vmx_complete_interrupts() does too much, split it up:
 - vmx_vcpu_run() gets the "cache important vmcs fields" part
 - a new vmx_complete_atomic_exit() gets the parts that must be done atomically
 - a new vmx_recover_nmi_blocking() does what its name says
 - vmx_complete_interrupts() retains the event injection recovery code

This helps in reducing the work done in atomic context.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

Instead of blindly attempting to inject an event before each guest entry,
check for a possible event first in vcpu->requests.  Sites that can trigger
event injection are modified to set KVM_REQ_EVENT:

- interrupt, nmi window opening
- ppr updates
- i8259 output changes
- local apic irr changes
- rflags updates
- gif flag set
- event set on exit

This improves non-injecting entry performance, and sets the stage for
non-atomic injection.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

This function need to be able to load the pdptrs from any
mmu context currently in use. So change this function to
take an kvm_mmu parameter to fit these needs.
As a side effect this patch also moves the cached pdptrs
from vcpu_arch into the kvm_mmu struct.
Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

This patch introduces a special set_tdp_cr3 function pointer
in kvm_x86_ops which is only used for tpd enabled mmu
contexts. This allows to remove some hacks from svm code.
Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

Move the TSC control logic from the vendor backends into x86.c
by adding adjust_tsc_offset to x86 ops.  Now all TSC decisions
can be done in one place.
Signed-off-by: NZachary Amsden <zamsden@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

Also, ensure that the storing of the offset and the reading of the TSC
are never preempted by taking a spinlock.  While the lock is overkill
now, it is useful later in this patch series.
Signed-off-by: NZachary Amsden <zamsden@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

Change svm / vmx to be the same internally and write TSC offset
instead of bare TSC in helper functions.  Isolated as a single
patch to contain code movement.
Signed-off-by: NZachary Amsden <zamsden@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

This is used only by the VMX code, and is not done properly;
if the TSC is indeed backwards, it is out of sync, and will
need proper handling in the logic at each and every CPU change.
For now, drop this test during init as misguided.
Signed-off-by: NZachary Amsden <zamsden@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

Now that we have the host gdt conveniently stored in a variable, make use
of it instead of querying the cpu.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

kvm reloads the host's fs and gs blindly, however the underlying segment
descriptors may be invalid due to the user modifying the ldt after loading
them.

Fix by using the safe accessors (loadsegment() and load_gs_index()) instead
of home grown unsafe versions.

This is CVE-2010-3698.

KVM-Stable-Tag.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

vmx does not restore GDT.LIMIT to the host value, instead it sets it to 64KB.
This means host userspace can learn a few bits of host memory.

Fix by reloading GDTR when we load other host state.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

Commit 341d9b535b6c simplify reload logic while entry guest mode, it
can avoid unnecessary sync-root if KVM_REQ_MMU_RELOAD and
KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC both set.

But, it cause a issue that when we handle 'KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH', the
root is invalid, it is triggered during my test:

Kernel BUG at ffffffffa00212b8 [verbose debug info unavailable]
......

Fixed by directly return if the root is not ready.
Signed-off-by: NXiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

Some guest device driver may leverage the "Non-Snoop" I/O, and explicitly
WBINVD or CLFLUSH to a RAM space. Since migration may occur before WBINVD or
CLFLUSH, we need to maintain data consistency either by:
1: flushing cache (wbinvd) when the guest is scheduled out if there is no
wbinvd exit, or
2: execute wbinvd on all dirty physical CPUs when guest wbinvd exits.
Signed-off-by: NYaozu (Eddie) Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

Makes it a little more readable and hackable.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

On Intel, we call skip_emulated_instruction() even if we injected a #GP,
resulting in the #GP pointing at the wrong address.

Fix by injecting the exception and skipping the instruction at the same place,
so we can do just one or the other.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

On Intel, we call skip_emulated_instruction() even if we injected a #GP,
resulting in the #GP pointing at the wrong address.

Fix by injecting the exception and skipping the instruction at the same place,
so we can do just one or the other.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

On Intel, we call skip_emulated_instruction() even if we injected a #GP,
resulting in the #GP pointing at the wrong address.

Fix by injecting the exception and skipping the instruction at the same place,
so we can do just one or the other.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

This patch enable guest to use XSAVE/XRSTOR instructions.

We assume that host_xcr0 would use all possible bits that OS supported.

