
at runtime. In any case, l3 vs l3s soley distinguishes itself by
'de-confusing' netfilter through switching skb->dev to ipvlan slave
device late in NF_INET_LOCAL_IN before handing the skb to L4.

Minimal fix taken here is to add a IFF_L3MDEV_RX_HANDLER flag which,
if set from ipvlan setup, gets us only the wanted l3mdev_l3_rcv() hook
without any additional l3mdev semantics on top. This should also have
minimal impact since dev->priv_flags is already hot in cache. With
this set, l3s mode is working fine and I also get things like
masquerading pod traffic on the ipvlan master properly working.

  [0] https://netdevconf.org/1.2/papers/ahern-what-is-l3mdev-paper.pdf

Fixes: f5a0aab8 ("net: ipv4: dst for local input routes should use l3mdev if relevant")
Fixes: 5f02ce24 ("net: l3mdev: Allow the l3mdev to be a loopback")
Fixes: 4fbae7d8 ("ipvlan: Introduce l3s mode")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Martynas Pumputis <m@lambda.lt>
Acked-by: NDavid Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ commit d3bd7413e0ca40b60cf60d4003246d067cafdeda upstream ]

While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.

Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ commit 979d63d50c0c0f7bc537bf821e056cc9fe5abd38 upstream ]

Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399 only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:

  - Load a map value pointer into R6
  - Load an index into R7
  - Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
    loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
    high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
  - Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
  - Load R0 = R6[R7]
  - Load R0 = R6[R0]

For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.

In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.

Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.

There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.

The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...

  PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
  PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
  PTR += 0x1000
  PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
  [...]

... which under speculation could end up as ...

  PTR += 0x1000
  PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
  PTR += 0x1000
  PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
  [...]

... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.

Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.

With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:

  # bpftool prog dump xlated id 282
  [...]
  28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)
  29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8)
  30: (57) r1 &= 15
  31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608)
  32: (57) r3 &= 1
  33: (47) r3 |= 1
  34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19
  35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479  |
  36: (1f) r11 -= r2                | Dynamic sanitation for pointer
  37: (4f) r11 |= r2                | arithmetic with registers
  38: (87) r11 = -r11               | containing bounded or known
  39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63              | scalars in order to prevent
  40: (5f) r11 &= r2                | out of bounds speculation.
  41: (0f) r4 += r11                |
  42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
  43: (6f) r4 <<= r1
  [...]

For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register
as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted
for the above example:

  [...]
  16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
  17: (1f) r11 -= r2
  18: (4f) r11 |= r2
  19: (87) r11 = -r11
  20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
  21: (5f) r2 &= r11
  22: (0f) r2 += r0
  23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
  [...]

JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:

  [...]
   d5:	je     0x0000000000000106    _
   d7:	mov    0x0(%rax),%edi       |
   da:	mov    $0xf153246,%r10d     | Index load from map value and
   e0:	xor    $0xf153259,%r10      | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
   e7:	and    %r10,%rdi            |_
   ea:	mov    $0x2f,%r10d          |
   f0:	sub    %rdi,%r10            | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
   f3:	or     %rdi,%r10            | but do not interfere with each
   f6:	neg    %r10                 | other. (Neither do these instructions
   f9:	sar    $0x3f,%r10           | interfere with the use of ax as temp
   fd:	and    %r10,%rdi            | in interpreter.)
  100:	add    %rax,%rdi            |_
  103:	mov    0x0(%rdi),%eax
 [...]

Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.

  [0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
      Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
      https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf

  [1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
      Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
      Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
      Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
      https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf

Fixes: b2157399 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ commit 9b73bfdd08e73231d6a90ae6db4b46b3fbf56c30 upstream ]

Right now we are using BPF ax register in JIT for constant blinding as
well as in interpreter as temporary variable. Verifier will not be able
to use it simply because its use will get overridden from the former in
bpf_jit_blind_insn(). However, it can be made to work in that blinding
will be skipped if there is prior use in either source or destination
register on the instruction. Taking constraints of ax into account, the
verifier is then open to use it in rewrites under some constraints. Note,
ax register already has mappings in every eBPF JIT.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ commit 144cd91c4c2bced6eb8a7e25e590f6618a11e854 upstream ]

This change moves the on-stack 64 bit tmp variable in ___bpf_prog_run()
into the hidden ax register. The latter is currently only used in JITs
for constant blinding as a temporary scratch register, meaning the BPF
interpreter will never see the use of ax. Therefore it is safe to use
it for the cases where tmp has been used earlier. This is needed to later
on allow restricted hidden use of ax in both interpreter and JITs.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ commit c08435ec7f2bc8f4109401f696fd55159b4b40cb upstream ]

Move prev_insn_idx and insn_idx from the do_check() function into
the verifier environment, so they can be read inside the various
helper functions for handling the instructions. It's easier to put
this into the environment rather than changing all call-sites only
to pass it along. insn_idx is useful in particular since this later
on allows to hold state in env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

commit ba50bf1ce9a51fc97db58b96d01306aa70bc3979 upstream.

fc96df16a1ce is good and can already fix the "return stack garbage" issue,
but let's also improve hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo(), which would silently
return stack garbage, if people forget to check channel->state or
ring_info->ring_buffer, when using the function in the future.

Having an error check in the function would eliminate the potential risk.

Add a Fixes tag to indicate the patch depdendency.

Fixes: fc96df16a1ce ("Drivers: hv: vmbus: Return -EINVAL for the sys files for unopened channels")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NDexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 6c57f0458022298e4da1729c67bd33ce41c14e7a ]

In certain cases, pskb_trim_rcsum() may change skb pointers.
Reinitialize header pointers afterwards to avoid potential
use-after-frees. Add a note in the documentation of
pskb_trim_rcsum(). Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: NRoss Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: 5510
CVE: NA
Signed-off-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NHanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: 5510
CVE: NA
Signed-off-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NHanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>