And we loaded xcr0 in the same way we handled fpu - do it as late as we can.
Signed-off-by: NDexuan Cui <dexuan.cui@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

fix:

[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
include/linux/kvm_host.h:258 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by qemu-system-x86/3796:
 #0:  (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0217fd8>] vcpu_load+0x1a/0x66 [kvm]

stack backtrace:
Pid: 3796, comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 2.6.34 #25
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff81070ed1>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0x9d/0xa5
 [<ffffffffa0214fdf>] gfn_to_memslot_unaliased+0x65/0xa0 [kvm]
 [<ffffffffa0216139>] gfn_to_hva+0x22/0x4c [kvm]
 [<ffffffffa0216217>] kvm_write_guest_page+0x2a/0x7f [kvm]
 [<ffffffffa0216286>] kvm_clear_guest_page+0x1a/0x1c [kvm]
 [<ffffffffa0278239>] init_rmode+0x3b/0x180 [kvm_intel]
 [<ffffffffa02786ce>] vmx_set_cr0+0x350/0x4d3 [kvm_intel]
 [<ffffffffa02274ff>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs+0x122/0x31a [kvm]
 [<ffffffffa021859c>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x578/0xa3d [kvm]
 [<ffffffff8106624c>] ? cpu_clock+0x2d/0x40
 [<ffffffff810f7d86>] ? fget_light+0x244/0x28e
 [<ffffffff810709b9>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x1f/0x10e
 [<ffffffff8110501b>] vfs_ioctl+0x32/0xa6
 [<ffffffff81105597>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x47f/0x4b8
 [<ffffffff813ae654>] ? sub_preempt_count+0xa3/0xb7
 [<ffffffff810f7da8>] ? fget_light+0x266/0x28e
 [<ffffffff810f7c53>] ? fget_light+0x111/0x28e
 [<ffffffff81105617>] sys_ioctl+0x47/0x6a
 [<ffffffff81002c1b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: NXiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

The name "pid_sync_vcpu_all" isn't appropriate since it just affect
a single vpid, so rename it to vpid_sync_vcpu_single().
Signed-off-by: NGui Jianfeng <guijianfeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

Add all-context INVVPID type support.
Signed-off-by: NGui Jianfeng <guijianfeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

According to SDM, we need check whether single-context INVVPID type is supported
before issuing invvpid instruction.
Signed-off-by: NGui Jianfeng <guijianfeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: NSheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

We only support 4 levels EPT pagetable now.
Signed-off-by: NSheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

The vmexit handler returns KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN since there is no handler
for vmentry failures. This intercepts vmentry failures and returns
KVM_FAIL_ENTRY to userspace instead.
Signed-off-by: NMohammed Gamal <m.gamal005@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

Memory allocation may fail. Propagate such errors.
Signed-off-by: NJan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: NSheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

SDM suggests VMXON should be called before VMPTRLD, and VMXOFF
should be called after doing VMCLEAR.

Therefore in vmm coexistence case, we should firstly call VMXON
before any VMCS operation, and then call VMXOFF after the
operation is done.
Signed-off-by: NDongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

Originally VMCLEAR/VMPTRLD is called on vcpu migration. To
support hosted VMM coexistance, VMCLEAR is executed on vcpu
schedule out, and VMPTRLD is executed on vcpu schedule in.
This could also eliminate the IPI when doing VMCLEAR.
Signed-off-by: NDongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

Do some preparations for vmm coexistence support.
Signed-off-by: NDongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

Define vmcs_load() and kvm_cpu_vmxon() to avoid direct call of asm
code. Also move VMXE bit operation out of kvm_cpu_vmxoff().
Signed-off-by: NDongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

Do not kill VM when instruction emulation fails. Inject #UD and report
failure to userspace instead. Userspace may choose to reenter guest if
vcpu is in userspace (cpl == 3) in which case guest OS will kill
offending process and continue running.
Signed-off-by: NGleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

cr0.ts may change between entries, so we copy cr0 to HOST_CR0 before each
entry.  That is slow, so instead, set HOST_CR0 to have TS set unconditionally
(which is a safe value), and issue a clts() just before exiting vcpu context
if the task indeed owns the fpu.

Saves ~50 cycles/exit.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

!! is not needed due to the cast to bool.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

MSR_K6_EFER is unused, and MSR_K6_STAR is redundant with MSR_STAR.
Signed-off-by: NBrian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <1279371808-24804-1-git-send-email-brgerst@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NPekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>

enter_lmode() and exit_lmode() modify the guest's EFER.LMA before calling
vmx_set_efer().  However, the latter function depends on the value of EFER.LMA
to determine whether MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE needs reloading, via
vmx_load_host_state().  With EFER.LMA changing under its feet, it took the
wrong choice and corrupted userspace's %gs.

This causes 32-on-64 host userspace to fault.

Fix not touching EFER.LMA; instead ask vmx_set_efer() to change it.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

Per document, for feature control MSR:

  Bit 1 enables VMXON in SMX operation. If the bit is clear, execution
        of VMXON in SMX operation causes a general-protection exception.
  Bit 2 enables VMXON outside SMX operation. If the bit is clear, execution
        of VMXON outside SMX operation causes a general-protection exception.

This patch is to enable this kind of check with SMX for VMXON in KVM.
Signed-off-by: NShane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

When EPT is enabled, we cannot emulate EFER.NX=0 through the shadow page
tables.  This causes accesses through ptes with bit 63 set to succeed instead
of failing a reserved bit check.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

Some guest msr values cannot be used on the host (for example. EFER.NX=0),
so we need to switch them atomically during guest entry or exit.

Add a facility to program the vmx msr autoload registers accordingly.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

vmx and svm vcpus have different contents and therefore may have different
alignmment requirements.  Let each specify its required alignment.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>